Just how much hurt Soviet Artillery will bring to bear....

[dragoon500ly]

Going through a copy of FM 100-2-1 Soviet Army Operations and Tactics and found a table that may be of interest...

Norms governing ammunition expenditure for the destruction or suppression of stationary, unobserved targets at ranges of 10km or less.

Fire coverage is calculated in number of rounds per hectare (a hectare is 10,000 square meters, the equivalent of 2.47 acres).

Target is a battery of SP howitzers, effect is target destruction; rounds fired:
122mm = 450; 130mm = 360; 152mm = 270; 203mm = 120; 120mm mortar = 450; 160mm mortar = 220; 240mm mortar = 120; 122mm MRL = 560

Target is battery of towed artillery in dug-in positions, effect is target suppression; rounds fired: 122mm = 240; 130mm = 220; 152mm = 180; 203mm = 100; 120mm mortar = 240; 160mm mortar = 160; 240mm mortar = 100l 122mm MRL = 400

Target is dug-in troops & weapons, tanks, IFVs & APCs in hasty prepared positions, effect is target suppression; rounds fired: 122mm = 150; 130mm = 150; 152mm = 110; 203mm = 45; 120mm mortar = 140; 160mm mortar = 85; 240mm mortar = 45; 122mm MRL = 240

target suppression has a high probability (90%+) that 25-30% of the elements in the target group or no longer combat effective and/or that 25-30% of the elements in the target area.

target destruction has a high probability (90%+) that at least 50% of the target area has been destroyed or rendered combat ineffective.

The above examples are based on number of rounds fired by a battalion and should be read as a battalion of 122mm OR a battalion of 130mm....any target that would require eight battalions worth of artillery, mortar and MRL would also be a likely target for a tacnuke.

[dragoon500ly]

There are a couple of terms floating around in describing the Soviet organization of artillery for wartime missions. Source is FM 100-2-1 Soviet Operations and Tactics.

Army Artillery Group (AAG): Front artillery assets are normally allocated among committed armies, proportionate to the importance of the assigned tasks. When an army commander receives front artillery assets, he decides, based on his concept of the operation, what artillery will be allocated to his first echelon divisions. Any remaining artillery formations would then be formed into the AAG and charged with the counterbattery role for the army.

Division Artillery Group (DAG): The division commander also allocates artillery, resulting in the formation of the DAG and several RAGs. The division may also organize more than one DAG if necessary, due to span of control, number of battalions and assigned missions. The DAG varies in size from two to four battalions and is employed in general support of the division. The DAG also assists the AAG with the counterbattery mission.

Regimental Artillery Group (RAG): RAGs are formed from organic and attached artillery and reinforcing nondivisional artillery battalions assigned to provide support to the first echelon regiments. RAGS are normally made up from two to four battalions. RAGs are responsible for the engagement of targets that hinder the advance of the attacking force. In addition, a battalion or battery from the RAG may be assigned to direct support of a specific battalion.

[dragoon500ly]

Artillery assets available at the various levels of TO&E

Source is FM 100-2-3 Soviet Troops, Organization and Equipment

A Soviet Front consists of a headquarters, several subordinate armies and supporting elements. A typical front will have 3-4 combined arms armies and 1-2 tank armies assigned.

Artillery support assigned to the front comes in the form of an artillery division and an attached heavy artillery brigade (from RVGK-Reserve of Supreme High Command).

The artillery division consists of 2 gun regts/bdes, 2 how regts/bdes, 1-2 antitank regts/bdes and a MRL brigade, in addition, these units may be made up of either 18-gun bns or 24-gun battalions, resulting in the following equipment totals:

130mm Field Guns M-46 or 152mm Field Guns M-1976 or 152mm SP Guns 2S5:
Regiment: 108-144
Brigade: 144-192
152mm Howitzer D-20 or 152mm SP Howitzer 2S3:
Regiment: 108-144
Brigade: 144-192
100mm Antitank Gun T-12/MT-12 or 125mm Antitank Gun:
Regiment: 36
Brigade: 48
ATGM Launcher Vehicle, BRDM-2/AT-3 or BRDM-2/AT-5
Regiment: 27
Brigade: 36
122mm MRL, BM-21 or 220 MRL, BM-27:
Brigade: 72

The Heavy Artillery Brigade consists of 2 battalions of heavy artillery and 2 battalions of heavy mortars, resulting in the following equipment totals:

203mm Howitzer B-4M or 203mm SP Gun M-1975: 24
240mm Mortar M-204 or 240mm SP Mortar M-1975: 24

The Combined Arms Army artillery assets consists of a Artillery Regiment/Brigade and a MRL Regiment. The Tank Army normally has no additional artillery attached, although (depending on its mission) it may have a artillery regiment and a MRL regiment attached.

