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Little Big Horn, A Study of a Cavalry Regiment in the Indian Wars

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  • Little Big Horn, A Study of a Cavalry Regiment in the Indian Wars

    So why the hooplaa over a battle that took place on June 25-26, 1876 After all,the root cause was a insane, glory hound named George Armstring Custer, at least that's what numerous Hollywood movies, various TV miniseries and scores of authors have told us every since that hot, summer day on a Montana Territory hillside. But when studying history, what is unearthed is many times, not what popular history says it is.

    The Battle of the Little Big Horn cost the US Army 268 men killed, or just over 1% of its total authorized strength of 26,312 men. Compared to the battles of the Civil War, LBH is at most, a minor skirmish. But to the regular army of the 1870s, 1 percent of its strength was a staggering loss. During the period of the Indian Wars (1866-1891) the US Army lost 1,128 men in the trans-Mississippi West. LBH accounts for one quarter of all the men killed during this period. This makes LBH a staggering defeat when viewed in the context of the small numbers of casualties that would normally be expected in an fight with Indians.

    When the Civil War ended in 1865, it brought about a reorganization of the army. The army had two roles, the first of policing the reconstruction effort in the South and the second of restoring order on the frontier. During the war, the frontier was guarded by over-stretched regular regiments or by various state militia units. The Indians took advantage of this and committed a series of depredations against white settlers, particularly in the Great Plains.

    The army, following the reorganization of 1866 consisted of twenty-five regiments of infantry (two colored), ten regiments of cavalry (two colored) and five regiments of artillery. The U.S. Seventh Cavalry was a brand new regiment created as part of the 1866 reorganization. In July, 1866, George Custer, brevet major general of volunteers and permament rank of captain in the regular army, was appointed as lieutenant colonel of the new regiment. Custer joined his new regiment at its permanent station at Fort Riley, Kansas.
    The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.

  • #2
    The organization of the regiment was comprised of a regimental staff and twelve companies (the official term is company for both the cavalry and artillery regiments, troop and battery were unofficial names, although widely used).

    The Regimental Staff of the Seventh Cavalry consisted of

    Colonel Samuel D. Sturgis (detached service to St. Louis, Missouri
    Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer (acting commander)
    Major Joseph Tilford (leave of absence)
    Major Lewis Merrill (detached service to Washington DC)
    Major Marcus Reno
    Adjutant First Lieutenant William Cooke (Custer Bn, killed in action)
    Quartermaster First Lieutenant Henry Nowlan
    Assistant Surgeon George Lord (Custer Bn, killed in action)
    Acting Assistant Surgeon James DeWolf (Reno Bn, killed in action)
    Acting Assistant Surgeon Henry Porter
    Veterinary Surgeon C. A. Stein (detached to Yellowstone Depot)
    Sergeant Major William Sharrow (Custer Bn, killed in action)
    Quartermaster Sergeant (detached to Yellowstone Depot)
    Commissary Sergeant
    Saddler Sergeant John Tritten (detached to Yellowstone Depot)
    Chief Trumpeter Henry Voss (Custer Bn, killed in action)
    Chief Musician Felix Vinatieri (detached to Yellowstone Depot)
    sixteen privates, regimental band, detached to Yellowstone Depot)
    The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.

    Comment


    • #3
      Company Organization of the 1876 Cavalry Regiment

      The Seventh Cavalry was made up of twelve companies. In spite of what Hollywood/TV would have you believe, Companies is the correct usage. Even the Artillery Regiments called their units companies instead of batteries. The terms troop and battery were in common use during this period. You would see written orders to "Commanding Officer of Company G" for example, while on the field the verbal order would be "G Troop will advance", of course this really depended on the senior officer involved!

