Summer 2000 [Poland] Offensive Revisited

[Raellus]

I know we've discussed this topic quite a bit here, but the discussion has been scattered amongst various threads and I thought it might be a good idea to dedicate a thread solely to this issue. I would also like to present a new take on the strategic thinking behind Summer 2000 offensive.

I've been studying the [American] Vietnam War quite a bit lately and my understanding of this conflict has significantly coloured my interpretation of events in Europe of the v1.0 Twilight 2000 timeline. The invasion of Cambodia in 1970 especially influenced my thinking. After campaigning behind a promise of securing "Peace with Honor" and his later "Vietnamization" initiative, Nixon was looking to strengthen the U.S./RVN hand prior to an eventual U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam. I've taken this strategic thinking and applied it to the U.S.' position in Poland, c. 2000.

This alternative explanation presupposes that U.S. MilGov was already seriously considering (if not actively planning) to pull the bulk of its forces out of Europe in the fall of 2000 prior to the Summer 2000 offensive.


Summer 2000 [Poland] Offensive Revisited

By the early spring of 2000, it was clear to the JCS that the war in Europe had reached a stalemate- neither side appeared to be strong enough to achieve a decisive strategic victory in Europe and American troops were needed elsewhere, where decisive results were thought possible. Furthermore, field reports were revealing an alarming dip in morale amongst the troops in Europe- cantonment life was proving quite frustrating to some. The endless cycle of garrison duty, patrols, raids, and counteraids was wearing on a lot of the troops. Many field commanders believed that a large-scale offensive would inject some fighting spirit and lift morale, preventing any large-scale mutinies and making the news of an impending large-scale withdrawal from Europe in the fall of 2000 easier to stomach.

It was decided at this time to pursue "Peace with Honor" (a term coined by former President Richard Nixon during the later years of the Vietnam War) in Europe, immediately prior to withdrawing the bulk of American troops back to CONUS for domestic use or redeployment elsewhere overseas (the Middle East or Korea). To claim "Peace with Honor" would require a clear-cut military victory on the decisive front of the European theatre of operations, Poland. Feelers were put out to America's NATO allies, especially Germany. Germany, suffering from serious war fatigue, was found to be quite ammenable to the idea of a U.S. pullout, despite some innitial relservations. When the JCS sweetened the pot by offering Germany a significant quantity of American heavy weapons and equipment, the German government quickly acquiesced. This hand was strengthened when contacts in the pro-Western Polish Free Congress reported that several high-ranking officers in several significant Polish military units were strongly considering either turning coats or, at the bare minimum, refusing to fight attacking American and German units. The case for a large-scale summer NATO offensive in Poland would never be stronger.

The elephant in the room was the possibility that a large-scale, successful NATO offensive in Europe would result in the Soviets unleashing its remaining tactical nuclear weapons, and, in a chilling worst-case scenario, launching a final, strategic gotterdammerung. DIA operatives in Soviet-controlled territory present reassuring reports indicating that the Soviet leadership would be unwilling to use its remaining nuclear arsenal so long as the fighting remained west of the Vistula.

Joint planning began to launch a large scale U.S.-German raid into WTO-held territory in the early summer of 2000. This raid would seriously disrupt WTO military capabilities and logistical capacities and would, if successful, give the appearance of a resounding U.S. military victory. U.S. MilGov could thenceforth claim to be leaving Europe on its own terms, thereby allaying the appearance of having retreated from the European continent with its tail between its legs.

In effect, the essential concept for the offensive was basically that of a massive spoiling attack. If successful, any potential WTO offensive operations would certainly be put off until the spring of 2001. In the interim, Germany would reorganize and strengthen its forces and diplomatic attempts would be made to secure an armistice with the Soviets.

As history would have it, the plan fell apart when a carefully masked Soviet/WTO summer offensive smashed into the spearheads of the NATO one. It was later discovered that NATO's PFC contacts had overstated their case, as had DIA agents working in Soviet-controlled territory. The ensuing battles would seriously weaken the Soviet military in Poland, leading to an eventual Soviet withdrawal from Poland.

