OT: China's new carrier

[boogiedowndonovan]

where's Matt Wiser? He usually chimes in on naval matters.

[RN7]

As to who had the better carrier, many people forget that the primary mission of the carrier is to project power; this is executed by the carrier's airgroup (both in size and capability). By this standard, the British did not have the finest carriers of the war, they had the most surviveable carriers, but their protection was paid for by smaller airgroups and above all, less storage space for avgas and munitions.

The Japanese carriers started the war with a small, hand-picked group of pilots. The primary failure of the IJN aviation is that they had no means of expanding or replacing the loss of the pre-war pilots. Many people consider the Battle of Midway to be the critical turning point, it wasn't. The key turning point for the IJN was the brutal fighting in the Soloman Islands were many of their most experienced pilots died, the IJN never recovered and their losses in the 1944-45 battles reflects this.

The American carriers stumbled in the early war but as more decks and additional air groups entered the war, they quickly became the major factor in the Allied advances in the Pacific.

I think survivability in the Pacific was highly important in a war which became dominated by air power more than anywhere else. Most British carriers up until the two Implacable Class ships and the Indomitable Class were built within the confines of ship design and the Second London Naval Treaty to which they complied, unlike the Japanese who had withdrawn from it. America was able to produce the pre-war Lexington's as they were originally to be battlecruisers, but they were cancelled after work had begun under the terms of the Washington Treaty and the tonnage was allowed for aircraft carriers instead. Once the war started America could build whatever it liked to what size it wanted hense the rapid production of the Essex Class, which neither Britain or Japan could match in numbers for industrial reasons, and Britain also had different naval ship buiding priorities. British heavy units and carriers were pretty much absent from the Pacific after early 1942, and only started returning from 1944. Different design philosophies for different priorities influenced the differences between US and British carriers. Although the American carriers had bigger air wings the werent as survivable as the British units until the Midway Class.

[dragoon500ly]

There is no doubt that when a suicide plane was inbound, I'd rather be aboard a WWII British carrier than an Essex-class.

But the purpose of an aircraft carrier is not to survive attacks, it is to launch them. The USN made the decision to go with more hanger space as well as increased avgas storage and magazine space. Did it make US carriers more prone to damage, without a doubt! But it also allowed the USN to throw heavier airstrikes for a longer period of time than another navy in WWII. And those larger air groups allowed the carriers defense in depth. Coupled with the development of the new VT fuze, it made attacking an American carrier task force a bloody affair.

[dragoon500ly]

Since we are discusing carrier air groups, here are some intresting facts...

In Dec 1941

A US Fleet Carrier deployed with 18 fighters, 36 dive/scout bombers and 18 torpedo bombers.

A Japanese Fleet Carrier deployed with 18 fighters, 18 dive bombers and 18-27 torpedo bombers.

A British Carrier (Feb 42) deployed with 21 fighters and 24 torpedo bombers.

In Sept 1943

A US Fleet Carrier deployed with 38 fighters, 28 dive bombers and 18 torpedo bombers.

A Japanese Fleet Carrier deployed with 18-27 fighters, 20-27 dive bombers and 10-23 torpedo bombers.

A British Fleet Carrier deployed with 36 fighters and 12 dive bombers.

In Dec 1944

A US Fleet Carrier deployed with 71 fighters, 15 dive bombers and 15 torpedo bombers.

A Japanese Fleet Carrier deployed with 26-27 fighters, 25-26 dive bombers and 17 torpedo bombers.

A British Fleet Carrier deployed with 60 fighters and 18 dive bombers.

[dragoon500ly]

Here's an intresting tidbit....the all time record for most enemy aircraft confirmed shot down in a single action goes to the USS South Dakota.

During the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, on October 26, 1942, she was attacked by a force of over 65 dive and torpedo bombers. In a wild melee in which she suffered three bomb hits and a near miss, she shot down 26 of her attackers. A record that has remained unbroken to this day.

[Legbreaker]

And probably never will be broken given that an average plane today is probably worth an entire WWII wing+.

[Webstral]

On the subject of carriers, it was a bloody miracle that the Germans never really got into the idea. German carrier fleets couldof decimated the Royal navy and would of blockaded the UK ina way that the U-boats could never of acheived.

The German Navy did understand the potential of aircraft carriers. Hitler just didn't keep to the timetable. He invaded Poland nine years too early for a German Navy with carriers.

Webstral

[James Langham]

The German Navy did understand the potential of aircraft carriers. Hitler just didn't keep to the timetable. He invaded Poland nine years too early for a German Navy with carriers.

Webstral

The plan was called Plan Z. The biggest drawback to it was it made mo allowances for the Royal Navy to react to the programme, oh and the war started early...

[Webstral]

i would of thought that the Vietnam war, Iraq and Afghanistan would of taught people that a technological advantage does not equate to military success.

