Very OT but of Interest to the Likes that Hang Here

[Raellus]

I am a huge FOTC fan. Their bits about the not-so-good-natured rivalry between New Zealanders and Australians are hilarious.

[CDAT]

I would like to ask though, would not the various State National Guards be the legitimate inheritors to the original militias I know they are heavily "federalized" but weren't they set up as a counter to a federal military trying to enforce federal policy onto the states

I cannot speak for each state, but when I joined the WA State National Guard, one of the things that they told us is that by state constitution we are supposed to help train the militia. So if we are to train the militia we cannot be the inheritors of the original militias. Now having said that I do think that to most politicians they are, and it may not be in the constitutional sense but for practical purposes I think that they have taken that role, as the "real" militia being something that they cannot control scares them.

[Webstral]

Okay, so I couldnt help myself when I read SSCs very legitimate question about the National Guard.

The National Guard is a joint state-federal reserve for which each party contributes half of the funding. The states get control by default, but the federal government may take command of any or all National Guard units at will. Once the federal government has mobilized a National Guard, the Guard unit, that unit is available for deployment anywhere in the world for any mission at the discretion of the federal chain of command. See the US Army Vehicle Guide.

When the Constitution was ratified by the states in 1789, a militia possessed several key characteristics. The militia was a reserve formation of citizen soldiers (non-professional) organized along regular military lines. The states, formerly the colonies, had full control of their militias. The CINC was the governor, who delegated his authority to the officers, who delegated it to the NCOs, just as the Regular Army officers get their authority from the President. The state legislature authorized the regulations governing the militia, among which are what we would call today a Uniform Code of Military Justice. Among the regulations were details regarding maximum number of days of service per annum, geographical limits on deployment (often the state border but uniformly the national border), and the like. Individuals were supposed to provide their own small arms and sufficient ammunition, equipment, and supplies for 3-5 days of operation. Longer operations were supported at government expense. Governments, local or state, could and typically did provide additional small arms for those not able to afford their own, stores, and even small cannon, the latter two of which were kept at facilities called armories.

At the time, the militia was intended to defend the nation against foreign aggression and the rise of domestic despotism. This concept survives to today in the oath service members take to defend the Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic. The militia was necessary for defense against foreign aggression because the new federal government was destitute. Even had the first leaders of the republic been inclined to raise and pay for a standing army of sufficient power to discourage aggression by the various European powers that might possess dark impulses, there simply was no money for anything of the sort. The states militia was the only viable solution to the security problem. Equally, though, the militia under the control of the states was seen as a counterbalance to the ambitions of a federal leader who might get control of the professional force. The key element is the chain of command. In 1789, and for the previous 150 years, the militia belonged exclusively to the states. Their authority to mobilize and embark on combat operations was derived from the electorate of the state through the executive and the legislature.

Things changed very quickly. Within 4 years, someone at the top realized that having the states militia operate solely under the command of the states violated the principals of unity of command and concentration of mass/combat power. New legislation gave the federal executive the authority to mobilize the states militia and deploy them as federal forces. At this point, the ability of the militia to defend against foreign aggression was enhanced at the expense of the ability of the militia to defend against domestic tyranny. The militia was set on its 110 year road to become the modern National Guard, a process which was completed with the Militia Act of 1903.

The distinction between being solely under the command of the states and being available for mobilization by the President may seem fine, but its everything. Soldiers obey orders from the authorized chain of command. The habits of discipline and obedience are the core of combat effectiveness for any army as long as there have been armies. The states militia were in a position to counterbalance the professional force in the event of federal despotism because the militia had no command relationship with the federal government. For the militia to take to the field against a Regular Army fighting for a domestic despot involved grave disobedience to the federal government but not mutiny"at least in 1789. Once the militia could come under the command of the federal government, the militia became in effect a federal reserve with a chain of command culminating not in the state executive but in the federal executive. The same risk that the Regular Army would simply follow the orders of a domestic tyrant out of habits of discipline and obedience applied to the states militia from 1793 onward, if in a somewhat reduced form. Orders by a state executive for the militia to secure federal facilities in the state as part of a fight against federal despotism could be countermanded by the federal authority. Again, the distinction may seem fine, but when citizen soldiers are making choices the authority of the chain of command makes all the difference in the world.

