Where would of the Soviet Offensive would have hit...

[Raellus]

I'm of the same mind that "gasoline", as it was used by the scenario writers, was a catch-all term for fossil fuels (like folks that call all carbonated beverages "Coke"). If 4th GTA had some T-80s, perhaps some of the fuel was indeed gasoline, but being that the majority of Soviet vehicles (pre-TDM) ran on diesel, that's probably what it was.

I still think that "gasoline" is too valuable a resource to allocate to a mobile reserve strike force. It's a strategic resource and local counterattacks are either a tactical or operational level task. It seems to me that the regional, WTO-controlled cantonments could have brewed up plenty of methanol (or whatever) for such a contingency. The "gas" was a trump card and I imagine the Soviets had a bold, strategic level plan for its use.

I don't advocate a general offensive into Germany. Even though the Soviets had superior numbers in the Berlin region, as has been pointed out, the area had already suffered heavily from nuclear strikes and conventional fighting. It would, however, act as a good jumping-off point being as there are so few NATO units in the vicinity.

I agree that the Soviets, by 2000, were in a very tenuous position, considering the uprising in Ukraine and some of the other Soviet republics. They were starting to have serious problems just holding on to what they had. The only strategic benefit in a land grab during the summer of 2000 is that the lands seized (in Germany) could be used as a bargaining chip if and when negotiations between the warring parties began again.

I think the Soviets had a more limited offensive in mind- one that would hinder NATO's ability to threaten Soviet/WTO controlled territory in Poland. That would allow the Soviets to stabilize the situation in Poland, and deal with the various mutinies, without the threat of a major NATO offensive hanging over their heads.

An envelopment operation to trap and destroy German 3rd Army in northern Poland fits this bill quite nicely.

[Legbreaker]

Lets examine the Gasoline-Diesel question a little more closely for a moment.
My understanding is that the vast majority of combat vehicles possessed by the 4th GTA required diesel rather than the alternatives. Without aircraft (that we know of) the 4th GTA should not require aviation fuel, so, besides a limited amount of gasoline, diesel is likely to be the fuel the Army received.

One might even go further and say (depending on the number of vehicles unable to burn diesel) that only diesel was supplied - gasoline burning vehicles were required to run on locally produced and sourced (aka stolen - I can't see much "fair" trading taking place) alcohol. It is possible the individual Divisions could produce enough for the move and subsequent operations for just these few vehicles.

It may be that, as previously mentioned, "gasoline" has been used as a catchword to describe all petroleum based fuels and lubricants supplied to the 4th GTA. It certainly makes more sense to me for diesel to be the predominately supplied fuel as it is generally simpler to refine from petroleum than gasoline, and a trend away from gasoline powered military vehicles has been evident ever since the 1940's.

[kato13]

I don't think it is as clear as that given the designers feel that most soviet trucks must run on gas. (Paul has similar info).

The Soviet Vehicle Guide (1st Edition contemporary to the Escape info) has the following:

Cannot run on Diesel (G,A) or (G, AvG, A)
Zil 135
Ural 375
BRDM-1
BRDM-2
BRDM-3

Can Run on Both gas and Diesel (D, G, A)
UAZ-469

Multi Fuel
BMP-A
BMP-B
BMP-C

Diesel Only (D, A)
T-80
T-72
T-64
SAU-122
SAU-152
BTR-70
BTR-80
MTLB

[Abbott Shaull]

I'm trying to look at this like a CIA/DIA analyst.

If the 4th GTA really has "Gasoline" then I think it was intended for an offensive, due to the fact that long term stability is an issue. If I was the 4th GTA commander and I had Diesel fuel I would have less of an "Use it or lose it" philosophy so I would be more comfortable as a strategic reserve.

Do we know anything about refinery(s) used If refineries were an issue is low grade diesel more likely than gasoline

What was the timeline for the fuel production How long was the transport time If it was gasoline is it nearing it's usable shelf life.