The Artillery Regiment consists of 2 gun and 1 howitzer battalions, the Artillery brigade consists of 2 gun and 2 howitzer battalions. Like the artillery divisions, 18 and 24-tube battalions are available, resulting in the following equipment:
130mm Field Gun M-46 or 152mm Field Gun M-1976 or 152mm SP Gun 2S5:
Regiment: 36-48
Brigade: 36-48
152mm Howitzer D-20 or 152mm SP Howitzer 2S3: 18-24 or 36-48

The MRL Regiment consists of 3 MRL battalions, equipped as follows:
122mm MRL BM-21 or 220mm MRL BM-27: 54

The combined arms army consists of 2-4 Motor Rifle Divisions and 1-2 Tank Divisions. A Tank Army consists of 2-4 Tank Divisions and 1-2 Motor Rifle Divisions.

The Motor Rifle/Tank Division has an Artillery Regiment, consisting of 2 towed and 1 SP howitzer battalions and a MRL battalion.

The towed howitzer battalions each consist of 18 122mm Howitzer D-30.

The SP howitzer battalion consists of 18 152mm SP Howitzer 2S3.

The MRL battalion consists of 18 122mm MRL BM-21

The Motor Rifle Division also has 1 BMP and 2 BTR-equipped Motor Rifle and 1 Tank Regiments, each has a organic howitzer battalion. The BMP/Tank battalions have each 18 122mm SP Howitzers 2S1, the BTR battalions each have 18 122mm Howitzer D-30.

The Tank Division has 3 Tank and 1 BMP regiments, each with an organiz battalion of 18 122mm SP Howitzer 2S1.

There is a saying in the Red Army, that the only God it worships is Artillery and as you can see from the above, it posses a lot of Artillery!

[schnickelfritz]

The questions that come to my mind are:
1) This seems like a huge requirement for ammunition; could ammunition useage of this scale be sustained for more than a few weeks
2) What would the effect of US/Allied/NATO counterbattery fire and aerial interdiction on firing positions and fire control
3) What would the effect of said interdiction on supply lines be
4) Wear and tear on gun tubes, especially on lower-echelon formations
5) The effect of the needs of the China campaign on pact artillery and ammunition supplies

My guess is that for the above reasons, artillery fire on this scale would only occur for the first few weeks of the war with any regularity, and then be restricted to important engagements therafter until ammo and replacement parts dwindle after TDM.

Most of the fiction that I've ever seen (Harold Coyle, Clancy, etc) seems to paint a picture that despite heavy losses, NATO is able to make a significant impact interdicting Pact artillery and supplies from the air. What I get is that for the first year or so, towed artillery in Europe is generally useless...things are so fluid and counterbattery/interdiction so effective that losses amongst towed pact artillery will eventually render them ineffective. Then, as the war enters 1998, towed artillery makes a significant comeback on both sides.

Firing 20+ rounds per gun tube in a battalion seems like an open invitation for MLRS units to "rain your grid square." That seems like a very bad day to me, although I'd really be interested to see what the post-strike images would look like...my guess is like a charred junkyard.

I'd think that strikes like these would take several minutes to complete, making it likely that counterbattery of a variety of forms would occur.

With all that said, I'd sure not like to be on the receiving end of any of this!

Thanks-
Dave

[DCausey]

Dave brought up the questions I had pretty much. I was especially going to ask about the possible effects of the war in China and about NATO air interdiction.

I'm looking forwards to seeing more people weigh in on this subject.

