OT Navies in WWII

[ShadoWarrior]

The military estimates for Operation Olympic included 125,000 casualties (including 31,000 dead). Operation Coronet was twice as large as Olympic and casualties were expected to be twice as many. The total estimate for the Downfall operations would be about 370,000 (including 80,000 dead) Allied losses.

So just were did the "million US dead" come from

For the most part, this statement appears in the memoirs of various politicans who were trying to make the case for the use of the atom bomb. This mythical million dead began as an exaggeration of the 370,000 casualties figure (often given as "between 250,000 to 500,000" in military briefing documents from the period). Half a million quickly became a million and casualties became deaths. Newspapers quickly picked up on the million dead because it made better copy. While the million American dead is a sheer myth, the military estimates of 80,000 killed and 290,000 wounded were very realistic, based as they were on recent experience. Any invasion of Japan would have increased the American deaths in World War II by 27%. Avoiding this invasion by any means possible was no laughing matter.

If you haven't done so, you should read the Wiki article on Operation Downfall, with special attention to the casualties section and the links to the source citations.

[dragoon500ly]

This is a myth. Even after two atomic bombings the Japanese military (mainly the Army generals) did not care about the losses due to bombing (of any sort). As I mentioned before (in the original thread), what finally drove half the Japanese leadership (including the Emperor) to contemplate surrender was the Soviet invasion of Japanese territory. It was the Russians invading them (on Aug. 9), the threat of the Soviets destroying them as a people, that motivated the Emperor to seek an immediate peace. Prior to that their thinking was that if they (the Japanese) inflicted enough casualties on the Allies (the US and Commonwealth) the Allies would be forced to negotiate on terms more favorable to the Japanese. There was no such possibility with the Soviets, since Stalin didn't care how many troops he lost in the process of grabbing land in the Far East, and the Japanese knew this.

Maybe its me, but I do belive that I made the point that it was a combination of events that convinced the Japanese to surrender. Yes the Russian invasion and the ease with which they demolished the Japanese forces in Manchuria played a major role. The loss of the IJN is another. The naval blockade played another, the loss of most of their cities is yet another card that was dealt. The shock value of the atomic bombs was the final card. No single event, be it the entry of Russia into the Pacific War or atomic bombs convinced the Japanese to surrender.

To be equally certain, the Japanese Army didn't want to surrender, there was even an aborted attempt to prevent the emperor's surrender recording from being broadcast. But enough of the leadership was willing to obey the emperor. And that is what caused the Japanese to surrender.

[dragoon500ly]

If you haven't done so, you should read the Wiki article on Operation Downfall, with special attention to the casualties section and the links to the source citations.

Both King and Nimitz opposed any landings in Japan and wanted to continue a naval and air blockade. Both admirals wanted to attack Taiwan or Korea or stage landings on the Chinese mainland. And both officers were called on the carpet by the JCS for using inflated figures.

Civilian experts predicted much higher losses. But the original briefing documents for Operation Downfall predicted about 370,000 casualities in the initial fighting.

As for wikipedia and its Downfall link, some of the sources quoted have been under fire for some time concerning their conclusions.

The Rand Corporation gamed out Downfall in the 1980s. The Allies were able to secure the ground objectives and suffered about 392,000 casualities. Japanese losses were quite a bit higher, running around 630,000 military and civilian.

So who was right. The world will never know.

And Thank God for that!

[dragoon500ly]

The Regia Marina in World War II

The Royal Italian Navy as of June 10, 1940 was organized as follows:

1st Fleet
5th Battleship Division: 2 BBs
7th Destroyer Squadron: 4 DDs
8th Destroyer Squadron: 4 DDs

9th Battleship Division (not yet fully operational): 2 BBs
14th Destroyer Squadron: 3 DDs
15th Destroyer Squadron: 5 DDs

1st Cruiser Division: 3 CAs
9th Destroyer Squadron: 4 DDs

4th Cruiser Division: 4 CLs
8th Cruiser Division: 2 CLs
16th Destroyer Squadron: 4 DDs

Auxiliaries: 1 seaplane tender, 3 water tankers, 2 tugs

2nd Fleet
3rd Cruiser Division: 4 CAs
12th Destroyer Squadron: 4 DDs
11th Destroyer Squadron: 4 DDs