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations has made a hash of common sense by defining the militia as two things as two things it cannot be. The active militia is defined as the National Guard, which is really a federal reserve. The inactive militia is defined as everybody else. This is absurd. Calling a mass of men of military age completely lacking in discipline, training, equipment, organization, or any of the other defining characteristics of a military formation a military formation is like calling a heap of building materials a house. This farce has gone on for 200 years because opposing interest groups can agree that Title 10 is in their best interest.

The various State Defense Forces are the only forces that could pass as militia as militia existed in 1789 and for the previous 150 years. Time and a Hamiltonian sensibility have altered the militia so that the volunteers for citizen soldiery are a federal reserve with a very diminished psychological and legal basis for taking up arms against domestic tyranny, while those who prefer not to volunteer have no responsibilities whatsoever and about as much military effectiveness in the event of a need for a patriot uprising.

My kids have used their tokens for TV watching, so its time for me to go parent.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

Hey Webstral, thanks for the info, it makes things clearer by showing just how murky and grey the situation is!

[.45cultist]

I cannot speak for each state, but when I joined the WA State National Guard, one of the things that they told us is that by state constitution we are supposed to help train the militia. So if we are to train the militia we cannot be the inheritors of the original militias. Now having said that I do think that to most politicians they are, and it may not be in the constitutional sense but for practical purposes I think that they have taken that role, as the "real" militia being something that they cannot control scares them.

Today's NG's were date back to a 1913 reorganization(it took a few years), state militias hung in until the 1950's before being eclipsed by the guard.

[CDAT]

Today's NG's were date back to a 1913 reorganization(it took a few years), state militias hung in until the 1950's before being eclipsed by the guard.

When I joined the WA Guard, we had (in WA) have the WAARNG (Washington Army National Guard), the WA State Guard, and then there are the not state sponsored Militias that we were told was part of our job to train (if they asked, most did not), I did not ever train them but know of some of the guys I worked with who did, on orders.

[Adm.Lee]

It's a couple of decades since my high school post-WWII history classes but hey, that's what Wikipedia is for right

Foreign policy of the John F. Kennedy administration

I think it's fair to say that the Kennedy Administration's relationship with France was complicated.

Agreed, but I don't see anything there about US withdrawal, or threats to withdraw, the nuclear umbrella from Western Europe. I understand that that is what France and other European nations worried about constantly, but I never heard that it was explicitly or implicitly said.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

The statement wasn't about the withdrawal of the US nuclear umbrella, it was about the use of those weapons as a first response should the Soviet Union invade Western Europe.
De Gaulle's argument was not that the US should withdraw nuclear weapons, it was that by softening the former hardline of nuclear response, it would make the Russians* believe the nuclear option would not be used to prevent aggression on their part.
De Gaulle believed that the threat of nuclear destruction was so overpowering as to encourage those involved in Europe to actively avoid another war. By toning down the nuclear deterence, it would, in his view, allow events that could lead to another war in Europe.

* de Gaulle typically referred to the Soviets as the Russians, probably because he saw them as the real power of the Soviet Union.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

Webstral,
My deepest apologies for derailing your thread.

[Tegyrius]

To be fair, SSC, this is one of the most informative and civil derailments I've seen on this forum...

- C.

[stormlion1]

Colonial Militia's during the era of the American Revolution were pretty simple things. All adults above a certain age and below a certain age gathered together a few weekends a year and practiced and drilled for several possible eventuality's. Things like Indian attacks, Invasion from the French or whomever, or even between other colonies. But they were not professionals, not by a long shot! When they attempted to use European tactics, the tactics they drilled in they got slaughtered every time. It was only when they changed tactics and fought from ambush or used cover and concealment that they had a much better time of it.
The other part of the equation for these citizen militias was that they were all armed and usually had the mixings to produce shot and shell and more weapons in there hometowns. They knew they couldn't depend on supply so they had to make there own and have there own ready to use. Every man in the militia had there own weapon, a ready supply of powder and shot, and all were close at hand. They literally could be out the door armed and ready to muster within a minute of being informed of trouble.

