Land Mines at Kalisz

[HorseSoldier]

I could see a specialist cottage industry growing up of semi-nomadic civilians who travel around clearing mines, IEDs, and UXO for farmers and smaller communities and then trading the recovered mines or explosives to merchants, military forces or new governments like Krakow. Could make for an interesting group for PCs to encounter or travel with.

[weswood]

On an almost off topic contribution, I was watching a show called 1000 Ways to Die. Three drunk former NVA/Vietcong were playing russian roulette in a hut. The pistol made it all the way around without going off and the drunk men began jumping up and down in triumph. The jumping set off a mine the hut had been built over and killed all three.

[Dog 6]

On an almost off topic contribution, I was watching a show called 1000 Ways to Die. Three drunk former NVA/Vietcong were playing russian roulette in a hut. The pistol made it all the way around without going off and the drunk men began jumping up and down in triumph. The jumping set off a mine the hut had been built over and killed all three.

LMFAO !

[Targan]

What he said.

The vast majority of mines the Viet Cong and NVA used in Vietnam against the Australians (and I suspect other allied nations also) came from a 7 mile long field which was supposed to have been watched over by the ARVN...
The situation became so bad that the entire field was dismantled rather than continue to allow hundreds of tonnes of mines to just walk away in the night.

IIRC the last or second-last Australian soldier to die in the Vietnam War was killed by an Australian or American mine recovered by the Viet Cong. Could have even been a mine lifted from the above mentioned minefield. Frustrating.

[Abbott Shaull]

I would think that the size of farm in Eastern Europe during WWII would be limited to 100 acre or less, and much less would be tilled for use if they were that large. One has to remember there were just so much a farmer and their family could do.

Not like today corporate farms in which with few farm hands can work several plots of 200+ acres during a grow season...

[Fusilier]

IIRC the last or second-last Australian soldier to die in the Vietnam War was killed by an Australian or American mine recovered by the Viet Cong. Could have even been a mine lifted from the above mentioned minefield. Frustrating.

How did they know that

[Legbreaker]

From the bits of mine left after it exploded.

[Webstral]

Who's going to be laying mines south of the 5th Division's last stand If it's the Soviets and Poles in July 2000, where did they get a lot of mines, and why would they be dropping them there IIRC, this was an extended meeting engagement, a mobile battle of sorts. Minefields, AFAIK, are more common in deliberate defensive positions, and the Battle of Kalisz doesn't seem to fit that for me.

This is a fair issue to raise. The answer comes in the form of the 1997 campaign. There"s a thread somewhere in the archives in which we discuss this issue at length, so I"ll only recap here. The Pact gets kicked out of East Germany in December 1997. Their best units have been very roughly handled, first by the West Germans, then by the Anglo-Americans. Although the West would like to come to terms at this point, the Kremlin has no intention of doing so. Since the Soviets aren"t going to sue for peace, they can hardly expect NATO to demobilize. In fact, the thing they fear the mosta German-led invasion by the West aimed at the USSR looks pretty darned likely at this point. The best thing to do is to use Poland as it has been intended for use all along: as a bulwark against the West.

Trading Polish space for Soviet time means fighting a defensive action until Pact forces can be readied for a counteroffensive. Soviet doctrine calls for defense in depth based on multiple belts of obstaclesprincipally mines. Given three to four months between the end of the campaign in East Germany and the beginning of the NATO offensive in Poland, the Pact can lay an awful lot of mines.

We know from the timetables given in the v1 chronology that NATO"s offensive didn"t exactly burn up the track moving across Poland. Much of this can be attributed, I assert, to the very dense defenses established by the Pact in western Poland in Jan-Apr 1997. As the NATO offensive ground eastward, the Pact would have established fresh defenses on the most likely avenues of approach. Kalisz is a road junction 200km east of the Oder. I think it"s entirely likely that the Pact would have established defenses in depth (meaning, among other things, minefields) here as the front line moved towards the Soviet border.

So the short answer is that the 1997 fighting would have resulted in minefields in and around Kalisz, along with the creation of fortified fighting positions and the other survivability structures employed by a dug-in defender. NATO would have cleared the mines affecting the MSR, but little else. They didn"t have the time and manpower to clear mines in their own rear between April and August/September 1997. The engineers would be too busy at the front.

After NATO fell back across the Oder, the Poles would be quite keen to get the minefields cleared, of course. The Soviets might not be so keen, though. So long as the LOC were open, the Soviets probably would have had better uses for their engineering assets. And, of course, everyone was busy coping with the nuclear exchanges for the rest of 1997.

Clearing mines without specialized equipment is a slow and agonizing business. It"s all well and good to talk about clearing mines by hand, but you don"t have to see too many people blown to hamburger by anti-tamper devices, ham-handedness, or just plain bad luck before this approach loses its charm. This much said, some sappers get quite good at this sort of thing. The civilian population in Central Europe will produce some folks who are fairly handy at this, too.

"Recycling" like this is likely to be one of the few methods of resupply by 2000.

Very astute, Leg. I agree completely. This goes to one reason why some minefields will be left in place, while others will have been created with scavenged or locally fabricated mines. The security situation enters a downward spiral from late 1997 onward. As the countryside fills with marauders, the need to fortify communities increases. Defensive barriers of every description will appear around the surviving communities. We should expect to see a moat of mines around Kalisz.

So by the time 5th ID rolls through western central Poland, there will be two main categories of minefields present: minefields left from the large-scale fighting of 1997 and minefields established in the interim for the purpose of keeping bandits out of town. Some of these fields will be known and marked. Some will be known but unmarked. (It"s better if the locals know where the mines are but let marauders stumble across them.) Some will be unknown and unmarked. Most will be in open areas, but some will be in restricted terrain, like the woods. After all, an unimproved road through the woods can offer a very serviceable bypass for attackers who don"t want to tackle minefields in the open.