7th Cruiser Division: 4 CLs
13th Destroyer Squadron: 4 DDs

2nd Cruiser Division: 2 CLs
10th Destroyer Squadron: 4 DDs

Auxiliaries: 1 repair ship, 4 water tankers, oil tanker, 2 tugs

Submarine Fleet
1st Group (La Spezia)
11th Squadron: 4 SS
12th Squadron: 6 SS
13th Squadron: 3 SS
14th Squadron: 3 SS
15th Squadron: 4 SS
16th Squadron: 2 SS
17th Squadron: 5 SS
2nd Group (Naples)
21st Squadron: 4 SS
22nd Squadron: 5 SS
3rd Group (Messina)
31st Squadron: 4 SS
33rd Squadron: 4 SS
34th Squadron: 4 SS
35th Squadron: 3 SS
37th Squadron: 3 SS
4th Group (Taranto)
40th Squadron: 4 SS
41st Squadron: 4 SS
42nd Squadron: 1 SS
43rd Squadron: 2 SS
44th Squadron: 1 SS
45th Squadron: 2 SS
46th Squadron: 4 SS
7th Group (Cagliari)
71st Squadron: 4 SS
72nd Squadron: 4 SS

Departmental Naval Forces

Based at La Spezia: 8 DEs, 20 MAS boats, 4 minelayers, 1 transport, 1 gunboat, 1 water tanker.

Based at Naples: 8 DEs, 2 minelayers, 2 water tankers.

Based at La Maddalena: 8 DEs, 4 MAS boats, 5 minelayers.

Based at Messina: 12 DEs, 1 sub chaser, 16 MAS boats, 4 minelayers, 2 depot ships, 4 water tankers.

Based at Taranto: 2 CLs, 8 DDs, 4 minelayers, 2 transports, 3 water tankers.

Based at Brindisi: 2 DDs, 4 DEs, 2 MAS boats, 1 gunboat, 1 water tanker.

Based at Venice: 4 DEs, 3 minelayers.

Based at Pola: 1 DE, 4 MAS boats, 3 minelayers, 1 oil tanker, 2 water tankers.

Based in Albania: 1 water tanker, 2 minesweepers.

Based at Rhodes: 2 DDs, 4 DEs, 8 SS, 15 MAS boats, 2 minelayers, 2 gunboats, 1 oil tanker.

Based at Tripoli: 4 DEs, 1 mine layer, 1 gunboat.

Based at Tobruk: 4 DDs, 10 SS, 5 gunboats, 3 water tankers.

Italian East Africa: 7 DDs, 8 SS, 2 DEs, 5 MAS boats, 2 gunboats, 3 minelayers, 3 water tankers.

Various ports in Italy, under direct command of Naval HQ: 3 yachts, 1 target ship, 2 survey ships, 5 transports, 1 hospital ship, 2 cable layers, 7 oil tankers, 1 petrol tanker, 9 seagoing tugs.

[ShadoWarrior]

Both King and Nimitz opposed any landings in Japan and wanted to continue a naval and air blockade. Both admirals wanted to attack Taiwan or Korea or stage landings on the Chinese mainland.

MacArthur was one of the biggest proponents for invading the Home Islands. The same bloody-minded fellow who needlessly wasted thousands of lives retaking the strategically unimportant Philippines just to fuel his own ego.

Civilian experts predicted much higher losses. But the original briefing documents for Operation Downfall predicted about 370,000 casualties in the initial fighting.

As for wikipedia and its Downfall link, some of the sources quoted have been under fire for some time concerning their conclusions.

The Rand Corporation gamed out Downfall in the 1980s. The Allies were able to secure the ground objectives and suffered about 392,000 casualities. Japanese losses were quite a bit higher, running around 630,000 military and civilian.

Those Rand figures are close to the figures cited in the Wiki article for what the JCS came up with in mid-1945. I don't put a lot of weight on "some of the sources quoted have been under fire for some time concerning their conclusions" when some of the folks debating such things still persist in believing that the atomic bombs won the war when the preponderance of evidence points otherwise.

