Tweet
Found an interesting tidbit on Global Security. This is part-fictional discussion of the use of motorcycles in combat. I've posted the fictional part that includes a WWIII in Europe and various reports about the effectiveness of the 24th Marine Motorcycle Regiment (also fictional).
For the entire report...
EXCERPTS
Chapter 1
The Beginning of World War III
The readers of popular fiction or the military
enthusiast may have read accounts about how a future World
War III started. Between the mid-1970's and 1980's, the
military, social, and economic competition between the United
States and the Soviet Union was portrayed by novelists as
leading to the third great war of the 20th century.
In Red Storm Rising, one of the best selling books from
Tom Clancy published in 1986, disenchanted Muslims sabotaged
the Soviet Union's newest and biggest POL refinery in Western
Siberia. The resulting fire completely destroyed the
refinery and the well tops in the adjacent oil field. The
thirteen member Politburo was briefed that 34% of the
country's total crude oil production would be lost for a
minimum period of one year and perhaps as long as three
years. While the refinery represented only 14% of the
country's refining capacity, the Nizhnevartovsk complex
processed 'light' crude oil. That oil was relatively easy to
refine and thus contained disproportionate amounts of the
most valuable fractions, i.e., gasoline, kerosene, and diesel
fuel. The losses for these distillates as a percentage of
total Soviet production was 44%, 48% and 50% respectively.
The loss was described to the Politburo as "disaster of
unprecedented scale for our economy."1 This disaster was not
just a single event, but an unfortunate combination of other
economic, social, and political factors. There was already a
crude oil shortfall of thirty-two million tons annually.
Coal production was 16% below plan and getting worse. While
gas production was improving, much of the output was going to
Western Europe to earn foreign currency, which in turn was
used to purchase foreign oil and grain. The total crude oil
shortfall after the fire was projected to cause a thirty-fold
increase in imported oil. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union
could barely afford a doubling of foreign oil purchases
because of low currency reserves.
In the Politburo, the practical effect of the disaster
was presented in bleak terms by the Defense Minister: two
hundred fifty million citizens, hungry and in the dark, the
Red Army, ministry of Interior, and KGB with restricted fuel
supplies. The NATO alliance would learn of the crisis and
politically exploit it. The existence of the state was
threatened. The Politburo decided that the only way the
Party could survive was to invade the Persian Gulf,
specifically Iran and Iraq, and seize their oil fields.
Since these fields supplied significant amounts of crude oil
to Western Europe and Japan, the Politburo feared a nuclear
response from the United States. To avoid this, they decided
that NATO had to be eliminated as a political and military
force.
Red Storm was the method of elimination: the code name
for a mechanized attack. The plan called for strategic
surprise using conventional weapons only. It would be a
short campaign thrusting into West Germany and the Low
Countries. The Soviet leadership felt if mobilization of
NATO could be delayed seven days, the campaign would achieve
its objectives in two or three weeks and NATO would be forced
into peace negotiations on unfavorable terms.
Red Storm Rising was a 1986 World War III scenario
caused by an oil shortage. A 1985 conflict was envisioned by
Sir John Hackett in his books, The Third World War August
1985 and The Third World War: The Untold Story. Sir John, a
soldier and military scholar from Great Britain, also
described a war between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO nations.
The instigator was again the Soviet Union. It was faced
with many internal and external problems. Poland was
diverging from the Soviet communist model. East Germany was
seeking a greater political role in Warsaw Pact affairs
proportionate to its economic superiority in Eastern Europe.
There was a growth of nationalism in the Soviet Asian
republics and tbe USSR was also faced with its third
consecutive disastrous grain harvest. Essentially,
"there had long been a growing awareness among the
rulers of the USSR of increasing strains within the
Warsaw Pact, and within the Soviet Union itself,
which could hardly be contained without a signal
military victory over the capitalist West. There
had also been, among the top people in the regime,
a very real fear of West Germany."2
In 1984, discussions were held in the Politburo
regarding the political situation in Europe. Both the KGB
and the Soviet Army General Staff (GRU) concluded for
different reasons that Western Europe was dying of social
decay. The KGB believed that strong trade unions, labor
unrest and massive unemployment, compounded by government
inaction, was leading to industrial anarchy. The GRU
believed the decay lay in the spread of neutralist and
pacifist attitudes. Western Europe did not want to defend
itself. With the aforementioned problems within the Soviet
Union and its client states, the political situation in
Western Europe presented itself as the classic "window of
opportunity" in the military sense. Attack and neutralize an
unprepared enemy while at the same time solidifying control
over unruly allies. If the opportunity was lost, it might
never appear again.
The war was staged. The Kremlin plan called for an
attack on West Germany by conventional and chemical means and
the selective bombing of port facilities in other European
countries. Warsaw Pact forces were to consolidate along the
Rhine within ten days and negotiate a cease fire with the
United States from a position of strength. To precipitate
this invasion and make it appear politically justified, the
Soviets first occupied the Slovenia region of Yugoslavia.
This incursion was opposed by American forces from Italy. The
Soviets had anticipated the response and deemed it an attack
on a peace loving socialist nation. They followed with their
full scale "defensive action" against NATO for which they had
been fully prepared and mobilized.
These popular books by Clancy and Hackett presented a
perspective that was widely believed by the western
democracies; the Soviet Union would be the aggressor in the
next world war. Who actually started the Third World War is
still being debated. It did not begin in 1985 or 1986. It
started in 1995. In retrospect it was a war between two aged
and overcommitted superpowers trying to restore their
youthful vigor. How and why it started is one of the great
ironies of modern history.
The period between 1988 and 1995 was an era of
increasing optimism between the Soviet Union and the United
States. In 1988 the United States Senate ratified the U.S.-
Soviet treaty eliminating Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces.
In 1988 the Soviet Union began withdrawing its combat forces
from Afghanistan in a kind of "peace with honor" retirement
similar to the United States' withdrawal from South Vietnam
in the early 1970's. Regular summits were held regarding the
reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals and in 1993 the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-2) was signed. It
called for a 10% reduction in strategic nuclear warheads and
it was widely expected that subsequent treaties would be
signed reducing the nuclear arsenals in stages by at least an
additional 40%. Also, in 1993, an agreement in principal was
recognized between the United States and the Soviet Union on
Conventional Arms Reductions. Although not reduced to treaty
form, the countries agreed to reduce their conventional
forces in Europe by a modest 5%. The withdrawals began in
June 1994. Again, expectations were high that a formalized
treaty would recognize further permanent reductions.
Although American-Soviet relations were arguably better
than at any point since World War II, the two adversaries
were insecure. Both countries saw their political and
economic influence waning in central Europe. There was
serious political unrest in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland
and East Germany as those countries seemed bent on
determining their own version of a communist state. In
Western Europe, the negotiated troop withdrawal was seen as
de facto recognition of changing U.S. strategic priorities
and increased nationalism in the NATO alliance countries.
America was turning its attention to the growing economic
importance of the western Pacific and South America, and
countries such as Spain, Turkey, and Greece had gradually
reduced the American military presence because of internal
political pressures.
It all seemed manageable, though. In fact, the
superpowers had greatly increased their social and cultural
ties to a level unknown in the cold-war period. One of the
many cultural exchange programs involved a series of events
which would culminate in the 50th anniversary of the founding
of the modern Polish and East German States in 1997 and 1999,
respectively. There were a number of events scheduled for
1995 and, as far as Americans were concerned, the biggest
revolved around the cities of Chicago and Milwaukee in the
United States, and Gdansk, Poland and Rostock in the German
Democratic Republic.
Both Chicago and Milwaukee had sizable populations of
Polish and German immigrant descendants. After some lengthy
negotiations between all interested parties they decided that
cultural ties could be enhanced by the simultaneous port call
visits of American, Polish and East German warships. On
April 15, 1995, East German and Polish frigates would be
separately escorted to Chicago and Milwaukee with reciprocal
arrangements for an American frigate and an LST in Gdansk and
Rostock respectively. After a one week stay the warships
would change ports.
The port calls began as tremendous successes.
Tragically, however, despite the extraordinary security
precautions, on the evening of 20 April a light plane laden
with explosives was flown into the side of the East German
warship anchored in Lake Michigan near Chicago. The frigate
promptly sank. Although an anti-communist group of Christian
fundamentalists opposed to rapprochement with the Soviet
Union and its allies quickly took creidt for the attack, it
was an international incident of the first magnitude.
The sight of the frigate superstructure jutting above
the waves of Lake Michigan in full view of the commuters
along Lake Shore Drive and the workers in the downtown
highrises was a powerful vision for the world press -- many
of whom had been covering the goodwill visits in the American
cities. While there was minimal loss of life because most of
the crew was staying with American families in the Chicago
area, the political damage was irreparable.
On the 21st of April, Polish and East German naval
forces boarded and seized the American ships. Although the
U.S. government guaranteed compensation for the loss and safe
passage for the remaining Polish frigate into international
waters, the situation quickly deteriorated. NATO and Warsaw
Pact forces were put on an increased alert status.
On 25 April, the East German government declared that
the U.S. sailors would be put on trial for espionage. On 26
April the Polish frigate, by this time near the Saint
Lawrence Seaway, was escorted to Rochester, New York. The
U.S. government declared that the East German and Polish
sailors would be turned over to the International Red Cross
unless they requested political asylum. It was hoped that
this move would secure the release of the American ships and
crews. If an agreement could be reached, a Polish crew could
then be flown to the United States to return the warship.
Negotiations fell apart when a majority of the crews
reportedly requested political asylum. The U.S. government
couldn't immediately resolve the classical dilemma: should
the sailors be returned to their respective countries against
their will or should they be granted political protection
On 1 May, East Germany, acting in concert with Soviet
army forces, cutoff ground access to West Berlin. On 2 May
a West German C-130 carrying American and British MP's was
shot down on its approach to the Templehof airport in West
Berlin and on 3 May the West Germans shot down an East German
MIG-29, claiming the pilot had violated West German airspace.
In another unfortunate turn of events, the pilot who was
captured after bailing out turned out to be a major in the
Soviet Air Force.
The Soviet Union, United States and their allies began
mobilizing in early May. The 24th Marine Regiment was one of
the first reserve units called up to active duty. They
reported to aerial ports of embarkation on the 19th of May
and by the 26th all the regiments' Marines and most of its
equipment was staged in the vicinity of Hannover, West
Germany.
Although the aggrieved parties tried to diffuse the
situation in the United Nations during May, there were two
ominous developments. Opposing forces, including units
airlifted from the United States began moving closer to the
East German/West German border. At the border there was
sporadic combat. While ground troops were firing at each
other in a realtively harmless fashion, patrol aircraft
became increasingly aggressive and launched their missiles
deeper into the sovereign airspace of their quarry. On May
31st, the war began in earnest with almost simultaneous air
strikes and massive artillery barrages along both sides of
the border.
The 24th Marines and their motorcycles were initially
employed as part of a strategic reserve. Their mobility and
antiarmor/antiaircraft weapons were to be used to blunt any
armor breakthrough in their sector. Why the 24th Marines and
their Harley-Davidson motorcycles were among the first
reserve forces airlifted to West Germany is a fascinating
story that combined history, economics, politics, and the
changing U.S. military establishinent. First, an historical
perspective of the motorcycle and its employment in warfare.