[Legbreaker]

I think the "honour" idea just doesn't work in T2K.
By 2000 nobody is going to care any more. There's no longer any allies to try impressing, the people at home don't have a clue about what's happening over the next hill, let alone care about Europe because they're too busy trying to survive, and for the soldiers themselves there's not a lot of meaning left either - they're even serving in units alongside former enemies.

A comparison to Vietnam doesn't work either - Vietnam was a war of public relations and the media. T2K doesn't have very much of either left.
Diplomacy no longer has any meaning by 2000. There's no governments left, at least none that are all that relevant any more. The new power is in the hands of the Generals and petty kingdoms that have sprung up everywhere. Not too many of them are going to care for an instant about a diplomatic "solution".

[Targan]

Some of those points may be true, Leg, but it's also likely that in the face of such a global disaster the generals who are left in charge may not adapt their thinking to the new state of affairs as quickly as might be hoped. They are, after all, heavily institutionalised (and mostly fairly old) men. They may, for the first few years of the global collapse, be locked into ways of thinking that are no longer 100% appropriate for the Twilight War new reality.

[Panther Al]

Some of those points may be true, Leg, but it's also likely that in the face of such a global disaster the generals who are left in charge may not adapt their thinking to the new state of affairs as quickly as might be hoped. They are, after all, heavily institutionalised (and mostly fairly old) men. They may, for the first few years of the global collapse, be locked into ways of thinking that are no longer 100% appropriate for the Twilight War new reality.

Or they may be thinking to the future as well. After all, it might not matter *now*, but 15, 30 years down the road when all the vets are older and in positions of power and influence, the last thing anyone wants is a nationwide sense of "We got to get them, those stinking commies can't be left alone thinking they beat us" mentality mucking things up and setting the stage for another go around.

After all, a good General Staff will look at the near, short, and *long* term effects of the choices they make - and plan accordingly.

[Raellus]

I think the "honour" idea just doesn't work in T2K.
By 2000 nobody is going to care any more. There's no longer any allies to try impressing, the people at home don't have a clue about what's happening over the next hill, let alone care about Europe because they're too busy trying to survive, and for the soldiers themselves there's not a lot of meaning left either - they're even serving in units alongside former enemies.

A comparison to Vietnam doesn't work either - Vietnam was a war of public relations and the media. T2K doesn't have very much of either left.
Diplomacy no longer has any meaning by 2000. There's no governments left, at least none that are all that relevant any more. The new power is in the hands of the Generals and petty kingdoms that have sprung up everywhere. Not too many of them are going to care for an instant about a diplomatic "solution".

Don't get too hung up on the political and PR aspects of the plan or assume that what I've proposed is a mirror image of the Vietnam situation.

I was looking at the summer offensive as being more of a psychological sop for the JCS and senior brass in Europe. Leaving Poland without a big victory to clean the palette would leave a sour taste in a lot of soldiers' mouths. The spectre of Vietnam and the psychological beating the military took both in Vietnam and at home in the States has still not quite been forgotten by the military establishment, even today. Returning home as losers would not sit well and the senior brass may have feared what would happen when the troops got home if they weren't feeling good about themselves and what they'd done in Europe.

In addition, the political side I was trying to emphasize (and apparently did a crummy job at) was the bit about the U.S. trying to convice Germany that an American withdrawal was in everyone's best interest. I think this would be a lot easier by guaranteeing the delivery of a crippling blow to the Soviet military in Poland before such a withdrawal would take place. Throwing in all of their heavy gear as part of the arrangement would only sweeten the pot. The U.S. would need the Germans' cooperation to pull it off. I can't see a "we're leaving now; good luck with the half-million Red Army troops hanging around on your doorstep..." approach going over very well with the Germans either.

Also, if MilGov pulled the troops out with nothing to show for it, CigGov could use it as a propaganda coup at home or in appealing to military units whose leadership was on the fence regarding MilGov and CivGov. No, the media and domestic communications networks are in very bad shape c.2000 but I'm sure that both political factions would be slagging their rivals at every opportunity in order to win public support or look more legitimate.