- DaveC

[Adm.Lee]

Firing 20+ rounds per gun tube in a battalion seems like an open invitation for MLRS units to "rain your grid square." That seems like a very bad day to me, although I'd really be interested to see what the post-strike images would look like...my guess is like a charred junkyard.

I'd think that strikes like these would take several minutes to complete, making it likely that counterbattery of a variety of forms would occur.

IMO, the Soviets are fiendish enough to have their own counter-counterbattery held ready to see if any NATO guns shoot back. Also, artillery batteries are the primary target of "forward detachments" and a tertiary target of Spetsnaz teams.

There is a saying in the Red Army, that the only God it worships is Artillery and as you can see from the above, it posses a lot of Artillery!

Suvorov brought that home to me by pointing out that a motor rifle regiment has 9 companies of mechanized infantry, but 10 batteries of artillery (including mortars and rockets).

I've just been looking at two of my old WW3 games (GDW's Third World War and VG's NATO), and noting again, that neither side's corps or army level artillery assets are represented. I think they do Not cancel each other out.

[dragoon500ly]

The questions that come to my mind are:
1) This seems like a huge requirement for ammunition; could ammunition useage of this scale be sustained for more than a few weeks
2) What would the effect of US/Allied/NATO counterbattery fire and aerial interdiction on firing positions and fire control
3) What would the effect of said interdiction on supply lines be
4) Wear and tear on gun tubes, especially on lower-echelon formations
5) The effect of the needs of the China campaign on pact artillery and ammunition supplies

My guess is that for the above reasons, artillery fire on this scale would only occur for the first few weeks of the war with any regularity, and then be restricted to important engagements therafter until ammo and replacement parts dwindle after TDM.

Most of the fiction that I've ever seen (Harold Coyle, Clancy, etc) seems to paint a picture that despite heavy losses, NATO is able to make a significant impact interdicting Pact artillery and supplies from the air. What I get is that for the first year or so, towed artillery in Europe is generally useless...things are so fluid and counterbattery/interdiction so effective that losses amongst towed pact artillery will eventually render them ineffective. Then, as the war enters 1998, towed artillery makes a significant comeback on both sides.

Firing 20+ rounds per gun tube in a battalion seems like an open invitation for MLRS units to "rain your grid square." That seems like a very bad day to me, although I'd really be interested to see what the post-strike images would look like...my guess is like a charred junkyard.

I'd think that strikes like these would take several minutes to complete, making it likely that counterbattery of a variety of forms would occur.

With all that said, I'd sure not like to be on the receiving end of any of this!

Thanks-
Dave

To be sure, the ammo counts are very heavy, but the first example represents an all out attempt to destroy an battery of SPs dispersed in their firing position, its unobserved, and is targeting a hectare of ground, this would be the sort of mission called on a battery that is in a position to interdict an attacking regiment. According to their doctrine, this target would require the maximum effort from at least 1 RAG, and more likely to be hit with a RAG/DAG.

The target suppression examples are not much different from US Army Artillery doctrine, at least when firing HE. Switching to ICM/DPICM should drop the ammo requirements by roughly a third.

As to just how much ammo is stockpiled, I've never seen any firm lists on any sort of count beyond 120 days stockpile....as has been mentioned by a variety of authors, modern ammo usage is much, much higher than pre-war planning takes into account.

NATO doesn't field as many artillery tubes as the WP does, and every battery committed to counterbattery, is that much less support for the troops. This is the real reason beyond the development of "shoot-n-scoot" as well as the increasing computerization of the FDCs, all of it designed to enable NATO to put as many rounds as possible, on target, in the shortest possible time.

[dragoon500ly]

Units of Fire-Red Army

A unit of fire is (ROFLMAO!) the planned expenditure of rounds for one tube for one day of combat. Here are the units of fire for the Soviet artillery.