In early 1995, the furthest thing from the minds of the
24th Marines was combat. There were probably some fleeting
thoughts of preparation for summer drills but
the preoccupations were the normal springtime concerns:
baseball, the opening of fishing season, warm weather, home
repairs, and family vacations. No one could have possibly
foreseen the mobilization call on 6 May and the deployment to
West Germany which followed. In less than a month's time the
Marines and Sailors went from the security blanket of close
communication with family and friends to the uncertainty of
notes and letters to distant loved-ones when time permitted.
Chapter 5
The 24th Marines in Combat
Editor's note: The Regimental Chaplain, Commander Richard
Hill, USNR, dated the following letter 8
July, 1995. Now semi-retired, his
"congregation" is the patients at the
Veterans Administration Hospital in Chicago.
Dearest Margaret,
Nothing in my ministry to Sailors and Marines over these
last fifteen years could have prepared me for what I have
seen, and smelled, and heard, and touched in the last six
weeks. The extent of death, destruction and misery numbs the
senses. It is as if the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse have
become our constant companions. An ordinary death is an
extraordinary event. To die in a mundane accident seems to
be the tragic loss of life. The other forms of dying:
shooting, exploding, crushing, burning and a dozen other
traumas, seem more necessary than tragic. We need all our
Marines so they can go into battle.
I had never doubted there was a God until now. My faith
was tested. After much praying my doubts have vanished, but
my belief has a different basis. Amid this devastation lies
the fundamental truth about the existence of God and his
relationship to Man. While God is perfect, He creates
imperfection. It couldn't be otherwise.
Had He created man as a perfect image we would Gods
ourselves. While it is abundantly clear in this landscape
that our imperfection is a curse, our imperfection is our
greatest blessing. We can still aspire to be God-like. So
much for my self-doubts and the short sermon. There is hope.
I have a new enlisted assistant. He will take the place
of Private Carson who was seriously wounded a week ago. Our
position was nearly overrun. Our regiment helped stop a
Russian advance and he was injured by artillery fire. I think
he is going to make it. I hope I can say the same for the
rest of us. Our movement has been in every direction except
East.
How are the children I think the dearest possession I
have now is the picture of you and the children...
Pray for the end of this
All my love,
Richard
Defensive Operations
The Marines were in an uncomfortable position. They
were not on the offense and they were not part of a Marine
command. With the exception of a few specialized units, they
were the only Marine Corps unit of any size deployed to
central Europe at that time. There had been two battalion-
sized Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) aboard naval shipping
prior to the outbreak of hostilities but they had been
diverted to the north Atlantic area when the U.S. warships
were seized in Poland and East Germany. The MEU's had
subsequently deployed to Norway.
The 24th Marines found themselves as part of the 10th
(US) Corps, which in turn constituted the reserve of Allied
Forces Central. There was some confusion as to how to best
employ the regiment and it was eventually decided to attach
each of the battalions to a 10th Corps division: the 52d
Infantry Division (Mechanized); the 54th Infantry Division
(Mechanized); and the 14 Panzers. The Corps commander,
Lieutenant General Thompson, later remarked, "I inspected the
regiment on a soccer field near Hannover. They were in full
battle dress, straddling their motorcycles. With their black
machines, camouflaged uniforms, and black helmets with the
dark visor down they looked like a swarm of mutant insects.
As I approached the formation, the commanding officer called
the regiment to attention. With that the Marines started
their cycles and pulled them up on their rear wheels, all the
while revving the engines. The noise actually sent a shiver
down my spine. I had a sudden image of them riding straight
to hell. I just hoped that was near Moscow somewhere."
During the first month of the war, the belligerents
tried to obtain air superiority for their respective ground
Forces. Due to the sudden outbreak or war, both sides were
relatively unprepared for mobilization and the deployment of
their armies. Air forces on each side were the most combat
ready of any of the strategic forces. Consequently, the
first phase of the war was primarily an air battle. Both
sides attempted to disrupt lines of communication and combat
formations, destroy command and control facilities and
logistics bases, and neutralize each other's air combat
power. Both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces had one singular
success in these efforts. The numbers of destroyed, damaged
and ineffective for maintenance aircraft reached staggering
proportions. The skills of the individual pilots and the
tactics of aircraft formations were largely negated by
technology. Antiaircraft missiles, whether hand held,
vehicle mounted, or air delivered were extremely effective.
Losses were in the thousands. It was no glamour war for the
air force of either side.
As a consequence of the mutual losses, only localized
air superiority could be achieved. Much of the remaining air
assets were used to protect vital installations and to escort
mobilized troops to the theater of operations. By the end of
June there was little impediment to either side in
positioning their ground combat formations. The "air" had
been temporarily removed from the expected air-land battle.
Without the aircraft assets at the front lines, the battle
was shaping up as protracted land warfare. Rather than the
carefully orchestrated ballet of combined arms, maneuver
warfare, blitzkrieg type tactics and the like, it appeared it
might become a wrestling match between two heavyweights.
The Warsaw Pact saw the situation emerging as
advantageous to their forces. With the air forces of both
sides effectively neutralized, the top Soviet military
commanders believed they held a strategic and operational
advantage because of their overwhelming numerical
superiority in armor and artillery, plus their ability to
quickly move their mechanized and motorized forces. By the
end of June and early July they began to exploit these
advantages.
The Soviet's basic principle of land warfare was
violent, sustained, and deep offensive action. Mechanized
and armored formations, supported by air action and
artillery, were to seize the initiative, penetrate the
enemy's defenses, and drive deeply and decisively into the
enemy's rear area.1 The essence of the attack and final
assault was combined arms cooperation based on the close and
uninterrupted interaction of all forces to best exploit their
capabilities. The Soviets believed the tank was the major
ground force weapon. It was the keystone of combined arms
cooperation in the attack. Concern for the enemy anti-tank
threat was the dominating factor in coordinating the combined
arms effort.2
In late June the Soviet's 28th Combined Arms Army began
massing west of Magdeburg for an attack towards Hannover. It
was to be a classic assault by the Army's five maneuver
divisions. They would begin a frontal attack and use
selected regiments to exploit open enemy flanks, gaps, and
breaches. With maneuver room the regiments would begin deep
envelopments on division objectives. It was the simple
tactical application of their offensive doctrine. When a
first echelon regiment's battalions had achieved a major
penetration, the area of penetration would be widened for
exploitation by second echelon forces.3 The division second
echelon or combined arms reserve would ideally be committed
upon the achievement of the division's immediate objective.
This commitment had to take place before the momentum of the
advance decreased.4 Intensified reconnaissance, artillery
and air strikes, and rapid ground attacks would be employed
to locate and destroy enemy reserves.5 Assuming the division
commander committed his second echelon or reserve on the axis
of the most successful penetration and the attack continued
successfully, the break-through could be developed further by
the parent army's commitment of follow-on forces. Additional
divisions could be deployed on a widening and ever deepening
rapid penetration and exploitation.6 The attack would
achieve an operational breakthrough.
Although the preferred method of Soviet attack was an
attack from the march, their attack from a position in direct
contact did have some advantages.7 It allowed more thorough
study of terrain and NATO force dispositions; it permitted a
more refined organization of battle; and it was easier to
coordinate fire and maneuver.8
The attack commenced at 0400, 29 June. By the next
day it was obvious to the commander of the 28th Combined Arms
Army that things were going well. Although he had received
only a small fraction of the aviation requirements he thought
prudent, the similar lack of opposing aviation negated the
disadvantage. Elements of the 7th Guards Tank Division and
the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division had achieved
breakthroughs and were already engaged with units suspected
of being NATO reserves of the 10th (US) Corps.
The battalions of the 24th Marines, attached to their
respective NATO divisions, were deployed near the rear
boundaries of front-line units. In general they had the
mission to assist in sector defense. For the motorcycle
Marines it was an ideal mission. The mobility of the cycles
allowed them to respond to areas of breakthrough and deploy
in width or depth as the situation required.
Within unit formations the motorcycles were employed in
fire teams of four motorcycles each. Besides personal
weapons two cycles carried a full complement of six JAWS
each. The other two cyclists composed a light machine-gun
team to provide suppressive fire in case dismounted troops
accompanied the most likely targets for the JAWS gunners:
tanks and light armored vehicles. The machine gun team also
carried extra JAWS rounds and everyone carried a variety of
smoke rounds. The smoke could be launched by rifle or
dropped individually to screen movement from position to
position.
While in the reserve area east of Hannover, the Marines
had rehearsed extensively for day and night operations. The
terrain was advantageous to their employment. There was an
extensive system of primary and secondary roads which could
be used for high speed ingress and egress. Cover and
concealment were also excellent. There were numerous wooded
areas and ample man-made structures for convenient hiding
spots. The cyclists familiarized themselves with the key
terrain and obstacles, and prepared firing positions in depth
along likely avenues of approach. The weather was an unknown
factor. Rain, in particular, could limit mobility. However,
if and when an attack came, the Marines expected to be able
to fire and move repeatedly.
The tactics and weapons were tested in earnest on 30
June. In the early morning darkness, the first thermal
images of Soviet tanks, BRDM's, and personnel carriers
appeared on the sights of the Marines anti-tank weapons.
What happened then can best be described by a sequence of
conversations that appeared in Red Storm Rising but could
have just as easily been said by the commander of the 28th
Combined Arms Army.
"Every time we break through," Major Sergetov (the
aide to General Alexseyev) observed quietly, "they
slow us down and counterattack. This was not
supposed to happen."
"A splendid observation!" Alexseyev (Deputy
CINC, Western Theater) snarled, then regained his
temper. "We expected that a breakthrough would
have the same effect as in the last war against the
Germans. The problem is these new light anti-tank
missiles. Three men and a jeep... can race along
the road set up, fire one or two missiles, be gone
before we can react, then repeat the process a few
hundred meters away. Defensive fire power was
never so strong before, and we failed to appreciate
how effectively a handful of rear guard troops can
slow down an advancing column. Our security is
based on movement... a mobile force under these
conditions cannot afford to be slowed down. A
simple breakthrough is not enough! We must blast a
massive hole in their front and race at least
twenty kilometers to be free of these roving
missile crews. Only then can we switch over to
mobile doctrine."
"You say we cannot win"
"I say what I did four months ago and I was
correct: this campaign of ours has become a war of
attrition. For the moment, technology has defeated
the military art, ours and theirs. What we're
doing now is seeing who runs out of men and arms
first."9
Later, Major Sergetov remarked to his father, a minister
at the Kremlin:
"But the worst thing of all are their anti-
tank missiles -- you know, just like ours, and
these missiles work all too well... Three men in a
wheeled vehicle. One driver, one gunner, one
loader. They hide behind a tree at a turn in the
road and wait. Our column comes into view and they
fire from a range of -- say two kilometers.
They're trained to go for the command tank -- the
one with the radio antenna up. As often as not the
first warning we have is when the first weapon
hits. They fire one more and kill another tank,
then race away before we can call down artillery
fire. Five minutes later, from another spot, it
happes again. It's eating us up."10
In much the same manner, the motorcycle Marines engaged
the Soviet vehicles. Their weapons and tactics were
effective, and they helped stop several penetrations along
the front. They weren't alone, of course. In the overall
scheme of things, the regiment was a very small piece of the
puzzle. Its Army friends and German allies were just as
responsible, perhaps more so, in preventing the introduction
of follow-on forces which could have widened and exploited
the initial breakthroughs by the 7th Guards Tank Division and
the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division.
