29th Infantry Division

[Graebarde]

Not so fast. First, look at the numbers. You've got 12 training divisions that were doing nothing but inital entry training (basic). Thats a lot of NCOs, and they were keeping the officer structure for it too. There were quite a few qualified captains and colonels that were doing all the administrative work and planning the logistics there. If you had 12 divisions, all active, all doing nothing but cranking out basic training recruits, you'd see a lot of opened reserve posts (which happened in the war on terror) like shelby, dix, attabury, so on. There are a lot more recruits coming then there are divisions to put them in.

Those training divisions do MORE than just BCT, they also do the AIT for combat arms and some of the less technical support skills. The trainee undergoes 16 weeks of training, such as the OSUT units do today. The 16 weeks can be reduced with some less tactical or important skills being less emphasised. The cadre of the training units that house the trainees is also minimal. Cadre strenghts of company, battalion and brigade are minimal at best. At the company level there are TWO officers for the company, each platoon has maybe three NCO cadre, plus the cooks, clerks and supply personnel. Battalion is a short staff that is very austure, maybe 25 in the HHC doing admin mostly, and brigade is as bare. The committee group is the largest assembly of cadre personnel as they do the field training and classroom instruction. Company NCOs do the D&C, discipline, etc.

There are NOT a lot of NCO and officer to strip from these divisions.

AND many of the cadre can be convelescent (sp) assignments as the war progressed. I remember the NCO cadre in my BCT and AIT in '68 (taken at two locations btw). The fact they were combat veterans and invoked 'lessons learned' on us (at least my perception) had and influence.

Yes they could bring in more convelecent NCO to form the units into 'line units' in the later phases, but I think they would keep the divisions functioning as they were designed as LONG as possible, and the schools would as well. The schools would be putting out new officers and NCOs, such as they did during 'Nam with accelerated OCS and NCOES courses kicking out sergeants (though I think rather than sergeants and staff sergeants they would be better making them corporals and sergants. I was NOT impressed with the honor graduate staff sergeants I came across, and one cost me a stripe after I kicked his ass, but that's another story.)

[The Rifleman]

Those training divisions do MORE than just BCT, they also do the AIT for combat arms and some of the less technical support skills. The trainee undergoes 16 weeks of training, such as the OSUT units do today. The 16 weeks can be reduced with some less tactical or important skills being less emphasised. The cadre of the training units that house the trainees is also minimal. Cadre strenghts of company, battalion and brigade are minimal at best. At the company level there are TWO officers for the company, each platoon has maybe three NCO cadre, plus the cooks, clerks and supply personnel. Battalion is a short staff that is very austure, maybe 25 in the HHC doing admin mostly, and brigade is as bare. The committee group is the largest assembly of cadre personnel as they do the field training and classroom instruction. Company NCOs do the D&C, discipline, etc.

There are NOT a lot of NCO and officer to strip from these divisions.

AND many of the cadre can be convelescent (sp) assignments as the war progressed. I remember the NCO cadre in my BCT and AIT in '68 (taken at two locations btw). The fact they were combat veterans and invoked 'lessons learned' on us (at least my perception) had and influence.

Yes they could bring in more convelecent NCO to form the units into 'line units' in the later phases, but I think they would keep the divisions functioning as they were designed as LONG as possible, and the schools would as well. The schools would be putting out new officers and NCOs, such as they did during 'Nam with accelerated OCS and NCOES courses kicking out sergeants (though I think rather than sergeants and staff sergeants they would be better making them corporals and sergants. I was NOT impressed with the honor graduate staff sergeants I came across, and one cost me a stripe after I kicked his ass, but that's another story.)

What you're saying is partially accurate, but you've got to remember that we are going back into time. The conversion of the divsions hadn't happened yet. For example, it was 98th Infantry Division (Training) as opposed to 98th Infantry Divsion (IT). The total army school system may have never happened. Part of the draw down in the 90s was that the army didn't need all this structure for just BCT. OSUT was only limited to combat arms 11, 13, and 19 series.