[RN7]

Maybe its me, but I do belive that I made the point that it was a combination of events that convinced the Japanese to surrender. Yes the Russian invasion and the ease with which they demolished the Japanese forces in Manchuria played a major role. The loss of the IJN is another. The naval blockade played another, the loss of most of their cities is yet another card that was dealt. The shock value of the atomic bombs was the final card. No single event, be it the entry of Russia into the Pacific War or atomic bombs convinced the Japanese to surrender.

To be equally certain, the Japanese Army didn't want to surrender, there was even an aborted attempt to prevent the emperor's surrender recording from being broadcast. But enough of the leadership was willing to obey the emperor. And that is what caused the Japanese to surrender.

A lot of truth to this. The Japanese military got a taste of what it was like to face a modern fully mechanised army in Manchuria during the Soviet-Japanese border wars in 1938-39, were they pretty much got their but kicked. It sort of determined Japanese conduct throughout WW2 in regards to not declaring war on the Russians. In 1945 the Russians rolled them over again in a little over three weeks, in fact the Russians crushed them. Facing the prospect of the Russians coming at them from Asia and the nuclear armed Americans surrounding them in the Pacific the saner elements among the Japanese leadership had little option but surrender.

[dragoon500ly]

MacArthur was one of the biggest proponents for invading the Home Islands. The same bloody-minded fellow who needlessly wasted thousands of lives retaking the strategically unimportant Philippines just to fuel his own ego.


Those Rand figures are close to the figures cited in the Wiki article for what the JCS came up with in mid-1945. I don't put a lot of weight on "some of the sources quoted have been under fire for some time concerning their conclusions" when some of the folks debating such things still persist in believing that the atomic bombs won the war when the preponderance of evidence points otherwise.

The two atomic bombs were, in and of themselves, not decisive weapons. Operation Musketeer, the B-29 low-level incendiary raids, did a lot more damage and killed far more Japanese then the A-Bombs. It was the sheer shock value of their use on top of the events of the last two years of the war that tipped the scales and gave the Japanese the push to surrender.

Far, far too many Western historians take the view that nuking Japan is what caused the surrender. In Japan's official military history, the Strategic Bombing Survey and numerous interviews with Japanese military and civilians, the point was made that the use of atomic bombs was simply the "straw that broke the camel's back".

And please....don't get me started on "Dug-Out Doug"...it spoils my lunch!

[dragoon500ly]

The Royal Italian Navy in World War II, of all the Italian military, received the most new equipment before the start of the war. Italian planners expected a great deal of the Regia Marina (including taking Gibraltar and conducting sorties into the Atlantic) and much was accomplished. Yet the RM was doomed to failure for several reasons:

Like the Kriegsmarine, the RM started the war with a critical shortage of fuel for their ships. RM holdings at the start of the war ammounted to some 1,880,000 tons of fuel. Fuel use in the first nine months of the war amount to some 1,000,000 tons. The RM was able to rebuild some of its stockpile via the Romanian oil fields (but this source was controlled by Germany and her needs were meet first) as well as restricting the use of the larger Italian warships.

Secondly, the RM was run by Royalist Admirals, firmly wedded to the idea of a grand finale daylight battle between battleships that would decide the course of the war. However, many of the other world's navies also started the war with the same idea, so Italian naval policy is symptomatic of the era.

A third problem was a delay in rearmament. Mussolini refained from major naval rearmament until 1933. With the invasion of Ethiopia and the possible hostility of France, Italy adopted a naval program that would add 300,000 tons of warships every year for the next five years. The Naval Ministry, by 1935, wanted to add 4 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers, four cruisers, 24 destroyers, 20 frigates, 12 torpedo boats and 54 submarines. Mussolini, wanted naval growth to be more gradual and thus not fuel an arms race. Italy was not capable, industrially or financially capable of supporting the rearmament program. The smaller units were built, two battleships were delayed until 1937 and two battleships and the three aircraft carriers were deleted.

Another problem lay in the RMs failure to promptly and fully exploit an Italian secret weapons. The frogmen of the fabled X Flotilla. First developed during the crisis of the 1935-36 Ethiopian War, they were allowed to decay in the years following. Properly supported from the start, Italy's special underwater
warfare units could have had a major impact in 1940 instead of late 1941-42.