By the middle of July, NATO forces were on an offensive
of their own. For the American public the offensive spirit
was embodied in the 24th Marines. The regiments' notoriety
had a life of its own. The making of a legend happened
somewhat by accident. After a lull in the Soviet offensive
operations of late June and early July, a writer for the an
Wisconsin State Journal filed a story for the Madison paper
about the local men from Delta Company, 2d Battalion, 24th
Marines. In it he described-how the "Low Riders" were
proudly fighting on Harley-Davidsons. After each action, the
Marines were keeping score by painting small tanks, trucks,
and personnel carriers on the gas tanks of their Harleys,
much in the same way as fighter pilots of the last great war
recorded their kills on the sides of their fighters. The
story was picked up by wire services across the country. It
wasn't long before camera crews were on hand to dutifully put
the Marines and their cycles on film. It made great copy.
Marines (reservists at that), Harley-Davidson motorcycles,
evidence of success: it had the aura of a gun fighter
notching his belt after a shoot-out at high noon. It was a
human story. While the tanks and jets had their share of
success, there was an impersonal quality about the way they
carried out their deadly business.
For their part, the Marines did little to dispel any
myths. Their natural braggadocio not only made great copy,
it made great viewing. The new 'aces' of modern warfare were
born.
Editor's Note: The following letter was dated 18 July, 1995.
The writer is Corporal Rickey Hunter,
originally a member of Headquarters and
Service Company, 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines.
This letter to his brother is the last his
family received. Corporal Hunter was
reported missing in action on 23 July.
Dear Mike,
How'd you like to trade places with me Everyone
thought when we left St. Louis on those C-5's the most
dangerous part of the trip would be liberty in Germany
somewhere. We thought this was just another screw-up by the
politicians and we would be back home in a week or two
sucking up some Budweiser at a Mets-Cardinal baseball game!
Not only was that wrong, but I thought I'd get to pound away
on a typewriter or something like that. Wrong again. At
least not dead wrong-yet.
No sooner than we got here and I was put on a cycle like
the rest of the grunts. I feel like I'm an official Fat Bob
now. Fat Bobs, -- can you believe it Everyone runs around
asking if you've seen Bob. When we hear that we try to stick
out our gut as far as we can. The Army guys think we're
pretty bizarre. They're right.
Anyway, if you want to know the truth, its bad over
here. Our losses are pretty heavy already. Jessie and Alan
are missing but that's the way it is. We go out, shoot and
move, shoot and move -- go back and reload and head out
again. When its all over there's always some missing -- they
just disappear.
So much for the bad news. You can tell the guys back
home I'm an ace. I know I got at least five. When that
happens we paint an ace of spades on our helmet. If the ammo
holds out at the rate I'm going maybe I'll have a full house
soon (that's five aces for some reason). As for good news I
do have some jokes for you. Here goes -- they all relate to
food -- don't ask me why.
How many different kinds of tank crews are there
Two - original recipe and crispy.
Why are hamburgers and tanks alike
They both lose weight during cooking.
What do crewmen and french fries have in common
Both are placed in a tank and deep fat fried.
Better to be blown away than burned away I say. Well,
rumor is we're going to see some more Marines from the States
soon and attack in a different direction. Don't tell Mom the
crispy-critter jokes -- Dad might savor them though.
This Bud's for you brother!
Semper Fi
Rickey
Offensive Operations
On the 2d of August the 24th Marines were officially
detached from the 10th (US) Corps to join the 4th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). The 4th MEB, nominally assigned
the mission to reinforce NATO's northern flank in Norway, had
just made an amphibious landing in West Germany in the
vicinity of Bremerhaven. It was the intent of the 4th MEB,
as part of a combined NATO force, to drive north and east of
Hamburg along the East German coast. Presuming there was
sufficient amphibious lift capability and sea lines of
communications stayed open along the approaches to the Baltic
Sea, the 4th MEB would conduct a series of landings along the
East German and Polish coasts or move overland to seize port
facilities and landing sites. Both strategies would
accommodate the introduction of additional follow-on forces
at advanced naval bases.
The 24th Marines were happy to be back in the Marine
Corps fold. At Bremerhaven they had a chance to catch some
well deserved rest and perform much needed maintenance on
their cycles. There were even additional reservists to be
used as individual replacements, and some cycles and spare
parts had been flown in. The men and equipment didn't fill
all the holes but the regiment was flushed with success and
anxious to show some offensive spirit to the newly arrived
expeditionary leathernecks. Again, the battalions of the
24th Marines were attached out, this time as part of the
three maneuver elements of the brigade: the 2d Marine
Regiment, the 8th Marine Regiment, and Task Force Super
Glide. Super Glide was a mechanized task force of a U.S.
Army tank battalion and two infantry companies mounted in
Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles, the 2d Marine Light
Armored Vehicle (LAV) Battalion with their organic infantry,
a self-propelled artillery battalion, and 3rd Battalion, 24th
Marines.
Opposing the 4th MEB were elements of the 10th Combined
Arms Army. Corporal Hunter was part of the Super Glide Task
Force. He and his fellow "Fat Bobs" soon found out how
different and how dangerous it was to be on the offensive.
The Super Glide Task Force was frequently the lead element of
the 4th MEB while the 2d and 8th Marine Regiments were held
in reserve to exploit the tactical situation. With Warsaw
Pact forces in northeast West Germany conducting a strategic
withdrawal to more defensible positions, the Task Force used
its maneuver ability to exploit the tactical situation.
Typically, the Task Force advanced to locate enemy
forces and rapidly develop the situation for the main body.
Their advance often resulted in a meeting engagement which
was a combat action which occurred when the moving Task
Force, incompletely deployed for battle, engaged the enemy at
an unexpected time and place.11 The Task Force commander
then had to quickly determine whether he would bypass the
enemy or conduct a hasty attack. If the latter, the Task
Force commander deployed and attacked quickly to gain the
upper hand and to keep the enemy from organizing
resistance.12 The speed of attack offset a lack of thorough
preparation. As the attack developed, the Task Force
commander, relying on his own evaluation or orders from
higher headquarters, then conducted either a battle of
exploitation or one of pursuit.
In exploitation, the Task Force drove swiftly for deep
objectives, seized or destroyed command posts, severed escape
routes, and struck at reserves, artillery, and combat support
units to prevent the enemy force from reorganizing an
effective defense or from conducting an orderly withdrawal.
The key to success was speed, as any delay afforded the enemy
the opportunity to regroup and mount counterattacks or to
establish delaying positions in depth. The psychological
effect of exploitation created confusion and apprehension.13
In pursuit, the objective was to completely destroy an
enemy force which had lost its ability to defend or delay in
an organized fashion. Unlike exploitation, in which the
objective was the destruction of the enemy support systems,
the objective of pursuit was the destruction of the enemy
force. In the conduct of a pursuit, relentless pressure was
directed against the retreating enemy while enveloping forces
severed the lines of escape. 14
The various tactical maneuvers of a hasty attack,
bypass, exploitation and pursuit were not mutually exclusive
terms. Rather, all were often elements in a single battle.
The participation of Task Force Super Glide in the Battle of
Rostock, 26-31 August, 1995, is illustrative.
The Task Force was advancing east towards Wismar in East
Germany when it made contact with elements of the Soviet
128th Motorized Rifle Division, holding key terrain near the
junction of highways 106 and 105. Estimating that it was a
regimental sized force, the Task Force commander believed a
quick attack would be successful but the MEB commanding
general instructed him to bypass Wismar to the south and then
swing north to pursue enemy forces withdrawing east along
highway 105 towards Rostock. While the 8th Marines enveloped
the Wismar resistance, the Task Force continued along 105 and
fought a pursuit battle for the next two days. It was then
ordered to the east of Rostock where, for the next three
days, it fought a battle of exploitation. The Task Force
blocked escape routes leading from the city on highways 103,
105, 108, and 110, and attacked command and control
facilities and logistics concentrations in and around the
city and port. As this phase of the battle progressed, the
2d Marine Regiment was lifted by helicopter west of Rostock
to eventually link up with the Task Force and encircle the
remaining enemy left in the city.
For the motorcycle Marines of the Task Force, the
enthusiasm of the advance was tempered by the high number of
casualties. The Marines frequently became victims of one of
their greatest assets - speed. Attacks were conducted while
on the move and the cyclists often raced ahead to reconnoiter
the area and seek targets of opportunity. While effective in
these roles, the small dispersed fireteams and single and
paired cyclists often fell easy prey to small enemy units and
individuals of the retreating Warsaw Pact forces. The same
kind of defensive tactics that the Marines used near Hannover
were equally as effective for the other side while the
cyclists were on the attack.
Unless they were disabled, it was unusual to find a
motorcycle after a battle. Frequently, ropes were laid
across the road and as a cyclist approached they were pulled
taut to either clothes line the rider or spill the cycle and
accomplish the same thing. The Marines were frequently left
simply dazed or injured on the road while the enemy retrieved
the cycle and rode off.
A captured prisoner described the technique in the
following manner.
"We hid the rope with dirt or debris as best we
could. The riders were seldom alone but they were
usually dispersed in line by a considerable
distance. We waited for the last rider to spring
our trap. With the rider dispatched, we retrieved
the motorcycle. We rarely shot the Marines.
Shooting them while mounted involved a great risk
of damaging the cycle. Shooting them dismounted
risked alerting the others. It just wasn't
necessary."
While a captured cycle could be used as as rapid means
for one or two soldiers to rejoin their unit, few cycles were
recaptured. They were mostly retrieved from civilians if at
all. The soldiers usually drove them to what they thought
was a safe area and traded them for whatever their greatest
need was at the time.
The loss of Marines and their cycles, frequently in "one's and two's," was rapidly thinning the ranks. Offensive combat was expensive in men and material. Had sustained combat lasted much beyond the battle for Rostock, it is questionable whether the 24th Marine Regiment could have maintained its combat capability without an extended period to replenish its depleted assets. Fortunately for those doing the fighting and those caught between the armies, the war was quickly coming to a surprising conclusion.
Chapter 6
The End of the War
Editor's Note: The next letter was written by Staff Sergeant
David Schmidt of "Charlie" Company, 1st
Battalion, 24th Marines. On September 20,
1995, he wrote his father in East Lansing,
Michigan. Staff Sergeant Schmidt is now a
student at Michigan State University.
Dear Dad,
We've been here in Rostock, East Germany, for the past
three weeks. I guess it's a combination of things --
weather, replacements, rest, evacuation of the dead and
wounded, refugees, POW's. The fighting is only a small part
of our job. By comparison, the rest is confusion.
A couple of things of note. Last time I wrote I was a
Corporal, I'm now a Staff Sergeant in charge of a platoon.
I'm not sure if it's deserved or not. The most important
factor in getting promoted is staying alive. If I survive a
couple more months I'll probably be an officer!
There's a sad sight in the harbor here -- as if there
weren't plenty to go around. The USS Manitowoc, the ship
that was involved in the start of this war, was scuttled to
block the entrance to the port. It's ironic. It was here
for goodwill and now we're spreading a little "goodwill" of
our own.