I think like many things that GDW did the use of Gasoline was overused for both Gas and Diesel at the same time when the writers wanted to simplify their point they were trying to get make. The only fuel they did make a clear distinction was "Av Gas" due to ground planes.

As for the fuel I am sure after things settle down one of the first steps the 38th Army and 3rd Guard Tank Army would of worked on in 1998. Stavka would want to make sure the Tank Armies they had in Western Soviet Union in would be a priority. To do so in a way in not broadcasting to everyone that you are doing such. Romanians wouldn't be too please of the Soviet helping themselves to their remaining fuel supplies. As 1998 wore into 1999 other 'Allies' wouldn't be to happy that they weren't getting a share either.

Also we have to remember that the supply network of this time wouldn't of been the best shape so supplying a month worth of fuel to the 4th GTA would take well over a year and good share of the what was being produced for the tankers to move to and from the locations where fuel was deposited for storage.

[Cdnwolf]

Ummm little problem .... The 4'th Guards Tank Army didn't exist..

From 1946 to 1957 the Army was named 4th Guards Mechanised Army. It was renamed 20th Guards Army in 1960,[3] and served for many years as part of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

[Raellus]

Ummm little problem .... The 4'th Guards Tank Army didn't exist..

The Soviets can't raise and name new units/HQs Or redesignate old ones How many new divisions did the Red Army create during WWII How many divisions were granted the "Guards" honorific during the war How many years had WWIII been going on for

Not a problem at all.

[Abbott Shaull]

One has to remember that Belorus based armies had to deal with rebellions there and in the Baltics. I think by 2000 Stavka was more concern with keeping control of the territory of the Soviet Union, than it would be giving NATO a black eye that would leave the Soviet Union closer to a collapse that they were trying to prevent. Most of Eastern Europe was in such a state they wouldn't be of no threat to the Soviet Union for years to come. Much of the government that was left in these countries realized that Germany wasn't in much shape to do much to them.

I am always reminded of what Sgt Malarky character told his new Lt in "Band of Brothers" series in when they were nearly in Germany on the River with the troop on each side. "We both have roof over our head, I don't think anyone wants to do something stupid!" When the Lt inquired about the opposing force even though the unit supposedly only gotten there.

The reaction of many of the Soviet Union units on the line were according to their commanders in any condition to move against the 5th Mechanized Division, the XI Corps or the Third German Army. The reasons ranging from lack of parts to lack of fuel to lack of ammo. Of these the lack of parts and ammo can be believable due to supply lines not being secured. As for fuel well since sometime in 1998 or even early 1999 units would of started to distill fuel for 'local' use.

Many units would have more than enough to get moving. What they didn't want to do is end up like happen to the 5th Mechanized Division. Get so far and the stall out for time to distill more fuel. I am sure the 4th GTA had been moving forward methodically. To keep units so they didn't get to disperse. Especially after the 38th Tank Division had rebelled. They grouped enough where the other Divisional Commanders were able to keep control of their troops too.

[Cdnwolf]

The Soviets can't raise and name new units/HQs Or redesignate old ones How many new divisions did the Red Army create during WWII How many divisions were granted the "Guards" honorific during the war How many years had WWIII been going on for

Not a problem at all.

Division okay... but this is a whole army. And it wouldn't have earned the Guards designation - it would have just been the 20'th Tank Army.

But thats just my curiosity speaking...

AND I may be wrong too.... and apologize in advance if I am.

[Legbreaker]

Stavka would want to make sure the Tank Armies they had in Western Soviet Union in would be a priority.

Why

Romanians wouldn't be too please of the Soviet helping themselves to their remaining fuel supplies.

Like they have a choice. Romania declaring for the other side was the death of Romania as a country. There's no way the Soviets would take that lying down (and as can be seen by the Soviet presence in Romania, and virtual destruction by them of the Romanian military, they didn't).

As 1998 wore into 1999 other 'Allies' wouldn't be to happy that they weren't getting a share either.

And again, like they had a choice in the matter.

