OT? A New Cold War

[Raellus]

This is more like it. Unfortunately, the article doesn't say which "Eastern European country" the tanks will be based in.

http://www.inquisitr.com/1637309/u-s-army-sending-tanks-to-eastern-europe-amid-russian-aggression/

[RN7]

The brunt of any initial NATO response to a Russian invasion of Estonia would likely be borne by the German and Polish armies. The British Army would probably contribute their two armoured brigades still based in Germany, but other NATO members would likely only contributing some rapid reaction infantry battalions or the odd armoured and artillery regiment. However even the German and Polish armies have shrunk dramatically in size over the past two decades. The German Army has downsized to just two armoured divisions, one special operations division, and some German infantry and support contingents in European multinational formations such as the Eurocorps. The Polish Army fields just three divisions and some independent brigades and regiments. On mobilisation NATO nations would likely begin to reactivate formations that were disbanded in the drawdown after the end of the Cold War.

The US Army would have to reactivate forces that were disbanded in the drawdown after the end of the Cold war. Unlike in the Cold War when there was nine US Army divisions based in Germany along with a bunch of brigades and cavalry regiments, today there are just three US Army combat units in the whole of Europe; the 2nd Cavalry Regiment and the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade in Germany and the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy. There are some air defence, engineer, signals, military police and training units in Germany, but nothing even resembling the component of even one heavy division. The US Army still maintains POMCUS equipment sets in Europe, although no known ones remain in Germany. POMCUS military material configured to fill four brigades under Combat Equipment Group-Europe (CEG-E) are located at four sites in the Netherlands, and two sites in Belgium and Luxembourg. CEG-E also maintained a field artillery battalion set in Norway. During the Cold War POMCUS held equipment sets for four divisions in Europe.

In the 1980's the US planned to rapidly reinforce NATO with land and air forces by using US and NATO ships and aircraft. Within ten days of hostilities with the Warsaw Pact the US planned to reinforce Europe with over 5 US Army divisions,1 US Marine brigade and 60 tactical fighter squadrons. 300 USAF transports were earmarked to land US troops in Europe within 24 hours of hostilities. 80 NATO military transports and 300 US civil airliners were added to this fleet to transport additional troops to Europe within 72 hours of hostilities. Within 12-15 days of hostilities 50 US military sealift and Atlantic Ready Reserve Force ships would arrive with the first major shipment of heavy equipment. From one to three months after hostilities up to 240 US National Defence Reserve Fleet and US civil cargo ships would be assigned to transport US forces across the Atlantic, with another 600 NATO civil cargo ships. An additional 19 US Army divisions and 20 brigades were available for deployment in the US along with 4 Marine Divisions, 74 USAF tactical fighter squadrons, 3 Marine air wings, a Canadian Army brigade and two Canadian tactical fighter squadrons.

IISS Military Balance lists the US Army (including NG and Reserve) with 10 combat divisions (2 armored, 5 mechanised), 4 combat brigades (2 armored, 1 mechanised) and 2 armored cavalry regiments excluding special forces and aviation, artillery and support brigades and battalions in 2013. There are also 3 Marine divisions. The USAF also has 368 heavy and medium transport aircraft in active service, and the US Navy has 29 principal amphibious ships with 12 more in the naval inactive fleet. US Navy Military Sealift Command operates 34 ships in the combat logistic force, 30 maritime preposition ships, 18 strategic sealift ships (at 4 days readiness), 16 special mission ships, and 14 service support ships. The National Defence Reserve Fleet operates 82 ships, with 48 ships in the Ready Reserve Force (30 days readiness).

The USAF still has substantial combat assets in Europe with the Third Air Force in Germany, Britain and Italy, with support forces based across Europe. The USAF also maintains Munitions Support Squadrons (MUNSS) at geographically separated units in Germany, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. In the event of a war today with Russia over Estonia, the main US contribution to a NATO liberations of Estonia would be the USAF at least at first. The first US heavy land forces to be deployed against the Russians might now be US Marines before the US Army can bring its force to bare.

[Raellus]

Maybe NATO doesn't enjoy quite the edge in the air that we thought we did...

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/04/pentagon-worries-that-russia-can-now-outshoot-u-s-stealth-jets.htmlutm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+thedailybeast%2Farticles+%28The+Daily+Beast+-+Latest+Articles%29

[Webstral]

An East-West confrontation that goes hot will have surprises for everyone.

[bobcat]

What non-nuclear EMP technology does NATO use and what is it's range
What computer viruses would NATO use to degrade Russian command and air defence systems
What defences against Russian computer viruses do NATO command and air defence systems have

these three questions are easiest to answer.
1: We have a number of systems of varying range available. most are generally used to test equipment for combat suitability(you don't want to feild gear that can be shut down with a COTS pinch). but the rusians likely do the same testing which means that attack mode is out of the question.