I don't know where we're headed next. We understand
both sides have been using chemical weapons to the south of
us. None in this area, thank God!
We hear the United Nations is getting involved in a
truce and there is talk of a cease fire. Mostly rumor I
guess. Do you know what's going on The truth is hard to
find around here.
Hope to see you soon. Your son,
David
In fact, there was something going on but it wasn't a United Nations sponsored truce or a cease fire arranged by the combatants. Early on, it was clear that the UN was ineffective. Although a majority of the nations worked for a negotiated settlement of some kind prior to and after the war started, many of the key NATO and Warsaw Pact nations were using the UN for propaganda purpose. It was not a forum for peace and reason. Rather, it was a forum for excuses and recriminations.
Because of the UN's impotence, several nations informally organized an association called Nations for Peace (NFP). The initial members were China, India, and Brazil. By the end of June, the fledgling organization was meeting regularly in New Dehli. The membership, their attention focused by the expanding war, had one basic item on their agenda -- what could they do to prevent the war from escalating into a nuclear exchange During July, the membership grew in prestige and diversity as Sweden, Mexico, Japan, South Africa, Vietnam, Israel, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Australia and New Zealand joined. The seriousness of the NFP agenda was underscored by the fact that nations put aside their long standing differences to work towards an end to the conflict. Eventually, the NFP membership encompassed most of the original UN countries, less those at war.
As the July/August NATO offensive advanced into East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the NFP feared the worst. This fear drove the formulation of what became known as the "Manifesto for Peace." The document and its contents were debated and agreed to in private so that, by early September, the NFP countries were ready to exert their influence. The Manifesto, in phase one, contained seven initial provisions for the signatory nations to execute sequentially as
circumstances dictated:
1. A declaration of neutrality.
2. The elimination of all exports and imports to and from belligerent nations.
3. The freezing of all economic assets held by belligerent nations in member financial institutions.
4. The nationalization of all business interests in the NFP countries owned by belligerent nations.
5. The revocation of existing agreements covering land basing, ship repair and port facilities, over-flight rights, and intelligence gathering facilities for belligerent nations.
6. The extension of national boundaries recognizing aseaward zone of sovereignty of 100 nautical miles.
7. The immediate removal of all personnel and military equipment of belligerent nations from NFP member nations.
With a great deal of publicity, the first step of the plan was announced and implemented on 12 September. The next steps were announced one at a time over the next six days. The reaction from NATO and Warsaw Pact countries was perhaps predictably nonplused. They refused to believe that the NFP countries would actually cause them significant economic or military damage since the war was substantially confined to central Europe.
When chemical agents were used for the first time by both sides in East Germany and Czechoslovakia during the third week of September, the NATO offensive was stopped. More importantly, however, it raised the specter that a nuclear exchange was now a real possibility.
The resultant civilian casualties and a lull in the fighting gave impetus to the NFP to execute phase two of their Manifesto. On the 29th of September, Vietnam seized Soviet military assets at Camh Ranh Bay and elsewhere and Japan did likewise to American assets on their soil.
With the warring sides perplexed over the rapid, new diplomatic developments and the growing prestige of the NFP in the eyes of world opinion, the NFP played their final card. On the third of October, elements of the Swedish Air Force flew north to the Kola Peninsula and south to West Germany and harmlessly dropped some bombs near Warsaw Pact and NATO port facilities. As soon as the aircraft returned, the NFP announced that its member nations were willing to enter the war as a third belligerent, against both the other factions. This development carried great risks for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact and underscored how serious the NFP nations viewed events in Central Europe.
NATO, and in particular the United States, faced the loss of naval superiority and a rising tide of public opinion against the war. The Soviet Union faced the real possibility of a second front against China, while its influence on other Warsaw Pack nations was waning because of the chemical attacks on their soil.
What quickly followed, of course, was the NFP supervised cease-fire on the 21st of October and the negotiated peace which subsequently followed. United States forces were withdrawn from Europe and Soviet forces withdrew to their own border. Following this disengagement the countries of Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, East Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland and Romania declared their neutrality.
Thus, the NFP, perceiving global survival the issue, exerted the necessary political will to diffuse the war and change the world.
CHAPTER 7
AFTER ACTION REPORT
As in any endeavor that involved combat, there are "lessons learned." The after action report, or command chronology, of the 24th Marines is a military document that contains the experience, insight, and observation of the commander and his staff who were actually on the scene. Some key points from the "lessons learned" by the 24th Marines are presented below. The words of the regimental commanding officer have been paraphrased.
If any word or concept characterized the regiment's participation in the war, it might very well be serendipity, "the gift of finding valuable or agreeable things not sought for." We were called up to active duty on 6 May. The division commander and I had talked periodically on the phone about that possibility, but we were both of the opinion that the likelihood of a call-up was remote. A political settlement would diffuse the situation. On the other hand, we also agreed that a call-up would provide a much needed test of what we perceived was a critical weak link in the one combat capability which is rarely effectively tested and evaluated -- mobilization.
The mobilization problems were threefold: would a political decision to mobilize be made soon enough to allow us the needed time to get ready Were our own mobilization plans adequate Would we be able to get there once mobilized I really only had to concern myself with the question of our own plans. The answers to the other questions were beyond my control.
Was the mobilization successful The answer is a qualified yes. The entire regiment and most of its equipment made it to West Germany in three weeks. That was surprising speed as far as I was concerned. The biggest challenge was to overcome inertia. Initially no one really believed we would go. When it became obvious we were going, we had to devote all our energy to the logistics details. The myriad of remaining administrative matters were largely ignored. We rationalized that we would sort it all out when we had the time. We literally had no other choice. I was in Germany with an advance party on the 13th of May. My battalion commanders told me that the actual embarkation had a circus atmosphere about it. They half expected that the Marines would debark the planes with an assortment of wives, children, pets, and briefcases full of office work still with them. I'm exaggerating of course, but I always had my doubts that the entire regiment would join me.
Once it became apparent we would all make it, I was preoccupied with my foremost concern -- combat readiness. Again, the problem was multi-faceted. Had we trained for the right war Would our motorcycles and anti-armor weapons be effective Could untested reserves fight in unfamiliar surroundings
Our training worried me the most. The regiment had been designated as part of the Second Marine Expeditionary Force and had periodically participated in battalion sized strength in joint exercises along the east coast with active duty units. However, the preponderance of our training had been done at 29 Palms and environs like it. We thought our most likely employment would be in the middle east or southwest Asia. The questions of whether our weapons and tactics would be effective and could we fight effectively are addressed elsewhere in this report.
Our initial employment as part of the 10th (U.S.) Corps reserve of Allied Forces Central was one of those fortuitous decisions, which, I believe, was in great measure responsible for our survival as a combat unit throughout the war. We were best suited for defensive operations. Although I personally disagreed when my battalions were attached to other 10th Corps divisions, our defensive role gave us some time to train and rehearse. Had we been in the front lines, we might have been overrun in the first onslaught.
When the actual combat started, I'd like to say that our success was due to the simple fact that we were Marines. Although that is part of it, we had unexpected help. Most of my Marines were from the midwest. Although there was the normal grumbling among the troops, when it became clear that we would fight, the Marines seemed to have a special spirit because the war had "started" in their backyard. After the first shot was fired, morale was never a problem. If anything, the Marines were too aggressive, especially in offensive operations.
The other unexpected surprise was in the effectiveness of our motorcycles and the JAWS anti-armor weapons. It is my observation that the battlefield was not dominated by airplanes, tanks, and personnel carriers. It mattered little how big or how fast they were. They could be easily seen or detected and destroyed. The individual soldier in many respects was safest when on foot. The ultimate in foot mobility, as far as I was concerned, was having a Marine on a motorcycle. In fact, as the war progressed, the Marines literally had to sleep with their cycles to protect them. It seemed that the ultimate war trophy, for friend and foe alike, was a Harley-Davidson. In combination with the JAWS, which turned out to be extremely reliable, it was a deadly combination of speed, accuracy, lethality and mobility. It was a unique "system." Neither side had a real counterpart.
A little bit about offensive operations. As I mentioned, over aggressiveness was a problem. With a subdued air battle, my Marines were occasionally the fastest movers on the battlefield. With the extensive road network in central Europe, it was all too easy for units and individuals to sprint ahead, hoping to surprise an armored vehicle for the kill. When the Marines did this, they became targets for rear guards and stragglers. We had our greatest number of casualties while attacking.
At one point I became so frustrated that I considered ordering my Marines to remove all the tank, helicopter, truck and personnel carrier insignia they were painting on their cycles. I thought that unit cohesion had broken down in favor of individual goals. Who would be the biggest "Ace" of the war I felt responsible for the problem because it was a good morale booster that I let get out of hand. When the first stories appeared about the new aces of warfare, I had encouraged the media coverage. It was too successful. It sometimes seemed as if there were a hundred correspondents following us around on their own cycles with mini cameras.
I eventually decided not to order the removal of the decals, but it was because we were back in defensive positions at the end of the war. I regret that the situation existed. I think it cost needless loss of life. Such is the burden of command.
While I have discussed some of the generalities of the war, let me mention some of the specific problems we encountered that should be corrected in the future.
Administration. Next to training, mobilization is probably the most important combat multiplier for a reserve unit. We were lucky. In May we were in the midst of preparing for summer exercises, so we were as administratively ready as we could have been. As it was, we had to ignore everything just to get our Marines to the airports. If it had been another time of the year we might have stayed at home. No notice call-ups should be one of the commanders top priorities.
Communications/Intelligence. I have lumped these two together because for us the problems were inseparable. For a similarly equipped regiment in the future, I believe each Marine needs a multi-channel radio built into his cycle and helmet. We could really only effectively communicate down to the platoon level. Critical intelligence was usually obtained only while in combat. Had we had the means of communicating through the chain of command to the individual Marine, we would have been much more successful. The Marines and their motorcycles are a mobile weapons platform just like an aircraft. Without a means of telling them exactly where to go, their effectiveness is diminished. Individual radios have to be part of the "system."
Operations. Doctrinally, you could say the combat employment of the cycle is at a similar stage of development to that of the airplane after World War I. It needs some innovative thought, especially in offensive operations. Some of my recommendations in the areas of communications and logistics, if adopted, will drive these doctrinal considerations. If you grant that we were successful, our euphoria needs to be tempered. The motorcycle is still but one part of combined arms. It worked in Europe in the summer but will it work in other climes and places against other enemies
Logistics. Our motorcycles and anti-armor weapons were durable and effective. Need I say more Well, yes. I think it is clear, that to the limit of technology, we need lighter weapons with a greater range so we can increase our combat load. Again, luck was with us in logistics. Our motorcycles and the heavier (greater range) JAWS they carried were somewhat unique. Our supply of replacement cycles, spare parts, and the weapons held up because we had little competition. We were the sole end-user. This might not be the case next time. If you have quality, quantity becomes critical.
As for new pieces of equipment, I have already mentioned the radios. That should be the first priority. The other piece of gear I put in the "must have" category is a night vision visor. The motorcycle helmet needs, to be completely redesigned. I think it is technically feasible to incorporate protection, communications, and night vision capability into a light weight helmet. It could probably even have some filters that would enhance rider survivability in a chemical/biological environment.
