Berlin in 1996

[Jason Weiser]

SGM Vallente GA Mills, a long-time veteran of Special Forces and a veteran of SFDB, told me that the SFDB's job if the balloon goes up was to exfiltrate out of Berlin (they had many routes in that respect) and to split into two sections. One section would begin to raise a partisan movement in East Germany, the other to begin to destroy communications hubs, dams, government and military buildings, and conduct harassing attacks against Warsaw Pact forces.

True Paul,
But up until November, we aren't a party to the conflict, we are neutral. Pro-German neutral, but neutral, so the Soviets have to be careful...hence SFDB might just exfil into the countryside with orders for a lot of SR taskings...

[StainlessSteelCynic]

The Stasi.

While not directly (or even indirectly) about the topic at hand, there's a decent German movie called The Lives Of Others that illustrates the workings of the Stasi.
While not completely accurate in its portrayal of East Germany** - surprise, surprise, a movie that's not true to reality - it shows well enough the emotional aspects as well as repercussions of "failing the regime".



** SPOILER ALERT

For example, it would have been incredibly difficult for a Stasi officer to conceal information from superiors because Stasi personnel themselves were subject to surveillance and monitoring.

[WallShadow]

The Stasi.

** SPOILER ALERT

For example, it would have been incredibly difficult for a Stasi officer to conceal information from superiors because Stasi personnel themselves were subject to surveillance and monitoring.

....by personnel who were under observation by agents who were being watched by snitches who....

[StainlessSteelCynic]

....by personnel who were under observation by agents who were being watched by snitches who....

Yep!
I vaguely recall some info that East Germany was the country with the highest percentage of surveillance conducted on it's own citizens. I believe that Stasi officers and their official assistants numbered about 2% of the population giving a figure of about one Stasi operative for every 60 people.

There's also a 2015 article from Spiegel Online that infers that the "citizen helpers" (i.e. those who were not officially employed by the Stasi), informing on their work colleagues, neighbours, family, friends etc. etc. numbered well over two million people, (and that doesn't include the West Berliners who informed on East Berliners). Two million people out of a population of 16 million meaning about 12% of the population informed on the rest of the populace.

And they weren't all motivated by politics, it's well worth a read.
Article here

[Jason Weiser]

That's kind of why I think if anything...the Stasi HAD to be in on the coup..now, that said..there might have been a falling out between them and the Army later..but, initially, the Stasi had to be in on it, or any coup was doomed to fail.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

I am inclined to agree with you Jason. The Stasi had a massive apparatus in place to collect information, I just can't imagine them missing something like the coup.
Whether it was a case of high ranking Stasi telling the lower ranks to "just go along with it" or whether the lower ranks performed their own coup and kept the higher ranks uninformed could make for a whole other discussion but regardless of who played what part, as mentioned, I cannot see the Stasi not knowing something about the coup and taking some part (either by participation or by not actively opposing it).

[James Langham2]

SGM Vallente GA Mills, a long-time veteran of Special Forces and a veteran of SFDB, told me that the SFDB's job if the balloon goes up was to exfiltrate out of Berlin (they had many routes in that respect) and to split into two sections. One section would begin to raise a partisan movement in East Germany, the other to begin to destroy communications hubs, dams, government and military buildings, and conduct harassing attacks against Warsaw Pact forces.

Gordon L Rottman to this as he was tasked with it. Apparantly the hardest part was getting out of West Berlin.

Also of note is the fact that Berliners were not subject to conscription as West Berlin was demilitarised.

[James Langham2]

That's kind of why I think if anything...the Stasi HAD to be in on the coup..now, that said..there might have been a falling out between them and the Army later..but, initially, the Stasi had to be in on it, or any coup was doomed to fail.

An alternative may be a vast disinformation campaign so the truth was hidden following Churchill's maxim

[Raellus]

Here are some possible explanations for the Stasi's inability to detect the "invasion", or convince the Soviets that it's coming.

1. They've shifted focus to the Far East. Perhaps the Stasi that count have been reassigned to monitor the Chinese diplomatic corps in Europe. It would be quite a stretch for them, as I'm sure language would be a barrier. A good chunk of the KGB and GRU would also have shifted their focus to the situation in the Far East.

2. The Soviets don't believe Stasi reports of an impending W. German invasion. Perhaps they believe that the Stasi is simply acting in concert with the civilian gov't of the DDR to forestall sending yet more NVA units to China. Canon's pretty clear that WARPACT governments are not happy with repeated requests for more military manpower. Perhaps the Soviets see reports of a coming West German invasion as a foot-dragging technique to avoid making more "contributions" to the fighting in the Far East.

3. Key Stasi have been turned by Western Intelligence. Perhaps they're contradicting or burying reports of the impending invasion. Disinformation spread via double-agents would also contribute to #2.

A combination of all of the above scenarios is the most plausible explanation for why the Soviets are caught flat-footed, IMO.

[Raellus]

I don't buy the idea of an air corridor to W. Berlin remaining open after fighting kicks off between the Bundeswehr and the GoSFiG. The fog-of-war would be so thick, you could cut it with a knife, and "accidents" would be unavoidable- inevitable even. Both sides would know this. I imagine W. Berlin would be placed in a de-facto stage of siege as soon as Bundeswehr forces cross the border into the DDR. Sure, the Soviet Union wouldn't be keen on provoking the rest of NATO into joining the fight, but I just don't see them being willing to allow air traffic from the West unimpeded access to East German territory. The Soviets would be too rattled- paranoia isn't paranoia when the fear is substantiated- by the clear and present danger of losing its western buffer to an aggressive, potentially united Germany (1941, anyone). Sure, they'd warn off the West in the most unambiguous of terms and, unlike 1948, I think they'd back their threats with deadly force (the Soviets didn't have an operational nuclear deterrent in '48; in '96, they would, and it would be massive). The Stavka would remember Stalin's mistake of writing off reports that Barbarossa was underway, and instructing border troops not to fight back in fear of "provoking" Hitler. I think a hard-line, military backed Politburo would draw a line in the sand, and prepare for the worst. With a war well underway in the Far East and a war flaring up in central Europe, the Soviets would not be willing to show weakness.

