Soviet Air Defense or "It really sucks to be an airdale over Russia!"

[Legbreaker]

Bagdad, hell, all of Iraqi for that matter, isn't really comparable to the Soviet Union in it's prime.
My guess is the Iraqis were poorly trained, poorly led and had virtually nil motivation. It's a miracle they hit as many planes as they did!
It could be said that more planes were probably shot down by "celebratory fire" (the practise of emptying mags into the air just because you're happy) than actual aimed AA fire.

[Raellus]

Bagdad, hell, all of Iraqi for that matter, isn't really comparable to the Soviet Union in it's prime.
My guess is the Iraqis were poorly trained, poorly led and had virtually nil motivation.

I couldn't agree more. Comparing Iraq to the USSR is like comparing the RVN to the USA- aside from some of the gear both used, it's not a fair or accurate comparison of capability.

[Matt Wiser]

Remember, we had six months to plan and prepare to take that air defense system down. If we'd had to go in, say in August or September, 1990, losses would've been heavier. Baghdad was so heavily defended (SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, Roland, MANPADS, and AAA) that only F-117s and cruise missiles went Downtown. This after a Daylight strike against Baghdad on 19 Jan 91 resulted in two F-16s down to SA-3, mainly due to the Wild Weasels already vacating the area (out of HARMs). But the sky turned brown due to all of the AAA being fired. Several other target areas were just as bad: Al Qaim by the Syrian border (WMD site), Basra, H-2/H-3 air base complexes, and Tallil AB. All had SA-2, SA-3, and AAA in quantity.

[Webstral]

Regarding morale, the Iraqi air defenders were defending their own airspace. We know the draftees in Kuwait had low morale and training, but the air defense types were protecting their homeland.

Matt's point about time for preparation is valid. We also had a numerical advantage, a technological advantage, and a doctrinal advantage. The Iraqi Air Force had not been used as a Western or even Soviet air force during the Iran-Iraq War. Although the early stages of the Iran-Iraq fighting taught the Iraqis the value of hardened aircraft shelters, the middle and later stages of the war featured few of the characteristics that would have marked conflict in Germany or Korea or that did mark the Coalition air offensive in 1991. It's one thing to have the gear, it's another to have a clear concept of use supported by training and organization.

Sheer density of ADA might not have served the Soviets any beter than it did the Iraqis. When the interdependent parts of a centralized air defense network are uncoupled, the serviceability of the remaining parts is compromised. Whether Nighthawks would have been as effective in their decapitation role in Central Europe is an open question. However, the use of stealth bombers to deliver precision strikes against the enemy's C3I hubs would have tested the Soviet redundancies and deception measures. Sheer weight of fire from ground-based defenses cannot entirely offset the advantage of flexibility and initiative that rests with the side putting up aircraft.

In 1996, the Soviets have been fighting for an extended period in China. The reserves of aircraft, crews, and parts that might have existed without a Sino-Soviet War aren't there when the West Germans cross the border. By the time the anglophone air forces enter the fight, the quantitative advantages enjoyed by the Soviets in 1994 might no longer exist in Central Europe. Although I rather doubt the situation much resembles that of Iraq in early 1991, NATO might well posses the advantage in numbers and quality of aircraft in December 1996. This would throw the onus of defense back on the ground-based network. How well the Pact system in the DDR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland would weather NATO action is a good question. After all, the fighting in Germany is seven weeks old by the time the USAF gets involved. This is a lot of time to observe the Soviet air defenses at work.

[Legbreaker]

After all, the fighting in Germany is seven weeks old by the time the USAF gets involved. This is a lot of time to observe the Soviet air defenses at work.

Depending on which version you use (see the timelines thread).
It's also a lot of time for the Soviets to iron out any problems against the Germans, as well as get hands on experience flying against a western force with similar tactics and strategy as the US, Britain, etc. By the time the rest of the world gets involved, they're likely to be rather efficient and organised.

It's also worth noting that Iraqi didn't even TRY to use aircover in any serious way. Their entire defensive strategy (if that's what you can call it) relied 99.9% on ground forces, whereas in the early stages of the European conflict in T2K the Soviets and their allies have at least air parity, if not superiority.

From memory, it's this eventual superiority by the East that forces Germany to call on Nato.