[RN7]

By 1776, it can be argued that "Americans" were a thing. Yes, the colonies were legally subject to the crown of England, but they had no direct representation in Parliament (a major complaint in the Declaration of Independence), no landed aristocracy, and were linguistically and more ethnically diverse than their cousins back in England. A vast majority of "Americans" had been born in the colonies and very few of them had ever set foot on English (the Isles) soil. Although most were considered British citizens at the time due to fairly liberal immigration law, "Americans" included significant numbers of Irish, Germans, and Dutch, quite a few of whom didn't even speak the King's English yet. There was no state church in the colonies and one could find significant numbers of Puritans, Calvinists, and Quakers here. In addition, per capita land ownership was much more widespread in the colonies, meaning that more people could participate in local government here than back "home" in England. These are significant differences and contributed to an increasingly distinct self-identity.

Although many colonists still considered themselves English subjects in 1776- at least legally speaking- most of them also knew by then that they were very different, socially, economically, and culturally, than their island brethren.

I think many Americans already considered themselves Americans by 1776, and its recorded that the British were calling American born colonists Yankees as early as 1758 and probably for decades before. The word Yankee may have originated in the 1600's as a name used by British colonists for Dutch colonists. The Americans also knew that the individual colonies should be more closely politically connected and that they should be taking a more direct role in governing themselves by this time. As early as 1643 the colonies of Massachusetts, Plymouth, New Haven and Connecticut formed the United Colonies of New England to unite the Puritan colonists and defend against the Indians and the Dutch colonies. The Albany Congress in 1754 was as much about closer political union between the colonies as self governance for the colonies, and common defensive measures against the Indians and the French in Canada was also a important reason for it. Interestingly only the Northern "Yankee" colonies sent representatives to Albany, with the Southern Colonies (including Maryland) and the colonies that later became part of Canada sending no representatives at all. Also what non-white Americans thought about American independence is unknown. The size of the Black population of the 13 Colonies was proportionally larger than its current proportion of the US population and it had no say at all, and it's fair to say that the Indians were no friends of the Yankee pioneers. Those Americans who still considered themselves British after the war by and large vacated to Canada, Britain or other parts of the British Empire in the America's.

Not so. British officers posted to the colonies during the French & Indian War (Seven Years War) frequently commented on how unlike their own troops colonial militias were, and vice-versa. Fighting in the wilderness of North America was very different than close order drill on the open plains of western Europe- wilderness fighting was not taught to the colonial militias by British regulars; it was gleaned from generations of conflict with Native Americans (Amerindians, if you will). During the half-dozen or so wars of empire during the 17th and 18th centuries (but especially during the French & Indian War), colonial fighters were appalled at the harsh discipline meted out by British officers, and by rank based on station of birth. They were quite used to electing their own officers or simply going home if they didn't like the way a campaign was being run. By the same token, many British officers viewed the colonial militiamen as being undisciplined ruffians, good for little else besides manual labor.

If you're referring to the Continental Army of the American Revolution, then yes, many colonial officers were blooded while serving alongside the British, but most did so as part of the militia. However, only a very few ever served in the British regulars. In addition, much of the experience in European-style warfare was provided by non-British sources (Lafayette, Pulaski, and Von Steuben being the most famous examples).

George Washington himself heavily criticised the Virginia militia under his charge in 1755 during the Seven Years War as being highly insubordinate and next to useless. Although I think it's fair to say that the British Army was a fairly harsh environment with flogging routinely dished out on the rank and file to keep them in line. The American civilian volunteers were not British soldiers and would not have been used to either the harsh discipline and the class riddled system of command that was then pervasive in the British military. British officers would have been used to troops obeying orders to march, drill and follow established tactics, while qualities such as motivation, individual initiative and notions of democracy would have been alien to them. On the other hand many of the militia would have been natural outdoors men, familiar with firearms and hunting and had a superior knowledge of the American terrain, environment and climate, and were on average far healthier and better educated than their British counterparts of the time.

