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Germany Plans
Chief of the Prussian General Staff from 1857 to 1871, and then Chief of the Great General Staff (Oberste Heeresleitung or OHL) from 1871 to 1888, Helmuth Karl Bernhard, Graf von Moltke (Von Moltke the Elder), was of the opinion that in the event of a two-front war, Germany was to remain on the defensive in the West and then attack East. He was also opposed to the acquisition of Metz and the Alsace. But during his tenure, Russia was, nominally, Germanys ally, and Frances military power, and its aggressive tendencies, were projected into Africa and Asia.
Von Moltke the Elder retired at the age of eight-eight and died three years later. His successor, Alfred, Graf von Schlieffen, was left to face the results of the first of Germanys foreign policy disasters; after 1894, in the event of a war with either France or Russia, Germany would have to fight on two fronts. Militarily, this was a catastrophe. Germanys only reliable ally, Austria-Hungary, spent hardly any money on its military and there was considerable doubt that the Austrians would actually fight.
Germany was left with the bitter prospect of a two front war, in which its army would be vastly outnumbered. In 1900, there were nearly two million Frenchmen and Russians in uniform, opposed by a shade over half a million Germans. Over the next twelve years, the German numbers crept slowly upwards, but so die the numbers for France and Russia.
In the event of war, Germany would have to destroy one enemy before it was itself destroyed by the other. Or the Germans, the only sensible plan was to attack France first, move an overwhelming force into France as quickly as possible, drive on Paris and knock France out of the war in a great battle of annihilation.
The fastest way into France was by way of Belgium and Holland. Von Schlieffen believed that Germany would be able to secure a passage through Belgium, or the Belgians would simply surrender. But the only practicable route into northern France for a large army was through Belgium and Holland. Like the French and British General Staffs, the German General Staff assumed that Belgium would fight on one side or the other, and planned accordingly.
Examination of his initial plan soon showed von Schlieffen that it was unfeasible. Germany simply lacked the manpower to make it work. Over the years, he tinkered with the plan and his pre-war dispositions give a good idea of his desperation. Von Schlieffen planned on defending the two-hundred some kilometers of the Alsace frontier with six battalions of Jager, an infantry division of the reserves, supported by a division of the Landwehr (units made up of old men or untrained draftees). The entire right bank of the Moselle River would be defend by four divisions, two of them from the reserves.
There would be in no troops held in reserve. Von Schlieffen didnt have enough men to sweep through Belgium, outflank Paris, defeat the French armies in the field and do anything else. The German Army simply lacked the manpower to have any chance of success.
Von Schlieffen kept adjusting his plan, trying to create a scenario in which it would work. He ignored the French and Belgian fortifications, assuming that German troops would simply march around them. If the French went onto the offensive in Alsace, he assumed that the Germans would be able to move faster than the French and fight and win the decisive battle before the French could get into Germany proper.
The political implications of writing off Alsace, northern Lorraine and East Prussia were staggering, but even then von Schlieffen did not have enough infantry to execute his plan. If one makes the assumption that an operational plan, to be approved and made the basis for operations, has to have some chance of success. By this benchmark, Germany had no plan. At least Admiral Yamamoto could say that if the American aircraft carriers were present at Pearl harbor on December 7 1941, than a successful air attack would leave the United States without any naval capabilities in the Pacific to speak of. In addition, in the vastness of the Pacific, it was possible to mount a surprise attack, once the Japanese fleet left home waters, it could be headed for anywhere. It was impossible for Germany to conceal a million men in the Rhineland.
Once German soldiers started moving through Belgium, the French could reasonably be expected to notice their movement and deploy their troops accordingly. While von Schlieffen could claim that his infantry would simply sweep all before them, this was clearly clutching at straws. In order to mae his plan work, Germany needed two things to happen; France would remain on the defensive and Russia would take forever to mobilize.
Source oeThe Myth of the Great War
Chief of the Prussian General Staff from 1857 to 1871, and then Chief of the Great General Staff (Oberste Heeresleitung or OHL) from 1871 to 1888, Helmuth Karl Bernhard, Graf von Moltke (Von Moltke the Elder), was of the opinion that in the event of a two-front war, Germany was to remain on the defensive in the West and then attack East. He was also opposed to the acquisition of Metz and the Alsace. But during his tenure, Russia was, nominally, Germanys ally, and Frances military power, and its aggressive tendencies, were projected into Africa and Asia.
Von Moltke the Elder retired at the age of eight-eight and died three years later. His successor, Alfred, Graf von Schlieffen, was left to face the results of the first of Germanys foreign policy disasters; after 1894, in the event of a war with either France or Russia, Germany would have to fight on two fronts. Militarily, this was a catastrophe. Germanys only reliable ally, Austria-Hungary, spent hardly any money on its military and there was considerable doubt that the Austrians would actually fight.
Germany was left with the bitter prospect of a two front war, in which its army would be vastly outnumbered. In 1900, there were nearly two million Frenchmen and Russians in uniform, opposed by a shade over half a million Germans. Over the next twelve years, the German numbers crept slowly upwards, but so die the numbers for France and Russia.
In the event of war, Germany would have to destroy one enemy before it was itself destroyed by the other. Or the Germans, the only sensible plan was to attack France first, move an overwhelming force into France as quickly as possible, drive on Paris and knock France out of the war in a great battle of annihilation.
The fastest way into France was by way of Belgium and Holland. Von Schlieffen believed that Germany would be able to secure a passage through Belgium, or the Belgians would simply surrender. But the only practicable route into northern France for a large army was through Belgium and Holland. Like the French and British General Staffs, the German General Staff assumed that Belgium would fight on one side or the other, and planned accordingly.
Examination of his initial plan soon showed von Schlieffen that it was unfeasible. Germany simply lacked the manpower to make it work. Over the years, he tinkered with the plan and his pre-war dispositions give a good idea of his desperation. Von Schlieffen planned on defending the two-hundred some kilometers of the Alsace frontier with six battalions of Jager, an infantry division of the reserves, supported by a division of the Landwehr (units made up of old men or untrained draftees). The entire right bank of the Moselle River would be defend by four divisions, two of them from the reserves.
There would be in no troops held in reserve. Von Schlieffen didnt have enough men to sweep through Belgium, outflank Paris, defeat the French armies in the field and do anything else. The German Army simply lacked the manpower to have any chance of success.
Von Schlieffen kept adjusting his plan, trying to create a scenario in which it would work. He ignored the French and Belgian fortifications, assuming that German troops would simply march around them. If the French went onto the offensive in Alsace, he assumed that the Germans would be able to move faster than the French and fight and win the decisive battle before the French could get into Germany proper.
The political implications of writing off Alsace, northern Lorraine and East Prussia were staggering, but even then von Schlieffen did not have enough infantry to execute his plan. If one makes the assumption that an operational plan, to be approved and made the basis for operations, has to have some chance of success. By this benchmark, Germany had no plan. At least Admiral Yamamoto could say that if the American aircraft carriers were present at Pearl harbor on December 7 1941, than a successful air attack would leave the United States without any naval capabilities in the Pacific to speak of. In addition, in the vastness of the Pacific, it was possible to mount a surprise attack, once the Japanese fleet left home waters, it could be headed for anywhere. It was impossible for Germany to conceal a million men in the Rhineland.
Once German soldiers started moving through Belgium, the French could reasonably be expected to notice their movement and deploy their troops accordingly. While von Schlieffen could claim that his infantry would simply sweep all before them, this was clearly clutching at straws. In order to mae his plan work, Germany needed two things to happen; France would remain on the defensive and Russia would take forever to mobilize.
Source oeThe Myth of the Great War
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