[Matt Wiser]

Of 42 kills of Iraqi aircraft (fixed-wing and helos), 36 were fixed-wing. Of those, half were running to Iran. But that left 18 others that did try to come up and fight-and lost. Mirage F-1s, MiG-29s, MiG-25s, MiG-23s, and MiG-21s tried the challenge.

There were three "unconventional kills" of fixed-wing: one MiG-29 tried a low-level split S in a fight with an F-15; and splattered himself all over the desert floor. Another had a Mirage F-1 that was chasing an EF-111 at low level-with an F-15 getting in close. The Spark Vark cleared a low ridge: the Mirage didn't. And an MiG-29 was landing at Tallil AB during an RAF Tornado raid with JP-233s. The MiG flew under an attacking Tornado and was hit by some of the anti-runway munitions-and crashed. The first two were credited, but the RAF refused to give the Tornado crew credit for a kill. But the Tornado in question was christened "MiG Eater" with nose art of a shark eating a MiG-29.

[Webstral]

Depending on which version you use (see the timelines thread).

For the sake of clarification, I should point out to the newcomers that I always use the v1 chronology.

It's also a lot of time for the Soviets to iron out any problems against the Germans, as well as get hands on experience flying against a western force with similar tactics and strategy as the US, Britain, etc. By the time the rest of the world gets involved, they're likely to be rather efficient and organised.

...whereas in the early stages of the European conflict in T2K the Soviets and their allies have at least air parity, if not superiority... From memory, it's this eventual superiority by the East that forces Germany to call on Nato.

The writers do mention Soviet air power prominently in v1:

"By the end of November, the Bundeswehr was in serious trouble. Soviet Frontal Aviation had left their most modern aircraft in the west; these were qualitatively a match for the Luftwaffe and quantitatively more than a match. As the Bundeswehr lines began to crumble" (GDW, 1984, p. 24)...

Based on this idea, it seems reasonable to believe that air power tipped the scales in favor of the Pact, although I also believe that the Pact had to rush in large numbers of replacements to keep the forces on the ground fighting.

How effective Soviet air defenses in the Northern Tier (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia) are in December 1996 is difficult to say with any certainty. Many variables apply. For instance, while there appears to be a wealth of experience to be mined in the Far East, recent reading suggests to me that the Soviets were keen to isolate non-dogmatic military ideas learned in Afghanistan. We might argue that the scale of the fighting in the Far East would make the lessons impossible to ignore. I suggest that the scale of the problem would cause the internal security apparatus to go into overdrive in an effort to prevent heretical ideas regarding initiative and the like from contaminating the rest of the Army and various air services. Obviously, it's impossible to completely block the flow of ideas from the Far East, but the State could do much to retard the flow.

The fighting against West Germany is a double-edged sword for the Pact. Leg is right that seven weeks of practice is going to mean a lot for Pact air defenses. We should see a lot of tightening up of procedures. Perhaps some changes in doctrine will start to emerge. Fighting a Western-style air force will yield some positive results for the Pact in terms of fortifying them against the onslaught by the USAF, RAF, and CFAC.

On the other hand, the Pact will be fighting in the spotlight, so to speak. NATO will have the opportunity to watch without spending any of its strength. We should take it as axiomatic that the West Germans will share everything they are learning with their allies. As the Pact adapts, NATO will be able to observe the adaptation. It's like watching a rival team play for a season without having to play them.

We also should bear in mind that the Luftwaffe is a very different force than the USAF. Without getting into the exercise of measuring manhood length, we should remember that the Luftwaffe and the USAF fly different airframes, have different ideas on how to use those airframes, and have different quantities of airframes. In 1996, the USAF dwarfs the Luftwaffe. Even a conservative estimate of the number of USAF combat aircraft in Europe in late 1996 should give the US at least twice as many fighting planes as the West Germans. Numbers matter, even if everything else is the same.

Of course, everything else is not the same. In the real world in 1996, the West Germans relied on the Tornado for most missions. In Twilight: 2000, they might have kept the F-4 in service for a while longer. Since the Luftwaffe didn't operate the Tornado ADV (air defense variant), and since the Eurofighter Typhoon wasn't available in time for the big show, we can only assume that the Luftwaffe would have kept its Phantoms for the air defense role. Although a splendid aircraft that has received numerous upgrades, the Phantom is not the same creature as either the F-16 or the F-15. In terms of strike missions, which are what this thread is about, the West German approach at the end of the Cold War was ultra-low penetration to low-altitude delivery of munitions by Tornadoes. Like the European allies in general, the West Germans planned to make the most of limited resources by going in low and fast without big packages of specialized aircraft or extensive EW. Operation Desert Storm demonstrated that Tornadoes can do their job in the assigned way, but there will be substantial losses to ground-based defenses.