Militarily, I think the parallels between Poland in the summer of 2000 and S.E. Asia in 1970 are there. The idea behind the Cambodian invasion was to disrupt NVA supply networks running through Cambodia to disrupt and delay any future NVA offensive operations vs. the RVN., with an eye on a future U.S. pull-out from South Vietnam. I think this applies equally well to Poland- a strong attack on Soviet/WTO forces in western and central Polands to disrupt/delay any near-future Soviet offensive operations vs. Germany, giving the Germans time to find their own feet and adapt to the absence of strong American forces.

I think taken all together, it's a reasonably plausible scenario but thanks for your feedback.

[B.T.]

Rae, I have a question here:

If the high ranking officers and the General-staffs know about the idea to leave Europe in the near future, would those ideas be communicated to the lower ranks And if not: I can imagine, that at least some rumours may occur amongst the troops.

Do you think, the American forces in Europe would do a good job on their "Poland Summer Tour", or would, at least a major part of the units, try to avoid sincere fighting. If the soldiers know about the plan to withdraw the troops from Europe, I can imagine, that a lot of individuals (and even some of the higher rankig officers) try to:
1. survive and
2. try to keep the troops in shape for the return to the American Civil War. And that means: If I (General XY) perform well in the raid into Poland, I might loose a lot of my battle-experienced veterans, who could be a high valued asset, when I come back to the States (where I might end up as one of the movers, and may become a lot more influential!).

[Raellus]

Rae, I have a question here:

If the high ranking officers and the General-staffs know about the idea to leave Europe in the near future, would those ideas be communicated to the lower ranks And if not: I can imagine, that at least some rumours may occur amongst the troops.

Do you think, the American forces in Europe would do a good job on their "Poland Summer Tour", or would, at least a major part of the units, try to avoid sincere fighting. If the soldiers know about the plan to withdraw the troops from Europe, I can imagine, that a lot of individuals (and even some of the higher rankig officers) try to:
1. survive and
2. try to keep the troops in shape for the return to the American Civil War. And that means: If I (General XY) perform well in the raid into Poland, I might loose a lot of my battle-experienced veterans, who could be a high valued asset, when I come back to the States (where I might end up as one of the movers, and may become a lot more influential!).

Those are some really good questions, B.T.

I'm not sure if word would be passed down to the troops. Perhaps. I've heard from quite a few veterans of the '70 Cambodia operation who were really happy to be finally going after the NVA, even though most folks at the time were taking Nixon's promises of a an American withdrawal from Vietnam in the not-so-distant future pretty seriously. By most accounts, the American troops that took part in the invasion performed quite well. We're talking about a good percentage of these troops being draftees fighting in a war at the apex of its unpopularity back home. In one incident, an American unit was only 5-10km from a major NVA HQ area but were told to stop short of this high-value target so as not to cross over an invisible stop line Nixon threw in after the invasion kicked off due to public outcry over what most Americans saw as an escalation in a war he'd promised to wind down. Most of the troops were still raring to go, despite the risks such aggressiveness usually entails.

I'm sure that a lot of American soldiers in Poland wouldn't be too keen on risking their lives in what would likely be America's last big battle in Poland, but I also think the majority would fight hard when asked. In a lot of cases, I think an offensive operation would actually be welcome to most of the troops. Many of them would have been sitting in cantonments since the previous summer. If met with initial success, I think enthusiasm would grow. There's a kind of euphoria that occurs when an army starts pushing forward again after a long stalemate. I think of the Allied breakout from Normandy, or the Soviet Bagration offensive in the summer of '44. In every account I've read, soldiers were happy to be on the move, pushing back their enemies.

I think that when given the option of sitting around in a firebase getting pecked to death by little raids and random rocketing, and being out in the field trying to take it to the enemy, the majority of troops would pick the latter. Yes, you'd lose some experienced troops, but, the lift in morale among the survivors (also, by now, experienced troops) would hopefully carry over back to the States. The alternative would be to return with a downtrodden group, one more likely to succumb to large scale desertions and perhaps even mutinies.

[Targan]

I can't point to any specific text but my impression from the Going Home module is that the planned withdrawal of US troops from Europe was not known of by the general US soldiery prior to the 2000 NATO summer offensive. And that makes sense in a whole lot of ways. Such a plan would have been highly sensitive, both politically and militarilly. Leaks would have occurred but the specifics and the levels of accuracy of the rumors would have degraded the further from the source they became.

