Warsaw Pact use of chemical weapons.

[Webstral]

Although we all know as much, I'll say it anyway: the Soviet attitude towards casualties was a calculated indifference. If losses had to be taken to achieve a specific end, then losses had to be taken. Throwing men away for the sake of throwing men away was not part of doctrine. If the hypothetical use of chemical weapons promised a certain benefit that outweighed the cost in manpower, we should expect the use of chemical weapons. If the perceived benefit did not outweigh the cost, then we should not expect to see the the use of chemical weapons.

On the defensive in Poland, the Soviets might well see use of persistent agents to be to their advantage. Their own people would have the advantage of prepared positions, while NATO forces would be obliged to move through contaminated areas. If anti-tank defenses obliged the NATO troops to dismount, the Pact troops in their strong points would be at a significant advantage vis-a-vis the Western dismounts.

On the other hand, the Poles would not much appreciate having their country turned into a chemical witch's brew in the name of defending it. Granted, the Soviets viewed Poland as a defensive bulwark, not an ally. However, the kind of massive civilian casualties that would result from widespread use of chemical weapons could cause some disaffection among the Poles. Someone in the Kremlin would have to decide whether the benefits of using chemical weapons in Poland would outweigh the cost.

On the other hand, the use of chemicals against NATO air bases and other critical point targets in Germany has a different logic. Heck with German casualties. The West Germans are the cause of the whole problem, while the East Germans are turncoats. Civilian casualties are to be embraced, unless they cause some other problem. If NATO retaliates with chemical attacks against Pact air bases in Poland, the issue of civilian casualties among the Poles might inspire disaffection among the Poles. Without exploring the issue in much greater depth, it's hard to predict how the Soviet-Polish relationship would be affected. It is also hard to know where the limits of chemical weapons use will be drawn. Is the exchange limited to Poland Poland and East Germany Poland and Germany Poland, Germany, and Czechoslovakia Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Belarus, the Netherlands, and Denmark Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Belarus, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Jugoslavia, Greece... Chemical escalation would have its own logic.

Lots to ponder with this one.

Webstral

[pmulcahy11b]

I would think that for many operations, you have to strike a balance between the Soviet attitude of calculated indifference and the NATO attitude of "every casualty is a calamity." It's cold, but it's a war, and people will die. Most soldiers know that, and to an extent, accept it.

Of course, by 2000, the amount of personnel left will be down so low that every loss will be a calamity.

[WallShadow]

As good as modern military planning might be, I always look at how history has treated the "givens" of upcoming conflict.

So much of the build up and thought process between the world wars was dedicated to gas warfare. "The Great Pacific War" postulated gas bombs used from aircraft against ships and land forces. I recently acquired a book written in 1941 concerning Civil Air Raid Defense, much of which was "learned" from the British model. This book is at least half taken up by gas preparation and countermeasures.

[Abbott Shaull]

Although we all know as much, I'll say it anyway: the Soviet attitude towards casualties was a calculated indifference. If losses had to be taken to achieve a specific end, then losses had to be taken. Throwing men away for the sake of throwing men away was not part of doctrine. If the hypothetical use of chemical weapons promised a certain benefit that outweighed the cost in manpower, we should expect the use of chemical weapons. If the perceived benefit did not outweigh the cost, then we should not expect to see the the use of chemical weapons.

On the defensive in Poland, the Soviets might well see use of persistent agents to be to their advantage. Their own people would have the advantage of prepared positions, while NATO forces would be obliged to move through contaminated areas. If anti-tank defenses obliged the NATO troops to dismount, the Pact troops in their strong points would be at a significant advantage vis-a-vis the Western dismounts.

On the other hand, the Poles would not much appreciate having their country turned into a chemical witch's brew in the name of defending it. Granted, the Soviets viewed Poland as a defensive bulwark, not an ally. However, the kind of massive civilian casualties that would result from widespread use of chemical weapons could cause some disaffection among the Poles. Someone in the Kremlin would have to decide whether the benefits of using chemical weapons in Poland would outweigh the cost.

On the other hand, the use of chemicals against NATO air bases and other critical point targets in Germany has a different logic. Heck with German casualties. The West Germans are the cause of the whole problem, while the East Germans are turncoats. Civilian casualties are to be embraced, unless they cause some other problem. If NATO retaliates with chemical attacks against Pact air bases in Poland, the issue of civilian casualties among the Poles might inspire disaffection among the Poles. Without exploring the issue in much greater depth, it's hard to predict how the Soviet-Polish relationship would be affected. It is also hard to know where the limits of chemical weapons use will be drawn. Is the exchange limited to Poland Poland and East Germany Poland and Germany Poland, Germany, and Czechoslovakia Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Belarus, the Netherlands, and Denmark Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Belarus, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Jugoslavia, Greece... Chemical escalation would have its own logic.

Lots to ponder with this one.

Webstral

You are quite right that if the lose met a means it is totally acceptable. Didn't mean for it to come of they could care less about all loses.

Yes that was my point once you let the genie out of the bottle where would the sanity take hold or would it escalate until crosses the threshold of no return.

[Trooper]

"In December (1996), when the first American units crossed the East German, the situation drastically changed. The United States and the Soviet Union were at war, and CENTCOM's deployment would be delayed until after the first of the year (all available transport was needed to support the war in Europe).

General Suryakin took advantage of the situation. The lead division of the 7th Guards Army advanced into nortwestern Iran, and encountered fanatical resistance from the Pasdaran militia. The Soviets countered this by using chemical weapons on a massive scale as they had in China."

RDF Sourcebook page 4.

[pmulcahy11b]

As good as modern military planning might be, I always look at how history has treated the "givens" of upcoming conflict.