I could see a specialist cottage industry growing up of semi-nomadic civilians who travel around clearing mines, IEDs, and UXO for farmers and smaller communities and then trading the recovered mines or explosives to merchants, military forces or new governments like Krakow. Could make for an interesting group for PCs to encounter or travel with.

Now that"s an interesting idea! I really like this one. EPW and convicts might be cheaper, but civilians with specialized techniques might be more cost-effective. One problem I foresee is that the local armed forces would be inclined to draft said civilians. This isn"t necessarily a deal breaker for the concept, but it"s something to be considered.

In forests- at least here in the U.S.- animals often create their own high speed trails. I have a number of rabbit trails in my backyard. Soldiers could follow newer game trails to avoid old mines or one could assume that game and/or hunters have accidently cleared most mines from older ones.

I was thinking just the same thing for my characters. However, it"s hard to move an M1 along a deer trail.


Webstral

[Legbreaker]

...it's hard to move an M1 along a deer trail.

Only if you want it to stay a deer trail....

I've seen the damage an M113 does to trees when moving through the forest. An M1 is a much larger and stronger beast.

[Webstral]

Only if you want it to stay a deer trail....

I've seen the damage an M113 does to trees when moving through the forest. An M1 is a much larger and stronger beast.

Absolutely it is. But in the context of land mines, we were discussing a deer trail because the deer likely would have cleared the mines. Other locations off-trail are terra incognita.

[atiff]

So the short answer is that the 1997 fighting would have resulted in minefields in and around Kalisz, along with the creation of fortified fighting positions and the other survivability structures employed by a dug-in defender. NATO would have cleared the mines affecting the MSR, but little else. They didn"t have the time and manpower to clear mines in their own rear between April and August/September 1997. The engineers would be too busy at the front.

After NATO fell back across the Oder, the Poles would be quite keen to get the minefields cleared, of course. The Soviets might not be so keen, though. So long as the LOC were open, the Soviets probably would have had better uses for their engineering assets. And, of course, everyone was busy coping with the nuclear exchanges for the rest of 1997.

So the above is largely a military viewpoint. But what about an economic one How will all these minefields affect the ability to farm and produce food in an area Feeding Poland (or not, as the case may be) is one thing I am working on at the moment; trying to work out what population is around, and where they get their food. I have been working on a simple model for this, and it uses land. Figuring out how this gels with minefields is something to work out...

So, maybe my paragraph above is just a comment, not a question. But does anyone have additional thoughts on the impact of mines on farmland

[Legbreaker]

I can't see much need to lay anti-vehicular mines in forests. Yes AFVs can push their way through them, but in heavy terrain there's a good chance they'll get hung up on the fallen trees, or worse throw a track.
Anti-personnel mines on the other hand would be almost everywhere if there was a long engagement in the vicinity, and the area could have been covered by fire. 2-3 years of plant growth could effectively hide these areas too, interrupting sight lines etc.

I would think that minefields are unlikely to have a great impact on farming due to the greatly reduced population in northern Europe. I can't recall off hand how many civilians died in the warzones, or moved to safer areas, but I can say Silesia had 97% losses.

It might be a bit inaccurate due to prewar food importation, farming methods, heavy machinery, etc, but 97% population reduction would have a similarly large reduction in required farming area. What farmland is required would likely avoid the known minefields.

[HorseSoldier]

Agreement -- it would be an unusual situation where someone would site a minefield of AT mines, or AP mines in a forested area. Mines to interdict trails or roads, but not fields. Militarily, a mine field is mostly sited to impair mobility and/or channel movement. Forests already impede vehicle movement (even with tracks).

I could see siting a field directly in front of a woodline as part of a kill zone where you wanted to keep the targets from being able to bolt the kill zone and get into the cover of a tree line. This would make more sense to me in the days of air power for the side with air superiority to keep the other side bottled up where attack helicopters or CAS can do some serious killing.

[Legbreaker]

This would make more sense to me in the days of air power for the side with air superiority to keep the other side bottled up where attack helicopters or CAS can do some serious killing.

A couple of machineguns with interlocking fields of fire do the job nicely enough.

[Webstral]

I agree completely that AT mines are much less likely in forested areas than AP mines, with the caveat that the more open the woodland the more likely AT mines will have been seen to be necessary.

One of the biggest effects of minefields is fear -- and even one mine can do that, make you afraid to take another step. ..that can be paralyzing, or at least slow your advance considerably or even stop it while you back out and look for another way around the area.

This is a very valid point. An American AFV crew fleeing Kalisz may be extremely risk-averse in a vehicle that can neither be replaced nor recovered. In the end, though, they may have to go through the trees where they can and hope that none of the AP mines they may encounter are strong enough to break a track.

Leg, you bring up a very reason not to get off the trail: inaccessible terrain. Once one gets off the beaten track in the woods with a tank, it"s hard to say what"s going to happen in terms of accessibility. The most logical thing to do is have the foot guys scout a route. This, of course, makes the foot guys vulnerable.

I"m not saying a group of PCs will huddle at the edge of the woods or get blown up on the way there. I"m trying to look at the mentality of a party of survivors.

Here"s another problem: the M1, given its voracious appetite for fuel, probably has to make a dash from one spot to another. This means driving hard for a period long enough to justify the fuel required to start the beast, then finding a hunker-down spot while recce goes out again. It"s all very stressful.