122mm Howitzer D-30 = 80rds
122mm SP Howitzer 2S1 = 80rds
130mm Field Gun M-46 = 80rds
152mm Howitzer D-20 = 60rds
152mm SP Howitzer 2S3 = 60rds
152mm Field Gun M-1976 = 60rds
152mm SP Gun 2S5 = 60rds
203mm Howitzer B-4M = 40rds
203mm SP Gun M-1975 = 40rds
82mm Mortar M-1937 = 120rds
120mm Mortar M-1943 = 80rds
160mm Mortar M-160 = 60rds
240mm Mortar M-240 = 40rds
240mm SP Mortar M-1975 = 40rds
122mm MRL BM-21 = 120rds
140mm MRL BM-14-16 = 48rds
140mm MRL BM-14-17 = 51rds
140mm MRL RPU-14 = 48rds
220mm MRL BM-27 = 32rds

[95th Rifleman]

Allot has been made of NATO avation and it being used to interdict soviet artillery.

I think this is being overestimated. NATO had a qualitive advantage over the WP in almost all areas but one of the few things the Soviets had the edge in was ADA.

I think NATO aircraft would soon find artillery interdiction missions to be near-suicidal when they walk into the superior ADA systems defending them.

[dragoon500ly]

"Just Reach Out and Touch Someone!" Artillery Ranges

122mm Howitzer D-30: max range 15,300m, max ROF: 8rpm, sustained ROF: 75 rph (rounds per hour)

122mm SP Howitzer 2S1: max range15,300m, max ROF: 8rpm; sustained ROF: 70rph

130mm Field Gun M-46: max range: 27,490m, max ROF: 8rpm; sustained ROF; 70 rph

152mm Howitzer D-20: max range; 27,490m, max ROF: 6rpm; sustained ROF: 70rph

152mm SP Howitzer 2S3: max range: 17,230m (30,000m with RAP); max ROF: 4; sustained ROF: 60rph

152mm Field Gun M-1976: max range: 27,000m; max ROF: 4rpm; sustained ROF: 40rph

152mm SP Gun 2S5: max range: 27,000m+; max ROF: 4rpm; sustained ROF: 50rph

203mm Howitzer B-4M: max range: 18,025m; max ROF: 0.5rpm; sustained ROF: 20rph

203mm SP Gun M-1975: max range: 30,000m, max ROF: 0.5rpm; sustained ROF: 20rph

82mm Mortar M-1937: max range: 3,040m; max ROF: 25rpm; sustained ROF: 140rph

120mm Mortar M-1943: max range: 5,700m; max ROF: 9rpm; sustained ROF: 70rph

160mm Mortar, M-160: max range: 8,040m; max ROF: 3rpm, sustained ROF: 38rph

240mm Mortar M-240: max range: 9,700m; max ROF: 1rpm; sustained ROF: 38rph

240mm SP Mortar, M-1975: max range: 12,000m; max ROF: 1rpm; sustained ROF: 25rph

122mm MRL BM-21: max range: 20,380m

140mm MRL BM-14-16: max range: 9,810m

140mm MRL BM-14-17: max range: 9,810m

140mm MRL RPU-14: max range: 9,810m

220mm MRL, BM-27: max range: 40,000m

[HorseSoldier]

Seen another way, the estimated rounds required to accomplish a given mission suggests Soviet artillery theorists did not see their weapons systems as highly efficient -- i.e. estimated rounds are what was required, not some happy intent to overkill a target.

There was a great deal of speculation back during the Cold War that the Warsaw Pact could only sustain combat operations for a couple months at the intensity level their doctrine called for. With what the Chinese front was drawing off in terms of units and resources, I'd suspect that the Soviet forces on the Western Front (before the nukes freed up troops in the east) weren't able to expend ammo or anything else at the level specified in doctrine.

[Legbreaker]

As others have indicated, my thoughts are there just won't be enough Nato tubes dedicated to counterbattery missions to make a significant long term difference, while the Pact seem to have tubes to spare. All in all, when you take into account the number of tubes, mobility, and all the other factors, my guess is that it would be roughly equal.

[ArmySGT.]

The Smallest Soviet target is a 1000 x 1000 meter grid square.

Soviets will to "Artillery Grid Search" a sort of "Recon by Fire". If they hit something and it explodes they bring the other tubes to bear.

What your missing is the Soviets have on Echelon of Command and Control Greater than NATO. The Front. NATO stops at Army to which several Divisions are attached. The Soviets go one higher with Front to which several Armies are attached.

The Doctrinal difference lies in how much East there is when looking from the West.