[Webstral]

I agree with Leg that there is a media and public relations aspect of the Vietnam experience that will be totally absent after December 1997. However, the lack of a media consideration doesn't necessarily alter the internal thought processes of the senior leaders. The in-house definition of honor becomes the only one that matters once Milgov is calling the shots for US forces in Europe. If the American flag officers agree that the best thing to do is put Germany in the best position possible before withdrawing US forces to CONUS, and if the German military leadership agrees, then that action becomes "peace with honor" by definition.

Though I'm sure I've said as much before, it bears repeating that the territory into which the Summer 2000 offensive is conducted was German territory as recently as 1945. In my mind, Germany surrendered her claims by waging war on the world and waging genocide; however, the events of the Twilight War up through 2000 render even the worst excesses of Nazi Germany a mere drop in a bucket of water. Were I a surviving American leader thinking about the future in 1999, probably I'd be willing to give the Germans a pass for what happened in the 1940's and put them in as strong a position as possible to rebuild over the next two generations. This means land and resources. Sorry, Poland. Geography has done you wrong yet again.

[Tegyrius]

Were I a surviving American leader thinking about the future in 1999, probably I'd be willing to give the Germans a pass for what happened in the 1940's and put them in as strong a position as possible to rebuild...

... rebuild and counterbalance France, I suspect.

- C.

[Legbreaker]

My understanding of Going Home is that the withdrawal was only made possible by the discovery by Germany of a oil tanker floating around at sea.
The US traded for this limited supply of oil with their heavy equipment - the Germans were absolutely in the drivers seat for the withdrawal and were able to name their price (which was the effective rearmament of their military).

It is (as I've said before) my view the objective of the summer offensive, which was primarily a German operation (just spearheaded by the US XI Corps) was to seize and hold the Baltic coastline and the coastal plains as far inland as possible. A side effect of this was to place the Estonian oil shale fields within striking distance. This oil would enable Nato to field aircraft once again and control of the Baltic would enable the oil to be quickly and efficiently shipped back to Germany for processing and distribution.

The holding of the Baltic coast was only possible in the longer term if the US and Britain were intending to stick around. Their troops were vital.

Having access to the oil, and putting planes back into the air would radically change the balance of power. At that point, the war was once again winable since air superiority would be in the hands of Nato.

Therefore, it's my opinion that the US withdrawal, while perhaps at least talked about for some time, was not a serious consideration, let alone possibility until after the offensive failed and the tanker was recovered. Note also that the order wasn't given until several months after the US 5th ID was destroyed and all other units had come to a standstill.

With the failure of the offensive, and battered state of both sides there was little point, or even capability of further decent offensive action within the next decade. With the Pact also disintergrating, there was also little need or desire to keep the additional mouths of tens of thousands of Americans on hand for defensive operations. All in all in late 2000 a US withdrawal was a GOOD THING for Germany.

[Adm.Lee]

I think you're over-emphasizing the "peace with honor" phrase, but the sentiment is spot on. Why go home with a tie when you can go for the win

Not just the appearance of a victory for the troops and people back home, but in the short term, getting the forces out of Europe is going to be a lot messier if the Germans and others are feeling abandoned. If one can point to the Pact's forces being wrecked first, then one can say "at least the heavy lifting is done" on the way out the door.

As for the derelict oil tanker found in Going Home, may I suggest that as the piece that allowed OMEGA to be done in one lift Otherwise, I suspect that it would have taken all winter to pull it off, using some oil requisitions from Iran.

[Legbreaker]

As for the derelict oil tanker found in Going Home, may I suggest that as the piece that allowed OMEGA to be done in one lift Otherwise, I suspect that it would have taken all winter to pull it off, using some oil requisitions from Iran.

That's exactly what the canon material is saying. I believe we also know from canon that there is little to no oil being sent from the middle east - there may be enough being produced to keep some aircraft in the air, but it's still in too short a supply to fill a ship bound for anywhere. At best we may see lubricants shipped to Europe and perhaps Korea, but nothing more, even to facilitiate getting a small percentage of the European forces mobile for a few weeks ala the Soviets and the Ploesti fields.
Shipping sufficient fuel from the middle east to all withdrawal of US forces isn't going to be possible for many years.