      The organization of the companies changed several times. There is the 1866, 1869, 1870, 1874 (twice!) and the 1875 reorganizations. The basic setup on July 28, 1866 provided for the following:

      Captain
      First Lieutenant
      Second Lieutenant
      First Sergeant
      Quartermaster Sergeant
      5 Sergeants
      8 Corporals
      2 Trumpeters
      2 Farriers & Blacksmiths
      1 Saddler
      1 Wagoner
      78 Privates

      The latest organization (the one used at LBH) was:

      Captain
      First Lieutenant
      Second Lieutenant
      First Sergeant
      5 Sergeants
      4 Corporals
      2 Trumpeters
      2 Farriers & Blacksmiths
      1 Saddler
      1 Wagoner
      54 Privates

      At LBH the companies looked like this:

      Company A: Captain Myles Moylan; one officer killed, one officer wounded, 8 enlisted killed, 6 enlisted wounded (1 died of wounds). Total=10 killed, 6 wounded out of 55 men on roster

      Company B: Captain Thomas McDougall; 1 officer killed, 2 enlisted killed, 5 enlisted wounded. Total=3 killed, 5 wounded out of 71 men on roster

      Company C: Thomas Custer; 3 officers killed, 36 enlisted killed, 4 enlisted wounded (1 died of wounds). Total=40 killed, 3 wounded out of 66 men on roster

      Company D: Captain Thomas Weir; 3 enlisted killed, 3 enlisted wounded. Total 3 killed, 3 wounded out of 64 men on roster

      Company E: Captain Charles Ilsley; 1 officer killed, 37 enlisted killed, 2 enlisted wounded. Total=38 killed, 2 wounded out of 61 men on roster

      Company F: Captain George Yates; 1 officer killed, 36 enlisted killed. Total=37 killed out of 68 men on roster

      Company G: Captain Joun Tourtellotte; 1 officer killed, 13 enlisted killed, 6 enlisted wounded. Total=14 killed, 6 wounded out of 69 men on roster

      Company H: Captain Frederick Benteen; 1 officer wounded, 2 enlisted killed, 20 enlisted wounded (2 died of wounds). Total= 4 killed, 19 wounded out of 55 men on roster

      Company I: Captain Myles Keeogh; 2 officers killed, 36 enlisted killed, 1 wounded (died of wounds). Total=39 killed out of 65 men on roster.

      Company K: Captain Owen Hale; 5 enlisted killed, 3 enlisted wounded. Total 5 killed, 3 wounded out of 69 men on roster

      Company L: Captain Michael Sheridan; 1 officer killed, 44 enlisted killed, 1 enlisted wounded. Total=45 killed, 1 wounded out of 69 men on roster

      Company M: Captain Thomas French; 1 officer killed, 12 enlisted killed, 11 enlisted wounded (1 died of wounds). Total=14 killed, 10 wounded out of 63 men on roster

      Quartermaster Employees present: 21 men fall into this category: comprised of 3 Guides, 2 Interpreters, 1 Correspondent, 13 Packers, 1 Scout, 1 accompanying civilian. Of these, 3 Guides, 2 Interpreters, 1 Correspondent, 1 Accompanying Civilian, and 1 Packer were killed and 1 Packer wounded. Total 8 killed, 1 wounded out of 21 men present

      Indian Scouts present: 51 Crow, Ree, Dak and Sioux scouts rode with the 7th Cavalry. Of these 2 were killed and 2 were wounded.
      The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.

      Comment


      • #4
        Tactical Organization of the Seventh

        When GAC split the Seventh Cavalry up on June 25, 1876, this was the tactical orginzation:

        Custer's Battalion
        Regimental Staff: Lieutenant Colonel George Custer
        Company C: Captain Thomas Custer
        Company E: First Lieutenant Algernon Smith
        Compant F: Captain George Yates
        Company I: Captain Myles Keogh
        Company L: First Lieutenant James Calhoun

        Reno's Battalion
        Battalion Staff: Major Marcus Reno
        Company A: Captain Myles Moylan
        Company G: First Lieutenant Donald McIntosh
        Company M: Captain Thomas French

        Benteen's Battalion
        Battalion Staff: Captain Frederick Benteen
        Company D: Captain Thomas Wier
        Company H: First Lieutenant Francis Gibson
        Company K: First Lieutenant Edward Godfrey

        Pack Train Escort
        Company B: Captain Thomas McDougall
        detachement of 1 NCO and 6 enlisted men from each troop.
        The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.