I mentioned serendipity earlier. Let me explain. Certainly, the war and our participation was neither sought for, nor expected. What we found was unexpected success on a battlefield we least expected to fight on
For the entire report...
EXCERPTS
Chapter 1
The Beginning of World War III
The readers of popular fiction or the military
enthusiast may have read accounts about how a future World
War III started. Between the mid-1970's and 1980's, the
military, social, and economic competition between the United
States and the Soviet Union was portrayed by novelists as
leading to the third great war of the 20th century.
In Red Storm Rising, one of the best selling books from
Tom Clancy published in 1986, disenchanted Muslims sabotaged
the Soviet Union's newest and biggest POL refinery in Western
Siberia. The resulting fire completely destroyed the
refinery and the well tops in the adjacent oil field. The
thirteen member Politburo was briefed that 34% of the
country's total crude oil production would be lost for a
minimum period of one year and perhaps as long as three
years. While the refinery represented only 14% of the
country's refining capacity, the Nizhnevartovsk complex
processed 'light' crude oil. That oil was relatively easy to
refine and thus contained disproportionate amounts of the
most valuable fractions, i.e., gasoline, kerosene, and diesel
fuel. The losses for these distillates as a percentage of
total Soviet production was 44%, 48% and 50% respectively.
The loss was described to the Politburo as "disaster of
unprecedented scale for our economy."1 This disaster was not
just a single event, but an unfortunate combination of other
economic, social, and political factors. There was already a
crude oil shortfall of thirty-two million tons annually.
Coal production was 16% below plan and getting worse. While
gas production was improving, much of the output was going to
Western Europe to earn foreign currency, which in turn was
used to purchase foreign oil and grain. The total crude oil
shortfall after the fire was projected to cause a thirty-fold
increase in imported oil. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union
could barely afford a doubling of foreign oil purchases
because of low currency reserves.
In the Politburo, the practical effect of the disaster
was presented in bleak terms by the Defense Minister: two
hundred fifty million citizens, hungry and in the dark, the
Red Army, ministry of Interior, and KGB with restricted fuel
supplies. The NATO alliance would learn of the crisis and
politically exploit it. The existence of the state was
threatened. The Politburo decided that the only way the
Party could survive was to invade the Persian Gulf,
specifically Iran and Iraq, and seize their oil fields.
Since these fields supplied significant amounts of crude oil
to Western Europe and Japan, the Politburo feared a nuclear
response from the United States. To avoid this, they decided
that NATO had to be eliminated as a political and military
force.
Red Storm was the method of elimination: the code name
for a mechanized attack. The plan called for strategic
surprise using conventional weapons only. It would be a
short campaign thrusting into West Germany and the Low
Countries. The Soviet leadership felt if mobilization of
NATO could be delayed seven days, the campaign would achieve
its objectives in two or three weeks and NATO would be forced
into peace negotiations on unfavorable terms.
Red Storm Rising was a 1986 World War III scenario
caused by an oil shortage. A 1985 conflict was envisioned by
Sir John Hackett in his books, The Third World War August
1985 and The Third World War: The Untold Story. Sir John, a
soldier and military scholar from Great Britain, also
described a war between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO nations.
The instigator was again the Soviet Union. It was faced
with many internal and external problems. Poland was
diverging from the Soviet communist model. East Germany was
seeking a greater political role in Warsaw Pact affairs
proportionate to its economic superiority in Eastern Europe.
There was a growth of nationalism in the Soviet Asian
republics and tbe USSR was also faced with its third
consecutive disastrous grain harvest. Essentially,
"there had long been a growing awareness among the
rulers of the USSR of increasing strains within the
Warsaw Pact, and within the Soviet Union itself,
which could hardly be contained without a signal
military victory over the capitalist West. There
had also been, among the top people in the regime,
a very real fear of West Germany."2
In 1984, discussions were held in the Politburo
regarding the political situation in Europe. Both the KGB
and the Soviet Army General Staff (GRU) concluded for
different reasons that Western Europe was dying of social
decay. The KGB believed that strong trade unions, labor
unrest and massive unemployment, compounded by government
inaction, was leading to industrial anarchy. The GRU
believed the decay lay in the spread of neutralist and
pacifist attitudes. Western Europe did not want to defend
itself. With the aforementioned problems within the Soviet
Union and its client states, the political situation in
Western Europe presented itself as the classic "window of
opportunity" in the military sense. Attack and neutralize an
unprepared enemy while at the same time solidifying control
over unruly allies. If the opportunity was lost, it might
never appear again.
The war was staged. The Kremlin plan called for an
attack on West Germany by conventional and chemical means and
the selective bombing of port facilities in other European
countries. Warsaw Pact forces were to consolidate along the
Rhine within ten days and negotiate a cease fire with the
United States from a position of strength. To precipitate
this invasion and make it appear politically justified, the
Soviets first occupied the Slovenia region of Yugoslavia.
This incursion was opposed by American forces from Italy. The
Soviets had anticipated the response and deemed it an attack
on a peace loving socialist nation. They followed with their
full scale "defensive action" against NATO for which they had
been fully prepared and mobilized.
These popular books by Clancy and Hackett presented a
perspective that was widely believed by the western
democracies; the Soviet Union would be the aggressor in the
next world war. Who actually started the Third World War is
still being debated. It did not begin in 1985 or 1986. It
started in 1995. In retrospect it was a war between two aged
and overcommitted superpowers trying to restore their
youthful vigor. How and why it started is one of the great
ironies of modern history.
The period between 1988 and 1995 was an era of
increasing optimism between the Soviet Union and the United
States. In 1988 the United States Senate ratified the U.S.-
Soviet treaty eliminating Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces.
In 1988 the Soviet Union began withdrawing its combat forces
from Afghanistan in a kind of "peace with honor" retirement
similar to the United States' withdrawal from South Vietnam
in the early 1970's. Regular summits were held regarding the
reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals and in 1993 the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-2) was signed. It
called for a 10% reduction in strategic nuclear warheads and
it was widely expected that subsequent treaties would be
signed reducing the nuclear arsenals in stages by at least an
additional 40%. Also, in 1993, an agreement in principal was
recognized between the United States and the Soviet Union on
Conventional Arms Reductions. Although not reduced to treaty
form, the countries agreed to reduce their conventional
forces in Europe by a modest 5%. The withdrawals began in
June 1994. Again, expectations were high that a formalized
treaty would recognize further permanent reductions.
Although American-Soviet relations were arguably better
than at any point since World War II, the two adversaries
were insecure. Both countries saw their political and
economic influence waning in central Europe. There was
serious political unrest in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland
and East Germany as those countries seemed bent on
determining their own version of a communist state. In
Western Europe, the negotiated troop withdrawal was seen as
de facto recognition of changing U.S. strategic priorities
and increased nationalism in the NATO alliance countries.
America was turning its attention to the growing economic
importance of the western Pacific and South America, and
countries such as Spain, Turkey, and Greece had gradually
reduced the American military presence because of internal
political pressures.
It all seemed manageable, though. In fact, the
superpowers had greatly increased their social and cultural
ties to a level unknown in the cold-war period. One of the
many cultural exchange programs involved a series of events
which would culminate in the 50th anniversary of the founding
of the modern Polish and East German States in 1997 and 1999,
respectively. There were a number of events scheduled for
1995 and, as far as Americans were concerned, the biggest
revolved around the cities of Chicago and Milwaukee in the
United States, and Gdansk, Poland and Rostock in the German
Democratic Republic.
Both Chicago and Milwaukee had sizable populations of
Polish and German immigrant descendants. After some lengthy
negotiations between all interested parties they decided that
cultural ties could be enhanced by the simultaneous port call
visits of American, Polish and East German warships. On
April 15, 1995, East German and Polish frigates would be
separately escorted to Chicago and Milwaukee with reciprocal
arrangements for an American frigate and an LST in Gdansk and
Rostock respectively. After a one week stay the warships
would change ports.
The port calls began as tremendous successes.
Tragically, however, despite the extraordinary security
precautions, on the evening of 20 April a light plane laden
with explosives was flown into the side of the East German
warship anchored in Lake Michigan near Chicago. The frigate
promptly sank. Although an anti-communist group of Christian
fundamentalists opposed to rapprochement with the Soviet
Union and its allies quickly took creidt for the attack, it
was an international incident of the first magnitude.
The sight of the frigate superstructure jutting above
the waves of Lake Michigan in full view of the commuters
along Lake Shore Drive and the workers in the downtown
highrises was a powerful vision for the world press -- many
of whom had been covering the goodwill visits in the American
cities. While there was minimal loss of life because most of
the crew was staying with American families in the Chicago
area, the political damage was irreparable.
On the 21st of April, Polish and East German naval
forces boarded and seized the American ships. Although the
U.S. government guaranteed compensation for the loss and safe
passage for the remaining Polish frigate into international
waters, the situation quickly deteriorated. NATO and Warsaw
Pact forces were put on an increased alert status.
On 25 April, the East German government declared that
the U.S. sailors would be put on trial for espionage. On 26
April the Polish frigate, by this time near the Saint
Lawrence Seaway, was escorted to Rochester, New York. The
U.S. government declared that the East German and Polish
sailors would be turned over to the International Red Cross
unless they requested political asylum. It was hoped that
this move would secure the release of the American ships and
crews. If an agreement could be reached, a Polish crew could
then be flown to the United States to return the warship.
Negotiations fell apart when a majority of the crews
reportedly requested political asylum. The U.S. government
couldn't immediately resolve the classical dilemma: should
the sailors be returned to their respective countries against
their will or should they be granted political protection
On 1 May, East Germany, acting in concert with Soviet
army forces, cutoff ground access to West Berlin. On 2 May
a West German C-130 carrying American and British MP's was
shot down on its approach to the Templehof airport in West
Berlin and on 3 May the West Germans shot down an East German
MIG-29, claiming the pilot had violated West German airspace.
In another unfortunate turn of events, the pilot who was
captured after bailing out turned out to be a major in the
Soviet Air Force.
The Soviet Union, United States and their allies began
mobilizing in early May. The 24th Marine Regiment was one of
the first reserve units called up to active duty. They
reported to aerial ports of embarkation on the 19th of May
and by the 26th all the regiments' Marines and most of its
equipment was staged in the vicinity of Hannover, West
Germany.
Although the aggrieved parties tried to diffuse the
situation in the United Nations during May, there were two
ominous developments. Opposing forces, including units
airlifted from the United States began moving closer to the
East German/West German border. At the border there was
sporadic combat. While ground troops were firing at each
other in a realtively harmless fashion, patrol aircraft
became increasingly aggressive and launched their missiles
deeper into the sovereign airspace of their quarry. On May
31st, the war began in earnest with almost simultaneous air
strikes and massive artillery barrages along both sides of
the border.
The 24th Marines and their motorcycles were initially
employed as part of a strategic reserve. Their mobility and
antiarmor/antiaircraft weapons were to be used to blunt any
armor breakthrough in their sector. Why the 24th Marines and
their Harley-Davidson motorcycles were among the first
reserve forces airlifted to West Germany is a fascinating
story that combined history, economics, politics, and the
changing U.S. military establishinent. First, an historical
perspective of the motorcycle and its employment in warfare.