[dragoon500ly]

Command and Control

Once again FM 100-2-1 Soviet Operations and Tactics is the source...

At regiment and above, an artillery officer who plans and coordinates artillery fires serves on the staff of maneuver un it commanders. He is called the Chief of Arty (COA) at regiment and the Chief Rocket Troops and Artillery (CRTA) at division or above. While he does not command the artillery units organic or attached to his maneuver unit, he is responsible for their control. The commander of the organic artillery unit attached to the maneuver unit is directly responsible for the performance of his artillery unit.

The division CRTA controls the divisional artillery regiment, the MRL battalion, the SSM battalion, the AT battalion and the ATGM batteries, mortar batteries and howitzer battalions of the subordinate maneuver regiments, though he does not command any of these units. The CRTA also has the authority to inspect the artillery units of the division and to hold them accountable for their technical proficiency.

In combat, the artillery groups form the basic framework for the control of artillery fires in the division. Decisions about the employment of artillery are made on a centralized basis. The division commander, with recommendations from the CRTA, exercises control over all organic and allocated artillery within the division. The following procedures are observed:
1) The division commander specifies the artiller organization for combat and the tasks to be carried out by the artillery.
2) The CRTA conducts and coordinates fire planning.
3) Artillery commanders normally are collocated with the commanders of the supported maneuver force.
4) The DAG commanders report directly to the CRTA.
5) RAG commanders report directly to the supported maneuver regimental commander while retaining contact with the CRTA.
6) Artillery battery and battalion commanders keep their supported maneuver commanders informed and report to their controlling artillery headquarters.


The artillery commander normally is collocated with the commander of the maneuver unit he is supporting and therefore effects coordination face-to-face. Provisions is also made for the artillery commander to enter the VHF(FM) command net of the supported unit. Except when subunits have been detached for special missions, artillery commanders retain rigid control of the deployment of weapons and observation posts to provide continuous artillery support in all phases of combat.

Radio and wire are the primary means of communications with visual and sound devices being used as a secondary means of communications. By regulation, communications are established from senior to subordinate and from supporting units to supporting unit.

Soviet artillery units may send radio traffic over support unit command nets, artillery command nets and fire direction nets. Artillery group command nets (RAG/DAG) have battalion commanders as substations. Battalion nets have battery commanders and the battalion observation nets if required.

Towed artillery units rely on the R-107 (VHF) portable radio for internal radio communications. Self-propelled units use the R-123 (VHF) vehicular radio, which is installed in every howitzer. At higher levels of command, long-range HF (AM) radios, such as the R-130 are used.

Wire communications are used whenever subunits remain in one location for any length of time, such as when in defensive positions. To provide redundancy, artillery wire nets normally parallel the wire nets of the supported units.

The Soviets also use pyrotechnics, especially in coordinating prearranged fires with the advance of maneuver units. Signal flags are used to acknowledge fire commands at the gun positions, for convoy control and for signaling between the firing point and the truck park (prime movers and ammunition carriers) in a battery firing position.

[dragoon500ly]

Soviet field artillery is subdivided into field guns, howitzers, mortars and multiple rocket launchers. Most Soviet field artillery is towed (with the exception of the MRLs). Towed guns are lightweight, low cost and simple. Their disadvantages are their lack of cross-country mobility and the absence of crew protection from NBC and counterbattery.

Field Guns are used for killing troops in the open; destroying buildings above ground level; engaging of rapidly moving targets; bombardment of distant targets such as artillery batteries, headquarters and columns moving in the rear areas; destroying tactical nuclear delivery means.

Howitzers are used for hitting indirect targets and for destroying or neutralizing enemy defensive positions.

SP Howitzers have been introduced in recent years, enhancing the Soviet artillery's ability to give continuous support in a conventional or NBC environment. While SP howitzers are protected by light armor and NBC filtration systems, their ability to resupply ammunition is limited as they depend on wheeled vehicles for logistic support.

Multiple Rocket Launchers are used to deliver massive strikes at decisive moments in a battle. They are an excellent area coverage weapon. Their ability to coverage a large area and their rapid ripple fire make MRLs an excellent delivery system for chemical agents.

Mortars are used to provide immediate support to motor rifle regiments.