        Comment


        • #5
          Indian Strength and Losses

          "Holy Shit! Look at all of those damned Ind----" Famous last words supposed to have been uttered by George Custer

          So just how many Indians were supposed to have been present at Little Big Horn The simple answer is that no one knows for sure.

          What is known is that the villages in the Valley of the Little Big Horn River had grown considerably in size from earlier in the year. Families would leave the reservation and join others for a summer of freedom. The Indian Agents would under report these depatures in order to continue to receive supplies for the larger number, which they would then turn around and sell and pocket the profit. How large was the problem The Standing Rock Indian Agency reported that 7,000 Indians were present, a count conducted by the Army confirmed only 2,300 were actually present.

          In 1877, the Scott Expedition returned to the Little Big Horn to rebury the cavalry men, the commanding officer of the expedition, Lieutenant H.L. Scott took the time to count the number of lodge circles present in the valley. He stopped counting at 1,500. This effort, while intresting, proves little as many families often moved several times, each time leaving a lodge circle. In addition, Lt. Scott failed to count the hundreds of wickiups, brush shelters that housed one or two people.

          The following are estimates of the numbers of warriors by various officers who either took part in the battle or examined the field afterwards:
          Colonel John Gibbon, 2,500; 2nd Lt Luther Hale, 4,000; scout George Herendeen, 3,000; 1st Lt Charles DeRudio, 3-4,000; Captain Myles Moylan, 3,500-4,000; 2nd Lt Charles Varnum, 4,000. 2nd Lt George Wallace first estimated 3,000 and then changed his mind at the Reno Court of Inquiry, testifing that there were 9,000. Captain Frederick Benteen initially estimated 1,500 and then changed his mind and stated 8-9,000.

          Even the Indians themselves could not provide an exact number. Chief Gall refused to offer any estimate; Flat Iron, 8,000; Chief Runs-the-Enemy, 2,000; Flying Hawk, 1,000 and Crazy Horse, at least 7,000. Red Cloud estimated 2,000. Allegedly, Indians believed that the number was less than a 1,000 and that anyone who counted higher than a 1,000 was dishonest.

          Even the various historians have different values: Stanley Vestal, 2,500; Frazier Hunt, 1,800 to 2,000; Lewis Crawford, 2,000-2,500; Fred Dustin, 3,000-3,500; Charles Eastman, not more than 1,400; Edgar Stewart, 3,000; Robert Utley; 2,000; Jeffery Wert, 2,000; anf George Grinnell, 4,500-6,000.

          The best estimate of the actual number of lodges was provided by John Gray:
          Northern Cheyenne: 120
          Oglala Sioux: 240
          Blackfoot, Brule and Two Kettle Sioux: 120
          Sans Arc Sioux: 110
          Minniconjou Sioux: 150
          Hunkpapa Sioux: 235
          Yanktonnais and Santee Sious: 25

          Gray estimates the total number of lodges at 1,000, but he does not include any Arapaho, members of this tribe were known to be present. It is estimated that each lodge would be home to two warriors, perhaps more if the older boys were counted. Add to this the large number of wickiups on the north end of the village which housed young warriors who did not live with their families; subtract the number of men who had reached old age (after their 40th birthday).....

          Whatever the exact number, it is fair to assume that the Seventh Cavalry was outnumbered.

          As for the Indian losses, estimated varily wildly from a low of 30-40 to as many as 500. As Custer had observed earlier "The Indians invariably endeavored to conceal their exact losses." The only Indian casualties that were found after the battle, consisted of eight bodies left within two lodges in the abandoned village. These warriors were dressed in their finest clothing and were lying on scaffolds.

          Even the Indians are divided on thier own losses. Red Horse later stated that "the soldiers killed 136 and wounded 160 Sioux".
          The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.