Your numbers are fairly close. Yes, there are only two officers per company and only three NCOs per platoon. But key is that your company command section is intact. Thats your clerk, commander, first sergeant and supply. Each platoon is getting a very good platoon sergeant and two squad leaders. The brains of the operation - company, platoon are there! These are light infantry divisions, so your HHC doesn't have to be big. You aren't moving sabot rounds for tanks and thousands of gallons of fuel for bradleys. Also, having those few key staff people, the brains of the logistics are there! So the numbers at battalion level would look like this -

Three Infantry Companies each:
Commander
XO
First sergeant E-8
PAK clerk E-5
Supply Sergeant E-6
Armorer E-5
3 enlisted basic trainees as RTOs

3x Infantry Platoons each:
Platoon Leader (vacant)
Platoon Sergeant E-7
2x Squad Leader E-6
1x Squad Leader E-6 (vacant)
8x Team Leader E-5 (vacant)
31 enlisted basic trainees as infantry

HHC
Commander
First Sergeant E-8
PAK clerk E-5
Supply sergeant E-6

Transportation section
Section Sergeant E-6
8 vehicle drivers E-4

Mess Section
Food Service NCO E-7
4 cooks E-4

Medic Section
Squad leader E-6
4 medics E-4

Maintanence Section
Motor Sergeant E-7
ULLS clerk E-5
Squad Leader E-6
4 mechanics E-4

Mortar Platoon
Platoon Leader (vacant)
Platoon Sergeant E-7
2 x Section Sergeants E-6
12 enlisted basic trainees as mortar crews

Battalion Staff
Commander
XO/S-3
S-1
S-2 (vacant)
S-4
Sergeant Major
Ops Sergeant E-8
PAK section Sergeant E-7
4 enlisted staff E-4
8 enlisted staff (vacant)
8 enlisted basic trainees as RTOs, vehicle drivers, staff

As we can see, the missing links are platoon leaders and E-5 team leaders. I am NOT a fan of raw, untrained LTs, but an even bigger pet peeve is "shake and bake" sergeants. The point is, its world war III. If infantry battalions didn't have an S-2 after 3 years of WWIII would it hurt Probably not. How long do you expect brand new LTs to survive in combat and how much do they contribute, compared to those E7s and E6s I'd say not much. These platoons are going to be able to shoot, move, communicate from the direction and training provided by those seasoned senior NCOs.

Where I do see a big problem is the missing E-5s. You can train soldiers in groups of 10, but the E-5s really are the ones that catch mistakes and ensure that things are moving along. They only have 3 joes to watch. However, after the first few fights, natural leaders and soldiers that have a knack for infantry combat will quickly rise and they'll be your team leaders.

Also, look at the strength for one of these new LIDs. They are running at about 5,000 full strength, not the 12,000 LID of pre-war. Times are desperate. Also, think about this: its 2000 and the US itself is in turmoil. Can't send soldiers overseas because there is no fuel, no ships. There are invaders coming across mexico and in washington state. Where would new draftees even come from How would we get them to ft benning or ft knox Closing some of the basic training centers and turning them into divisions just makes sense.

[HorseSoldier]

It's worth noting that the USAR light infantry divisions do not become maneuver units until the summer of 1998, eight or nine months after the strategic nuclear campaign begins. Presumably, even before the war with Mexico, civil unrest had reached a tipping point where whatever long term ill effects to the training process their conversion represented was deemed less important than augmenting law enforcement and military forces still CONUS in reestablishing order.

From the unit histories, several of those divisions got badly mauled in action against marauders, which speaks to how bad the situation was by late summer/early fall '98. Admittedly some of that may speak to poor performance by units that had limited resources, training, and experience, and some of it may represent covert resistance by well-equipped and organized New America cells rather than bandits and such. But whatever the details on the ground, it's pretty clear that by July '98, the US was in dire straits and desperate for manpower to help with its internal issues.

[Legbreaker]

Not so fast. First, look at the numbers....

+1

You also need to look at the dates these units were converted, and whether or not Civgov or Milgov commands them. Post nuke they're not likely to be receiving many new recruits so there reason for being is gone.