Also we have to remember that the supply network of this time wouldn't of been the best shape so supplying a month worth of fuel to the 4th GTA would take well over a year and good share of the what was being produced for the tankers to move to and from the locations where fuel was deposited for storage.

The Black sea is basically the Soviets private bathtub. I'm fairly sure they'd be able to find a few small ships to carry a few hundred barrels of fuel up to Odessa so I completely disagree that it would take a full year. 3-6 months is a more reasonable estimate. From Odessa (or another nearby port) the trucks and carts of the 4th GTA should have been sufficent to manage. Yes, this would have taken fuel, but if we estimate 5% (a rediculously high percentage) of the supply was used in transport, there's still a huge amount left for the army as a whole.

As for "renaming" the 4th GTA, why can't the Army have earnt the title through the course of the war Virtually every other Guards unit in the Soviet military earnt their title in WWII, a conflict which is comparable with WWIII in scale, duration and horror.

[Targan]

The Black sea is basically the Soviets private bathtub. I'm fairly sure they'd be able to find a few small ships to carry a few hundred barrels of fuel up to Odessa so I completely disagree that it would take a full year. 3-6 months is a more reasonable estimate. From Odessa (or another nearby port) the trucks and carts of the 4th GTA should have been sufficent to manage. Yes, this would have taken fuel, but if we estimate 5% (a rediculously high percentage) of the supply was used in transport, there's still a huge amount left for the army as a whole.

That's funny, I'd always assumed a lead time of around six months too. And around 5% of the fuel being used to transport it. These seem like reasonable figures to me.

[kato13]

That's funny, I'd always assumed a lead time of around six months too. And around 5% of the fuel being used to transport it. These seem like reasonable figures to me.

Logistics Rule of thumb form Dunnigan's "How to make war"

"By truck one percent of the weight moved will be consumed as fuel for each 100 kilometers traveled."


Edit from Pitesti, Romania to Kalisz Poland is 914km as the crow flies. 1,276 km driving distance.

[Webstral]

I still think that "gasoline" is too valuable a resource to allocate to a mobile reserve strike force. It's a strategic resource and local counterattacks are either a tactical or operational level task. It seems to me that the regional, WTO-controlled cantonments could have brewed up plenty of methanol (or whatever) for such a contingency. The "gas" was a trump card and I imagine the Soviets had a bold, strategic level plan for its use.

The ability to move forces rapidly in response to a crisis cannot be overestimated. The fuel, combined with Fourth Guards Tank Army, represents the ability to intervene while a crisis is still evolving. I"m not saying that the idea of some sort of offensive action is out of the picture. I"m saying that offensive action is not the only explanation for the fuel set aside for Fourth Guards Tank Army or even the best. We should bear in mind that the whole army got its fourth point of contact handed to it by a single US division. You"d think a force that was going to go up against NATO on the attack might have been a bit better trained and be in possession of better leaders. The apparently low quality of the leadership is a bit easier to understand if Fourth Guards Tank Army is supposed to knock over marauders and rebels.

We also can"t assume that alcohol fuels are generously available. If they were, everyone would have plenty of mobility. Even organic wastes and wood have other uses (compost and heating fuel) that have a decided value. I agree that every formation will want to have an on-hand reserve of alcohol fuel for emergencies. I"m not convinced that said on-hand reserves are going to give any of the Pact formations in Poland the kind of sustained mobility that would obviate the need for an operational/strategic reserve of the sort represented by Fourth Guards Tank Army. Some movement certainly is possible, but local reserves using alcohol don"t possess a significant maneuver advantage over the attackers; a tank army with fossil fuel in its vehicles can outrun its NATO equivalent if the NATO forces are using alcohol. In effect, Fourth Guards Tank Army can use its superior mobility to get inside the decision cycle of its NATO counterparts, which will dramatically increase the combat power of the force. In effect, the fossil fuel (in theory) enables the Soviets to have a smaller theater reserve to achieve a desired effect on the battlefield. Freeing more troops for other duties is a good reason to invest the fossil fuel.