          Comment


          • #6
            Battlefield Terrain

            What is today considered the Little Big Horn Battlefield lays on the northern side of the Little Big Horn River. Running from east to west:

            The Reno-Benteen Defense Site: Here seven companies of the Seventh under the command of Major Reno held a defensive position ontop of this bluff after Renos rout from the valley floor. It lies about 600 yards north of the LBHR. Remains of the crude trench and rifle pits dug by the troopers can still be scene.

            Next is Sharpshooter's Ridge located about 500 yards north of the Reno-Beenteen Defense Site. On this ridge, throughout July 26th, an Indian sharpshooter killed or wounded a number of the pinned-down troopers. This Indian gained a grudging respect for his marksmanship before being either killed or forced away from the rdige by the troopers concentrated fire.

            Wier Point, located about a mile northwest of the RBDS is a small promontory above Medicine Tail Coulee. This is the location that Captain Wier and his company advanced to without orders from Reno/Benteen. From this point, Captain Wier was able to observe Indians in the distance firing at objects on the ground around Custer Hill. Weir was forced back from this point and driven back to the RBDS.

            Medicine Tail Coulee runs from north of Wier Point about 300 yards to the river at the southern end of the Indian village on the opposite bank. Indians tell of a movement by part of Custer's Battalion down this ravine (either as a feint or as an attempt to attack the village). This movement met with fierce opposition and retreated north and east (up Deep Coulee) to Battle Ridge. There are also stories that Custer was either killed or wounded during this fight.

            Nye-Cartwright Ridge forms part of the divide between Medicine Tail Coulee and Deep Coulee and was named for two students who located numerous firing positions in the area. It is believed that troopers deployed in this position to cover Custer's right flank and cover the approach of the pack train.

            Deep Coulee leads to the LBHR near the center of the Indian village and is located at the northern end of the Nye-Cartwright Ridge, just south of Calhoun Hill. It is believed that elements of Custer's Battalion may have retreated up this coulee after attacking down Medicine Tail Coulee and then being repulsed by the Indians. Gall and a group of warriors rode up this coulee to attack Battle Ridge near Calhoun Hill.

            Calhoun Hill overlooks Deep Coulee and is the southern end of Battle Ridge. This is the location that Lieutenant Calhoun and Company L were overrun and killed by Gall and Crazy Horse.

            Battle Ridge is a half-mile long ridge that is bordered by Custer Hill on the north and Calhoun Hill on the south. This us where most of the Custer Battalion fought and died. Crazy Horse is believed to have rallied a group of warriors in the village, crossed the river and then swept down Battle Ridge from Custer Hill to Calhoun Hill, killing everyone in his path.

            Deep Ravine is also sometimes called North Medicine Tail Coulee by some researchers. It is located near the end of the slope that runs from Custer Hill west to the LBHR. This line is sometimes referred to as the South Skirmish Line, although there is little or no evidence of any major fighting. Indian stories hint at an attempt by a company-sized force attempting to break-out from Custer Hill/Battle Ridge. Testimony by soldiers burying their dead two days later state that 28 men of Company E were buried in a mass grave at a point some 2,000 feet from Custer Hill, near the end of Deep Ravine. These bodies have never been recovered.

            Custer Hill, this is the northern part of Battle Ridge and is the location where the body of Custer and 40 of his men were found. The location is currently marked a monument erected in 1881 and bearing the names of all the officers and enlisted killed in the battle stands on top of the hill. The graveyard of Custer and his men was actually relocated to their present positions when the monument was erected.
            The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.

            Comment


            • #7
              Weapons at Little Big Horn-The Cavalry

              In 1870, the army's Ordnance Department held field trials of various rifles and carbines to replace the mismash of Civil War relics that armed the troops. The army sought a weapon that was reliable and used a single-shot system rather than the newer repeaters due to manufacturing cost. The initial ninety entrys from such makers Elliott, Freeman, Mauser, Peabody and Spencer were narrowed down to four: The Remington rolling block; the sliding breech block Sharps; the trapdoor Springfield and the bolt-action Ward Burton. The final selection was made by the 1872 board presided by General Alfred Terry and including Major Marcus Reno as a member. The board's decision was announced on May 5,1873 by the secretary of war.