So where did the oil tanker come from My guess it was adrift for a couple of years, floating about on the ocean currents after the crew succumbed to radiation sickness or some kind of fast acting disease. It could be more recent than that and be a shipment from the UK North Sea wells, but I can't see the UK sitting still for that much oil just "disappearing" from their custody. I believe most of that is piped out anyway.

[Raellus]

My understanding of Going Home is that the withdrawal was only made possible by the discovery by Germany of a oil tanker floating around at sea.
The US traded for this limited supply of oil with their heavy equipment - the Germans were absolutely in the drivers seat for the withdrawal and were able to name their price (which was the effective rearmament of their military).

I don't want to contradict canon so I will have to take a close look at this. If I can't work this out, I may scrap my proposal.

It is (as I've said before) my view the objective of the summer offensive, which was primarily a German operation (just spearheaded by the US XI Corps) was to seize and hold the Baltic coastline and the coastal plains as far inland as possible. A side effect of this was to place the Estonian oil shale fields within striking distance. This oil would enable Nato to field aircraft once again and control of the Baltic would enable the oil to be quickly and efficiently shipped back to Germany for processing and distribution.

The holding of the Baltic coast was only possible in the longer term if the US and Britain were intending to stick around. Their troops were vital.

This whole idea seems very hopeful to me. How is NATO going to extract and refine this shale oil I think it is safe to assume that any pre-existing infrastructure for doing so has already bombed to ashes by the summer of 2000. From my understanding, just extracting shale oil is a more involved process than pumping "regular" crude. Then, one would either need proper refineries nearby or a pipeline with which to transport it to an distant operable refinery.

Turning shale oil into jet fuel is easier said than done. Assuming refinery facilities are available inthe first place, it's still not going to happen overnight. And what about the lack of spares and maintainance for the aircraft that have been grounded for a year or three If you don't fly a jet aircraft every so often, it will need significant work in order to be made airworthy again. If a NATO airfleet could once again be fueled, it would be a fairly small one- hardly a game-changer.

And how would NATO plan to hold a long, isolated front running from west of Gdansk all the way to Lithuania A second Baltic Shelf (llok at the first one from WWII) would be incredibly vulnerable to attacks from the south. Severing it would not be that difficult if a few strong divisions could be assembled (and, as canon bears out, the Soviets can and did, and that doesn't count the Soviet Corps in Belarus). This would not only sever the purported oil supply, it would also trap significant NATO military assets. As you yourself have pointed out, NATO does not have the shipping assets needed to remove the oil by sea, and/or support an isolated unit holding the oil fields (ergo, the 8th ID) in the Baltic states.

And what about the elephant in the room Wouldn't NATO troops on Soviet territory prompt nuclear attacks Why not just nuke the refineries that would be needed to deal with the shale oil If Soviets could not retake their shale oil fields by conventional means, why couldn't/wouldn't they just nuke the source Better no one have them, than NATO.

There are too many variables that your scenario does not address. In order to succeed, your proposed Summer 2000 offensive would require:

1. Sufficient combat strength to seize and hold a continuous front of several hundred miles along the Baltic coast,

OR (in lieu of a continuous front)

adequate shipping needed to both support a Baltic NATO pocket AND remove the oil.

2. Adequate infrastructure to transport and refine the shale oil, once it was extracted.

3. A way to ensure/protect against a Soviet nuclear response to an incursion on to its sovereign soil.

As far as I can tell, none of the above exists in the Summer of 2000. Oh, and if the oil from the shale beds in Lithuania is able to be extracted and refined in the Summer of 2000, why aren't the Soviets themselves already doing it


This is just my opinion, but a large-scale raid (I believe canon calls the Summer Offensive a "raid" at least once)/ spoiling attack is a lot more plausible than a general offensive to seize and hold Lithuanian oil shale beds.

[Legbreaker]

This seems very hopeful to me. How is NATO going to extract and refine this shale oil I think it is safe to assume that any pre-existing infrastructure for doing so is bombed to ashes by the summer of 2000.

Well, if the Germans could do it in the late stages of WWII when their industry was a pulverised shell of what it once was....
I'm not saying it would be easy, just possible. The capture of the oil shale was also not likely to be a major objective, but a target of opportunity.