A fifth problem, was the lack of aircraft carriers. This is widly regarded as THE key reason for the RMs defeat at sea. This lack was compounded by an absence of any sort of land-based Naval Aviation. Mussolini had hoped that the Regia Aeronautica would closely co-operate with the RM, this was not to be and the result was a series of defeats suffered by the RM.

This problem needs to be placed in the context of Italian doctrine. The RM built ships with guns capable of firing tremendous distances. Gunnery was to be aided by seaplanes spotting the fall of the shot. However, the Royal Navys ability to field at least one carrier with every major operation in the Mediterranean allowed their slender fighter strength to control the air above the fleets, denying the Italians fire control and reconnaissance. The RM would end up not fighting the war she was prepared for, but rather the war her enemies were prepared for.

It is intresting to speculate on the RM's capability if it had deployed one or two modern carriers to support its operations. The refusal of the navy to build carriers is often awarded to Mussolini and Balbo; actually, much of the fault can be laid squarely on the shoulders of the RM. The navy's top leadership were so firmly wedded to the idea of battleships as the decisive weapon, that they didn't want any carriers.

Coupled with the lack of its leadership to build carriers, the RM was also crippled by the poor design of its heavy antiaircraft weapons. Its heavy AA guns were excellent for barrage firing, but were not accurate when firing directly at enemy planes. Of all of the RMs losses in WWII, 1/3 of her frontline cruisers and destroyers were lost due to air attack, while 1/2 of her torpedo boats were sunk by air power. Even heavier losses were suffered by the Italian merchant fleet.

The RM's submarine fleet also had their share of problems ranging from a lack of attack computers, air conditioning units that leaked poisonous gases when tubing was ruptured under depth charge attacks, easily seen from the air in the shallower parts of the Mediterranean as well as being slow to dive...not a good situation to be in when under attack.

The RM also lacked flashless powder for their big guns, thus making night actions impossible. Since the RM was wedded firmly to the idea of a decisive daylight action, they saw no need to develop flashless powder. They also lacked an adequate night-time fire control system.

The RMs gunnery problems didn't end there. Their surface fire control systems were not of modern design (1920s). The Italians had also opted for a high muzzle velocity for their guns in order to get as much range as possible, but this also led to the guns wearing out faster and so lose their accuracy. Most twin mounts for 8-inch guns down, were designed for the shells to be fired from the turret at the same time. Mounts with common cradles had the guns too close to each other, causing interference when the shells were in flight (although it did save weight). Elevation of individual guns could not be made to allow for individual wear.

An Italian salvo of shells would often have a high longitudinal dispersion and this could very from salvo to salvo and from shell to shell. With the RM wedded to the idea of long-range surface duels---with inaccurate guns.

During the war, the RM fielded 36 different types of torpedoes, leading to both shortages of specific torpedoes as well as problems of supplying the correct spare parts.

Italian ship design was behind the times, depending on riveting instead of the new electrical welding. Hull lines, were quite flat, leading to major problems for ships in rough seas. The desire of the RM to have the fastest possible ships led to engines being worn out earlier than expected, allowing their ships to be caught and sunk. Electronics was another area of inferiority. In all of WWII, the RM only built 50 radar sets, although several additional sets were ordered from Germany. In spite of having a submarine fleet second only to the Soviet Unions, Italian ASW work lagged far behind other navies. In 1941, the RM had only two sonar outfits. Again the Germans would supply additional sonars, but it was too little, too late.

In the course of the war, the RM would sink 267,236 tons of merchant and warships. This would include 7 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 32 submarines and other small craft belonging to the Royal Navy.

Total losses for the RM by the time of the armistice were 11 cruisers, 33 destroyers, 34 torpedo boats (frigates), and 60 submarines. Italy also lost 595 of the 786 merchant ships that she stated the war with.

[dragoon500ly]

The HIJMS Yamato and Musashi were the largest battleships ever built, displacing almost 70,000 tons at full load. They carried the heaviest guns ever to put to see, nine rifles of 18.11 inch bore (460mm) and were capable of throwing a 3,219lb shell just over 45,000 yards.

They were also white elephants, obsolete almost as soon as they were built. Both ships fell prey to the new decisive weapon of the sea, airpower.

