One of Eisenhower's Poorer Decisions

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The Targets

Sources are Omaha A Flawed Victory by Adrian Lewis, D-Day by Steven Ambrose and D-Day by Tute, Costello and Hughes

The Target List

The target list for the Joint Fire Plan included enemy artillery batteries, main roads, road intersections, communications centers, bridges, railway centers, cable junctions, road embankments, telephone exchanges, pillboxes, ammo depots, construction sites, machine gun positions and troop concentrations.

First priority was on for the destruction of enemy offensive weapons. Second priority on the isolation of the battlefield and third priority for the destruction of enemy defensive positions. Considering that only forty minutes of bombardment was available to attack the waters edge defenses, the vast majority of the effort was expended elsewhere. Case in point, Pointe du Hoc, a known enemy coastal defense battery site. A brief survey of the site, even today, confirms a vast amount of overkill. Pointe du Hoc had been the target of pre-invasion air strikes, and on D-Day was targeted by air strikes and naval gunfire and then by direct assault by a Ranger battalion. It is none known that the artillery pieces originally stationed there had been withdrawn inland. At the time, it was the opinion of Allied Intelligence that the guns were of large enough caliber and with sufficient range to threaten the transports, this was the main reason behind the decision to relocate the transport area further out to sea. Such a large amount of ordnance was expended on Point du Hoc that, in realistic terms, a quarter of it would have been enough to suppress the battery for the day. The use of the remaining three quarters of the ordnance would have been enough to clear three of the beach exits on Omaha Beach. But this scale of destruction was intentionally avoided because of fears that the damage done to the beach structure would have slowed the buildup.

The invasion beaches at Omaha, with their obstacles and minefields, were not targeted by the heavy bombers and battleships. The reason behind this decision was optimism on the part of the senior leaders (Eisenhower, Montgomery and Bradley) who simply did not believe that the assault would be difficult. These leaders also did not want to disfigure the beaches by bombing them with 500 and 1,000-pound bombs and 14-inch shells from the battleships. The craters caused by this type of bombardment would have so damaged the beach surface, that extensive engineer work would have been necessary to repair the beach surface, thus slowing the buildup of troops and supplies. Tests at the Woolacombe Assault Training Center had determined that the ideal weapon for clearing beach obstacles and minefields would be the 100-pound high explosive bomb.

The casemated gun positions of reinforced concrete could not be destroyed by such small bombs. In order to achieve the quality and character of the destruction desired, they would be forced to use various types of bombs. The heavy bombers were therefore assigned targets on the bluffs above and behind the beach and the beach exits themselves. A total of ten targets were assigned at Omaha Beach and they were scheduled to be attacked from H-30 minutes to H-5 by the heavy bombers. None of these targets were engaged by the heavy bombers on D-day because the planes flew too high and employed a method of bombing that was incapable of providing the precision necessary---blind, radar bombing. Naval gunfire support from the battleships and cruisers were dedicated to counter battery fire and other inland targets. This left only the twelve destroyers and the armed landing craft to provide the oedrenching fire for the assault teams. The necessary levels of drenching fire need to destroy beach obstacles, breach minefields and suppress or destroy defensive emplacements was simply not possible given the breadth of the assault beaches, the naval assets dedicated and the level of joint training acquired in June of 1944.

In the Pacific, the navy, marines and army perfected the technique of providing the assault troops with a wall of walking fire. This type of fire required both a large number of firing platforms as well as extensive ammunition reserves. It also required close coordination and extensive training between the assault elements and the supporting units, a level of coordination and training that was never achieved in the European Theater of Operations. In part this was due to the nature of the terrain with the army and navy seldom having to come into contact with one another, thus joint operations were simply a momentary inconvenience to the independent operations of each service. In addition, veteran troops soon learned the necessity of following up the bombardment at distances of 100-150 yards, accepting the resulting oefriendly-fire) losses in order to close assault the defenders before they could recover from the shock of the bombardment, the inexperienced units deployed at Omaha Beach were incapable of this level of combat acumen.

Drenching fire has been mentioned several times before, this type of fire was designed to explode land mines before advancing troops, cause enemy soldiers to take cover, cause destruction and disorganization in the enemys defenses and allow the attack troops to close with the enemy. As can be seen by the previous posts, this type of fire may have been planned, but was not delivered at Normandy. In addition, drenching fire was not intended to destroy pillboxes or reinforced positions. Such targets had to be engaged individually and with direct fire. This was one of the key lessons of Tarawa. It was a lesson that Eisenhower, Montgomery and Bradley all failed to heed.

[Adm.Lee]

Good points, especially those last few.

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The Joint Fire Plan, the Aviation side

Sources are Omaha A Flawed Victory by Adrian Lewis, D-Day by Steven Ambrose and D-Day by Tute, Costello and Hughes

The role of the U.S. Army Air Forces has been studied extensively. While opinions on the effectiveness vary, in general, historians of the air war conclude that the results from the application of air power, while in the main, were satisfactory, were less then expected. It is the general belief that too much was expected from the young service and that air force leaders exaggerated the capabilities of air power and fostered the development of unrealistic expectations. One of the great ironies of air operations in the European Theater of Operations was that, when operating against a first-class adversary on a continental land mass, air units assigned or attached to ground forces proved incapable of providing effective support of ground forces.