[The Rifleman]

Admittedly some of that may speak to poor performance by units that had limited resources, training, and experience

Thats it right there. You don't have enough experienced leaders, you have a longer span of control and you run the risk of losing big in a fight. These weren't premier combat organizations. Also, if you notice the ones that were committed slowly to a fight and gained some experience, they did better. The ones that were fighting right off and didn't have time to learn lessons got hammered.

[Graebarde]

What you're saying is partially accurate, but you've got to remember that we are going back into time. The conversion of the divsions hadn't happened yet. For example, it was 98th Infantry Division (Training) as opposed to 98th Infantry Divsion (IT). The total army school system may have never happened. Part of the draw down in the 90s was that the army didn't need all this structure for just BCT. OSUT was only limited to combat arms 11, 13, and 19 series.

First they are NOT Infantry Division (Training) or (IT), they are designated as TRAINING divisions, with no branch indicated. And I realize the Twilight timeline the conversion to IT had not yet taken place, though it was '93 when the transition started. As for the army school system, it preceeds this period. The branch schools have been around since at least WW2. And the school system trained specialists, not combat arms other than the higher grades/ranks. OSUT for combat arms makes sense, since a company of clerks, cooks, drivers, mechanics, medics, etc does not make a lot of sense generally speaking. And the TD has the schools for the support courses. The BCT would be OSUT concept, with persons selected for the support courses taken out after phase one (BCT) probably, or perhaps one company in a battalion had only BCT for the REMFs.

Your numbers are fairly close. Yes, there are only two officers per company and only three NCOs per platoon. But key is that your company command section is intact. Thats your clerk, commander, first sergeant and supply. Each platoon is getting a very good platoon sergeant and two squad leaders. The brains of the operation - company, platoon are there! These are light infantry divisions, so your HHC doesn't have to be big. You aren't moving sabot rounds for tanks and thousands of gallons of fuel for bradleys. Also, having those few key staff people, the brains of the logistics are there!

The Platoon NCOs we had in the companies were Staff Sergeants and Sergeants or Corporals. The only training SFC we had, which would be a platoon sergeant, was the SDI. As for VERY GOOD, that is debateable as I saw some loosers along with the Excellent, but that's not the argument. Yes a conversion to the said light infantry division would be easier than to the heavy, that's a given.

So the numbers at battalion level would look like this -

Three Infantry Companies each:
Commander
XO
First sergeant E-8
PAK clerk E-5
Supply Sergeant E-6
Armorer E-5
3 enlisted basic trainees as RTOs

3x Infantry Platoons each:
Platoon Leader (vacant)
Platoon Sergeant E-7
2x Squad Leader E-6
1x Squad Leader E-6 (vacant)
8x Team Leader E-5 (vacant)
31 enlisted basic trainees as infantry

HHC
Commander
First Sergeant E-8
PAK clerk E-5
Supply sergeant E-6

Transportation section
Section Sergeant E-6
8 vehicle drivers E-4

Mess Section
Food Service NCO E-7
4 cooks E-4

Medic Section
Squad leader E-6
4 medics E-4

Maintanence Section
Motor Sergeant E-7
ULLS clerk E-5
Squad Leader E-6
4 mechanics E-4

Mortar Platoon
Platoon Leader (vacant)
Platoon Sergeant E-7
2 x Section Sergeants E-6
12 enlisted basic trainees as mortar crews

Battalion Staff
Commander
XO/S-3
S-1
S-2 (vacant)
S-4
Sergeant Major
Ops Sergeant E-8
PAK section Sergeant E-7
4 enlisted staff E-4
8 enlisted staff (vacant)
8 enlisted basic trainees as RTOs, vehicle drivers, staff

This is REALLY a light support for the battalion, especially at the mess level. Doesn't there need to be a mess team at each company level See above the company breakout of NCOs, though Committee group could and probably would contribute some needed NCOs in the E5-E7 paygrades.