In early 1995, the furthest thing from the minds of the
24th Marines was combat. There were probably some fleeting
thoughts of preparation for summer drills but
the preoccupations were the normal springtime concerns:
baseball, the opening of fishing season, warm weather, home
repairs, and family vacations. No one could have possibly
foreseen the mobilization call on 6 May and the deployment to
West Germany which followed. In less than a month's time the
Marines and Sailors went from the security blanket of close
communication with family and friends to the uncertainty of
notes and letters to distant loved-ones when time permitted.
Chapter 5
The 24th Marines in Combat
Editor's note: The Regimental Chaplain, Commander Richard
Hill, USNR, dated the following letter 8
July, 1995. Now semi-retired, his
"congregation" is the patients at the
Veterans Administration Hospital in Chicago.
Dearest Margaret,
Nothing in my ministry to Sailors and Marines over these
last fifteen years could have prepared me for what I have
seen, and smelled, and heard, and touched in the last six
weeks. The extent of death, destruction and misery numbs the
senses. It is as if the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse have
become our constant companions. An ordinary death is an
extraordinary event. To die in a mundane accident seems to
be the tragic loss of life. The other forms of dying:
shooting, exploding, crushing, burning and a dozen other
traumas, seem more necessary than tragic. We need all our
Marines so they can go into battle.
I had never doubted there was a God until now. My faith
was tested. After much praying my doubts have vanished, but
my belief has a different basis. Amid this devastation lies
the fundamental truth about the existence of God and his
relationship to Man. While God is perfect, He creates
imperfection. It couldn't be otherwise.
Had He created man as a perfect image we would Gods
ourselves. While it is abundantly clear in this landscape
that our imperfection is a curse, our imperfection is our
greatest blessing. We can still aspire to be God-like. So
much for my self-doubts and the short sermon. There is hope.
I have a new enlisted assistant. He will take the place
of Private Carson who was seriously wounded a week ago. Our
position was nearly overrun. Our regiment helped stop a
Russian advance and he was injured by artillery fire. I think
he is going to make it. I hope I can say the same for the
rest of us. Our movement has been in every direction except
East.
How are the children I think the dearest possession I
have now is the picture of you and the children...
Pray for the end of this
All my love,
Richard
Defensive Operations
The Marines were in an uncomfortable position. They
were not on the offense and they were not part of a Marine
command. With the exception of a few specialized units, they
were the only Marine Corps unit of any size deployed to
central Europe at that time. There had been two battalion-
sized Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) aboard naval shipping
prior to the outbreak of hostilities but they had been
diverted to the north Atlantic area when the U.S. warships
were seized in Poland and East Germany. The MEU's had
subsequently deployed to Norway.
The 24th Marines found themselves as part of the 10th
(US) Corps, which in turn constituted the reserve of Allied
Forces Central. There was some confusion as to how to best
employ the regiment and it was eventually decided to attach
each of the battalions to a 10th Corps division: the 52d
Infantry Division (Mechanized); the 54th Infantry Division
(Mechanized); and the 14 Panzers. The Corps commander,
Lieutenant General Thompson, later remarked, "I inspected the
regiment on a soccer field near Hannover. They were in full
battle dress, straddling their motorcycles. With their black
machines, camouflaged uniforms, and black helmets with the
dark visor down they looked like a swarm of mutant insects.
As I approached the formation, the commanding officer called
the regiment to attention. With that the Marines started
their cycles and pulled them up on their rear wheels, all the
while revving the engines. The noise actually sent a shiver
down my spine. I had a sudden image of them riding straight
to hell. I just hoped that was near Moscow somewhere."
During the first month of the war, the belligerents
tried to obtain air superiority for their respective ground
Forces. Due to the sudden outbreak or war, both sides were
relatively unprepared for mobilization and the deployment of
their armies. Air forces on each side were the most combat
ready of any of the strategic forces. Consequently, the
first phase of the war was primarily an air battle. Both
sides attempted to disrupt lines of communication and combat
formations, destroy command and control facilities and
logistics bases, and neutralize each other's air combat
power. Both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces had one singular
success in these efforts. The numbers of destroyed, damaged
and ineffective for maintenance aircraft reached staggering
proportions. The skills of the individual pilots and the
tactics of aircraft formations were largely negated by
technology. Antiaircraft missiles, whether hand held,
vehicle mounted, or air delivered were extremely effective.
Losses were in the thousands. It was no glamour war for the
air force of either side.
As a consequence of the mutual losses, only localized
air superiority could be achieved. Much of the remaining air
assets were used to protect vital installations and to escort
mobilized troops to the theater of operations. By the end of
June there was little impediment to either side in
positioning their ground combat formations. The "air" had
been temporarily removed from the expected air-land battle.
Without the aircraft assets at the front lines, the battle
was shaping up as protracted land warfare. Rather than the
carefully orchestrated ballet of combined arms, maneuver
warfare, blitzkrieg type tactics and the like, it appeared it
might become a wrestling match between two heavyweights.
The Warsaw Pact saw the situation emerging as
advantageous to their forces. With the air forces of both
sides effectively neutralized, the top Soviet military
commanders believed they held a strategic and operational
advantage because of their overwhelming numerical
superiority in armor and artillery, plus their ability to
quickly move their mechanized and motorized forces. By the
end of June and early July they began to exploit these
advantages.
The Soviet's basic principle of land warfare was
violent, sustained, and deep offensive action. Mechanized
and armored formations, supported by air action and
artillery, were to seize the initiative, penetrate the
enemy's defenses, and drive deeply and decisively into the
enemy's rear area.1 The essence of the attack and final
assault was combined arms cooperation based on the close and
uninterrupted interaction of all forces to best exploit their
capabilities. The Soviets believed the tank was the major
ground force weapon. It was the keystone of combined arms
cooperation in the attack. Concern for the enemy anti-tank
threat was the dominating factor in coordinating the combined
arms effort.2
In late June the Soviet's 28th Combined Arms Army began
massing west of Magdeburg for an attack towards Hannover. It
was to be a classic assault by the Army's five maneuver
divisions. They would begin a frontal attack and use
selected regiments to exploit open enemy flanks, gaps, and
breaches. With maneuver room the regiments would begin deep
envelopments on division objectives. It was the simple
tactical application of their offensive doctrine. When a
first echelon regiment's battalions had achieved a major
penetration, the area of penetration would be widened for
exploitation by second echelon forces.3 The division second
echelon or combined arms reserve would ideally be committed
upon the achievement of the division's immediate objective.
This commitment had to take place before the momentum of the
advance decreased.4 Intensified reconnaissance, artillery
and air strikes, and rapid ground attacks would be employed
to locate and destroy enemy reserves.5 Assuming the division
commander committed his second echelon or reserve on the axis
of the most successful penetration and the attack continued
successfully, the break-through could be developed further by
the parent army's commitment of follow-on forces. Additional
divisions could be deployed on a widening and ever deepening
rapid penetration and exploitation.6 The attack would
achieve an operational breakthrough.
Although the preferred method of Soviet attack was an
attack from the march, their attack from a position in direct
contact did have some advantages.7 It allowed more thorough
study of terrain and NATO force dispositions; it permitted a
more refined organization of battle; and it was easier to
coordinate fire and maneuver.8
The attack commenced at 0400, 29 June. By the next
day it was obvious to the commander of the 28th Combined Arms
Army that things were going well. Although he had received
only a small fraction of the aviation requirements he thought
prudent, the similar lack of opposing aviation negated the
disadvantage. Elements of the 7th Guards Tank Division and
the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division had achieved
breakthroughs and were already engaged with units suspected
of being NATO reserves of the 10th (US) Corps.
The battalions of the 24th Marines, attached to their
respective NATO divisions, were deployed near the rear
boundaries of front-line units. In general they had the
mission to assist in sector defense. For the motorcycle
Marines it was an ideal mission. The mobility of the cycles
allowed them to respond to areas of breakthrough and deploy
in width or depth as the situation required.
Within unit formations the motorcycles were employed in
fire teams of four motorcycles each. Besides personal
weapons two cycles carried a full complement of six JAWS
each. The other two cyclists composed a light machine-gun
team to provide suppressive fire in case dismounted troops
accompanied the most likely targets for the JAWS gunners:
tanks and light armored vehicles. The machine gun team also
carried extra JAWS rounds and everyone carried a variety of
smoke rounds. The smoke could be launched by rifle or
dropped individually to screen movement from position to
position.
While in the reserve area east of Hannover, the Marines
had rehearsed extensively for day and night operations. The
terrain was advantageous to their employment. There was an
extensive system of primary and secondary roads which could
be used for high speed ingress and egress. Cover and
concealment were also excellent. There were numerous wooded
areas and ample man-made structures for convenient hiding
spots. The cyclists familiarized themselves with the key
terrain and obstacles, and prepared firing positions in depth
along likely avenues of approach. The weather was an unknown
factor. Rain, in particular, could limit mobility. However,
if and when an attack came, the Marines expected to be able
to fire and move repeatedly.
The tactics and weapons were tested in earnest on 30
June. In the early morning darkness, the first thermal
images of Soviet tanks, BRDM's, and personnel carriers
appeared on the sights of the Marines anti-tank weapons.
What happened then can best be described by a sequence of
conversations that appeared in Red Storm Rising but could
have just as easily been said by the commander of the 28th
Combined Arms Army.
"Every time we break through," Major Sergetov (the
aide to General Alexseyev) observed quietly, "they
slow us down and counterattack. This was not
supposed to happen."
"A splendid observation!" Alexseyev (Deputy
CINC, Western Theater) snarled, then regained his
temper. "We expected that a breakthrough would
have the same effect as in the last war against the
Germans. The problem is these new light anti-tank
missiles. Three men and a jeep... can race along
the road set up, fire one or two missiles, be gone
before we can react, then repeat the process a few
hundred meters away. Defensive fire power was
never so strong before, and we failed to appreciate
how effectively a handful of rear guard troops can
slow down an advancing column. Our security is
based on movement... a mobile force under these
conditions cannot afford to be slowed down. A
simple breakthrough is not enough! We must blast a
massive hole in their front and race at least
twenty kilometers to be free of these roving
missile crews. Only then can we switch over to
mobile doctrine."
"You say we cannot win"
"I say what I did four months ago and I was
correct: this campaign of ours has become a war of
attrition. For the moment, technology has defeated
the military art, ours and theirs. What we're
doing now is seeing who runs out of men and arms
first."9
Later, Major Sergetov remarked to his father, a minister
at the Kremlin:
"But the worst thing of all are their anti-
tank missiles -- you know, just like ours, and
these missiles work all too well... Three men in a
wheeled vehicle. One driver, one gunner, one
loader. They hide behind a tree at a turn in the
road and wait. Our column comes into view and they
fire from a range of -- say two kilometers.
They're trained to go for the command tank -- the
one with the radio antenna up. As often as not the
first warning we have is when the first weapon
hits. They fire one more and kill another tank,
then race away before we can call down artillery
fire. Five minutes later, from another spot, it
happes again. It's eating us up."10
In much the same manner, the motorcycle Marines engaged
the Soviet vehicles. Their weapons and tactics were
effective, and they helped stop several penetrations along
the front. They weren't alone, of course. In the overall
scheme of things, the regiment was a very small piece of the
puzzle. Its Army friends and German allies were just as
responsible, perhaps more so, in preventing the introduction
of follow-on forces which could have widened and exploited
the initial breakthroughs by the 7th Guards Tank Division and
the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division.
