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Issues of underfunding and training time for the Army reserve components go to the very role of the National Guard. When one compares the training time per annum for the RA with the training time for the AR or NG, one is forced to choose between conclusions: the NG is training to an acceptable standard, and therefore the RA is squandering vast amounts of resources with its grossly inflated training budget and schedule; or the RA is training to an acceptable standard and the NG is not. Having worked both sides of the fence in the combat arms, I"m going to say that the latter is a more credible conclusion.
When it comes down to it, the National Guard has no business maintaining combat brigades on a part-time basis. There are several reasons for this. Most pressing (in my mind) is the business of skills. The combat arms kill people and break things. Popular opinion notwithstanding, killing folks and breaking things is a skilled activity that requires constant maintenance if it is to be done correctly once the shooting starts. Naturally, this is why the idea of having reserve formations receive supplementary training before deployment comes up. Unfortunately, this training is overseen by generals who are more interested in preserving their own careers than in properly training their people. Plans are drawn up, and boxes are checked. My unit spent five months training for deployment, and by the end the best that can be said is that we had been run ragged to no good end. We spent a single dayone [expletive deleted] dayon the rifle range. I spent a day at the M203 range, where I received a sub-rudimentary refresher and fired a dozen 40mm grenades. I spent a day at the M240B range, where I fired 200 rounds. The only thing we did reasonably intensively was CQB (close quarters battle). Under the tutelage of our 93rd ID instructors, we spent three or four days in CQB marksmanship. On our own, we practiced house clearing drills with guys who had done it in a high-speed RA unit and a SWAT guy who had joined our unit the month before we were called up.
Given all of this, the idea that NG combat brigades would hit the ground with acceptable levels of proficiency at the deadliest trade is rather unlikely. We just got lucky.
Going further, do the various states really require combat brigades organized and equipped like Regular Army units for any purpose written into any of the applicable constitutions Unless Mexico or Canada is planning an invasion, none of the border states have any use for tanks and MRL in the pursuit of state security and disaster relief. There isn"t much justification for infantry, either. Well-equipped MPs, yes. Infantry, no. The NG combat brigades are a federal reserve that the states get control of until the feds need them. It"s all very silly.
The Army National Guard is in dire need of repurposing. Combat brigades should be phased out and replaced with a National Guard equivalent of Maneuver Enhancement Brigades and Sustainment Brigades. These brigades would be able to take care of disaster relief and security missions perfectly well. One might go so far as to imagine a very small combat arms force for each state maintained on active duty and trained specifically to do rare but tough internal security jobs. These guys would be very few in number, though.
The jobs that MEB and SB perform are a bit more forgiving of on-the-job relearning than combat roles. It would be much more palatable to call up a NG MEB and send them in-theater after a month of refresher training.
The Army"s reserve combat arms strength should be built into the picture. The balance of active combat brigades to active support brigades should be adjusted so that a significantly larger number of trigger-pullers are training at bases where the logistical and support systems are in place already. Instead of relying on the National Guard for additional combat units, the Army should have the combat units it needs training on a full-time basis but a relative shortage of active support units. The support would come from activated NG units.
Of course, my ideas have not a prayer of being put into practice. The inertia of politics and perception will require something more than the ideas of a lowly rifleman before they are overcome.
Webstral
When it comes down to it, the National Guard has no business maintaining combat brigades on a part-time basis. There are several reasons for this. Most pressing (in my mind) is the business of skills. The combat arms kill people and break things. Popular opinion notwithstanding, killing folks and breaking things is a skilled activity that requires constant maintenance if it is to be done correctly once the shooting starts. Naturally, this is why the idea of having reserve formations receive supplementary training before deployment comes up. Unfortunately, this training is overseen by generals who are more interested in preserving their own careers than in properly training their people. Plans are drawn up, and boxes are checked. My unit spent five months training for deployment, and by the end the best that can be said is that we had been run ragged to no good end. We spent a single dayone [expletive deleted] dayon the rifle range. I spent a day at the M203 range, where I received a sub-rudimentary refresher and fired a dozen 40mm grenades. I spent a day at the M240B range, where I fired 200 rounds. The only thing we did reasonably intensively was CQB (close quarters battle). Under the tutelage of our 93rd ID instructors, we spent three or four days in CQB marksmanship. On our own, we practiced house clearing drills with guys who had done it in a high-speed RA unit and a SWAT guy who had joined our unit the month before we were called up.
Given all of this, the idea that NG combat brigades would hit the ground with acceptable levels of proficiency at the deadliest trade is rather unlikely. We just got lucky.
Going further, do the various states really require combat brigades organized and equipped like Regular Army units for any purpose written into any of the applicable constitutions Unless Mexico or Canada is planning an invasion, none of the border states have any use for tanks and MRL in the pursuit of state security and disaster relief. There isn"t much justification for infantry, either. Well-equipped MPs, yes. Infantry, no. The NG combat brigades are a federal reserve that the states get control of until the feds need them. It"s all very silly.
The Army National Guard is in dire need of repurposing. Combat brigades should be phased out and replaced with a National Guard equivalent of Maneuver Enhancement Brigades and Sustainment Brigades. These brigades would be able to take care of disaster relief and security missions perfectly well. One might go so far as to imagine a very small combat arms force for each state maintained on active duty and trained specifically to do rare but tough internal security jobs. These guys would be very few in number, though.
The jobs that MEB and SB perform are a bit more forgiving of on-the-job relearning than combat roles. It would be much more palatable to call up a NG MEB and send them in-theater after a month of refresher training.
The Army"s reserve combat arms strength should be built into the picture. The balance of active combat brigades to active support brigades should be adjusted so that a significantly larger number of trigger-pullers are training at bases where the logistical and support systems are in place already. Instead of relying on the National Guard for additional combat units, the Army should have the combat units it needs training on a full-time basis but a relative shortage of active support units. The support would come from activated NG units.
Of course, my ideas have not a prayer of being put into practice. The inertia of politics and perception will require something more than the ideas of a lowly rifleman before they are overcome.
Webstral
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