A doubt about Engineers / Sappers

[cavtroop]

I can't give you a reference off the top of my head, but I dimly remember a lesson in ROTC where MSG Chinn told us the "teeth to tail" ratio in the US Army is about 1-to-10. (That was in 1983, however.) Which is disturbing in my mind...

That same subject is also brought up in The Forever War. The main character, William Mandella, also makes the comment that as an army gets older, the ratio of officers to enlisted men and NCOs tends to go up. Joe Haldeman is a vet and a student of military history, so he has a good idea of what he's talking about.

According to this paper:

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/mcgrath_op23.pdf

"The Long War Occasional Series Paper 23, The Other End of the Spear: The Tooth-to-Tail Ratio (T3R) in Modern Military Operations"

The T3R ratio in Iraq in 2005 is 1 : 2.5 - MUCH less than I thought. Numbers could be misleading though, as it doesn't seem to take into account non-theater forces, most of which are non-combat arms, I'd imagine. This is a fascinating topic to me, perhaps we should split this off to a separate thread

EDIT: 1 :4 ratio, when you include in-theater contractors....

[m47dragon]

I've been with units that have had Marine Corps CE's attached to it and with units that have had Army CE's attached to it. I don't know what the MOS task breakdown is for CE's, or if it differs between the two branches of service, but the Army seemed to have a lot of nice heavy equipment whereas my fellow Marines ran with we grunts (they were masters at breaching obstacles, demolitions, mines, etc. They also were trigger pullers. The Army CE's were great at digging your fighting positions very rapidly and getting you the materials for overhead cover.) As far as the USMC is concerned, the infantry MOS of 0351 has as its secondary specialty that of demolitions and breaching. We were well trained on field expedient demolitions, blasting, cratering, cutting (with C4 and TNT) creating obstacles, FODing potential runways, breaching wire-minefields-doors, etc. Bangalore torpedo rushes were on our training menu (as was making field expedient Bangalore torpedoes...and claymores...and other party favors.)

[pmulcahy11b]

According to this paper:

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/mcgrath_op23.pdf

"The Long War Occasional Series Paper 23, The Other End of the Spear: The Tooth-to-Tail Ratio (T3R) in Modern Military Operations"

The T3R ratio in Iraq in 2005 is 1 : 2.5 - MUCH less than I thought. Numbers could be misleading though, as it doesn't seem to take into account non-theater forces, most of which are non-combat arms, I'd imagine. This is a fascinating topic to me, perhaps we should split this off to a separate thread

EDIT: 1 :4 ratio, when you include in-theater contractors....

Does it also take into account that most REMFs these days are...well, not really REMFs anymore The Army's come a long way from the days when REMFs didn't know one end of an M-16 from the other and looked at Claymore mines in complete confusion.

[cavtroop]

Does it also take into account that most REMFs these days are...well, not really REMFs anymore The Army's come a long way from the days when REMFs didn't know one end of an M-16 from the other and looked at Claymore mines in complete confusion.

Very good point. I only skimmed the document, haven't had a chance to sit down and read it yet. The line between REMF and front-line soldier is blurred, that's for sure. I'd bet that they look at the combat rated MOS's (11, 12, 13, 18, 19 series, plus some I'm forgetting), vs. all others. I'd like to see a breakdown by the whole force, not just one theater.

[Adm.Lee]

I'd like to see a breakdown by the whole force, not just one theater.

That will probably jack it up a bit. I remember reading about the 1:10 T3R (love that acronym!) before. One needs to remember that the Cold War US Army (and other services) maintained a higher "overhead" than other armies for at least two reasons. One is to keep the possibility of disciplined expansion in the case of WW3 (learned some lessons from the chaos of WW1); and the other is to be able to project and support forces on other continents. Others include the need to maintain modern weapons and provide comforts to peacetime levels.

Heck, if air forces consider only their aircrew as "teeth," their T3R is way high!

I have some stuff on the '80s Army TO&Es, I will see if I can dig up the engineer battalion things.

[Adm.Lee]

Very good point. I only skimmed the document, haven't had a chance to sit down and read it yet. The line between REMF and front-line soldier is blurred, that's for sure. I'd bet that they look at the combat rated MOS's (11, 12, 13, 18, 19 series, plus some I'm forgetting), vs. all others. I'd like to see a breakdown by the whole force, not just one theater.