Only once was on these "superbattleships" in a position to face American battleships in a slug-fest, this would have been on October 25, 1944 at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. A Japanese task force consisting of Yamato, three older battleships, as well as a cruiser/destroyer escort slipped through San Bernardino Strait and attacked a CVE task group off Samar Island. The running fight that ensued turned into an American victory as the Japanese broke off their pursuit after sinking 2 CVEs and 3 DDs.

The US planning for the invasion of the Philippines had envisioned the possibility that the IJN might threaten the invasion forces with surface ships. Accordingly Admiral Halsey was to detach seven fast battleships and form Task Force 34 under the command of Admiral Willis Lee, the Navy's best battleship commander. However, when Halsey took Third Fleet north to attack the Japanese carriers, he took the battleships with him (later citing their massive antiaircraft batteries were needed to protect the carriers). Had he not done so or if he had heeded the initial warnings to dispatch them southwards then the largest battleship fight of the war could have taken place with the HIJMS Yamato, Nagato, Haruna and Kongo and the USS Iowa, New Jersey, Massachusetts, South Dakota, Washington and Alabama...and as Samuel Eliot Morison would later write, "What a brawl that would have been!"

[dragoon500ly]

The Golden Age of Torpedo Warfare took place during World War Two. Torpedoes were used extensively by all combatants and by all means possible; land-based, submarines, aircraft and surface ship.

The Japanese enjoyed a significant advantage in torpedo warfare for the first two years of the war. Their primary torpedo was both larger and more capable than that of any other combatant.

Type 8: 24-inch diameter. An older (1920s) design used by older cruisers and destroyers. Weighed 5,207lbs with a 761lb warhead. When set for 38 knot speed, had a range of 10km. When set for 32 knot speed, range went up to 15km.

Type 89: 21-inch diameter. Another 1920s design, used by submarines. Weighs 3,677lbs with a 661lb warhead. At 45 knots, range was 5.5km; at 35 knots range was 10km.

Type 90: 21-inch diameter. A 1930s design used by some cruisers. Weighed 5,743lbs and carried a 827lb warhead. At 46 knots had a 7km range; at 35 knots, range was 15km.

Type 95: 21-inch diameter. The submarine version of the Long Lance torpedo. Weighed in at 3,671lbs and had a warhead of 893lbs. At 50 knots, range was 9km; at 46 knots, range was 12km.

Type 93: 24-inch diameter. The (in)famous Long Lance torpedo. Weighed 5,952lbs and carried a 1,080lb warhead. At 49 knots had a range of 20km; at 36 knots, range was 40km.

Type 97: 17.7-inch diameter. Used by midget submarines, only known use was at Pearl Haarbor. Weighed in at 2,094lbs, with a 772lb warhead. At 45 knots had a 5.5km range.

Type 91-1: 17.7-inch diameter. The standard aerial torpedo at the start of the war, by 1941 was replaced by the Type 91-2. Weighed in at 1,728lbs with a 331lb warhead. At 42 knots, range was 2km. Could be launched at a maximum altitiude of 100ft and a max speed of 200knots

Type 91-2: 17.7-inch diameter. Replaced the 91-1 by early 1942. Weighed 1,841lbs with a 452lb warhead. At 42 knots, range was 2km.

Type 91-3: 17.7-inch diameter. Replaced the 91-2 by 1943, could be dropped at 350 knots and from a max altitude of 200ft. Weighed in at 1,872lbs with a 529lb warhead. At 42 knots had a 2km range.

Type 04: 17.7-inch torpedo. The final version of the aerial torpedo, entered service in 1944 and could be dropped at speeds of up to 400 knots and 250ft. Weighed in at 2,169lbs with a 670lb warhead. At 42 knots, range was 1.5km.

On the other side of the coin....these were the primary US torpedoes of WWII.

Mark 10: 21-inch diameter. A WWI torpedo used on the S-class submarines. Weighed in at 2,215lbs with a 497lb warhead. At 36 knots, had a 3.2km range.

Mark 15: 21-inch diameter. The standard destroyer torpedo. Weighed 3,841lbs and had a 825lb warhead. At 45 knots, had a 5.5km range; at 26 knots had a 13.7km range.