The West Germans knew they were up against a numerically superior foe in the air. They also would have known that the enemy had specially designed modern aircraft for the jobs at hand, such as the MiG-29, MiG-31, Su-27, MiG-27, Su-25, and others. I'm not an airman, so the best I can do is speculate about how the Luftwaffe would have tried to manage the air situation under rather unfavorable circumstances. Even assuming that the Luftwaffe kept at least some of its Phantoms in service through 1996, the strong suit of the West Germans in terms of fighting Pact air power would have been counter-air missions against enemy air bases and strikes against Pact C3I centers. Tornadoes would have done this job going in low and fast. How the Luftwaffe would have divided its bombing sorties between counter-air strikes against Pact air bases, strikes on C3I targets, interdiction missions, and close air support is beyond my ability to say. However, I think it's fair to say that the initial emphasis would have been on counter-air and C3I strikes in order to establish a tolerable air situation. It's hard to say how successful the Luftwaffe would have been in the first week or two. The lessons learned by the RAF in the Gulf would have been applied vigorously in an ongoing Cold War environment. The West Germans had the advantage of tactical or even strategic surprise, the value of which is not to be underestimated. The West Germans would have opened with a surge, which would have generated enough sorties vis--vis their Pact counterparts to reduce the effects of West German numerical inferiority in the short term. However, even if we assume that the Luftwaffe generally achieved its goals in the first two weeks, the inability of the Bundeswehr to seal the deal on the ground would have exposed the Luftwaffe to the combined effects of very large numbers of Pact aircraft entering the war zone and the very great depth of the theater. The v1 chronology establishes that the West Germans essentially lost the air war during the last half of November, exposing the Bundeswehr to the weight of Pact ground attack fires.

A few important ideas are relevant when making an assessment of the ability of the USAF to prosecute offensive operations in East Germany in December. I'll start with the conditions of the USAF. The USAF has specialized aircraft for all the jobs that need doing. By December, the wings that were slated to reinforce Europe would have been in place for a month or more. While the need for combat air patrols during the German-Pact fighting would have been greater than during peace time, the tempo would not have compared with wartime tempo. The air crews, ground crews, and aircraft would have entered the fighting in December in good condition. Intelligence probably would have been available to the USAF almost as quickly as it was available to the Luftwaffe. The developing operational and tactical patterns of the Pact could be analyzed before a single engagement by US, UK, or Canadian pilot. Perhaps as importantly, the USAF is a different creature than the Luftwaffe. Whereas the Luftwaffe emphasized ultra-low penetration for strike missions, the USAF emphasized medium-level penetration by large strike packages of specialized aircraft with massive EW support. At the risk of putting too fine a point on the matter, one does not defend against this kind of aggressor the same way one defends against strike packages of Tornadoes (and perhaps AlphaJets) screaming in just above the treetops.

On the Pact side, seven weeks of high-tempo operations would have taken their toll. In all likelihood, there would have been several surges over the seven weeks of the German-Pact phase of the war. Persistent West German attacks on Pact airfields within striking distance of the front lines would have yielded substantial losses in aircraft and ground crews. Exhaustion would have set in among air and ground crews alike, leading to slower turnaround times, more aircraft grounded for maintenance, more aircraft going up with nonfunctional systems, and accidents. Obviously, the exhaustion phenomenon is going to affect the West Germans, too; but in December, the contest enters a new phase in which the Anglophone members of NATO take on the Pact. The Americans, British, and Canadians enter the fight in just about the best condition possible, whereas the Pact defenders are already battered and tired. Worse, the Pact is up against a type of air operation they haven't yet experienced in China or in Europe. They got to see the USAF strut its stuff in Operation Desert Storm, so the American mode is not entirely new to them. Still, there's a paradigm shift. At the same time, the RAF picks up where the Luftwaffe left off in terms of Tornado operations. Although comparing the Pact air defense situation in Central Europe in December 1996 to the Iraqi air defense situation in early 1991 is a reach, the situation may be just as far removed from that described by General Sir John Hackett in The Third World War. Ground-based air defenses would be more important than ever.