Many do know this. I make it a point of emphasis. Without the French, the Revolutionary War would have been a much more drawn-out affair; perhaps it would have been unsuccessful. To be fair though, the French did not provide direct military support until after the Continental army won the battle of Saratoga on its own, proving to the French that the British-American colonies had a chance of succeeding in their rebellion. After losing much of its own colonial territory in the French and Indian War, the French did not want to risk additional losses by backing a losing team. It was definitely a team-effort and I teach my students this.

In hind sight the French contribution to the American victory proved to be pyrrhic for them. Britain more than any other power thwarted Napoleon's plans for domination of Europe and the world, and industrialised at a far quicker rate and founded an even bigger empire in the 19th Century with France getting the left over's from what Britain didn't want. In the long term it also helped create and even bigger English speaking power to make the Francophiles squirm.

This isn't a point of emphasis in standard courses, but AP students could probably discuss British [Whig] support for the colonists in Parliament. The vocal minority not withstanding, the majority in Parliament rebuffed the Colonists demands for redress of the representation question as early as 1766 with the Declaratory Act.

By and large the British Parliament didn't give a hoot what the Americans wanted.

Absolutely, but this doesn't make them any more pro-French. It's not like the Louisiana Territory was a gift- if Napoleon hadn't been hard up for cash and already on his heels in the Caribbean (thanks, Toussaint Louverture!), it's unlikely that the deal would have been made. This is veering into alternative history a bit, but it would have likely been taken by force, like Mexican territory was, at a later date. As the British found out in 1776 and 1812, the American colonies were just too large and too distant to control from across an ocean (a key argument made by British national Thomas Paine in his famous pro-independence pamphlet, Common Sense).

I think in the long term the Americans still would have taken the Louisiana Territory, in fact they might have taken Canada as well if relations with Britain hadn't improved.

No. But should they DeGaulle had lots of problems with the U.S. and had always been a particularly troublesome ally- just ask Churchill! The reason you cited was largely a fait accompli and if it hadn't been that, it would have been something else. Much of France's post-WWII foreign policy was based on maintaining its own diminishing hold on its crumbling foreign empire.

DeGaulle was just impossible to get along with unless you completely agreed with his delusions about French power and his vision of a post-war Western Europe dominated by France.

No, but they should. It's unfortunate. At the same time, I think some Americans feel that the French have been ungrateful for the assistance the U.S. provided them in the two World Wars. This sentiment surely drives a lot of the France bashing that goes on today, albeit unfairly.

I'd love to know how the US is supposed to have betrayed France.

[Webstral]

Evidently reading history and common sense aren't prevailing. Those men practiced to repel Indians and French incursions. At least until the regular forces arrived. The training might not have been for European style war, but one needed a plan for counter insurgency (like "King Phillip's War-I forgot the chief's real name) and the like.

A man who knows that there was a King Philip's War and that King Philip had a proper Wampanoag name. How splendid! I read a fascinating book on the subject maybe 3 years ago and passed it to a fellow Massachusetts man living in California.

No, reading history is not as common as it should be. Even people who read a lot sometimes shun history. Last month I was at dinner with friends who are avid readers. The dining companion on my right remarked that she usually reads two books at a time--one in hard copy and one on her tablet. She's a novel reader. I remarked that I was very pleased to have finished a 500 page hard cover book, The New Russians, in 6-7 weeks. I described the contents, and she said the whole business sounded like torture.

I think, too, that there is a popular mythology about the Revolution that tends to block out contravening information. Even intelligent people believe odd things, such as the idea that militias sprang into being in 1775 just in time for Lexington and Concord.