On D-Day, the U.S. Eighth and Ninth Air Forces had three missions to perform: to continue to isolate the battlefield by destroying communications channels and interdicting the movement of reinforcements to the invasion beachheads; to destroy or neutralize the waters edge defenses to facilitate the amphibious assault; and to provide close air support---scheduled and on-call. The battle for air supremacy had already been won.

The first mission was performed, effectively isolating the battlefield, but the remaining two missions were performed considerably less successfully.

Air Force doctrine was set forth in July 1943 with the publication of oeCommand and Employment of Air Power FM 100-20. This manual was published without the occurrence of the Army Ground Forces, who viewed the manual with dismay. FM 100-20 is often described as the Army Air Forces Declaration of Independence.

Air Force thinking was guided by two beliefs that dominated all others. First was that the war could be won through air power using precision daylight strategic bombing. The second was that the air force must be autonomous, independent from the armys command and control. These two views led to the concentration of air power and prevented it from being divided up to support army corps and divisions. It meant that the air force would retain operational command and control of all air resources. It also meant that the air force would not acquire the training, develop the procedures, or achieve the necessary level of integration with army units to effectively conduct on-call close air support missions in close proximity to ground force until well after the Normandy invasion.

General Montgomery, in his position as assault force commander, believed that air power, when concentrated, was a oebattle winning factor, this position was endorsed by the air force. Montgomerys plan to win the battle for the beaches at Normandy, his plan for the breakout at Caen, and Bradleys plan for the breakout at Saint-Lo were based on the belief that air power could achieve battlefield success cheaply. Montgomery wrote: oeNothing could be more fatal to successful results than to dissipate the air resources into small packets placed under command of Army formation commanders with each packet working on its own plan. Montgomery called for the two services, air and ground to advance the concept that they were oeindependent with a oecommon task. And because the services were independent, any satisfactory solution to military problems had to be based on a oeprocess of negotiation. And this process of negotiation had to be based on knowledge of the strengths, limitations and capabilities of the respective services as well as on oemutual trust and honesty. The simple fact that a high ranking commander had to take the time to write this is indicative of a problem in the command structure.

Montgomery also called for a Tactical Air Force to support the Army Group in the field. He called for a Tactical Air Force comprised of a Headquarters; Tactical Groups on the scale of one per army; a Light/Medium Bomber Group; a Strategic Reconnaissance Wing and a Base Defense Group. In essence, this was organizational structure of the U.S. Ninth Air Force after it had detached its heavy bombers to the Eighth Force. Within the Ninth Air Force, three tactical air commands (TACS) were created and assigned to each U.S. Army. Thus, the IX TAC was attached to the First Army, the XIX TAC was attached to the Third Army and the XXIX TAC was attached to the Ninth Army. All remained under the command of the Ninth Air Force which was associated with Bradleys Twelfth Army Group.

Following its reorganization in the United Kingdom, the Ninth Air Force, in the period from October 16, 1943 until June 6 1944, increased in size from 4 to 45 tactical groups, from less than 300 to more than 1,100 bombers, from zero to more than 3,000 troop-carrier aircraft and from less than 50,000 to more than 200,000 personnel. The mission of the Ninth Air Force was not primarily to fit organized, trained and equipped units into its structure, but rather to construct these units from casual personnel, to struggle for their aircraft and other equipment and to train and retain all personnel for functions quite often entirely foreign to those for which they were originally trained and equipped.

Because of the magnitude of their problems, the Ninth Air Force found it impossible to conduct close support missions in close proximity to friendly ground forces on D-Day. Indeed, Ninth Air Force was unable to organize any training with ground troops until May 1944, by which time, the assault troops had already completed their training and had been sealed in their pre-invasion oesausages for their final briefings.

In order to prove close air support, the Ninth Air Force assigned a air support party (ASP) to each RCT. They were equipped with VHF radios, but were not permitted to talk directly with aircraft unless given specific orders to do so. Nor were the air support parties given the authority to intervene in stopping attacks on friendly troops. In order to request air support, the ASPs had to contact a headquarters ship and the request would then be relayed to a central control facility in Uxbridge, England. There the decision would be made on whether to grant the request. This process took time. During the entire period of the D-Day landings on June 6th.Uxbridge received a total of thirteen requests, of which six came from Omaha Beach. What air support that was available to the assault troops came from pilots on station, attacking targets of opportunity, well inland.

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Omaha Beach itself and the Defenders

Sources are Omaha A Flawed Victory by Adrian Lewis, D-Day by Steven Ambrose and D-Day by Tute, Costello and Hughes

Omaha Beach was the code name for one of the five invasion beaches chosen for the Allied invasion of France. The beach is located on the coast of Normandy, France, facing the English Channel and is some five miles long, from east of Sainte-Honorine-des-Pertes to west of Vierville-sur-Mer, on the right bank of the Douve River estuary.

Omaha Beach was to be the focus of the main American landing, linking with the British forces at Gold Beach to the east and reaching to the Isigny and the link-up with the VII Corps landing at Utah Beach.