By the middle of July, NATO forces were on an offensive
of their own. For the American public the offensive spirit
was embodied in the 24th Marines. The regiments' notoriety
had a life of its own. The making of a legend happened
somewhat by accident. After a lull in the Soviet offensive
operations of late June and early July, a writer for the an
Wisconsin State Journal filed a story for the Madison paper
about the local men from Delta Company, 2d Battalion, 24th
Marines. In it he described-how the "Low Riders" were
proudly fighting on Harley-Davidsons. After each action, the
Marines were keeping score by painting small tanks, trucks,
and personnel carriers on the gas tanks of their Harleys,
much in the same way as fighter pilots of the last great war
recorded their kills on the sides of their fighters. The
story was picked up by wire services across the country. It
wasn't long before camera crews were on hand to dutifully put
the Marines and their cycles on film. It made great copy.
Marines (reservists at that), Harley-Davidson motorcycles,
evidence of success: it had the aura of a gun fighter
notching his belt after a shoot-out at high noon. It was a
human story. While the tanks and jets had their share of
success, there was an impersonal quality about the way they
carried out their deadly business.
For their part, the Marines did little to dispel any
myths. Their natural braggadocio not only made great copy,
it made great viewing. The new 'aces' of modern warfare were
born.
Editor's Note: The following letter was dated 18 July, 1995.
The writer is Corporal Rickey Hunter,
originally a member of Headquarters and
Service Company, 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines.
This letter to his brother is the last his
family received. Corporal Hunter was
reported missing in action on 23 July.
Dear Mike,
How'd you like to trade places with me Everyone
thought when we left St. Louis on those C-5's the most
dangerous part of the trip would be liberty in Germany
somewhere. We thought this was just another screw-up by the
politicians and we would be back home in a week or two
sucking up some Budweiser at a Mets-Cardinal baseball game!
Not only was that wrong, but I thought I'd get to pound away
on a typewriter or something like that. Wrong again. At
least not dead wrong-yet.
No sooner than we got here and I was put on a cycle like
the rest of the grunts. I feel like I'm an official Fat Bob
now. Fat Bobs, -- can you believe it Everyone runs around
asking if you've seen Bob. When we hear that we try to stick
out our gut as far as we can. The Army guys think we're
pretty bizarre. They're right.
Anyway, if you want to know the truth, its bad over
here. Our losses are pretty heavy already. Jessie and Alan
are missing but that's the way it is. We go out, shoot and
move, shoot and move -- go back and reload and head out
again. When its all over there's always some missing -- they
just disappear.
So much for the bad news. You can tell the guys back
home I'm an ace. I know I got at least five. When that
happens we paint an ace of spades on our helmet. If the ammo
holds out at the rate I'm going maybe I'll have a full house
soon (that's five aces for some reason). As for good news I
do have some jokes for you. Here goes -- they all relate to
food -- don't ask me why.
How many different kinds of tank crews are there
Two - original recipe and crispy.
Why are hamburgers and tanks alike
They both lose weight during cooking.
What do crewmen and french fries have in common
Both are placed in a tank and deep fat fried.
Better to be blown away than burned away I say. Well,
rumor is we're going to see some more Marines from the States
soon and attack in a different direction. Don't tell Mom the
crispy-critter jokes -- Dad might savor them though.
This Bud's for you brother!
Semper Fi
Rickey
Offensive Operations
On the 2d of August the 24th Marines were officially
detached from the 10th (US) Corps to join the 4th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). The 4th MEB, nominally assigned
the mission to reinforce NATO's northern flank in Norway, had
just made an amphibious landing in West Germany in the
vicinity of Bremerhaven. It was the intent of the 4th MEB,
as part of a combined NATO force, to drive north and east of
Hamburg along the East German coast. Presuming there was
sufficient amphibious lift capability and sea lines of
communications stayed open along the approaches to the Baltic
Sea, the 4th MEB would conduct a series of landings along the
East German and Polish coasts or move overland to seize port
facilities and landing sites. Both strategies would
accommodate the introduction of additional follow-on forces
at advanced naval bases.
The 24th Marines were happy to be back in the Marine
Corps fold. At Bremerhaven they had a chance to catch some
well deserved rest and perform much needed maintenance on
their cycles. There were even additional reservists to be
used as individual replacements, and some cycles and spare
parts had been flown in. The men and equipment didn't fill
all the holes but the regiment was flushed with success and
anxious to show some offensive spirit to the newly arrived
expeditionary leathernecks. Again, the battalions of the
24th Marines were attached out, this time as part of the
three maneuver elements of the brigade: the 2d Marine
Regiment, the 8th Marine Regiment, and Task Force Super
Glide. Super Glide was a mechanized task force of a U.S.
Army tank battalion and two infantry companies mounted in
Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles, the 2d Marine Light
Armored Vehicle (LAV) Battalion with their organic infantry,
a self-propelled artillery battalion, and 3rd Battalion, 24th
Marines.
Opposing the 4th MEB were elements of the 10th Combined
Arms Army. Corporal Hunter was part of the Super Glide Task
Force. He and his fellow "Fat Bobs" soon found out how
different and how dangerous it was to be on the offensive.
The Super Glide Task Force was frequently the lead element of
the 4th MEB while the 2d and 8th Marine Regiments were held
in reserve to exploit the tactical situation. With Warsaw
Pact forces in northeast West Germany conducting a strategic
withdrawal to more defensible positions, the Task Force used
its maneuver ability to exploit the tactical situation.
Typically, the Task Force advanced to locate enemy
forces and rapidly develop the situation for the main body.
Their advance often resulted in a meeting engagement which
was a combat action which occurred when the moving Task
Force, incompletely deployed for battle, engaged the enemy at
an unexpected time and place.11 The Task Force commander
then had to quickly determine whether he would bypass the
enemy or conduct a hasty attack. If the latter, the Task
Force commander deployed and attacked quickly to gain the
upper hand and to keep the enemy from organizing
resistance.12 The speed of attack offset a lack of thorough
preparation. As the attack developed, the Task Force
commander, relying on his own evaluation or orders from
higher headquarters, then conducted either a battle of
exploitation or one of pursuit.
In exploitation, the Task Force drove swiftly for deep
objectives, seized or destroyed command posts, severed escape
routes, and struck at reserves, artillery, and combat support
units to prevent the enemy force from reorganizing an
effective defense or from conducting an orderly withdrawal.
The key to success was speed, as any delay afforded the enemy
the opportunity to regroup and mount counterattacks or to
establish delaying positions in depth. The psychological
effect of exploitation created confusion and apprehension.13
In pursuit, the objective was to completely destroy an
enemy force which had lost its ability to defend or delay in
an organized fashion. Unlike exploitation, in which the
objective was the destruction of the enemy support systems,
the objective of pursuit was the destruction of the enemy
force. In the conduct of a pursuit, relentless pressure was
directed against the retreating enemy while enveloping forces
severed the lines of escape. 14
The various tactical maneuvers of a hasty attack,
bypass, exploitation and pursuit were not mutually exclusive
terms. Rather, all were often elements in a single battle.
The participation of Task Force Super Glide in the Battle of
Rostock, 26-31 August, 1995, is illustrative.
The Task Force was advancing east towards Wismar in East
Germany when it made contact with elements of the Soviet
128th Motorized Rifle Division, holding key terrain near the
junction of highways 106 and 105. Estimating that it was a
regimental sized force, the Task Force commander believed a
quick attack would be successful but the MEB commanding
general instructed him to bypass Wismar to the south and then
swing north to pursue enemy forces withdrawing east along
highway 105 towards Rostock. While the 8th Marines enveloped
the Wismar resistance, the Task Force continued along 105 and
fought a pursuit battle for the next two days. It was then
ordered to the east of Rostock where, for the next three
days, it fought a battle of exploitation. The Task Force
blocked escape routes leading from the city on highways 103,
105, 108, and 110, and attacked command and control
facilities and logistics concentrations in and around the
city and port. As this phase of the battle progressed, the
2d Marine Regiment was lifted by helicopter west of Rostock
to eventually link up with the Task Force and encircle the
remaining enemy left in the city.
For the motorcycle Marines of the Task Force, the
enthusiasm of the advance was tempered by the high number of
casualties. The Marines frequently became victims of one of
their greatest assets - speed. Attacks were conducted while
on the move and the cyclists often raced ahead to reconnoiter
the area and seek targets of opportunity. While effective in
these roles, the small dispersed fireteams and single and
paired cyclists often fell easy prey to small enemy units and
individuals of the retreating Warsaw Pact forces. The same
kind of defensive tactics that the Marines used near Hannover
were equally as effective for the other side while the
cyclists were on the attack.
Unless they were disabled, it was unusual to find a
motorcycle after a battle. Frequently, ropes were laid
across the road and as a cyclist approached they were pulled
taut to either clothes line the rider or spill the cycle and
accomplish the same thing. The Marines were frequently left
simply dazed or injured on the road while the enemy retrieved
the cycle and rode off.
A captured prisoner described the technique in the
following manner.
"We hid the rope with dirt or debris as best we
could. The riders were seldom alone but they were
usually dispersed in line by a considerable
distance. We waited for the last rider to spring
our trap. With the rider dispatched, we retrieved
the motorcycle. We rarely shot the Marines.
Shooting them while mounted involved a great risk
of damaging the cycle. Shooting them dismounted
risked alerting the others. It just wasn't
necessary."
While a captured cycle could be used as as rapid means
for one or two soldiers to rejoin their unit, few cycles were
recaptured. They were mostly retrieved from civilians if at
all. The soldiers usually drove them to what they thought
was a safe area and traded them for whatever their greatest
need was at the time.
The loss of Marines and their cycles, frequently in "one's and two's," was rapidly thinning the ranks. Offensive combat was expensive in men and material. Had sustained combat lasted much beyond the battle for Rostock, it is questionable whether the 24th Marine Regiment could have maintained its combat capability without an extended period to replenish its depleted assets. Fortunately for those doing the fighting and those caught between the armies, the war was quickly coming to a surprising conclusion.
Chapter 6
The End of the War
Editor's Note: The next letter was written by Staff Sergeant
David Schmidt of "Charlie" Company, 1st
Battalion, 24th Marines. On September 20,
1995, he wrote his father in East Lansing,
Michigan. Staff Sergeant Schmidt is now a
student at Michigan State University.
Dear Dad,
We've been here in Rostock, East Germany, for the past
three weeks. I guess it's a combination of things --
weather, replacements, rest, evacuation of the dead and
wounded, refugees, POW's. The fighting is only a small part
of our job. By comparison, the rest is confusion.
A couple of things of note. Last time I wrote I was a
Corporal, I'm now a Staff Sergeant in charge of a platoon.
I'm not sure if it's deserved or not. The most important
factor in getting promoted is staying alive. If I survive a
couple more months I'll probably be an officer!
There's a sad sight in the harbor here -- as if there
weren't plenty to go around. The USS Manitowoc, the ship
that was involved in the start of this war, was scuttled to
block the entrance to the port. It's ironic. It was here
for goodwill and now we're spreading a little "goodwill" of
our own.
I don't know where we're headed next. We understand
both sides have been using chemical weapons to the south of
us. None in this area, thank God!