On a tangent, one of the things has always plagued me about my understanding of history is the number of people involved. There were perhaps 3 million people in the entirety of the American Colonies at the time of the American Revolution. On the scale of the individual, this is a lot of folks. On the scale of modern America, this is a rather small state. Iowa has about 3 million people. A small number of people had a huge impact on the future of a large nation.

Until the advent of the Internet, I struggled with the population issue regarding Greek and Roman history. How many Greeks are we talking about during the golden age of Athens How many Romans were there during the various Punic Wars The loss of 50,000 men on the battlefield meant something completely different to societies with 5 million people than the same loss would mean to us.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

I think, too, that there is a popular mythology about the Revolution that tends to block out contravening information. Even intelligent people believe odd things, such as the idea that militias sprang into being in 1775 just in time for Lexington and Concord.

I think this also gets worse the further in history the event was, for example the story of King Canute being so proud he thought he could command the waves is pretty common "knowledge". Whereas digging deeper, the rest of the story emerges of Canute rebuffing a belief that a King could command all within his domain including the seas, by the simple act of going down to the sea and proving that the waves did not obey him. Most people don't seem to want to do the extra research required to get at the real story.

On a tangent, one of the things has always plagued me about my understanding of history is the number of people involved. There were perhaps 3 million people in the entirety of the American Colonies at the time of the American Revolution. On the scale of the individual, this is a lot of folks. On the scale of modern America, this is a rather small state. Iowa has about 3 million people. A small number of people had a huge impact on the future of a large nation.

Until the advent of the Internet, I struggled with the population issue regarding Greek and Roman history. How many Greeks are we talking about during the golden age of Athens How many Romans were there during the various Punic Wars The loss of 50,000 men on the battlefield meant something completely different to societies with 5 million people than the same loss would mean to us.

And further to that, other factors such as travel times in that period are sometimes hard to grasp.
This really came home to me many years ago when I was describing to a friend in Europe that I would often travel 600km (approx 370 miles) from an outback town to the city, just to spend a weekend with mates. For them, that 600km was one and sometimes two other countries.
To me, those distances are nothing, a 5-6 hour trip by car but... if I had to do it on horse, it's about a week long trek.

This helped me to put some things into perspective particularly when they talk about moving armies around before the advent of steam vehicles let alone motor vehicles.
To me, this ably illustrates the need for a well-trained militia to react to potential threats given that the regular army could be a half-week march away. Which is probably why the Minutemen are given such prominence. But, it does imply that such a militia must have access to good training and be well disciplined if it is to act in a timely and effective manner, after all, it may be required to hold the line for several days to allow the main force to arrive.
However, it does appear that over the course of time, because this implication has not been overtly stated, most people have forgotten (or haven't bothered to read between the lines) this and now seem to think that a bunch of householders grabbed their guns and fought off an empire.

[Webstral]

To me, this ably illustrates the need for a well-trained militia to react to potential threats given that the regular army could be a half-week march away. Which is probably why the Minutemen are given such prominence. But, it does imply that such a militia must have access to good training and be well disciplined if it is to act in a timely and effective manner, after all, it may be required to hold the line for several days to allow the main force to arrive. However, it does appear that over the course of time, because this implication has not been overtly stated, most people have forgotten (or haven't bothered to read between the lines) this and now seem to think that a bunch of householders grabbed their guns and fought off an empire.

Despite our fascination with violence military power, Americans are highly averse to actually serving. We have a Hamiltonian sensibility in that regard. Weve been at war for 13 years in Afghanistan and were at war in Iraq for 8 years. On the order of 1% of us have been involved in uniform. The same people keep going again and again and again. Between the two wars, some guys have fought WW2 twice.

Anyway, the myth that fighting wars is relatively easy for the right kind of people justifies the American aversion to the discomfort of service. Its human nature, really. However, some societies have done a better job of inculcating the belief that a modest amount of universal discomfort is necessary for success on the battlefield. The myth that farmers and shop keepers with no training or formal organization beat the British Army rationalizes the American aversion to service.