Overlord listed seventeen sectors along the Normandy coastline with codenames from the current Allied phonetic alphabet, thus Able was just west of Omaha and Rodger lay on the eastern flank of the invasion area. Each beach sector was subdivided into three with the colors Green, Red and White, and again subdivided with numbers, hence Item Red 2 for example. On either end of Omaha Beach there were large rocky cliffs, the beach itself was a crescent-shape with a gentle sloping tidal area averaging some 300 yards between the low and high-water marks. Above the high-tide line was a bank of shingles some 8 feet high and up to 15 yards wide in some places. At the western end, the shingles rested against a sea wall for roughly one-third of its length (stone in places and wooden in others). This sea wall ranged from 4 to 12 feet in height. For the remaining two thirds of the invasion beach, the shingles lay against a low sand embankment. Behind this embankment was a level shelf of sand, narrow at either end and perhaps 200 yards wide in the center. Steep escarpments or bluffs then rose to some 100-170 feet, dominating the entire beach and cut into by small wooden draws at five locations, codenamed from west to east as D-1, D-3, E-1, E-3 and F-1.

The German defensive plans did not allow for any defense in depth, depending on their ability to stop the invasion at the beaches. There were four major lines of obstacles constructed in the water. The first was a non-contiguous line with a small gap in the middle of Dog White Beach and a larger gap across all of Easy Red Beach and consisted of 200 Belgian Gates (heavy steel fence roughly 6 feet high and nine feet wide), with mines lashed to the upright posts. Roughly 30 yards behind this was the 2nd line of obstacles, which consisted of logs driven into the sand at a sharp angle, with every third one capped with a anti-tank mine. An additional 30 yards behind was the 3rd line of obstacles, which consisted of a continuous line of 450 wooden ramps, with mines attached, sloping towards shore and designed to force flat-bottomed landing craft to ride up and either flip over or detonate the mine. The 4th line of obstacles was a continuous line of hedgehogs (three pieces of iron welded into a three armed cross and designed to stop a tank). The entire area between the shingle and the bluffs was heavily wired and mined, with additional minefields placed on the bluff slopes.

Troop deployments consisted of five companies of infantry, concentrated at 15 strongpoints (Widerstandsnester or resistance nests), numbered WN-60 in the east to WN-74 near Vierville in the west. These were primarily located to control the approaches to the various draws. Each strongpoint consisted of weapons casemates, interconnected with tunnels and trenches. In addition to each companies normal allotment of rifles and machine guns, over 60 light artillery pieces ranging from 37mm to 88mm were deployed at these strongpoint points. The heaviest pieces were located in eight gun casemates and four open positions, the lighter guns were housed in 35 pillboxes. An additional 18 antitank guns (50mm to 88mm) were emplaced to cover the beach. Areas in between each strongpoint were lightly manned with occasional trenches, rifle pits, and an additional 85 machine gun emplacements. No part of the beach was left uncovered and the disposition of weapons meant that flanking fire could be brought to bear anywhere along the beach.

Allied Intelligence identified the coastal defenses as being manned by a reinforced battalion (800-1,000 men) of the 716th Infantry Division, a static defensive unit estimated to contain up to 50% of non-German troops, mostly Russian volunteers and German Volksdeutsche. The nearest reserve unit was the 352nd Infantry Division concerted around Saint Lo, some 20 miles inland. However, Intelligence missed the movement forward of the 352nd towards the invasion beaches. As part of this movement, the 352 assumed responsibility for the defense of Omaha Beach, reinforcing the 726th Grenadier Regiment (and its attached 439th Ost Battalion) with the 916th Grenadier Regiment, supporting these troops were the 1st and 4th Battalions,, 352nd Artillery Regiment (twelve 105mm and four 150mm howitzers. Covering the eastern part of Omaha was the 3rd Battalion, 352nd Artillery Regiment (twelve 105mm howitzers). A reserve force of two companies of the 916th Grenadiers was held at Formigny, two miles inland. Located south-east of Bayeux was the divisional reserve, the 915th Grenadier Regiment.

[Adm.Lee]

Again from "The dead and those who are going to die", it was mentioned that Omaha's terrain initially led planners to want to bypass the beach, but it was needed to fill the gap between Utah and the British beaches. Allowing the Germans to defeat either sector in detail was considered Not a Good Thing, for obvious reasons.

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the defensive positions

Sources are Omaha A Flawed Victory by Adrian Lewis, D-Day by Steven Ambrose and D-Day by Tute, Costello and Hughes and the 6juin1944.com web site.


The Omaha Beach defenses had their strongpoints covering the approaches to the five woody draws that allowed vehicle access inland. From East to West these were WN-60 (one 75mm gun, 3 tobruks with 50mm mortars, one 81mm mortar, one FlaK 38 20mm AAA gun and flamethrowers), this covered the eastern side of the F-1 Draw leading into Cabourg.

