OT: All-Out in the Falklands

[Adm.Lee]

Are you saying that the Argentinians didn't expect a military reaction I suppose they thought it highly unlikely, but in military intelligence, one must look at enemy capabilities instead of trying to divine enemy intentions.

True, but the British had given some indication of their intentions. The lone warship down there, HMS Endurance, was due for retirement later in 1982. One or both of their carriers was nearly sold to India (or was it Australia). There was a negotiating team in place to talk about transfer of the islands. Unfortunately, there was some dust-up between some scrappers, and Argentinian sub, and some Marines on South Georgia-- I forget the details, but it spooked the Argentinians into jumping the gun and launching the invasion.

The British had the capability of sending a military task force to retake the Falklands and the Argies knew this. Failing to take the possibility seriously was a colossal mistake. My argument is that, if they'd taken the possibility seriously, they could have prepared a welcome that would have stood a very good chance of securing a strategic victory.

A better way to "win" would have been to wait 6-12 months, and then walk in when the British couldn't have done a darn thing about it. If they had timed it closer to the Antarctic winter, they would have had the weather to support them. The Royal Navy was very anxious to avoid operations in the winter, as hard on ships and planes.

[quote] I contend that the Argentinians were taking a gamble, hoping and praying that the British would not be willing to expend the blood and treasure necessary to win back a strategically insignificant imperial afterthought. Clearly, they miscalculated badly. But, the possibility of a British military response was an obvious possibility. It didn't/doesn't take hindsight to come to that conclusion. [\quote]

Agreed.

I'm arguing that if the Argies had played smarter, they could have won the war.

Agreed.

[Legbreaker]

One or both of their carriers was nearly sold to India (or was it Australia).

One was to be sold to Australia. The Invincible I think.
The Melbourne had been retired a short time before because of the intended purchase and if it had been known it would fall through, the Melbourne may have been retained for a few more years.

[Targan]

The Melbourne had been retired a short time before because of the intended purchase and if it had been known it would fall through, the Melbourne may have been retained for a few more years.

And so it was that ever since Australia's naval aviation has been restricted to helicopters. And the Melbourne ended up assisting China's carrier-based pilot training. How stupid.

[Adm.Lee]

Another forum I read states that the carrier had an engine failure and could not get up enough speed in the calm weather and low winds to launch the aircraft.

Ethell & Price, Air war South Atlantic, confirms that the wind was too low on May 1 and May 2 for the 25 de Mayo to launch fully-loaded jets.

And it was early on May 1 when the first Vulcan strike cratered the runway at Pt. Stanley, which meant it could not be used for staging jets. (Which begs the question, why didn't they send engineers to make sure the runway stayed open)

The junta misjudged the political climate in Britain, believing that democracies were weak, indecisive and averse to risk, and did not anticipate that the British would move their fleet halfway across the globe.

A professor of mine pointed out that machismo may have had something to do with it, too. A woman wasn't going to fight, right I'm presuming the junta had never seen the interplay of the House of Commons.

[RN7]

Ethell & Price, Air war South Atlantic, confirms that the wind was too low on May 1 and May 2 for the 25 de Mayo to launch fully-loaded jets.

And it was early on May 1 when the first Vulcan strike cratered the runway at Pt. Stanley, which meant it could not be used for staging jets. (Which begs the question, why didn't they send engineers to make sure the runway stayed open)



A professor of mine pointed out that machismo may have had something to do with it, too. A woman wasn't going to fight, right I'm presuming the junta had never seen the interplay of the House of Commons.

Margaret Thatcher wasn't called the Iron Lady for no reason!

[Webstral]

The Argentines had a number of combat aircraft. A coordinated effort involving an all-out air assault at the schwerpunkt might have swamped British defenses. Obviously, the Brits knew this and would have taken measures to prevent the Argentines from getting their forces into position to launch such an attack. The conditions under which the decisive battle would have been fought would have been determined by the foresight of the respective senior commands and the capabilities of the screening forces. Also, I really have no idea whether the Argentines could have coordinated an air-surface attack involving all or almost all of their assets. These things are much easier said than done.

It seems in the end that the Argentines just didn't have a Plan B. Once their assumptions about the way things were supposed to go didnt pan out, they had no idea what to do next. Under those circumstances, the Royal Navy had a clear advantage because they had a clear idea of what they wanted to accomplish. Also, the Royal Navy does a good job of allowing its leaders to take the initiative within the overall scope of the mission. Very important.

[Adm.Lee]

Duh, I made a connection

Oh, yeah, it's May 2012, isn't it That would make this month the 30th anniversary of most of this fighting, wouldn't it

Web, I think operations-tempo and refuelling assets were a big limiting factor for the Argentinian efforts.