Unfortunately for the Pact, medium-altitude attacks rise above ADA. Again, I'm not an airman, so my understanding of the picture is rather rudimentary. However, I believe the scheme underlying large strike packages of specialized aircraft with massive EW support is to keep the aircraft out of the reach of the ADA while using powerful jamming to defeat the defending SAM. Anti-radiation missiles and precision guided munitions knock out defenses and the target without the aircraft having to come down into the enemy's ground-based wall of fire. At least, this is how it's supposed to work. The Pact's integrated air defenses will have taken rather a beating during the seven weeks of the German-Pact phase of the war, although repaired systems and replacements will have mitigated some of the damage. Still, with large numbers of Pact aircraft-especially strike aircraft-committed in the Far East and yet more lost in the recent fighting, the numbers game in the air may very well belong to NATO. Ground-based defenses are not flexible, so the practice of opening corridors through the defending radar, ADA, and SAM used so effectively during Operation Desert Storm might very well prove irresistible under conditions of NATO air superiority.

I have always believed that the US essentially bushwhacked the Soviets upon entering the war. Call it a Red Pearl Harbor. Some sort of operational agreement between the US and the USSR kept the German-Pact war contained until the Germans started to lose. Once the US entered the war, a well-planned surge was executed against the Pact defenders. While the Pact might not have been caught with their pants down, the need to prosecute the war with the West Germans would have prevented the defenders from being really ready for a sudden burst of offensive activity from the USAF, RAF, and CFAC.

The really interesting part of the contest between Soviet/Pact ground-based defenses and NATO air attacks occurs in Poland, I believe. Very dense fixed defenses on the ground would have had their ground-based air defenses counterparts. Fighting in Europe, Korea, and the Gulf would have seriously taxed the stockpiles of precision munitions available to the West, obliging more of the NATO mud movers to descend into the maelstrom of ADA to deliver CAS. That's where I think the contest between Pact weight of fire from the ground and Western tactics and techniques gets interesting.

[Raellus]

There were three "unconventional kills" of fixed-wing: one MiG-29 tried a low-level split S in a fight with an F-15; and splattered himself all over the desert floor. Another had a Mirage F-1 that was chasing an EF-111 at low level-with an F-15 getting in close. The Spark Vark cleared a low ridge: the Mirage didn't.

Someone [else] has been watching DOGFIGHTS...

[Adm.Lee]

Of 42 kills of Iraqi aircraft (fixed-wing and helos), 36 were fixed-wing. Of those, half were running to Iran. But that left 18 others that did try to come up and fight-and lost. Mirage F-1s, MiG-29s, MiG-25s, MiG-23s, and MiG-21s tried the challenge.

I read an article recently about the rise of drones in air warfare. One of the project officers in the Pentagon was an Eagle driver in GW1. He had one his wall a photo taken from the helmet camera of the MiG-29 he'd shot down. It showed the missile warhead exploding: the last thing that pilot saw, quite literally.

Kinda gruesome.

[Matt Wiser]

That was COL Cesar "Rico" Rodriguez, USAF. He has three kills: two from GW 1, and one from Kosovo. (One MiG-29 and MiG-23 in the former, one MiG-29 in the latter conflict)

[Matt Wiser]

Web: from talking with my cousin Jacqui (USN F/A-18E driver), the usual limit for AAA is 10,000 feet. You hardly see the heavy AAA anymore, like the 85-mm and 100-mm that one saw in NVN. Most of the AAA systems seen these days are 57-mm and below. Unless you're going in to support troops in contact, or have ordnance that requires a low level delivery (A-10s and their guns, for example, or if dropping aerial mines in a waterway, say), pilots these days generally stay above 10,000 feet. Obviously, if we have to take apart an IADS on a no-notice basis, tactics will be different until the target system is torn apart.

[ArmySGT.]

Grozny Experience

[Legbreaker]

Grozny Experience

Which is a good example of what is not the case in T2K.
In T2K the military did not suffer from lack of funds, etc and war, while perhaps not 100% expected, was known to be likely. Therefore it's quite conceivable, if not extremely probable, that the Soviets would have spent the time, money and effort to ensure their units were ready for combat.

[James Langham]

Option

Did the ZSU-30-6 exist anywhere beyond the Soviet Vehicle Guide and Red Storm Rising

- C.

I regarded it as a prototype design that was rushed into production in 1995. The ZSU30-2 was another candidate in the same programme and was also pushed into production. As an alternative have one replace the other as the first was unsatisfactory in service.