              The Model 1873 Springfield Carbine in .45/55 caliber was the winner. It was a single-shot, breech-loading carbine that measured 41.3 inches in length and weighed 6.9 pounds. Its .45-caliber cartridge used a copper-case loaded with 55 grains of black powder and an effective range of 300 yards and a maximum range of 1,000 yards. A properly trained cavalryman could fire his carbine at 15 rounds per minute. The Seventh was issued the M1873 prior to the 1874 Black Hills Expedition. The Springfield would remain the basic weapon of the army until its replacement by the Krag-Jorgensen magazine rifle in 1892.

              The troopers were also issued the Model P 1872 Colt single-action revolver which was chosen because of its simpler operation, stronger parts and reliability. This .45-caliber weapon had a 7.5-inch barrel, fired six metallic cartridges loaded with 28 grains of black powder and had an effective range of 60 yards.


              At the Battle of the Little Big Horn, the troopers of the Seventh were issued 100 rounds of carbine ammunition, half carried in their saddle bags and half carried in issue ammo boxes holding 28 rounds or in the new "prairie belts" that held 50 rounds (the prairie belt was a leather belt with leather thimble loops sewed on). A disadvantage of the prairie belt was the interaction of the chemicals used in the tanning process interacting with the copper cases, resulting in deposits on the cartridge. The trooper was also issued 24 rounds for his revolver, six in the weapon and 18 carried in a small pouch on his belt.

              Contrary to Hollywood/TV, the frontier trooper did not carry his issue saber into the field. The saber was a heavy, cumbersome and noisy weapon that was merely an ornament for the parade field. Only one officer, 1st Lt Charles DeRudio, who had served as a cavalryman in Europe, carried his saber into LBH.

              In the years since 1876, there has been a stream of debates about the malfunctions of the Springfield carbine. The primary cause was the use of copper cases, combined with a defective extractor mechanism and simple dirt, could cause the base of the cartridge to be torn away when the block was opened. This would leave the body of the cartridge stuck inside the firing chamber, requiring the use of a pocket knife or horseshoe nail to pry the cylinder out prior to reloading and firing. While this is a known problem, just how bad was this defect at LBH

              The best source is the 1983-1986 archaelogical survey conducted by Dr. Richard A. Fox . A study of recovered .44/55-caliber cartridge casings confirmed that very few displayed evidence of pry or scratch marks. On the Custer portion of the battlefield only 3 of 88 casings showed any evidence of pry marks. On the Reno-Benteen Defense Site, out of 257 casings, only 7 showed evidence of prying. Based on this sample, it appears that malfunction caused by the carbines jamming was, at best, minimal and therefore cannot be considered to be a factor in the defeat.

              There is another possibility in that the men simply ran out of carbine ammunition, Each trooper only carried 50 rounds in his cartridge belt. The additional 50 rounds in his saddle bags were lost when the Indians stampeded the horses. Fifty rounds fired in the heat of battle could be expended in a very short period of time. The Colt revolvers, with their 24 rounds of ammo, would not have lasted long.

              Remember that Custer dispatched an urgent message to the pack train asking that the regimental ammo reserve be brought forward. There is a possibility that rather than jamming carbines, the real cause of Custer's defeat is that his men simply ran out of ammunition.

              This would also explain why Custer's command was strung out along Battle Ridge instead of being formed into a compact defensive position. The companies to the south, may have been trying to hold open a corridor for the pack train and the ammunition reserve.
              The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.

              Comment


              • #8
                Weapons of Little Big Horn-The Indians

                One of the enduring myths of LBH is that the Indians were armed with Winchester rifles and that this allowed them to overwhelm Custer's Battalion under the sheer weight of their firepower. At LBH the Indians were armed with weapons ranging from warclubs, bows and arrows, lances, knives, tomahawks and a wide array of old and new firearms. The Indians obtained their firearms through a variety of means ranging from trade, gun running, capture from enemies, or issued by the US government for hunting purposes.