WN 61 (one 88mm PaK in pillbox; one 50mm PaK in open emplacement, one tobruk with a R35 tank turret [37mm gun], 2 tobruks with Mgs and flamethrowers) was positioned half down the bluff between the F-1 and E-3 Draws, providing flanking fire for both. Across the E-3 Draw was WN-62 (two 75mm guns in pillboxes, two 50mm PaKs in open emplacements, three MG positions, one tobruk with MG, two tobruks with 50mm mortars, inw twin AAMG in concrete emplacement, an artillery observation post as well as flamethrowers) The E-3 Draw led up to the village of Colleville-sur-Mer and the position of WN-63 (a company command post/radio station).

WN-64 (one 76.2mm gun, one 20mm AAA gun and two tobruks with 50mm mortars) and WN-65 (one 50mm Pak in pillbox, one 50mm Pak in open emplacement, one 75mm gun and two tobruks with 50mm mortars) controlled the access to the E-1 Draw

The D-3 Draw had the only hard-surfaced road leading inland to St. Lourent-sur-Mer and was protected by WN66 (one 50mm PaK in open emplacement, one 75mm PaK in pillbox; 2 tobruks with R35 [37mm gun] tank turrets, two 81mm mortars in open emplacements and one double-embrasure pillbox with MGs) on the eastern side of the draw, WN-67 (320mm rocket launcher position) at the head of the draw (on the outskirts of St. Lourent-sur-Mer), WN68 (one 50mm PaK in open emplacement, one 75mm PaK in open emplacement, two tobruks with R35 [37mm] tank turrets, one double-embrasure pillbox with MGs) on the western side of the draw, and WN69 (one 20mm AAA gun and several MG positions) on the western side of the village and controlling the read leading to Vierville-sur-Mer.

Midway between the D-3 Draw and the D-1 Draw was WN70 (one 75mm gun in pillbox, one 75mm gun in open emplacement, four tobruks with Mgs, two 81mm mortar emplacements and one 20mm FlaK gun).

Defending the D-1 Draw was WN71 (an artillery observation post, several MG positions, one tobruk with MG, one 81mm mortar emplacement and a double-embrasure pillbox with MGs) on the eastern side and WN-72 (one 88mm PaK in pillbox, one 50mm PaK in a double-embrasure pillbox, several MG positions, one tobruk with MG and a double-embrasure pillbox with MGs) on the western side. Overlooking WN72 was WN73(one 75mm gun in pillbox, three tobruks with 50mm mortars, several MG positions and an observation post).

Finally, on the western end of Omaha Beach was WN74 (two 75mm guns in emplacements).

Mention has been made several times of a oetobruk, this was a concrete placement with a small ammunition storage chamber offset from a circular firing position that place the weapon at roughly ground level. This was a universal position that could take a machine gun, be fitted with a stand to hold a 50mm mortar or even be fitted with a tank turret (usually removed from one of the thousands of captured French light tanks).

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Organization of the Assault Troops, Part I

Sources are Omaha A Flawed Victory by Adrian Lewis, D-Day by Steven Ambrose and D-Day by Tute, Costello and Hughes and the 6juin1944.com web site.

Two American Divisions were selected for the assault on Omaha Beach, the 1st Infantry Division oeThe Big Red One and the 29th Infantry Division oethe Blue and Grey. The 1st Infantry Division was chosen because, at the time, it was the most experienced U.S. Army division in amphibious operations. This led to the unusual assignment of the 29th Infantry Division as an attachment on D-Day.

Major General Clarence R. Huebner, commander of the 1st ID was therefore responsible for deploying and fighting the assault force. His primary mission was to secure a lodgement through which follow-on forces could then advance. It was his duty to develop the tactical plans that would achieve army and corps objectives and minimize the risks to the lives of his soldiers. While Eisenhower, Montgomery and Bradley would shoulder the ultimate responsibility for what happened on Bloody Omaha, Huebner deserves credit for what happened on the beach.

Huebner and Gerow (commander US V Corps) were, for the most part in agreement on the concept of the operation. Both staffs worked closely together to develop and troubleshoot the plan, as a result, there was a high degree of consensus between Gerow and Huebner. Both officers fought to have H-Hour moved up to take advantage of the cover of darkness. And both were threatened with relief of their commands if they failed to follow Bradleys directives. The result of this was that Huebner was given very little latitude in developing the plan for the assault on Omaha Beach. The when, where, who and how---the doctrine--- was dictated to him in considerable detail. So severe was this oeoversight from on high, that one battalion commander complained in his after action report that he had been given no latitude in in determining what equipment his battalion would carry, and as a result, his men went into action carrying gear that they had no need of and left behind gear that they needed.

Huebner was told that he would assault with two regiments abreast, two battalions abreast in each regiment. He was told how to load the landing craft, how to configure his platoons into the new (and untested) boat teams, what equipment each boat team would carry and even how they teams would exit the landing craft. He was given the engineer plan for clearing lanes through the obstacles and the Joint Fire Plan. Any analysis of the landing plan for Omaha Beach finds little or no conformation with standard organizational and doctrinal procedures. No attempt was made to follow lessons learned in previous amphibious landings and not even the basic principle of unit integrity was maintained.

Remember that the 1st Infantry Division was brought into the invasion because it had more experience with amphibious operations than any other division in the ETO. Their very experience was ignored by the planning staffs at First Army. Bradley had his vision of what the invasion would entail, and nothing and no one was allowed to rock the boat.

