OT: Rhodesian War Resources

[Webstral]

I've been reading a Christmas present over the past couple of weeks: The Saints: The Rhodesian Light Infantry. This, together with Fireforce by Chris Cocks, The Bush War in Rhodesia by Dennis Croukamp, Britain's Rebel Air Force (author unknown--I gave it to my father), and a USMC review of the Rhodesian War paint a fascinating picture of the Rhodesian counter-insurgency effort. One of the more interesting points is that the insurgents got creamed until Chinese-backed ZANU, operating out of Mozambique, started using Maoist methods of turning the local population in northeastern Rhodesia. At this point, the intelligence that had been so critical to Rhodesian security efforts dried up. Equally importantly, the British South African Police (basically, the Rhodesian cops) led the counter-insurgency effort in many areas until ZANU started using its Maoist methods in the northeast. Until that time, the BSAP could obtain information from the locals easily. After ZANU infiltrated a given village, the police lost their effectiveness entirely.

The lessons of the Rhodesian War probably have more application to the NATO effort in Afghanistan than the Twilight War. Still, a few of the salient points can be applied, perhaps. The Rhodesian Air Force operated a tiny fraction of the airframes the USAF, USN, and USMC operated over South Vietnam, but they were able to provide good air support to the Rhodesian troops on the ground. Aircraft availability was higher than for the USAF in South Vietnam, despite the embargo imposed on Rhodesia. Conventional wisdom holds that counterinsurgency forces need to maintain a 10:1 force ratio. The Rhodesians maintained something like a 1:1 ratio and won every fight for fifteen years. They were moderately-well equipped. Their effectiveness all seems to come back to morale, discipline, and training. The level of motivation was very high.

In particular, the Selous Scouts deserve mention. The Scouts fought the enemy on his own terms and did him one better. The Scouts went into the water to fight the shark, so to speak, and learned to bite him hard indeed. Okay, I'm getting away from lessons that are applicable to Twilight: 2000.

Support of the local population matters--especially when one is operating small units of light infantry. If the primary form of combat in a region is raids by light fighters, then the attitude of the locals makes a big difference. When an Army formation is trying to control a large area, such as the 78th Infantry Division in New Jersey, then the willingness of the locals to provide information may be the difference between success and failure in the Army's efforts to track and destroy marauders, etc. Generally, we'd think that the locals would be happy to provide whatever information they could on the bad guys; however, if the bad guys are good at intimidating the locals or have figured out a way to get the locals on their side, a small reaction force might not be able to deal with the marauders. I know we've discussed this idea many times, but reading about how ZANU used Maoist tactics to defeat the Rhodesians brings the lesson home to me again.

Freedom to use the roads means freedom to bring overwhelming force to bear. The wise enemy will try to deny Blue Force the ability to use the roads in his own rear area. The effect on mines on the Portuguese in Mozambique was pretty debilitating. Raiders from both sides will try to disrupt transportation in the enemy's rear. As applied to Thunder Empire, Mexican raiders will try to prevent Fort Huachuca's forces from using the roads to bring in overwhelming combat power once (if) the Mexican raiders are discovered. A steady trickle of random casualties also would be a good thing, if only to sap American morale and make road movement an exercise in anxiety.

Small quantities of equipment in the hands of well-trained, highly-motivated, and well-led troops can perform brilliantly on the battlefield. Obviously, this is not news to anyone here. The Rhodesian experience, however, really highlights the fact that this principal can be applied to very small forces.

Again, though, the Rhodesian War probably offers more lessons for Afghanistan than for Twilight: 2000.


Webstral

[Raellus]

After I wrote up the back-story for my oft-delayed T2K Kenya campaign (Operation Proud Lion), I started reading up on the Rhodesian bush wars since they seem to offer a precedent for that kind of low-tech, low intensity warfare in the African veldt that I am envisioning for the 173rd BCT c.2000. I've read both Fireforce, which was not bad, and Croukamp's book, which I found very disappointing. I really wanted to learn more about Selous Scout tactics and operations and Croukamp's book offered very little detail concerning either. Most of the book seemed to center around his personal life which, at times, was pretty creepy (dating a 13 year old and groping a married woman who was in bed with her husband). When he did write about combat ops, which was pretty rarely, he really didn't offer much detail. He mentioned finding guerilla "spoor" countless times but he never went into detail about what that actually was. He really came across as a bit of a sociopath and his writing voice and style verged on sophomoric.

