Hello all,
This will be a quick post, just found this interesting and would probably find interest and/or spark discussion......
Prior to the end of the Cold War, the Army's force requirements
were daunting. For example, intelligence estimates credited the Soviet
Army with more than two hundred divisions, eighty of which were
manned at more than 50 percent strength and ready for operations with
minimal mobilization and training. To address this kind of threat, the
JCS developed a "Minimum-Risk Force" intended for a "high assurance
of success" general war. In 1987, this force required 66 Army divisions:
40 for assignment to the European Command (EUCOM), 10 for the
Central Command, 12 for the Pacific Command (PACOM), 2 for the
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and 2 for defense of the continental
United States (CONUS). Lacking the resources required to provide U.S.
troops to all contingencies simultaneously, the Joint Staff reduced force
levels to those of a "Planning Force," which could meet U.S. strategic
objectives with "reasonable risk." Planning Force requirements were
36 Army divisions in 1987: 26 EUCOM, 6 CENTCOM, 2 PACOM, 0
SOUTHCOM, and 2 CONUS. The Army's actual "Current Force" for
that year was somewhat smaller: 18 active divisions (5 of which had
reserve component "round-out" brigades) and 10 Army National Guard
divisions. This "Current Force" obviously accepted increased risk,
especially in lower priority theaters. Based on risk analysis and political
priorities, it apportioned the twenty-eight existing Army divisions to the
regional combatant commands as follows: 19 EUCOM, 5 CENTCOM,
2 PACOM, 0 SOUTHCOM, and 2 CONUS.
The whole book is here:
Army Command Post and Defense Reshaping, 1987-1997
I also found this an interesting read, especially about the 5 H-series ARNG Divisions and how the seperate Heavy & Light Brigades fit in.......
(or google Army of Excellence)
Enjoy,
Louie
This will be a quick post, just found this interesting and would probably find interest and/or spark discussion......
Prior to the end of the Cold War, the Army's force requirements
were daunting. For example, intelligence estimates credited the Soviet
Army with more than two hundred divisions, eighty of which were
manned at more than 50 percent strength and ready for operations with
minimal mobilization and training. To address this kind of threat, the
JCS developed a "Minimum-Risk Force" intended for a "high assurance
of success" general war. In 1987, this force required 66 Army divisions:
40 for assignment to the European Command (EUCOM), 10 for the
Central Command, 12 for the Pacific Command (PACOM), 2 for the
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and 2 for defense of the continental
United States (CONUS). Lacking the resources required to provide U.S.
troops to all contingencies simultaneously, the Joint Staff reduced force
levels to those of a "Planning Force," which could meet U.S. strategic
objectives with "reasonable risk." Planning Force requirements were
36 Army divisions in 1987: 26 EUCOM, 6 CENTCOM, 2 PACOM, 0
SOUTHCOM, and 2 CONUS. The Army's actual "Current Force" for
that year was somewhat smaller: 18 active divisions (5 of which had
reserve component "round-out" brigades) and 10 Army National Guard
divisions. This "Current Force" obviously accepted increased risk,
especially in lower priority theaters. Based on risk analysis and political
priorities, it apportioned the twenty-eight existing Army divisions to the
regional combatant commands as follows: 19 EUCOM, 5 CENTCOM,
2 PACOM, 0 SOUTHCOM, and 2 CONUS.
The whole book is here:
Army Command Post and Defense Reshaping, 1987-1997
I also found this an interesting read, especially about the 5 H-series ARNG Divisions and how the seperate Heavy & Light Brigades fit in.......
(or google Army of Excellence)
Enjoy,
Louie
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