Huebner was forced to make his tactical plans based on the strategic assumptions of Eisenhower, Montgomery and Bradley. These assumptions included the erroneous assessment of the firepower of the Army Air Forces, the over-inflated capabilities of the limited naval gunfire support, the erroneous assessments of the German strength, capabilities and concept for the conduct of their defense. It was based on the assumption that tactical surprise would be achieved, and on unproven tactical doctrines, of which the most critical was the ability of the engineers to clear formidable obstacles, in daylight, and under heavy enemy fire. Miscalculations and erroneous information and assumptions caused Huebner to prepare his division to fight the wrong battle, to his enternal credit, Huebner ruthless drilled his men in their individual tasks and on their platoon and company objectives.

As a result of tactical miscalculations of Eisenhower, Montgomery and Bradley, the 1st Infantry Division were deployed in a manner that failed to maximize their chances of success and survival. They were deployed in a direct frontal assault against heavily dug in German defenders. In World War One, this type of assault failed time and time again, and on June 6, 1944, it almost failed again.

Omaha Beach would see the deployment of two regiments, the 116th Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division was a National Guard unit that had never seen combat, indeed the 29th Infantry Division had been in England for so long (October 1942) that it had earned the nickname oeEnglands Own. The only veteran unit would be the 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, a unit that seen amphibious assaults in North Africa and Sicily. Both units had undergone training at the Amphibious Training Center at Woolacombe.

In 1944, a Army rifle company consisted of 6 officers and 193 enlisted men. In the company were a headquarters squad of 6 men, three rifle platoons of 41 men each and a weapons platoon of 31 men. During the build up for the Normandy Invasion, there was a great fear that there would not be enough LCVPs available to land all of the troops. The primary consideration was to maximize the load out on the LCVPs and to insure that each landing craft would be loaded with a mixture of men and equipment so that if one or more boats were lost, that each boat team would be able to continue to fight on its own.

Every amphibious assault in World War Two accepted that it was more important to maintain unit integrity than to maximize loads with one glaring exception. The Normandy Invasion threw out that basic principle for an untried boat team concept

The Assault Team was composed of a 5-man rifle section, a 4-man BAR section, a 4-man bazooka section, a 4-man 60mm mortar section, a 4-man wire cutting section, a 2-man flamethrower section and a 4-man demolition section. Each team was commanded by an officer and a NCO. The assault teams were created by mixing the weapons platoon in with the rifle platoons and adding additional personnel. Each assault team was oeoptimized to be able to be landed on the beach and attack the fortifications without any support.

The first man off the boat was the officer, he would be followed by the rifle section, which would provide supporting fire with rifle grenades. Then the wire cutting team would advance to any barbed wire and cut a gap with Bangalore Torpedoes and wire cutters. The bazooka section would fan out to either side and fire rockets at any openings in the pillboxes. The BARs and 60mm mortar would provide covering fire while the flamethrower and demolitions sections would assault the fortifications. Last man off would be the NCO.

Six Assault Teams and a Command Boat Team would be formed out of a rifle company.

The weapons company needed its own special organization. It would be organized into five Support Boat Teams and a Command Boat Team. The Support Boat Teams were to land in the second wave, once an area had been secured and set up their heavy weapons. Each team, however, also had the ability to attack fortifications, if necessary. It was comprised of a 5-man rifle team, a 6-man HMG team, a 4-man wire cutting team, a 8-man 81mm mortar team and a 5-man demolitions team as well as an officer and NCO.

The Command Boat Teams averaged 16 men and included the company executive officer. The company commander would land as an extra man in one of the Assault Boat teams. The remainder of the Command Boat Team was filled up with attachments such as the tank battalion liaison team or a Shore Fire Control Party. Two of the seven boats in the rifle company carried a medic.

In addition to its 30-men, each LCVP also carried a 3-man Navy crew as well as additional ammunition and demolition supplies. So overloaded were the LCVPs that their freeboard was reduced to only 1-3-feet. With the heavy waves (4-6 feet), many of the assault craft shipped large amounts of water and even swamped before reaching the beaches.

Another feature of the landings was the overloading of the troops. Many of the soldiers leaving the landing craft were carrying loads of between 60-90 pounds.

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Organization of the Assault Troops, Part II

Sources are Omaha A Flawed Victory by Adrian Lewis, D-Day by Steven Ambrose and D-Day by Tute, Costello and Hughes, Spearheading D-Day by Jonathan Gawne and the 6juin1944.com web site.

ASSAULT BOAT TEAM

Boat Team Leader: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; M1911A1 Pistol w/3mags; 6 colored smoke grenades; 1 smoke grenade, 1 frag grenade, 1 SCR-536 radio.

Assistant Boat Team Leader: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 2 smoke grenades; 8 frag grenades.

Rifle Team #1 and 2: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 1 smoke grenade; 2 frag grenades; wirecutters.

Rifle Team #3: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 1 smoke grenade; 1 frag grenade; 1 grenade launcher M7; 10 rifle grenades.

Rifle Team #4 and 5: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 1 smoke grenade, 2 frag grenades, 1 Bangalore Torpedo section.