We hear the United Nations is getting involved in a
truce and there is talk of a cease fire. Mostly rumor I
guess. Do you know what's going on The truth is hard to
find around here.
Hope to see you soon. Your son,
David
In fact, there was something going on but it wasn't a United Nations sponsored truce or a cease fire arranged by the combatants. Early on, it was clear that the UN was ineffective. Although a majority of the nations worked for a negotiated settlement of some kind prior to and after the war started, many of the key NATO and Warsaw Pact nations were using the UN for propaganda purpose. It was not a forum for peace and reason. Rather, it was a forum for excuses and recriminations.
Because of the UN's impotence, several nations informally organized an association called Nations for Peace (NFP). The initial members were China, India, and Brazil. By the end of June, the fledgling organization was meeting regularly in New Dehli. The membership, their attention focused by the expanding war, had one basic item on their agenda -- what could they do to prevent the war from escalating into a nuclear exchange During July, the membership grew in prestige and diversity as Sweden, Mexico, Japan, South Africa, Vietnam, Israel, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Australia and New Zealand joined. The seriousness of the NFP agenda was underscored by the fact that nations put aside their long standing differences to work towards an end to the conflict. Eventually, the NFP membership encompassed most of the original UN countries, less those at war.
As the July/August NATO offensive advanced into East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the NFP feared the worst. This fear drove the formulation of what became known as the "Manifesto for Peace." The document and its contents were debated and agreed to in private so that, by early September, the NFP countries were ready to exert their influence. The Manifesto, in phase one, contained seven initial provisions for the signatory nations to execute sequentially as
circumstances dictated:
1. A declaration of neutrality.
2. The elimination of all exports and imports to and from belligerent nations.
3. The freezing of all economic assets held by belligerent nations in member financial institutions.
4. The nationalization of all business interests in the NFP countries owned by belligerent nations.
5. The revocation of existing agreements covering land basing, ship repair and port facilities, over-flight rights, and intelligence gathering facilities for belligerent nations.
6. The extension of national boundaries recognizing aseaward zone of sovereignty of 100 nautical miles.
7. The immediate removal of all personnel and military equipment of belligerent nations from NFP member nations.
With a great deal of publicity, the first step of the plan was announced and implemented on 12 September. The next steps were announced one at a time over the next six days. The reaction from NATO and Warsaw Pact countries was perhaps predictably nonplused. They refused to believe that the NFP countries would actually cause them significant economic or military damage since the war was substantially confined to central Europe.
When chemical agents were used for the first time by both sides in East Germany and Czechoslovakia during the third week of September, the NATO offensive was stopped. More importantly, however, it raised the specter that a nuclear exchange was now a real possibility.
The resultant civilian casualties and a lull in the fighting gave impetus to the NFP to execute phase two of their Manifesto. On the 29th of September, Vietnam seized Soviet military assets at Camh Ranh Bay and elsewhere and Japan did likewise to American assets on their soil.
With the warring sides perplexed over the rapid, new diplomatic developments and the growing prestige of the NFP in the eyes of world opinion, the NFP played their final card. On the third of October, elements of the Swedish Air Force flew north to the Kola Peninsula and south to West Germany and harmlessly dropped some bombs near Warsaw Pact and NATO port facilities. As soon as the aircraft returned, the NFP announced that its member nations were willing to enter the war as a third belligerent, against both the other factions. This development carried great risks for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact and underscored how serious the NFP nations viewed events in Central Europe.
NATO, and in particular the United States, faced the loss of naval superiority and a rising tide of public opinion against the war. The Soviet Union faced the real possibility of a second front against China, while its influence on other Warsaw Pack nations was waning because of the chemical attacks on their soil.
What quickly followed, of course, was the NFP supervised cease-fire on the 21st of October and the negotiated peace which subsequently followed. United States forces were withdrawn from Europe and Soviet forces withdrew to their own border. Following this disengagement the countries of Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, East Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland and Romania declared their neutrality.
Thus, the NFP, perceiving global survival the issue, exerted the necessary political will to diffuse the war and change the world.
CHAPTER 7
AFTER ACTION REPORT
As in any endeavor that involved combat, there are "lessons learned." The after action report, or command chronology, of the 24th Marines is a military document that contains the experience, insight, and observation of the commander and his staff who were actually on the scene. Some key points from the "lessons learned" by the 24th Marines are presented below. The words of the regimental commanding officer have been paraphrased.
If any word or concept characterized the regiment's participation in the war, it might very well be serendipity, "the gift of finding valuable or agreeable things not sought for." We were called up to active duty on 6 May. The division commander and I had talked periodically on the phone about that possibility, but we were both of the opinion that the likelihood of a call-up was remote. A political settlement would diffuse the situation. On the other hand, we also agreed that a call-up would provide a much needed test of what we perceived was a critical weak link in the one combat capability which is rarely effectively tested and evaluated -- mobilization.
The mobilization problems were threefold: would a political decision to mobilize be made soon enough to allow us the needed time to get ready Were our own mobilization plans adequate Would we be able to get there once mobilized I really only had to concern myself with the question of our own plans. The answers to the other questions were beyond my control.
Was the mobilization successful The answer is a qualified yes. The entire regiment and most of its equipment made it to West Germany in three weeks. That was surprising speed as far as I was concerned. The biggest challenge was to overcome inertia. Initially no one really believed we would go. When it became obvious we were going, we had to devote all our energy to the logistics details. The myriad of remaining administrative matters were largely ignored. We rationalized that we would sort it all out when we had the time. We literally had no other choice. I was in Germany with an advance party on the 13th of May. My battalion commanders told me that the actual embarkation had a circus atmosphere about it. They half expected that the Marines would debark the planes with an assortment of wives, children, pets, and briefcases full of office work still with them. I'm exaggerating of course, but I always had my doubts that the entire regiment would join me.
Once it became apparent we would all make it, I was preoccupied with my foremost concern -- combat readiness. Again, the problem was multi-faceted. Had we trained for the right war Would our motorcycles and anti-armor weapons be effective Could untested reserves fight in unfamiliar surroundings
Our training worried me the most. The regiment had been designated as part of the Second Marine Expeditionary Force and had periodically participated in battalion sized strength in joint exercises along the east coast with active duty units. However, the preponderance of our training had been done at 29 Palms and environs like it. We thought our most likely employment would be in the middle east or southwest Asia. The questions of whether our weapons and tactics would be effective and could we fight effectively are addressed elsewhere in this report.
Our initial employment as part of the 10th (U.S.) Corps reserve of Allied Forces Central was one of those fortuitous decisions, which, I believe, was in great measure responsible for our survival as a combat unit throughout the war. We were best suited for defensive operations. Although I personally disagreed when my battalions were attached to other 10th Corps divisions, our defensive role gave us some time to train and rehearse. Had we been in the front lines, we might have been overrun in the first onslaught.
When the actual combat started, I'd like to say that our success was due to the simple fact that we were Marines. Although that is part of it, we had unexpected help. Most of my Marines were from the midwest. Although there was the normal grumbling among the troops, when it became clear that we would fight, the Marines seemed to have a special spirit because the war had "started" in their backyard. After the first shot was fired, morale was never a problem. If anything, the Marines were too aggressive, especially in offensive operations.
The other unexpected surprise was in the effectiveness of our motorcycles and the JAWS anti-armor weapons. It is my observation that the battlefield was not dominated by airplanes, tanks, and personnel carriers. It mattered little how big or how fast they were. They could be easily seen or detected and destroyed. The individual soldier in many respects was safest when on foot. The ultimate in foot mobility, as far as I was concerned, was having a Marine on a motorcycle. In fact, as the war progressed, the Marines literally had to sleep with their cycles to protect them. It seemed that the ultimate war trophy, for friend and foe alike, was a Harley-Davidson. In combination with the JAWS, which turned out to be extremely reliable, it was a deadly combination of speed, accuracy, lethality and mobility. It was a unique "system." Neither side had a real counterpart.
A little bit about offensive operations. As I mentioned, over aggressiveness was a problem. With a subdued air battle, my Marines were occasionally the fastest movers on the battlefield. With the extensive road network in central Europe, it was all too easy for units and individuals to sprint ahead, hoping to surprise an armored vehicle for the kill. When the Marines did this, they became targets for rear guards and stragglers. We had our greatest number of casualties while attacking.
At one point I became so frustrated that I considered ordering my Marines to remove all the tank, helicopter, truck and personnel carrier insignia they were painting on their cycles. I thought that unit cohesion had broken down in favor of individual goals. Who would be the biggest "Ace" of the war I felt responsible for the problem because it was a good morale booster that I let get out of hand. When the first stories appeared about the new aces of warfare, I had encouraged the media coverage. It was too successful. It sometimes seemed as if there were a hundred correspondents following us around on their own cycles with mini cameras.
I eventually decided not to order the removal of the decals, but it was because we were back in defensive positions at the end of the war. I regret that the situation existed. I think it cost needless loss of life. Such is the burden of command.
While I have discussed some of the generalities of the war, let me mention some of the specific problems we encountered that should be corrected in the future.
Administration. Next to training, mobilization is probably the most important combat multiplier for a reserve unit. We were lucky. In May we were in the midst of preparing for summer exercises, so we were as administratively ready as we could have been. As it was, we had to ignore everything just to get our Marines to the airports. If it had been another time of the year we might have stayed at home. No notice call-ups should be one of the commanders top priorities.
Communications/Intelligence. I have lumped these two together because for us the problems were inseparable. For a similarly equipped regiment in the future, I believe each Marine needs a multi-channel radio built into his cycle and helmet. We could really only effectively communicate down to the platoon level. Critical intelligence was usually obtained only while in combat. Had we had the means of communicating through the chain of command to the individual Marine, we would have been much more successful. The Marines and their motorcycles are a mobile weapons platform just like an aircraft. Without a means of telling them exactly where to go, their effectiveness is diminished. Individual radios have to be part of the "system."
Operations. Doctrinally, you could say the combat employment of the cycle is at a similar stage of development to that of the airplane after World War I. It needs some innovative thought, especially in offensive operations. Some of my recommendations in the areas of communications and logistics, if adopted, will drive these doctrinal considerations. If you grant that we were successful, our euphoria needs to be tempered. The motorcycle is still but one part of combined arms. It worked in Europe in the summer but will it work in other climes and places against other enemies
Logistics. Our motorcycles and anti-armor weapons were durable and effective. Need I say more Well, yes. I think it is clear, that to the limit of technology, we need lighter weapons with a greater range so we can increase our combat load. Again, luck was with us in logistics. Our motorcycles and the heavier (greater range) JAWS they carried were somewhat unique. Our supply of replacement cycles, spare parts, and the weapons held up because we had little competition. We were the sole end-user. This might not be the case next time. If you have quality, quantity becomes critical.
As for new pieces of equipment, I have already mentioned the radios. That should be the first priority. The other piece of gear I put in the "must have" category is a night vision visor. The motorcycle helmet needs, to be completely redesigned. I think it is technically feasible to incorporate protection, communications, and night vision capability into a light weight helmet. It could probably even have some filters that would enhance rider survivability in a chemical/biological environment.
I mentioned serendipity earlier. Let me explain. Certainly, the war and our participation was neither sought for, nor expected. What we found was unexpected success on a battlefield we least expected to fight on