As we can see, the missing links are platoon leaders and E-5 team leaders. I am NOT a fan of raw, untrained LTs, but an even bigger pet peeve is "shake and bake" sergeants. The point is, its world war III. If infantry battalions didn't have an S-2 after 3 years of WWIII would it hurt Probably not. How long do you expect brand new LTs to survive in combat and how much do they contribute, compared to those E7s and E6s I'd say not much. These platoons are going to be able to shoot, move, communicate from the direction and training provided by those seasoned senior NCOs.

Where I do see a big problem is the missing E-5s. You can train soldiers in groups of 10, but the E-5s really are the ones that catch mistakes and ensure that things are moving along. They only have 3 joes to watch. However, after the first few fights, natural leaders and soldiers that have a knack for infantry combat will quickly rise and they'll be your team leaders.

I agree with this assessment. See the Committee Group comment as to where SOME of the missing NCOs will come from. CG has the largest group of troops in the TD, and the 'experts' per se.

Also, look at the strength for one of these new LIDs. They are running at about 5,000 full strength, not the 12,000 LID of pre-war. Times are desperate. Also, think about this: its 2000 and the US itself is in turmoil. Can't send soldiers overseas because there is no fuel, no ships. There are invaders coming across mexico and in washington state. Where would new draftees even come from How would we get them to ft benning or ft knox Closing some of the basic training centers and turning them into divisions just makes sense.

TDs only have about 3000 cadre total of all ranks and specialties. Granted times are desperate, that's a given. Where do the draftee's come from Refugee camps for one, since in the army at least they can get a meal and it's more secure.. debateable I know. There would not be a need to move them to Benning, Knox or anywhere else. The TDs would set up at places like McCoy, Chaffee, Shelby, and other reserve camps/forts as well as at the existing forts such as Lewis, Ord, Sill, Polk, Riley, Hood, and other places where the RA units have moved out to the front. Facilities are there, why waste them. The TDs are regionally allocated. But as with everything else in Twilight, once TDM occurs all bets are off.

[The Rifleman]

@ Graebarde

Yes, I know that this organization is NOT very pretty. Also, as has been debated, these divisions did not fair very well. I think that some of the contributing factors is that we are all veterans, with knowledge from different eras, and on top of that, the T2K timeline makes everything blurry with "what ifs".

When I attended OSUT in the early 90s, every basic training company had 5 platoons, with an E-7 and and E-6 each. Also, if there was a new DS in training, he was not counted in the totals. Further, at one point, some of the battalions had 5 companies in them. I've scaled back from that, but still, its a lot of senior billet holders. That didn't include all the instructors, which in the armor field, was quite a few. There was a full compliment of 14 tanks per company, and a dozen instructors per company as well. Those guys were the E-5s and E-6s. Then, on top of that, the rifle ranges, the mine training course, the hand grenade range, land nav course.... all had their own dedicated staff. I didn't touch any of them either.

The mess section in many line units is only authorized a few guys to boil water for the "T" rats, nothing more. Yes, I know, it looks like dog squeeze, but the cooks are going to draw on the infantry for KPs, and old school KP, where you do a lot more than just wash the pots and pans.

The place where I would be the most concerned is the medics. There just isn't enough for a platoon medic, and barely enough for company medics. I suppose the they could be sucked off from in-processing or hospital units, but that would be highly concerning to me.

As you said yourself, TDs have a cadre of 3,000 people. But they really aren't starting the war with much more than 5,000.

Everything you said is completely valid. I guess it just comes down to how you view organization of assets. I'm assuming that you'd have rather seen the 30,000 or so new soldiers distributed amoungst the existing divisions, brining their strength up to 3-7k. The merit to that plan is that you are putting novices with veterans. That could work well, but you end up with the headaches of the vietnam war and WWII individual replacement systems.

For me, I'd rather see smaller divisions as they are more agile and easy to weild. I like the idea of divisions training as a unit in CONUS before they deploy. When the LIDs were sent over, I would have then shipped the used up units back on the returning ships. An example of this would be 2nd Armored Division. What good does it do to have a division with less than 1,000 people in it Thats going too far. I'd use that as a cadre to then build around, in CONUS. It gives the veterans a break and at the same time it gives the unit an expereince base.