Mark 14: 21-inch diameter. The standard submarine torpedo of WWII, in the early years suffered major failures due primarly to the new magnetic-field-detecting detonator. When set for contact mode, the detonator fired to fire due to the firing pin being made of cheap, easily bendable metal. The problems were finally solved in 1943 and it enjoyed a decent reputation afterwards. Continued in service until the 1970s. Weighed in at 3,280lbs with a 643lb warhead. At 46 knots, range was 4.1km; at 31 knots range was 8.2km.

Mark 13: 17.7-inch diameter. The standard aerial torpedo (also used by late-war PT boats). At first could only be dropped from a max altitude of 50ft and at a speed no greater than 110 knots. By late war could be dropped from 1,000ft and at speeds of over 200 knots. Weighed 2,216lbs with a 600lb warhead. At 33 knots had a 6.7km range.

Mark 18: 21-inch diameter. An unsuccessful copy of the German G7e torpedo. Did not leave a wake. Weighed 3,154lbs with a 575lb warhead. At 29 knots it had a 3.6km range.

Mark 24: 19-inch diameter. The first effective homing torpedo, it was used by ASW aircraft from 1943 onwards against submerged subs. Weighed 680lbs with a 92lb warhead. At 12 knots it had a 3.6km range.

Mark 27: 19-inch diameter. The sub-launched version of the Mark 24. It appeared in 1944. Weighed 720lbs with a 95lb warhead. At 12 knots it had a 4.5km range.

[dragoon500ly]

I was reading the other day yet another book on WWII in which the author tried to put forward what the Japanese should have done (with him in charge...I think).

There were two points that he made that left me sitting in my armchair, laughing.

The first point was that the Japanese should have invaded Australia. And the second was that they should have invaded the Hawaiian islands.

Sorry, had to stop and laugh after the last one.

Of all the world powers, Japan entered WWII with the greatest disadvantage. Now to be sure, Japan had a fairly modern military, but Japan, as an island nation, relied upon imports to fuel her military machine. And she didn't have the merchant hulls to do so. As much as 40% of her imports were carried in foreign-flagged vessels and that stopped when the Pacific erupted in war.

Since the Japanese started the war with a shortfall in merchant hulls, how then could the Japanese support Pacific conquests, not to mention a major war in China. The short answer is that they didn't.

The Imperial Japanese Army committed less than a dozen division-equivalents to the Pacific. Their primary focus was on the war with China and the advance into India/Burma. This was were the IJA sent its best troops and equipment. Indeed, right up to the very end of the war, most of the IJA was stationed in China.

From this standpoint alone, any Japanese invasion of Australia would have lacked the troop strength and the logistic support needed to capture and hold it.

So what about the invasion of Hawaii

As part of the post Midway planning, the IJA committed two divisions for follow-up operations in Hawaii. A Japanese occupation of the island chain would have seriously hampered US operations until they were retaken. And the fall of Hawaii, would have had serious implications for the "Europe First" doctrine.

The island of Oahu offered the best ground for conducting military operations, as well as being home to the military installations that the Japanese would have needed to maintain control. On Oahu, the US Army already had two infantry divisions (the 24th and 25th), plus the Hawaiian National Guard, various support and Army Air Force troops, as well as numerous Navy and Marine personnel...as well as some very elaborate coastal defenses.

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, the US moved the entire 27th Infantry Division (an older 'square' division with four regiments) as well as several battalions of tanks, artillery and antiaircraft guns. By March 1942, there were neary 75,000 combat troops as well as over 100,000 support troops on Oahu. Not to mention lots of new aircraft.

In order to cover the invasion, Japan needed Midway...too be sure, bombers could have reached Pearl Harbor, but Midway is a small atoll and could handle, at most, some 100-150 aircraft. Primary air support would have come from the IJN's First Air Fleet made up of their six first line carriers. These would have had trouble going up against an alerted American air defense network, especially with the Pacific Fleet's three carriers lurking in the wings. Such an operation would have tied up even more of an already stretched thin merchant marine.

It is doubtful that Japan could have supported either operation.

So to those budding authors that want to write "historical fiction", please, take the time to do a little research.....

[dragoon500ly]

In any discussion of WWII, the German U-Boat campaign seems get get the most attention. The U.S. slaughter of Japanese shipping is seldom mentioned. U.S. submarines accounted for over half of Japanese merchant shipping. The increasing reach of American land and carrier-based aviation complemented this effort, ensuring that Japanese shipping was under attack almost from the moment it left Japan until it arrived at their front line bases.