Wire Cutting Team (4 men): each with M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 1 smoke grenade; 2 Bangalore Torpedo sections; and either one pair wire cutters or 1 large search nose wirecutters.

BAR Team #1 and 3: M1918A2 BAR w/13 mags; BAR spare parts kit

BAR Team #2 and 4: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; BAR belt w/13 mags

60mm Mortar Team #1: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; mortar sight; cleaning staff; binoculars; compass; flashlight; 12 mortar rounds

60mm Mortar Team #2: M1911A1 Pistol w/3 mags; mortar; 5 mortar rounds.

60mm Mortar Team #3: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; 12 mortar rounds.

60mm Mortar Team #4: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; 12 mortar rounds.

Bazooka Team #1 and 3: each with: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; M-1A1 Bazooka w/8 rockets

Bazooka Team #2 and 4: each with: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 12 rockets

Flamethrower Team # 1: M-1911A1 Pistol w/3 mags, 1 flamethrower

Flamethrower Team #2: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 4 smoke grenades; 6 frag grenades; 5 gallon fuel refill; spare nitrogen tank and wrenches.

Demolitions Team (5 men): each with: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 1 smoke grenade; 2 frag grenades; 50 Primercord; 4 detonators; 6 blocks of TNT; 2 fuse lighters; demo kit w/crimpers, knife, tape and cord. Team also carried 7 satchel charges and 3 pole charges.

SUPPORT BOAT TEAM
Boat Team Leader: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; M1911A1 Pistol w/3mags; 6 colored smoke grenades; 1 smoke grenade, 1 frag grenade, 1 SCR-536 radio.

Assistant Boat Team Leader: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 2 smoke grenades; 8 frag grenades.

Rifle Team # 1, 2 and 3: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; grenade launcher M7; 1 smoke grenade; 2 frag grenades; 12 rifle grenades.

Rifle Team #4 and 5: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 2 smoke grenades, 5 frag grenades, wirecutters.

HMG Team #1: M1911A1 Pistol w/3 mags; tripod

HMG Team #2: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; M1917A1 .30-caliber HMG.

HMG Team #3: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; water chest; spare parts kit; ammo box.

HMG Team #4 and 5: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; 2 ammo boxes.

HMG Team #6: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; binoculars; 2 ammo boxes.

Wire Cutting Team (4 men): each with M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 1 smoke grenade; 2 Bangalore Torpedo sections; and either one pair wire cutters or 1 large search nose wirecutters.

81mm Mortar Team #1: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; mortar sight; binoculars; compass; flashlight; sound powered phone; 5 mortar rounds.

81mm Mortar Team #2: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; bipod; sound powered phone.

81mm Mortar Team #3: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; mortar tube w/aiming stakes in it.

81mm Mortar Team #4: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; baseplate.

81mm Mortar Team #5: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; 7 mortar ounds; 400 yards communication wire on reel.

81mm Mortar Team #6, 7 and 8: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 7 mortar rounds.

Demolitions Team (5 men): each with: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 1 smoke grenade; 2 frag grenades; 50 Primercord; 4 detonators; 6 blocks of TNT; 2 fuse lighters; demo kit w/crimpers, knife, tape and cord. Team also carried 7 satchel charges and 3 pole charges.

On board each LCVP were:
12 bandoleers of clipped ammunition (48 rounds per)
6 frag grenades
2 smoke grenades
6 ammo boxes each with 250 rounds of belted .30-caliber.
72 rounds 60mm mortar or 24 rounds of 81mm mortar bombs
10 Bazooka rockets
2 pole charges
3 satchel charges
2 ammo boxes of 250 loose rounds of .30-caliber (BAR)
12 rifle grenades

As can be seen, a lot of weapons and ammunitionbut in addition:

INDIVIDUAL CLOTHING
Web waist belt
Wool drawers
Helmet with liner
2 handkerchiefs
M1941 Field Jacket or Winter Combat Jacket
Service shoes & leggings
Impregnated socks, wool, protective
Flannel shirt, protective
Wool trousers, protective
Undershirt, wool

INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT
M1928 Haversack and carrier or Musette Bag and M1936 suspenders for officers and containing raincoat, blanket, toiletries, 4 1.5-oz heating units; water purification tablets, 3 pairs of wool socks, 1 pair of protective socks; 2oz can of insect powder; 3 K-Rations, 3 D-Rations, 7 packs of cigarettes; 7 sticks of gum, and 7 boxes of matches.

Canteen, cup, and cover
Spoon
First Aid Pouch w/bandage; envelope of sulfanilamide powder and 12 sulfadiazine tablets
Parachutists First Aid Packet w/bandage; envelope of sulfanilamide powder; 12 sulfadiazine tablets; tourniquet and morphine syrette.

M-5 Assault Gas Mask w/mask, 1 tube protective ointment; 1 set anti-dim agent; 2 sleeve gas detectors; 1 8oz can show impregnite; 1 individual cover; 1 tube BAL eye ointment; 2 eye shields.