P.113 of the above document shows the breakdown of units that the author considered. He did mention, for instance, that MP units running convoys would be "combat," while those guarding PWs were considered "logistical."

I didn't read it thoroughly, more of a deep skim. He found that the T3R averages 1:3, over the 20th century.

I also skimmed through my old Assault-series games (awesome GDW game of battalion- to brigade-level combat in the 1980s), to look up engineers. It confirms that a US divisional engineer battalion would have 4 companies of mixed assets (mine-laying, mine-clearing, dozers, bridges and obstacles) and one of bridging. That way, the divisional CO could push one company down to each of three brigades, and keep one in reserve.

[Webstral]

In the early 90's, heavy divisions had an engineer brigade (DIVENG) that included one battalion for each brigade. Each maneuver battalion thus had its own engineer company. Light divisions had to make do with one company per brigade.

Webstral

[Adm.Lee]

In the early 90's, heavy divisions had an engineer brigade (DIVENG) that included one battalion for each brigade. Each maneuver battalion thus had its own engineer company. Light divisions had to make do with one company per brigade.

Webstral

I wonder if these were fresh-raised battalions, or were they re-assigned from the brigades already assigned to Corps or Armies Given that the '90s, the US had 8 heavy divisions, that's 16+ new battalions and their brigade HQs, at a time when the Army was being cut back.

[Abbott Shaull]

Does it also take into account that most REMFs these days are...well, not really REMFs anymore The Army's come a long way from the days when REMFs didn't know one end of an M-16 from the other and looked at Claymore mines in complete confusion.

Well the Maintenance Company making a wrong turn during the run to Baghdad was a long over due wake up call for the Army. Now think about the way they used and throw in a well placed Airborne/Air Assault landing on top of them. It makes me cringe to think about back then. Even by today standards, I wouldn't have a warm and fuzzy feeling either, but they would be more like to put up resistance than before.

Just my humble opinion.

[Abbott Shaull]

Very good point. I only skimmed the document, haven't had a chance to sit down and read it yet. The line between REMF and front-line soldier is blurred, that's for sure. I'd bet that they look at the combat rated MOS's (11, 12, 13, 18, 19 series, plus some I'm forgetting), vs. all others. I'd like to see a breakdown by the whole force, not just one theater.

Also remember that most Artillery and Armored units if they don't deploy in Infantry role, they serve dual purpose, where part of the time they are filling their primary role and other their new founded but I ain't no infantryman role too. Also remember in several Brigades some troops change MOS via on the job training from Infantry or Armored to Cavalry Scout too during the conversion to the much improve Modular Army. Please excuse the sarcasm.

Just make laugh to think that after operations since the Vietnam war, they finally figured out that they probably will never send an Army Combat Division into combat complete like they once were able to do. Even during Desert Storm the only units that were over there with their entire assets were the 82nd and 101st. All other Army Division were hodge podge of assets through out the army.

Even in Vietnam the 23rd Infantry Division was organized around 3 Brigade that were independent organization. The 101st went over in piecemeal stages and the 82nd sent one brigade.

[Abbott Shaull]

I wonder if these were fresh-raised battalions, or were they re-assigned from the brigades already assigned to Corps or Armies Given that the '90s, the US had 8 heavy divisions, that's 16+ new battalions and their brigade HQs, at a time when the Army was being cut back.

No many of these Battalion were stripped from Combat Engineer Brigades that were Corps level assets. One of the many lessons that the US Army should of learned during WWII but never realized until then, was that the Divisions in combat usually have several Attachments. The last 8 years or so the Army has been re-learning lessons and slowly applying them.

[Adm.Lee]

No many of these Battalion were stripped from Combat Engineer Brigades that were Corps level assets. One of the many lessons that the US Army should of learned during WWII but never realized until then, was that the Divisions in combat usually have several Attachments. The last 8 years or so the Army has been re-learning lessons and slowly applying them.

IMO, it's a sort of cycle. There was a TO&E immediately after WW2 that added a lot of attachments permanently to the regimental combat team (like a tank company, cannon company, etc.) These were stripped out for the ROAD division after the Pentomic fiasco, and re-concentrated at the division level. Tanks and artillery didn't need to be down at the lower levels in Vietnam, after all.

Sometimes you need it, sometimes you don't.