2: Officially we do not engage in cyber warfare.

3: We do have countermeasures for if networks are taken out by viruses, surgical strikes, environmental factors, etc. unfortunately IMHO we do not train as effectively as we should to conduct missions in this manner.

in summary NATO capabilities in these areas need significant training. mostly training senior leaders to allow subordinate commanders to actually make decisions. but that's always the case for every unit. which is why big army sucks at unconventional warfare.

[bobcat]

and while everyone is considering the cost-benefit ratios for conventional military strike let me remind you the US and the UK have a large number of military age males that fight dirty. be it sneak into the Cosmodrome and arrange for the propellant and oxidizer tanks cross feed and ignite which would prevent launches of space based systems. or a number of very small cells attacking Russian airfields(a little bit of the right compounds properly dispersed could destroy a large number of aircraft in short order.). even dropping off sabotaged ammo in ASP's could destroy moral. Less than 1000 men with the right training could cripple an entire army faster than the first gulf war.

and while everyone is worried about how long it would take to field heavy units in Europe let us not forget the lessons our Finnish friends taught us during the winter war. you don't need tanks to fight tanks in the mountainous regions of Eastern Europe. small squads roaming the hills at will could easily damage/destroy road-bound heavy armor. whether they fight with javalins and goose guns, or IED's and my favorite drink. when in rough terrain the tank is useless.

[RN7]

these three questions are easiest to answer.
1: We have a number of systems of varying range available. most are generally used to test equipment for combat suitability(you don't want to feild gear that can be shut down with a COTS pinch). but the rusians likely do the same testing which means that attack mode is out of the question.

And what are these systems Have they been weaponised What is their effective range How would they be deployed against Russian forces ie on aircraft, missile or on land

2: Officially we do not engage in cyber warfare.

3: We do have countermeasures for if networks are taken out by viruses, surgical strikes, environmental factors, etc. unfortunately IMHO we do not train as effectively as we should to conduct missions in this manner.

in summary NATO capabilities in these areas need significant training. mostly training senior leaders to allow subordinate commanders to actually make decisions. but that's always the case for every unit. which is why big army sucks at unconventional warfare.

I have to say this doesn't fill me with too much confidence.

[RN7]

and while everyone is considering the cost-benefit ratios for conventional military strike let me remind you the US and the UK have a large number of military age males that fight dirty. be it sneak into the Cosmodrome and arrange for the propellant and oxidizer tanks cross feed and ignite which would prevent launches of space based systems. or a number of very small cells attacking Russian airfields(a little bit of the right compounds properly dispersed could destroy a large number of aircraft in short order.). even dropping off sabotaged ammo in ASP's could destroy moral. Less than 1000 men with the right training could cripple an entire army faster than the first gulf war.

And how would all these commando's be deployed into ultra paranoid and heavily defended Russian territory undetected And how would they then travel across the vast distances that is Russia to target different bases and facilities widely dispersed across the length of Russia and allied territory

and while everyone is worried about how long it would take to field heavy units in Europe let us not forget the lessons our Finnish friends taught us during the winter war. you don't need tanks to fight tanks in the mountainous regions of Eastern Europe. small squads roaming the hills at will could easily damage/destroy road-bound heavy armor. whether they fight with javalins and goose guns, or IED's and my favorite drink. when in rough terrain the tank is useless.

But Estonia and the Baltic states, and Byelorussia, and most of the Western Ukraine and Russia and also the northern half of Poland and Germany are located on the Great European Plain which extends from the Pyrenees Mountain in France to the Ural Mountains in Russia. Its the largest mountain-free land form in Europe and is renowned tank country!

[Webstral]

RN7 is absolutely correct that the Winter War experience will be very difficult to replicate in the Baltics. With the right number of troops doing the right thing the right way, Baltic urban areas can be turned into very hard nuts to crack. Under the current circumstances, however, the Russians will overwhelm the Baltics at will.

Getting 1000 special operations types into position to hit dozens of targets simultaneously would be hard enough if we were talking about attacking the DR Congo. Attempting to put them into position in western Russia would be an act of folly. If we were not currently at war, the Russians would view such an act as an act of war. If we were at war, I think the challenges of penetrating Russian airspace on a scale necessary to get these people to their drop/landing zones would be insuperable barring air supremacy. Getting them in overland Its hard to imagine that SACEUR would treat such a priceless resource so carelessly. Then theres the little matter of getting them back out, unless one is content to have them killed or captured.