Unfortunately, books about Rhodesia's wars are both rare and expensive.

[Webstral]

I agree that one learns too little of the "trade secrets", if you will.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

Although they're not going to reveal trade secrets in great detail, you want to look for books by Peter Stiff.
I have the ISBNs for the following: -
"See You In November" ISBN 0 94702 026 8
"Selous Scouts Top Secret War" ISBN 0 620 06674 1

The last book was written by Stiff from the words of Lt.Col. Ron Reid Daly.

Other books include: -
"Tommy Goes Home"
"Selous Scouts - A Pictorial Account"
"Taming The Landmine"

Publication was typically in the 1980s so these books are probably best located through places like Amazon, ALibris or AbeBooks

[dragoon500ly]

Although they're not going to reveal trade secrets in great detail, you want to look for books by Peter Stiff.
I have the ISBNs for the following: -
"See You In November" ISBN 0 94702 026 8
"Selous Scouts Top Secret War" ISBN 0 620 06674 1

The last book was written by Stiff from the words of Lt.Col. Ron Reid Daly.

Other books include: -
"Tommy Goes Home"
"Selous Scouts - A Pictorial Account"
"Taming The Landmine"

Publication was typically in the 1980s so these books are probably best located through places like Amazon, ALibris or AbeBooks

LTC Ron Reid Daly was the former commander of the Selous Scouts, his book goes a bit more into the background and forming of the unit and covers some of their wilder operations (including their cross-border ones).

"Spoor" was local slang for tracks, while the Selous Scouts did quite a bit of tracking (it was their official cover story), what they were really known for was using "turned" guerillas to combat active guerillas. Surprisingly enough, none of these former guerillas ever betrayed their Rhodesian allies after being turned.

Selous Scouts,Top Secret War is one of the better reads, good luck finding a copy!

[Targan]

I don't regard "spoor" as slang. Spoor is one of the old words used in hunting. Perhaps it might seem like slang now because it is a word rarely used in modern American English but it isn't a colloquialism.

[dragoon500ly]

You know, if I ask about 20 of the local rednecks what "spoor" meant...I'd bet a paycheck that at least 15 of them will check the bottoms of their boots...and the other 5 will start scrapping their boots on the nearest curb!

[headquarters]

lingo

I don't regard "spoor" as slang. Spoor is one of the old words used in hunting. Perhaps it might seem like slang now because it is a word rarely used in modern American English but it isn't a colloquialism.

in our beautiful Norse tongue , spor means literally "track" - to track somebody is to "spore "

anyways.

The Rhodesian war has interesting points indeed - their home made equiptment for one- read about them producing their own FAVs on a budget when embargos etc dried out their sources.

[helbent4]

I don't regard "spoor" as slang. Spoor is one of the old words used in hunting. Perhaps it might seem like slang now because it is a word rarely used in modern American English but it isn't a colloquialism.

Targan,

Spoor is not an unused or even particularly rare term in North America, albeit it's normally used relating to hunting/tracking animals (hence Lee's comment about rednecks). What might make it slang in this context is applying it to the tracking and hunting of human beings during counter-insurgency operations, as it were. I'm sure the comparison of African guerrillas to animals hunted for sport is purely unintentional!

(Seriously, for all their faults the Europeans in Rhodesia were certainly more willing accept the principle of majority rule before the Apartheid-era South Africans, at least when their ship was going down.)

Tony

[Panther Al]

Until recently my knowledge of the war was sparse, but recently I started reading up on it I have to admit, I'm impressed with what they was able to do with all the handicaps they suffered under. Makes one wonder what they could have done without the sanctions. As an aside, back when I was Iraq we was assigned to do escort for the folks moving all the new currency to they banks. They also had private security, mostly from Fiji. But two of them, both older, was from Rhodesia and talked about all the times they was running around in g-cars. Wish I knew then what I know now, would have loved to hear those stories.