                The archaeological excavations of the battlefield, starting in 1983 recovered cartridge casings from 45 different makes of firearms used by 371 different individuals. This evidence confirms that the Indians were in possession of Spencers, Sharps, Smith & Wessens, Evans, Forehand & Wadworths, Remingtons, Henrys, Starrs, Winchesters, Maynards and Enfields, as well as Springfields and Colts captured from the cavalry.

                An intresting view on the weapons used by the Indians came from the last survivor of the battle, Private Charles Windolph, a Medal of Honor winner with Company H. Windolph stated that at least half of of the Indians were armed with bows and arrows, another quarter were armed with old muzzleloaders and single-hot rifles, and the remainder were armed with repeaters.

                Major Marcus Reno stated in his Court of Inquiry that "the Indians had Winchester rifles and the column made a large target for them and they were pumping bullets into it." The Winchester was THE weapon of choice of the Indians whenever they could get get their hands on it.

                The Winchester Model 1866 fired a .44-caliber, 200-grain bullet with 28 grains of black powder. It had a magazine capacity of seventeen rounds and had an effective range of 100 yards and a maximum range of about 400 yards. Its main advantage was its high rate of fire of 34rpm, compared to the 17rpm of the Springfield.

                Indian tactics called for the warriors to remain hidden a safe distance away while they fired an endless barrage of arrows at the cavalrymen. Add to the arrow barrage the favored Indian tactic of infiltrating as close as possible to the cavalry and then using the awesome short range firepower of the Winchester...this allowed them to acheive complete fire-superiority over the cavalry.
                The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.

                Comment


                • #9
                  Wow. They only had 100 carbine rounds and 24 pistol rounds.

                  Yeah I would say it probably more lack of resupply of ammo, in combination with some reckless tactics, and some disregard of orders (depending on how you look at it). It kinda like reading one of those Second from disaster shows. Not one thing in particular may have led to a lost battle, but enough incidents happen during a timeline that led to failure.

                  I do find it interesting that Major Reno wasn't court martial afterwards, but considering how many Officers in the Army felt about GAC. There were many who felt he only got to his position by luck and hadn't really earned his way to position he held in the war and lack the experience of the post Civil War Army that held too.

                  On a side note, same Lt. Colonel GAC, seems to have been suspended from command of the said regiment, and was court martial for being AWOL due to the fact he went to see his wife.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by Abbott Shaull View Post
                    Wow. They only had 100 carbine rounds and 24 pistol rounds.
                    100 rounds per rifle wasn't far off "official issue" numbers in WWII.
                    A generous and sadistic GM,
                    Brandon Cope

                    http://copeab.tripod.com

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      The interesting "What if" of LBH

                      What I find the most unusual tale of June 26, 1876, is the note sent by GAC via Pvt John Martin to Captain Benteen.

                      GAC commanded 5 companies of the 7th Cav
                      Reno commanded 3
                      Benteen commanded 3
                      One company was with the pack train.

                      WHAT IF.....

                      Benteen had not been ordered by GAC to scout the left flank, instead stay with Reno, and the pack train to form a more compact unit.

                      Could the 7 Companies do more than the 5 with Custer

                      Hard to tell. Reno and Benteen fought for 2 days once reunited until reinforced by Terry. Probably would have made no difference on "Last Stand Hill"...But one of those little "what if's" of history

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Originally posted by Abbott Shaull View Post
                        Wow. They only had 100 carbine rounds and 24 pistol rounds.

                        I do find it interesting that Major Reno wasn't court martial afterwards, but considering how many Officers in the Army felt about GAC. There were many who felt he only got to his position by luck and hadn't really earned his way to position he held in the war and lack the experience of the post Civil War Army that held too.
                        Major Reno was court martialed for "improper advancements on a fellow officer's wife" in 1877.