[Legbreaker]

What I'm seeing here is reality interfering with the game.
The unit histories, etc were originally written back in the early to mid 80's. Many of the points raised about why certain organisational structures can/cannot be possible are from dates and events after the original material was written, and therefore their relevance is questionable at best.

[Olefin]

"An example of this would be 2nd Armored Division. What good does it do to have a division with less than 1,000 people in it Thats going too far. I'd use that as a cadre to then build around, in CONUS. It gives the veterans a break and at the same time it gives the unit an expereince base. "

I agree with you completely there Rifleman - that unit, in reality, would have been rotated back and rebuilt. At the time they got hammered in the game they were still bringing in new units. So why leave it in place as an emasculated brigade that was basically useless - instead it would have gone home on the next ships heading back and been rebuilt, most likely using one of the training divisions to build it back up to strength and being re-equipped with stateside gear - i.e. M60A4's and M113's or new build M1's and reconditioned Bradleys.

The writers of the game gave the Soviets way too much credit and had the US do things they would never do and act very dumb in many ways.

There are other examples - the 25th Light disintegrates in Korea and falls apart and they reform the division with less than 1000 survivors. At the same time you have the 7th Light staying intact but also getting hammered and also having less than 1000 men.

So why reform the 25th at all Send the survivors to the 7th and bring it back up to where it can at least be useful. Having two different divisional structures with only 1100 men between them makes absolutely no sense and in reality the Army would have folded them together or sent them home and used them as cadres of veterans that the training divisions could have been formed around.

Same with three Marine Corps division in Korea that between them have 3000 men. That makes absolutely no sense - so why have two weak divisions that are basically peacetime battalions They should be one division with 3000 men and 20 tanks, which in July of 2000 makes them quite formidable, not three divided formations.

The GDW designers seemed to have been reading histories of the Wehrmacht in WWII and not the US Army when they came up with their idea of creating new formations instead of sending them replacements or rotating units back home.

[Graebarde]

What I'm seeing here is reality interfering with the game.
The unit histories, etc were originally written back in the early to mid 80's. Many of the points raised about why certain organisational structures can/cannot be possible are from dates and events after the original material was written, and therefore their relevance is questionable at best.

Maybe, however my position IS from the period in which the game set. Heck, it's the era I KNOW.

[The Rifleman]

Maybe, however my position IS from the period in which the game set. Heck, it's the era I KNOW.

I think that describes many of us. We lived it. Its probably why this game is more popular with people in the 30s and 40s as opposed to kids.

[The Rifleman]

"An example of this would be 2nd Armored Division. What good does it do to have a division with less than 1,000 people in it Thats going too far. I'd use that as a cadre to then build around, in CONUS. It gives the veterans a break and at the same time it gives the unit an expereince base. "

I agree with you completely there Rifleman - that unit, in reality, would have been rotated back and rebuilt. At the time they got hammered in the game they were still bringing in new units. So why leave it in place as an emasculated brigade that was basically useless - instead it would have gone home on the next ships heading back and been rebuilt, most likely using one of the training divisions to build it back up to strength and being re-equipped with stateside gear - i.e. M60A4's and M113's or new build M1's and reconditioned Bradleys.

The writers of the game gave the Soviets way too much credit and had the US do things they would never do and act very dumb in many ways.

There are other examples - the 25th Light disintegrates in Korea and falls apart and they reform the division with less than 1000 survivors. At the same time you have the 7th Light staying intact but also getting hammered and also having less than 1000 men.

So why reform the 25th at all Send the survivors to the 7th and bring it back up to where it can at least be useful. Having two different divisional structures with only 1100 men between them makes absolutely no sense and in reality the Army would have folded them together or sent them home and used them as cadres of veterans that the training divisions could have been formed around.

Same with three Marine Corps division in Korea that between them have 3000 men. That makes absolutely no sense - so why have two weak divisions that are basically peacetime battalions They should be one division with 3000 men and 20 tanks, which in July of 2000 makes them quite formidable, not three divided formations.