Technology is a combat multiplier, like troop quality. A bankrupt strategy is a bankrupt strategy. Assuming a halfway decent strategy, the key is that the leaders and troops using the technology know what to do with it. I suspect the tankers of VII US Corps would argue that technology gave them a decisive edge in western Kuwait in early 1991. The Japanese Navy trained hard for night actions and really took it to the US Navy around Guadalcanal in 1942. As the USN learned what to do with their radar, night actions at sea became less successful for the Japanese.

Unfortunately, I agree that Americans are inclined to learn the wrong lessons from Vietnam, etc. There are some good reasons for this. Hardware looks handsome and brings revenues into Congressman Jones' district. Well-trained troops cost money but don't employ factory workers; and on the parade ground it's nearly impossible to tell the proficient killers from the professional boot polishers. Also, we cling fervently to the idea that all around the world people are, deep down, Americans: democratic, enterprising, and all the other nice ideas. Therefore, we believe in the "tipping point" thesis, in which just a little more effort (money, technology, firepower) will set off a chain of events in which the people will come together, the war will be won, representative government will spontaneously erupt, and the rats we had to get into bed with will be swept away in the new dawn of Vietnamese, Iraqi, and Afghani democracy. Then we'll all have pie (make mine apple, please). Machines, therefore, are more comfortable to believe in than cold-eyed killers and pragmatists who say things we'd rather not hear about what it will take to achieve victory--whatever that means.

Webstral

[95th Rifleman]

Technology is a combat multiplier, like troop quality. A bankrupt strategy is a bankrupt strategy. Assuming a halfway decent strategy, the key is that the leaders and troops using the technology know what to do with it. I suspect the tankers of VII US Corps would argue that technology gave them a decisive edge in western Kuwait in early 1991. The Japanese Navy trained hard for night actions and really took it to the US Navy around Guadalcanal in 1942. As the USN learned what to do with their radar, night actions at sea became less successful for the Japanese.

Unfortunately, I agree that Americans are inclined to learn the wrong lessons from Vietnam, etc. There are some good reasons for this. Hardware looks handsome and brings revenues into Congressman Jones' district. Well-trained troops cost money but don't employ factory workers; and on the parade ground it's nearly impossible to tell the proficient killers from the professional boot polishers. Also, we cling fervently to the idea that all around the world people are, deep down, Americans: democratic, enterprising, and all the other nice ideas. Therefore, we believe in the "tipping point" thesis, in which just a little more effort (money, technology, firepower) will set off a chain of events in which the people will come together, the war will be won, representative government will spontaneously erupt, and the rats we had to get into bed with will be swept away in the new dawn of Vietnamese, Iraqi, and Afghani democracy. Then we'll all have pie (make mine apple, please). Machines, therefore, are more comfortable to believe in than cold-eyed killers and pragmatists who say things we'd rather not hear about what it will take to achieve victory--whatever that means.

Webstral

The problem, the very scary problem, is it will take a massive and bloody defeat on American soil to change this attitude. While America fights conflicts in the gardens of other nations, there will never be enough incentive to change doctrine.

Look at internatonal terrorism, for decades the Americans never took it seriously enough, in fact they supported many terrorist groups operating in Soviet-controlled nations. It's also a big bone of contention over here that Americans in New York and Boston where fund raising for the IRA.

It took 9/11 to really shake America and make the American people and government realise how dangerous terrorism really is and why supporting it, even in hostile nations, is a recipe for disaster. Afterall, it was the American-supported individuals who fought the Russians that masterminded 9/11.

[LBraden]

Aye, it always gets me how people do not realise the "other side" of my fathers exact comment when I got home from school that day and said "what the hell is going on", he replied "The bastards finally got what they need".

Part of that IS because the US paid for terrorism against Communism, but also, large areas of the Eastern Seaboard in the US paid, supplied and even hides IRA people, who in my fathers eyes, as he was 1 Ulster Defence Regiment of the British Army, born in Northern Ireland, are terrorists.

But I think we are going a little off topic from Carriers, but yes, its interesting to see what overtures are going on in Taiwan and China, and that it does appears since some news I heard yesterday, that China has an interest in a "Coastal Defence Force" and using fighters launching Exocets at long ranges.

[rcaf_777]

Owning a carrier is one thing, operating one and carrier strike group, is something completely different, by the time China can operate a carrier strike group, the US will have left that field and moved onto something far more flexible and unmanned

[95th Rifleman]

Owning a carrier is one thing, operating one and carrier strike group, is something completely different, by the time China can operate a carrier strike group, the US will have left that field and moved onto something far more flexible and unmanned

Which could be America's downfall.

[ShadoWarrior]

Operating cheaper UCAVs that don't risk pilot's lives and have longer loiter times in zone is worse for America than operating expensive and very complex jet fighters that risk pilots to imprisonment, torture, and/or death?

[95th Rifleman]

Operating cheaper UCAVs that don't risk pilot's lives and have longer loiter times in zone is worse for America than operating expensive and very complex jet fighters that risk pilots to imprisonment, torture, and/or death?

Remember that thing about over-reliance on technology?