Identification Tags
Entrenching tool and cover
PLUS, for riflemen; Cartridge belt and M-1 bayonet
OR for automatic riflemen: BAR Magazine Belt and M-3 knife
OR for men issued the carbine or pistol: pistol belt, carbine or pistol ammo pouch; M-3 knife, if armed with a pistol, the M1916 pistol holster was issued.

In addition to the above, each man was issued 200 francs in invasion currency; 6 anti-seasickness pills; 2 bags, vomit, 1 lifebelt, 1 Pilofilm cover for weapon and a copy of Eisenhowers Order of the Day.

The clothing issued to the assault troops for Overlord was heavily impregnated for protection from mustard gas, this treatment resulted in a foul-smelling oily coating that added to the discomfort of the soldiers who were forced to wear their foul-smelling, stiff uniforms for weeks after the invasion.

The last item issued to the troops was an inflatable life belt that contained compressed CO2 cartridges that would inflate the belt when they were squeezed. Orders were issued to the troops to wear these belts up high under the arms so that when inflated, these belts would not slip down the body and flip the soldier upside down. In spite of these orders, many men were drowned when their life belts did fall too low.

The 1st Infantry Division, drawing on its previous amphibious experience, issued two life belts to each man and insured that they were tied in place up high under the arms with twine. The units also tied life belts to ammo boxes, heavy weapons, radios and other bulky equipment so that they would float to shore if dropped in the water.

[dragoon500ly]

Organization of the Assault Troops, Part II

Sources are Omaha A Flawed Victory by Adrian Lewis, D-Day by Steven Ambrose and D-Day by Tute, Costello and Hughes, Spearheading D-Day by Jonathan Gawne and the 6juin1944.com web site.

ASSAULT BOAT TEAM

Boat Team Leader: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; M1911A1 Pistol w/3mags; 6 colored smoke grenades; 1 smoke grenade, 1 frag grenade, 1 SCR-536 radio.

Assistant Boat Team Leader: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 2 smoke grenades; 8 frag grenades.

Rifle Team #1 and 2: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 1 smoke grenade; 2 frag grenades; wirecutters.

Rifle Team #3: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 1 smoke grenade; 1 frag grenade; 1 grenade launcher M7; 10 rifle grenades.

Rifle Team #4 and 5: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 1 smoke grenade, 2 frag grenades, 1 Bangalore Torpedo section.

Wire Cutting Team (4 men): each with M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 1 smoke grenade; 2 Bangalore Torpedo sections; and either one pair wire cutters or 1 large search nose wirecutters.

BAR Team #1 and 3: M1918A2 BAR w/13 mags; BAR spare parts kit

BAR Team #2 and 4: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; BAR belt w/12 mags

60mm Mortar Team #1: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; mortar sight; cleaning staff; binoculars; compass; flashlight; 12 mortar rounds

60mm Mortar Team #2: M1911A1 Pistol w/3 mags; mortar; 5 mortar rounds.

60mm Mortar Team #3: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; 12 mortar rounds.

60mm Mortar Team #4: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; 12 mortar rounds.

Bazooka Team #1 and 3: each with: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; M-1A1 Bazooka w/8 rockets

Bazooka Team #2 and 4: each with: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 12 rockets

Flamethrower Team # 1: M-1911A1 Pistol w/3 mags, 1 flamethrower

Flamethrower Team #2: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 4 smoke grenades; 6 frag grenades; 5 gallon fuel refill; spare nitrogen tank and wrenches.

Demolitions Team (5 men): each with: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 1 smoke grenade; 2 frag grenades; 50 Primercord; 4 detonators; 6 blocks of TNT; 2 fuse lighters; demo kit w/crimpers, knife, tape and cord. Team also carried 7 satchel charges and 3 pole charges.

SUPPORT BOAT TEAM
Boat Team Leader: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; M1911A1 Pistol w/3mags; 6 colored smoke grenades; 1 smoke grenade, 1 frag grenade, 1 SCR-536 radio.

Assistant Boat Team Leader: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 2 smoke grenades; 8 frag grenades.

Rifle Team # 1, 2 and 3: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; grenade launcher M7; 1 smoke grenade; 2 frag grenades; 12 rifle grenades.

Rifle Team #4 and 5: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 2 smoke grenades, 5 frag grenades, wirecutters.

HMG Team #1: M1911A1 Pistol w/3 mags; tripod

HMG Team #2: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; M1917A1 .30-caliber HMG.

HMG Team #3: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; water chest; spare parts kit; ammo box.

HMG Team #4 and 5: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; 2 ammo boxes.

HMG Team #6: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; binoculars; 2 ammo boxes.

Wire Cutting Team (4 men): each with M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 1 smoke grenade; 2 Bangalore Torpedo sections; and either one pair wire cutters or 1 large search nose wirecutters.

81mm Mortar Team #1: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; mortar sight; binoculars; compass; flashlight; sound powered phone; 5 mortar rounds.

81mm Mortar Team #2: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; bipod; sound powered phone.

81mm Mortar Team #3: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; mortar tube w/aiming stakes in it.

81mm Mortar Team #4: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; baseplate.

81mm Mortar Team #5: M-1 Carbine w/5 mags; 7 mortar ounds; 400 yards communication wire on reel.

81mm Mortar Team #6, 7 and 8: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 7 mortar rounds.