This is not to say that some special operations actions cannot be undertaken. But they can hardly substitute for action by the USAF and allied air forces.

[bobcat]

sending 1000 "exchange students" to russia would actually be rather easy on a modern timeline. now doing so at the height of the cold war would take a bit more planning but it's doable. and lets face it you don't need tier 1 operators for that kind of work, any appropriately trained engineering or chemistry student will do. heck i've caused similar havok with POG's playing OPFOR (lets face it nobody ruins your day like army finance, nobody).

as for locking down the Baltic cities yes it would require a bit of warning before the balloon goes up. but it doesn't matter whether your in mountains, forest, deserts, or those rainy plains in Spain light forces are far better at holding ground than heavy armor. and tank country also is artillery country. it doesn't matter if soviet SHORAD can keep the A10's off if you've got an FO dressed like a shrubbery directing 105MM DPICM onto their armor and supporting infantry. especially if his rather bored PSD(those infantry dudes) remembered to bring the ATGM's that the FM's keep saying are supposed to be pushed down to platoon level.

not to say that tank's aren't useful it just that they are better suited to offense rather than defense. so getting them on site while we're just holding the line isn't as critical as having someone there to hold the line initially.


RN7: as for EMP devices they range so widely that it's hard to say.
heck you can buy them here even: http://www.amazing1.com/emp.html
and they're tactically useless anyway for reasons i have already explained.

[Raellus]

I see your point, Bobcat. Hezbollah has demonstrated how deadly current generation ATGMs can be against amor in difficult terrain and urban settings. But current generation MBTs are rolling out new active point defense systems that can, to some degree, protect from anti-tank rockets and missiles. It's a constantly evolving game of cat and mouse. The advantage seems to shift every few years. Based on the success of Trophy and other Israeli point defense systems during the latest round of fighting in Gaza, the advantage currently appears to lie with the modern AFV. A few years prior, in southern Lebanon, it looked like the modern ATGM had the upper hand. My point is that modern ATGMs are not a trump card (neither are MBTs, to be fair). I'm eager to see what kind of defenses the new Russian ARMATA series of advanced AFVs, especially the MBT version, will feature (it's supposed to roll out on May Day this year).

As for artillery, the Russians have long been big believers in the liberal application of artillery, tube and rocket both, on the battlefield and light infantry are very vulnerable to its effects. Unfortunately for our Estonian and Latvian allies, their stocks of artillery are neither numerous or particularly capable. NATO light brigades do have their own organic artillery, but usually nothing heavier than 105mm howitzers and 120mm mortars. Russian mechanized forces have tube and rocket artillery that can easily outrange and outweigh (in terms of explosives delivered per shell/barrage) NATO light artillery.

For the reasons cited above, if I had to put my money on a defending light infantry force or an attacking heavy mechanized force on a conventional battlefield, I'd put it on the latter. Recent history supports my decision. Although insurgents in Fallujah c. 2004 didn't have access to their own heavy artillery, nor did the Chechen rebels in Grozny, both were fighting from carefully prepared urban positions, and both had access to prodigious quantities of AT rockets, land mines, IEDs, etc. Although both put up a valiant fight, neither could hold their city against combined arms attacks by forces employing armor, heavy artillery, and air power.

The best a light infantry force could hope to accomplish in the Baltics is slow down the Russian mechanized forces long enough for friendly mechanized forces to arrive. I think we've already adequately addressed the difficulties of getting heavy units to the northern Baltic states in anything like the numbers required to beat back a determined Russian all-arms assault.

[Webstral]

Sending 1,000 undercover saboteurs into Russia is a very different matter than sending 1,000 operators into Russia. I dont object to a change of subject as long as we acknowledge that they are very, very different creatures.


Sabotage based on undercover operations is hard to pull off on the scale were talking about. Getting 1,000 people under cover to plan and execute simultaneous attacks against sensitive military or economic targets is no simple matter. Theres a lot than can go wrong with inserting a single agent into a society that still has a better internal security apparatus than we do. Inserting 1,000 is asking a very great deal of our luck. Human operations is not our strong suit. We might be better off planning to hit those targets with missiles and manned aircraft than trying to infiltrate Russian civil society with so many people trying to execute attacks on important targets.

but it doesn't matter whether your in mountains, forest, deserts, or those rainy plains in Spain light forces are far better at holding ground than heavy armor.