Of course, the value of getting inside the enemy"s decision cycle counts just as much on the offensive as on the counteroffensive.

I don't advocate a general offensive into Germany. Even though the Soviets had superior numbers in the Berlin region, as has been pointed out, the area had already suffered heavily from nuclear strikes and conventional fighting. It would, however, act as a good jumping-off point being as there are so few NATO units in the vicinity.

I agree that the Soviets, by 2000, were in a very tenuous position, considering the uprising in Ukraine and some of the other Soviet republics. They were starting to have serious problems just holding on to what they had. The only strategic benefit in a land grab during the summer of 2000 is that the lands seized (in Germany) could be used as a bargaining chip if and when negotiations between the warring parties began again.

I think the Soviets had a more limited offensive in mind- one that would hinder NATO's ability to threaten Soviet/WTO controlled territory in Poland. That would allow the Soviets to stabilize the situation in Poland, and deal with the various mutinies, without the threat of a major NATO offensive hanging over their heads.

An envelopment operation to trap and destroy German 3rd Army in northern Poland fits this bill quite nicely.

I"m certain somebody at the theater headquarters said almost exactly this. The logic is sound. I"d like to add a caveat, though. I think it"s quite likely that the Soviets had got wind of the upcoming NATO offensive and had decided that it would be easier to tackle the Germans and Americans in the open, rather than in their prepared positions. Legbreaker summed it up nicely. I think the Soviets intended to let the NATO troops begin their offensive, then bring in Fourth Guards Tank Army and Twenty-Second Cavalry Army to destroy the enemy in the field. If the NATO offensive never opened up, then perhaps the Pact would have launched a deliberate offensive meant to push NATO back across the Oder. On the other hand, a duke-it-out in confined quarters with a heavy NATO force might not have been seen as the best way to employ a highly mobile corps-sized formation.

Knocking out Third German Army seems like a more plausible goal than launching a general offensive into Germany. It"s hard to say what the theater-level thinkers knew about NATO"s plans and capabilities; at any rate, I believe it would have been more in line with the capabilities of the Western TVD at the time to wait for NATO to make its move or not make its move while keeping a mobile reserve intact for whatever contingency arose.

Webstral

[Webstral]

I do agree that the nomenclature issue regarding Fourth Guards Tank Army is, after five years of war, not as great as it would be if we were trying to compile a list of formations in 1995 or even 1997. It's possible that Fourth Guards Tank Army is an entirely new formation, albeit composed of pre-existing divisions.

Webstral

[Webstral]

Regarding fuel types, it might be possible that Fourth Guards Tank Army is running on both gasoline and diesel. The products aren't from exactly the same place in the distillation column, although the difference is not like propane and asphalt. If the trucks have to have gas, while the tanks have to have diesel, so be it. Either way, Ploesti ran for a month to provide Fourth Guards Tank Army with fossil fuel.

The Soviet trucks' use of gasoline is unexpected. US Army trucks run on diesel. Pretty much everything does, with notable exceptions like the M1. Diesel is a superior choice for engines that just run and run and run. This is why commercial trucks in the US use diesel. I'm more than a little surprised that the Soviet trucks are supposed to be using gasoline in gasoline engines, given that trucks are workhorses. There must be a factor in here that is outside my knowledge base.

Webstral

[Legbreaker]

I've had a quick look through the Soviet and Russian military vehicles and, as a rule of thumb, anything introduced after the early to mid 80's tends to run on diesel. This is especially true for AFVs and almost all tracked vehicles, regardless of age (except for the really old ones) are diesel.

As far as trucks go, globalsecurity.com has the following listed vehicles under "trucks"
■GAZ 2975 Tigr
■GAZ-3308 Sadko
■GAZ 3937 Vodnik
■Ural-4320
■Ural-5323
All of these are have diesel engines, however the GAZ-3308 Sadko may have either.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/ground.htm