So much of the build up and thought process between the world wars was dedicated to gas warfare. "The Great Pacific War" postulated gas bombs used from aircraft against ships and land forces. I recently acquired a book written in 1941 concerning Civil Air Raid Defense, much of which was "learned" from the British model. This book is at least half taken up by gas preparation and countermeasures.

The overall plan for the invasion of Japan that would have taken place if the atom bombs hadn't been dropped called for the use of chemical weapons by the Allies on selected Japanese cities, industrial facilities, and suspected strongpoints. So we didn't have our potential hands clean in that one either.

[Matt Wiser]

The plan for gas in DOWNFALL was not finalized, but Hap Arnold was on record as being against strategic use, as the industrial targets meant to be hit by gas would've been burned out by B-29s anyway. Limited, tactical use of gas was far more likely, and troops going ashore would've had masks, protective suits and gloves, and four Liberty ships with gas munitions were to be offshore on X-Day in Kyushu (scheduled for 1 Nov 45). After Iwo and Okinawa, the plan was to use gas on those cave and bunker defenses that had resisted all other efforts to subdue (i.e. the "blowtorch and screwdriver" method of flame throwers, explosive charges, and direct fire from tanks and artillery), that were in the line of advance. The agents used were likely to have been Phosgene and Cyanogen Chloride. And in tests at Dugway in Utah, those agents were tested against mockup cave and bunker defenses, with gas concentrations five to ten times as dense inside the cave as one got outside, enough to penetrate gas mask filters and kill masked Japanese. All that one needed was formal Presidential Approval, but that had not been given prior to the Japanese surrender.

[Raellus]

IIRC, there was an incident during the invasion of Italy in '43 when a German bomber hit a supply ship in port filled with poison gas, dispersing it. I seem to remember reading something about this in Rick Atkinson's The Day of Battle. So it would seem that the Americans, at least, brought poison gas supplies with them in other theatres as a "just in case" measure.

[HorseSoldier]

Haven't heard about it, but it makes sense -- if the other side had gone hot on chemical weapons, it would have been a bad scene to be waiting on stuff from CONUS, or even the UK, to respond.

[jester]

There were also stocks of chemical weapons in the Pacific, especialy when the buildup for Operation Coronet and Olympic were being readied.

They also are working on destroying some of the stockpiles stored at the chemical munitions depots, many of which have been obsolete since WWII and a few items when I did the study had been obsolete prior to WWII.

Another thing to consider,

We had chemical weapons units in theater in WWII. Most of the time their job was to send in smoke. But, I would imagine where one finds those troops, their assets ie chemical weapons would be near.

[enrious]

IIRC, there was an incident during the invasion of Italy in '43 when a German bomber hit a supply ship in port filled with poison gas, dispersing it. I seem to remember reading something about this in Rick Atkinson's The Day of Battle. So it would seem that the Americans, at least, brought poison gas supplies with them in other theatres as a "just in case" measure.

That was Bari, Italy. A good book on it, Disaster at Bari.

There is a wikipedia entry on it - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Raid_on_Bari

From the article: "One of the destroyed vessels, the US Liberty ship John Harvey, had been carrying a secret cargo of 2,000 M47A1 World War I type mustard gas bombs, each of which held 30-35kg (60-70 lb) of sulfur mustard. This cargo had been sent to Europe to retaliate if Germany resorted to chemical warfare."

[HorseSoldier]

We had chemical weapons units in theater in WWII. Most of the time their job was to send in smoke. But, I would imagine where one finds those troops, their assets ie chemical weapons would be near.

If I remember right, some of the WW2 Ranger battalions had 4.2" Chemical Mortar companies attached to augment their limited organic support weapons, also.

[Webstral]

We should assume, and I believe always have, that the Soviets used chemical weapons in Europe prior to the nuclear exchange. We should assume that the use of chemical weapons would be dictated by Soviet perception of advantage. Perhaps they don't use chemicals against the West Germans in 1996 because the other Western Allies are still on the sidelines. It's hard to say how things would shape up once the Anglo-Americans get involved. I'm certain the Soviets would use chemicals in Poland, although I can't say how that would play out for them without investing some real time and energy.

The Soviets and the Chinese start the Sino-Soviet War with darned significant chemical exchanges. We should expect that the Soviets would use their chemical weapons in accordance with doctrine, more or less. We should expect that the Chinese will retaliate in a manner that fits their needs. Since chemical contamination slows everything down, and since the Chinese possess the ability to respond in kind, the Soviets probably find that use of chemicals on the front lines is not to their advantage. The same probably is true in Iran, once the Iranians begin to retaliate with chemical weapons. (If the Iranians experience any technical difficulties, it's not hard to see the West or China providing needed assistance.)

The Pact probably uses chemical weapons in the Balkans. Again, how this shapes up depends a good deal on how effectively the Romanians and Jugoslavs hurt the Pact back.

Webstral

[jester]

I would think that it would be at Corps, Army or Army Group level depots. And used as a stratiegic weapon for a special operation.

Now, once things start to breakdown and units loose their comand and control as well as cohesion as it relates to nationality and higher headquarters <Remember a large majority of the pact forces hate each other> we could find signifigant quantities of chemical weapons in the hands of the higher levels of comand or what is left of them or even the depot/forces who controlled these upper level depots where these weapons were stored. This could be a very interesting twist to a campaign for sure.

Now, we could also toss these weapons into the hands of a commander fresh from the Asian theater of operations and he has little reguard for life or no fear of the stigma associated with using chemical weapons.

And then we have the commander who has such weapons but has no desire to sink to the level of using such weapons and thus he keeps his stockpile secure.

And then we have the tactical leader who will use such weapons but only in sdmall spurts to gain a tactical advantage, but never really willing to go all out. Much like the game history says the threshold of nuclear war occured.