                        What the press did to him is very familiar to what happens today if a military officer "gets out of line".

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          When you look at the available ammo loadout, you need to consider the means of transport. The typical cavalry mount has a useful load of 240 pounds. Attached is a list of equipment to be carried by a trooper for a five day patrol.

                          Halter: 2lbs 1oz
                          Watering Bridle: 1lb, 1.5oz
                          Bridle: 2lbs 13oz
                          Saddle: 14lbs 13.5oz
                          Saddle Bags: 2lbs 2oz
                          Filling of near side pouch of saddle bags,
                          10lbs of rations with meat in the can: 11lbs 2 oz
                          Filling of off side pouch of saddle bags,
                          1pr socks, 1 pr drawers, 2 shirts, 40rds carbine ammo, toilet articles: 7lbs 8
                          oz
                          Forage Sack with 15lbs of oats: 15lbs 6oz
                          Lariat and pin: 3lbs 1.5oz
                          Overcoat: 4lbs 6.5oz
                          Brush and shoe pouch: 1lb
                          Near-side pocket, curry comb and brush: 1lb
                          Off-side pocket, 2 horseshoes, 15 shoe nails: 2lbs
                          Saddle cover: 1lb
                          Surcingle: 11.5oz
                          Saber & slings: 4lbs 13oz
                          Waist belt and plate: 1lb
                          Pistol and holster: 3lbs 2oz
                          Carbine sling and swivel: 10lbs 4 oz
                          Carbine cartridge box: 1lb
                          24rds carbine ammo in box: 2lbs
                          Pistol cartridge pouch: 4oz
                          12rds pistol ammo in pouch: 14oz
                          Man: 140lbs

                          Total weight: 240lbs 12.5oz

                          As you can see, there is not a lot of room for extra gear, this is perhaps the major reason why the saber was left in garrision, that 4lbs and 13oz translates allowed for extra carbine/pistol ammo.
                          The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            I do find it interesting that Major Reno wasn't court martial afterwards, but considering how many Officers in the Army felt about GAC. There were many who felt he only got to his position by luck and hadn't really earned his way to position he held in the war and lack the experience of the post Civil War Army that held too.
                            Reno called for and was granted a Court of Inquiry, this court was little more than a dog-and-pony show, carried out by career military officers who wanted nothing more than to white-wash the entire LBH episode. Aided by the effort by the Seventh's remaining officers to avoid disgrace the unit. Their stories differed from reports made at the time, the only testimony against Reno was made by several of the civilian packers whose testimony was dismissed.

                            The finding of the court was as follows: "The conduct of the officers throughout was excellent, and while subordinates, in some instances, did more for the safety of the command by brilliant displays of courage than did Major Reno, there was nothing in his conduct which requires animadversion (criticism or censure) from this Court."

                            It was later discovered that one of the Courts officers Colonel Wesley Merritt had "closeted with the Recorder alone for several hours, and, it is understood, did most of the work of the decision, the Recorder having no voice save to present the case on trial."

                            Merritt had hated Custer since their days in the Cavalry Division of the Army of the Potomac and there was little doubt among the handful of Custer supporters that he had taken full advantage to blacken the name of his old rival.
                            Last edited by Targan; 12-18-2010, 09:40 PM. Reason: Fixed broken quote
                            The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              WHAT IF.....

                              Benteen had not been ordered by GAC to scout the left flank, instead stay with Reno, and the pack train to form a more compact unit.

                              Could the 7 Companies do more than the 5 with Custer

                              Hard to tell. Reno and Benteen fought for 2 days once reunited until reinforced by Terry. Probably would have made no difference on "Last Stand Hill"...But one of those little "what if's" of history
                              A more intresting "what if" is if Major Reno had not been present. In this case Benteen would have had the command of the valley fight. While everyone notes that Benteen hated Custer, nobody disputes Benteen's willigness to fight. Would he have paused halfway down the valley and go on the defensive Or would he have driven his charge home and completed the scatter of the Indians
                              The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.

                              Comment

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