This shortfall of shipping was assisted by new construction, but at rates far less than that of the Allies, typically some 500,000 tons of new construction a year with a peak, in 1944 of 1.7 million tons (the same year that the US sank 2.7 million tons).

By the end of 1943, Japan's merchant marine was crippled.

Submarines accounted for 5,880,000 tons sunk during the war, roughly 62% of the total.

Carrier aircraft accounted for another 1,740,000 tons, 18% of the total.

Land based aircraft added 825,000 tons, 9% of the total sunk.

Mines accounted for 600,000 tons or 6%.

And finally 450,000 tons were sunk by accidents at sea or by surface ship action, some 5 % of the total.

Another way of looking at Japan's situation is this:

In Dec. 1941, 6.4 million tons were available.

In Jan. 1943, 5.9 million tons remained.

In Jan. 1944, 4.8 million tons remained.

In Jan. 1945, available shipping had been reduced to 2.4 million tons.

And in Aug. 1945, the Japanese merchant marine was reduced to 1.5 million tons.

USN submarines spent 31,671 days on patrol (roughly 3 weeks on patrol). In attacking 4,112 Japanese merchant ships, US subs expended 14,748 torpedoes (roughly 3.6 per attack). Because of defective torpedoes, the odds of sinking a vessel, from 1941-1943 was less than 20%. It rose to 50% for the rest of the war.

US Subs confirmed the sinking of 188 warships and 1,294 merchant men, this does not include ships attacked, damaged and later sank by some other means. This cost the USN 49 submarines.

The IJN lost 130 submarines in WWII; the British lost 3 subs and the Dutch lost 5 subs in the Pacific. Allied submarines sank 2% of all Japanese shipping sunk.

Japan started the war with 67 subs, the US Pacific Fleet had 56 subs. The IJN built 120 subs during the war....the US built 200.

As successful as US subs were, their crews took high losses. 22% of all US submarine crews were killed during the course of the war. This is the highest percentage loss of any arm of the service.

[ShadoWarrior]

So to those budding authors that want to write "historical fiction", please, take the time to do a little research.....

Harry Turtledove, the award-winning author of many alternate-history novels, wrote one a few years ago (the Days of Infamy duology) in which the initial attack on PH was a full-on invasion, and not just a raid. It was very well researched and pretty plausible. The Japanese do, eventually, lose the war due to America's awesome industrial might. But it takes the US a lot longer to win it, and there's an enormous amount of grief for the unfortunate citizens of Hawaii prior to the US invasion to retake the islands.

[copeab]

This has been touched on a bit in two previous posts, but I'll elaborate on it here: Japan's merchant fleet was inadequate and what she had was improperly used.

This came down to four points:
(1) japan entered the war with too few merchant ships (including those operated by the IJN and IJA)
(2) She inadequately protected the ships she did have (rarely sailing them in convoys or with sufficient escort vessels)
(3) Japan didn't use her ships efficiently. For example, a ship operated by the Army might take a cargo from Japan to Java but return with an empty hold, but a navy ship might sail to Java with an empty hold and return with a full load (this also related to the incredible degree of non-cooperation between the IJA and IJN)
(4) Japan didn't have the resources to fully replace it's merchant shipping losses during the war.

As a result, the Japanese never was able to ship as much men, material and oil and they should have and the situation rapidly declined by the end of the war.

[dragoon500ly]

Harry Turtledove, the award-winning author of many alternate-history novels, wrote one a few years ago (the Days of Infamy duology) in which the initial attack on PH was a full-on invasion, and not just a raid. It was very well researched and pretty plausible. The Japanese do, eventually, lose the war due to America's awesome industrial might. But it takes the US a lot longer to win it, and there's an enormous amount of grief for the unfortunate citizens of Hawaii prior to the US invasion to retake the islands.

I enjoy Turtledove, he takes the time to research his material and that shows through in his books, certainly makes for an enjoyable read!

There is another best selling author that initially impressed me...then he wrote a triology. The final book really destroyed him for me...one of his major battle scenes was an almost line for line description of an older movie called "Zulu". The scene was much better done in the movie.