And how would NATO plan to hold a long, isolated front from Gdansk to Lithuania.

Part of the problem we face today is that the canon materials include unit information from both before and after the offensive without any real consistancy. for example we have units shown to be south of Berlin with prewar details, yet the US XI Corps have their locations shown as post offensive, even though the date is supposed to be pre offensive. For the offensive to have been even contemplated in the beginning, Nato had to have beleived they had the strength to seize and hold a large swath of Poland. We can assume the 5th ID was not intended to be in the Lodz area alone very long, and as Lodz is a long way from the coast, we have to assume the follow on units (the bulk of the German III Army, as well as the British were strong enough and large enough in early 2000 to fulfill their role.
As I've said time and time again, the Pact units actually in contact with Nato at the outset were relatively weak, lulling Nato into the false belief of their military superiority. As we can see in canon, the Soviet counter offensive was brutal and came out of nowhere.

We also know the Tarawa was still floating in the initial stages of the offensive and a ship of it's status isn't likely to be sailing around unescorted. It could well be that the plan for the oil shale, processed or not, was to be carried by these ships. Unprocessed a simple cargo ship would suffice, processed and you'd need tanks (or lots and lots of barrels).

And what about the elephant in the room Wouldn't NATO troops on Soviet territory prompt nuclear attacks

Canon materials downplay the availablity of nukes. In fact I can recall only one warhead still in Soviet hands (Bears Den I think). Boomer also shows the great lengths the Soviets go to to recover he sub and especially it's handful of warheads.
We also see in Twilight encounters that one of the scenarios lists the Pact as having a handful of long range missiles at their disposal, but no nuclear warheads. The plan was for a precision strike using conventional explosive warhead on an important communications hub or headquarters based on intel from a recon flight by one of the last two remaining aircraft.

Therefore, it's safe to say nukes are not a serious, widespread threat.

1. Sufficient combat strength to seize and hold a continuous front of several hundred miles along the Baltic coast,

They had it. Just look at all the previous work I've done on the subject. It was the unexpected brutality of the Pact counteroffensive which smashed the plan into oblivion.

Adequate shipping needed to both support a Baltic NATO pocket AND remove the oil.

Suppies come in, oil shale goes out. Same ships, different directions.

2. Adequate infrastructure to transport and refine the shale oil, once it was extracted.

See comment on Tarawa

3. A way to ensure/protect against a Soviet nuclear response to an incursion on to its sovereign soil.

See above

Oh, and if the oil from the shale beds in Lithuania is able to be extracted and refined in the Summer of 2000, why aren't the Soviets themselves already doing it

That is a question I have too, however it may have something to do with the Soviet units in the area. One of the three (at least - memory is a bit vague at the moment) has defected and barely has the strength to hold back the other(s). The native population have suffered badly from the war with vast swaths of the countryside abandoned - I can't see them supporting much more than subsistance farming, etc.

As already established, oil shale is difficult to process. Given the Ploesti fields and greater potential output (once they fixed the refineries), closer location of Ploesti to where the fuel is needed, and relative isolation of Estonia, it begins to make sense why the Soviets were not actively exploiting the resource. Nato also probably targeted this area heavily early in the war with airstrikes to destroy much of the industry and transportation - rebuilding was probably not a priority for the Soviets given the situation they faced elsewhere.
And once again, the oil shale isn't likely to have been the main objective of the offensive - that was far more likely to have been putting pressure on the northern flank of the Pact units in Germany and Poland and giving the Pact commanders cause to withdraw or face encirclement.

This is just my opinion, but a large-scale raid (I believe canon calls the Summer Offensive a "raid" at least once)/ spoiling attack is a lot more plausible than a general offensive to seize and hold Lithuanian oil shale beds.

It's the US 5th ID's action which is described as a raid. They were just one small (no more than 5% by manpower) part of the overall offensive.

One has to remember this wasn't a Divisional operation, or even just a Corps involved. You have to go bigger, much bigger. The offensive elements alone were an entire Army with the British Army and other formations tasked with support and to follow on after.

This action was HUGE and involved at least half of Nato's forces. Only in the south facing down towards the Italians, or up in Norway was the front quiet.