Im not quite sure how to address such an egregious overstatement of the power of light infantry in a fashion that separates my response to the idea from my respect for the individual. The nature of the terrain makes a huge difference in the effectiveness of light infantry on the defense. As a rule, light infantry is not very effective at defending against mechanized forces (which is what the Russians would bring to bear) on open ground. Light infantry cannot maneuver in the face of enemy mechanized forces without sacrificing any advantages derived from fortifications and virtually all advantages derived from defending restricted terrain. The ability of mechanized formations to maneuver gives the mech commander the initiative, which in turn enables him to decide whether to fight or whether go around enemy strong points. Superior mobility enables the mechanized force to concentrate at the chosen point of attack, such that sheer weight of numbers and firepower can achieve a breakthrough, which in turn renders the defensive line of the light force inert. Superior mobility enables the mechanized force to seek out and exploit weak points in the defense. Superior firepower enables the mechanized force to prepare a chosen place for breakthrough.


An armored force is very powerful on the offense, but its even more powerful on the defense, all things being equal. A tank in a hull down position, whether in a prepared position or firing from behind the crest of a hill, possesses an enormous advantage over a tank making an assault on that position. Obviously, the position has to be selected to exploit the field of fire of the tank. However, since thats true of any weapon sited for defense, I wont elaborate. In an ideal world, the defending tank can hide in a turret-down position and not even be seen by the enemy until he moves into his firing position. Once there, he can fire on an oncoming enemys full silhouette, whereas the attacker is forced to engage only that part of the tank exposed by giving a fire line of fire from the gun of the tank to the target. Depending on the type of tank and whether the tank is defending from a position prepared by engineers or from an unprepared position behind the crest of a terrain feature, the amount of defending tank exposed ranges from 50% of the full frontal silhouette to 20%.

The defending tank is much less vulnerable to the enemys supporting barrage than defending infantry, DPICM notwithstanding. Since DPICM is expensive and still comparatively rare, its not realistic to assume that artillery supporting the attack is going to be firing DPICM under every circumstance. To this day, most artillery rounds are HE, while most of the remainder are smoke. Under their armor, the crew of a tank is invulnerable to HE shock and concussion that would incapacitate light infantry"even in good fighting positions. Depending on the type of tank, the tank crew is also significantly less vulnerable to chemical weapons. The optics of a modern tank enable the defending tank to retain good visibility even in inclement weather and under conditions of an enemy smoke screen.

The main gun of a tank can service targets at a much greater rate of fire than can ATGM. An M1A1 can put more than three times as many rounds downrange in the first minute of an engagement as a Javelin crew with an equal chance of scoring a hit with each round. Depending on what kind of tank is doing the defending and the quality of the defensive position, the defender may get off 10 rounds before the attacker comes in range.


Just as importantly, a tank can displace in the face of the enemys attack. Once the attack of an enemy mechanized force starts, its very difficult to suicidal for a defending infantry force to move back to another firing position. The infantry can defend in depth, but is not the same as being able to move a unit back to a new firing position.

In short, under almost any circumstances the superior firepower, survivability, and mobility of the tank makes it a much superior weapon of defense than the infantry. Whether it is cost effective to use tanks for the defense under a given set of circumstances is another matter entirely.

[Raellus]

This article about a recent Israeli air strike inside Syria contains some interesting reporting concerning the cat-and-mouse game between modern strike aircraft and SAM systems. Although the Syrians are using some fairly sophisticated Russian-made SAMs, their AD network doesn't appear to be all that advanced. Still, they managed to shoot down one of the Israeli guided munitions.

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/four-israeli-f-15s-dodged-syrian-missile-fire-to-attack-urgent-targets-a28cff11323d

It's also pretty telling that the latest defense appropriations bill asked for a substantial sum in order to purchase a number of Super Hornet variants specializing in defense suppression (aka "Wild Weasel" missions).

[Raellus]

The hardware and tactics described in this piece might help NATO establish a sustained presence over/around/near a beleaguered Baltic State after a Russian invasion.

http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/the-pentagons-flying-decoy-super-weapon-is-about-to-get-1669729445

The Israelis effectively used a similar tactic against Syrian air defenses in the 1982 air campaign over the Bekaa Valley, using Pioneer drones to trick the Syrian SAM crews into turning on their targeting radars before Israeli Wild Weasel's swept in to take them out.

I wonder if the Russians have any countermeasures for this sort of tactic.

[Webstral]

It would be very interesting to see how the different strengths of the air forces involved played out over western Russia. The surprises would go on and on. Over the course of time, I would expect the surprises to level out and the core strengths of the air forces involved to become prominent. This would probably play to the advantage of the Western air forces. Even if we imagine that the Russians have learned how to be as adaptable as the Westerners, the NATO conglomerate has several different national commands working together. We can expect them to try a variety of ideas, the most successful of which would rise to the fore. Also, the willingness of the different Western air forces to try their own ideas would complicate the Russian mission of devising standard tactics for defense.