The GDW designers seemed to have been reading histories of the Wehrmacht in WWII and not the US Army when they came up with their idea of creating new formations instead of sending them replacements or rotating units back home.

I agree with the above completely. As has been noted elsewhere, with the haters of the 44th Armored Division, independanty brigades have a special use. Massed numbers of them dilute combat power that could be used elsewhere. The germans tried a lot of seperate panzer brigades on the Soviet front in 43 and quickly ended the experiment. The US army had lots of independant tank battalions and TD battalions and found that they just didn't work for too many reasons to explain.

I would think that similarly, having these 400 person divisions as one "brigade" wouldn't cut it. Its just a waste of combat power and reasources. However, using them as a cadre, and as others have pointed out, scooping up starving refugees and putting an M231 or M16 in their hands, would provide a unit to do either security missions or clearing out bandits or even policing duties. It would go a long way towards restoring stability in the US.

[HorseSoldier]

I've been working on a write up that might get submitted for the next Good Luck e-zine (assuming I can actually get it done by then) about the 194th Militia Regiment -- basically the local defense militias active in the 194th Armored Brigade's AO in southern Illinois/Missouri/Kentucky. The militia does local security functions and frees up the personnel from the brigade to focus on security for the refinery at Robinson and more proactive, longer range patrolling. It also allows the brigade to rapidly focus more of its combat power against larger threats or objectives without having to completely leave its farming communities swinging in the breeze.

The basic premise is kind of a low budget Vietnam CAP program crossed with the Iraq/A'stan ETTs -- the militia has its own NCOs and officers, but has limited number of cadre from 194th Arm'd Bde embedded all the way down to platoon level. The Regimental structure also incorporates attempts to reestablish civilian law enforcement in the AO and a company headquarters that coordinates scout/liaison teams of local militia assigned to 194th Armored's units for their knowledge of local terrain and human terrain.

Organizationally, it's mostly part-timers with the building block being four squad platoons recruited from individual settlements -- during low threat (or high labor demand) time periods, each squad does one week of active service per month, but this can be flexed as resources allow and threat level dictates. Armament is a mix of M16EZs and an assortment of civilian firearms, everything from AR-15s and other military style weapons to hunting rifles and shotguns. Uniforms are, likewise, anything from BDUs to civilian hunting clothing to street clothes, worn with locally made copies of the 194th Arm'd Bde's patch and a militia patch either sewn on or worn on a brassard.

I think this sort of arrangement would be prevalent in pretty much all cantonment areas with a military garrison in the US (MilGov or CivGov), and means that in a real emergency a military unit in an established cantonment area could exceed its listed manpower by 50-100% (though these extra forces probably aren't capable of much more than conducting static defenses, and lack the firepower to go toe to toe with a well equipped, well trained opponent).

I'd imagine that overseas where US or other forces were foreigners and outsiders, I'd think this system would also be workable, though probably with the de jure arrangement typically being that local militia were affiliated with the host nation military but being de facto incorporated into the local cantonment's military unit, whatever the nationality. (Though, obviously, this only works anywhere if the military unit in cantonment is not dealing with significant hostility and unrest from the local population -- in the face of pronounced overt or covert resistance from the locals, this kind of militia organization would be more problematic and less successful.)

[James Langham]

Maybe one of the reasons for the Training Divisions being converted is that there was not any infrastructure to allow them to get new recruits to train. With everything going to Hell, a logical alternative might be to have each division recruit and train locally.

As for the illogical nature of decisions I still maintain the theory that history shows that few governments or leaders have a good record of making good decisions...

[dragoon500ly]

You run into the same problem...would it be a more efficient use of resources to "create" a dozen "new" LIDs, or use the cadres to bring existing divisions up to strength

In this case, the Army would have deactivated several of the Training Divisions and assign their cadre to other divisions (allowing able-bodied soldiers to be sent to the front) or sent en-bloc to reinforce a division already in combat.