Demolitions Team (5 men): each with: M-1 Garand w/176 rounds; 1 smoke grenade; 2 frag grenades; 50 Primercord; 4 detonators; 6 blocks of TNT; 2 fuse lighters; demo kit w/crimpers, knife, tape and cord. Team also carried 7 satchel charges and 3 pole charges.

On board each LCVP were:
12 bandoleers of clipped ammunition (48 rounds per)
6 frag grenades
2 smoke grenades
6 ammo boxes each with 250 rounds of belted .30-caliber.
72 rounds 60mm mortar or 24 rounds of 81mm mortar bombs
10 Bazooka rockets
2 pole charges
3 satchel charges
2 ammo boxes of 250 loose rounds of .30-caliber (BAR)
12 rifle grenades

As can be seen, a lot of weapons and ammunitionbut in addition:

INDIVIDUAL CLOTHING
Web waist belt
Wool drawers
Helmet with liner
2 handkerchiefs
M1941 Field Jacket or Winter Combat Jacket
Service shoes & leggings
Impregnated socks, wool, protective
Flannel shirt, protective
Wool trousers, protective
Undershirt, wool

INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT
M1928 Haversack and carrier or Musette Bag and M1936 suspenders for officers and containing raincoat, blanket, toiletries, 4 1.5-oz heating units; water purification tablets, 3 pairs of wool socks, 1 pair of protective socks; 2oz can of insect powder; 3 K-Rations, 3 D-Rations, 7 packs of cigarettes; 7 sticks of gum, and 7 boxes of matches.

Canteen, cup, and cover
Spoon
First Aid Pouch w/bandage; envelope of sulfanilamide powder and 12 sulfadiazine tablets
Parachutists First Aid Packet w/bandage; envelope of sulfanilamide powder; 12 sulfadiazine tablets; tourniquet and morphine syrette.

M-5 Assault Gas Mask w/mask, 1 tube protective ointment; 1 set anti-dim agent; 2 sleeve gas detectors; 1 8oz can show impregnite; 1 individual cover; 1 tube BAL eye ointment; 2 eye shields.

Identification Tags
Entrenching tool and cover
PLUS, for riflemen; Cartridge belt and M-1 bayonet
OR for automatic riflemen: BAR Magazine Belt and M-3 knife
OR for men issued the carbine or pistol: pistol belt, carbine or pistol ammo pouch; M-3 knife, if armed with a pistol, the M1916 pistol holster was issued.

In addition to the above, each man was issued 200 francs in invasion currency; 6 anti-seasickness pills; 2 bags, vomit, 1 lifebelt, 1 Pilofilm cover for weapon and a copy of Eisenhowers Order of the Day.

The clothing issued to the assault troops for Overlord was heavily impregnated for protection from mustard gas, this treatment resulted in a foul-smelling oily coating that added to the discomfort of the soldiers who were forced to wear their foul-smelling, stiff uniforms for weeks after the invasion.

The last item issued to the troops was an inflatable life belt that contained compressed CO2 cartridges that would inflate the belt when they were squeezed. Orders were issued to the troops to wear these belts up high under the arms so that when inflated, these belts would not slip down the body and flip the soldier upside down. In spite of these orders, many men were drowned when their life belts did fall too low.

The 1st Infantry Division, drawing on its previous amphibious experience, issued two life belts to each man and insured that they were tied in place up high under the arms with twine. The units also tied life belts to ammo boxes, heavy weapons, radios and other bulky equipment so that they would float to shore if dropped in the water.

[dragoon500ly]

Weather and Losses

Sources are Omaha A Flawed Victory by Adrian Lewis, D-Day by Steven Ambrose and D-Day by Tute, Costello and Hughes, Spearheading D-Day by Jonathan Gawne and the 6juin1944.com web site.

The story of the weather of D-Day is well known.but picture a heavily loaded LCVP making its way through 5-6 foot waves. Many troops were forced to bail out their boats in the long approach, the soldiers had little room to move and were drenched with freezing spray, when the ramps went down, some of the troops couldnt move ashore, but stumbled and fell into the water. They had become so cramped because of the overcrowding that their muscles could not respond. They lay in the water for several minutes, until they had recovered enough to move ashore.

Not only were the rough seas an impact, but the strong off shore current played havoc with the landing plan. The 116th Infantry was scheduled to land four companies abreast, covering the Easy Green, Dog Red, Dog White and Dog Green beaches. One company was landed on target on Dog Green, two companies were swept into the Easy Green sector and the final company was landed on Fox Green and Easy Red in the 1st Infantry Divisions sector.

The landing plan for Omaha Beach called for 45,000 troops, 2,853 vehicles and 1,100 tons of supplies to be landed on June 6, 1944. The initial assault waves contained some 7,000 men. The official record of losses for D-Day state that there was some 1-1500 losses. As the years have rolled on and more and more records have been declassified, the estimates of the losses have moved upwards. The latest research places the losses on D-Day at closer to 5,000 men, killed, wounded and missing. The worst hit unit was Company A of the 116ht Infantry Regiment, which landed on Dog Green and in 10 horrific minutes, lost 90% of its personnel.