[Panther Al]

in our beautiful Norse tongue , spor means literally "track" - to track somebody is to "spore "

Heh, always wanted to pick up a scandinavian language but never had the chance. Except for a summer in high school when I found the only copy of "Burnt Njal" they had was in old norse and I spent the summer pouring over a old textbook edited by Tolkien translating it. Man, is it wierd I found that fun

[pmulcahy11b]

Heh, always wanted to pick up a scandinavian language but never had the chance. Except for a summer in high school when I found the only copy of "Burnt Njal" they had was in old norse and I spent the summer pouring over a old textbook edited by Tolkien translating it. Man, is it wierd I found that fun

I once, with a Latin-English dictionary, spent months giving most of the D&D monsters Latin genus and species names.

[Panther Al]

I once, with a Latin-English dictionary, spent months giving most of the D&D monsters Latin genus and species names.

Now that's just awesome. Please tell me you have a copy of that still and if you do, what's the odds of getting one myself

[pmulcahy11b]

Now that's just awesome. Please tell me you have a copy of that still and if you do, what's the odds of getting one myself

Naw, one of those things that got lost over the years, like my D&D characters. Now that really hurt. I used to save them all, dead or alive.

[dragoon500ly]

Rhodesian OOB info: The Guerrillias

The Oppos:

There were basically three African nationalist organizations involved in the Rhodesian Bush War, there are:

Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). This was the original nationalist movement led by Joshua Nkomo. It's military wing is the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army or ZPRU, led by "Nikita" Mangena until his death in 1978 and succeeded by "Lookout" Masuku. Basically, this is the Russian-backed faction. ZIPRA is the more "regular" of the two major organizations. It remained based in Zambia and Botswana. Enjoying lavish Soviet supportthan its ZANLA rivals. By 1977, ZIPRA had few guerrillas in Rhodesia (200 active vs 3,000 ZANLA). This was partially due to their hope for a negotiated settlement, but there was also a widely-held belief that they were waiting for ZANLA and the Rhodesian security forces would fight each other to a standstill. ZIPRA held its main forces in Zambia where they built-up a conventional mechanized brigade equipped with T-34 tanks and BTR-152 APCs. It was also confirmed that ZIPRA was planning a full scale assault into Rhodesia by 1979, supported by their own air force.

Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Formed in 1963 when a number of more radical nationalists left ZAPU to form their own movement. Led by Robert Mugabe after 1975. Its military army is the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), intially led by a political committee until 1974, when Joseph Tongogara was appointed commander until his death in 1979 and replaced by Rex Nhongo. Basically, this is the Chinese-backed faction. Initially operated from bases in Zambia, but following the the collapse of Portuguese rule in Mozambique in 1974, they shifted the majority of their forces/support network there. ZANLA had more manpower and maintained more guerrillia groups in Rhodesia. Also noted as the more terrorist-like of the guerrillias.

Front For the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI). Formed in 1970 by breakaway sections of both ZAPU and ZANU. It tried to operate its own guerrilla groups but could not compete with the larger organizations. Disappeared after 1974.

Having two different nationalist organizations is clearly counter-productive and in 1972, ZAPU and ZANU were persuaded to establish a Joint Military Command by the various African states that also supported the two organizations. The JMC failed to work. A more determined attempt was made in 1975, when the military wings were forced to unite as the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). It was commanded by a new Joint Military Command headed by ZANLA's Nhongo, with a ZIPRA deputy. There were several attempts to integrate the two forces, but there were difficulties from the start, by 1977, the ZIPA was effectively ZANLA-controlled.

Both groups operated in teams of about ten men, armed with a RPG-7 or light mortar, a light machine gun and half a dozen automatic rifles. Weapons included Russian grenades, Tokarov pistols, PPSh SMGs, SKS carbines and AK-47 assault rifles, Czech M52/65, French MAS and even old German Mauser rifles and MP-40 SMGs. Soviet pattern land lines and even 75mm recoilless rifles were also used, but the problems of transporting them limited their use.

Each team would have a commander and his deputy, a political commissar and his deputy, medical, supply and security specialists and about three ordinary guerillias. Reconnaissance was the responsibility of the "mujibas", boys of school age who hung around the army camps and passed on details of what they saw. Other services were provided by "chimbwidos", female helpers who cooked and carried supplies and messages for the guerillias.