[RN7]

Here are some possible explanations for the Stasi's inability to detect the "invasion", or convince the Soviets that it's coming.

1. They've shifted focus to the Far East. Perhaps the Stasi that count have been reassigned to monitor the Chinese diplomatic corps in Europe. It would be quite a stretch for them, as I'm sure language would be a barrier. A good chunk of the KGB and GRU would also have shifted their focus to the situation in the Far East.

2. The Soviets don't believe Stasi reports of an impending W. German invasion. Perhaps they believe that the Stasi is simply acting in concert with the civilian gov't of the DDR to forestall sending yet more NVA units to China. Canon's pretty clear that WARPACT governments are not happy with repeated requests for more military manpower. Perhaps the Soviets see reports of a coming West German invasion as a foot-dragging technique to avoid making more "contributions" to the fighting in the Far East.

3. Key Stasi have been turned by Western Intelligence. Perhaps they're contradicting or burying reports of the impending invasion. Disinformation spread via double-agents would also contribute to #2.

A combination of all of the above scenarios is the most plausible explanation for why the Soviets are caught flat-footed, IMO.

I read somewhere (I think in a 2300AD article) that rumours about the Germans planning a reunification were known to Western intelligence agencies well in advance of the event. But nobody took it seriously and no evidence ever surfaced to implicate the Germans. Turning back the clock to this period and the idea that the Germans would unilaterally unite by themselves under the noses of NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be considered preposterous. It seems the diversion of the warfare in China and other international Super-Power tension gave them the chance to do it.

[Jason Weiser]

I don't buy the idea of an air corridor to W. Berlin remaining open after fighting kicks off between the Bundeswehr and the GoSFiG. The fog-of-war would be so thick, you could cut it with a knife, and "accidents" would be unavoidable- inevitable even. Both sides would know this. I imagine W. Berlin would be placed in a de-facto stage of siege as soon as Bundeswehr forces cross the border into the DDR. Sure, the Soviet Union wouldn't be keen on provoking the rest of NATO into joining the fight, but I just don't see them being willing to allow air traffic from the West unimpeded access to East German territory. The Soviets would be too rattled- paranoia isn't paranoia when the fear is substantiated- by the clear and present danger of losing its western buffer to an aggressive, potentially united Germany (1941, anyone). Sure, they'd warn off the West in the most unambiguous of terms and, unlike 1948, I think they'd back their threats with deadly force (the Soviets didn't have an operational nuclear deterrent in '48; in '96, they would, and it would be massive). The Stavka would remember Stalin's mistake of writing off reports that Barbarossa was underway, and instructing border troops not to fight back in fear of "provoking" Hitler. I think a hard-line, military backed Politburo would draw a line in the sand, and prepare for the worst. With a war well underway in the Far East and a war flaring up in central Europe, the Soviets would not be willing to show weakness.

I agree somewhat with you. The Politburo is backed into a corner, but it is one of their own making..and they need to find a way out. I am sure there was already multiple feelers sent out to semi-sympathetic Western nations (Italy and Greece come to mind) to mediate a end to the fighting in China before the '96 offensive. By the time October 1996 rolls around, the Soviets are in a corner. But they aren't dumb.

One, they cannot simply nuke somebody into compliance, NATO has the means to retaliate, swiftly, and it would paradoxically, demonstrate they are now conventionally speaking, weak on the ground.

Two, as much as some elements in the Politburo want to show the West that the Bear still has his claws, there are others who want to get the hell off the tiger they now find themselves on. Thus, a flurry of contradictory orders are going to come out of the Defense Council from Moscow..blockade Berlin, don't blockade Berlin..hell GSFG might get ten different orders on that in a day, and now that it's short an entire Combined Arms Army, as well as significant air assets Might not be the time to pick a fight with NATO. I don't think the Soviets would go much further than '48 for that reason. Might there be an incident or two Yes. But they are going to be very careful about that. Suppose the Soviets shoot down an American C-141 leaving Templehof with American military dependents on board because they wanted to make a point That will not go over well, and the Soviets strike me as pragmatists. Don't buy more trouble when you have enough already is probably the predominant thinking in the Kremlin.

Three, I would state 3 is the most likely thing. It would make the most sense and explains how the Stasi are "in" on the coup. Now, granted, the West Germans and the East German army do not trust them at all, and I am sure more than a few are later liquidated, but that said, the fact remains..the Stasi was ever present in East Germany, for the East German army to have simply remained in barracks when the Bundeswehr came calling That suggests preparation and coordination of some sort, at the highest levels for it to be army-wide. No way the Stasi would not get wind of that. Unless somebody in the Stasi buried it.

Four, considering the plans and responsibility for reducing West Berlin in case of war was primarily a job for the East Germans, and the East Germans have now thrown in their lot with the enemy, where are the Soviets going to get the troops to throw up a proper cordon around West Berlin The Soviets need every soldier they have to hold off the Bundeswehr. Maybe when the Poles and Czechs show up, they can take that responsibility, but that will take time.

[RN7]

I don't buy the idea of an air corridor to W. Berlin remaining open after fighting kicks off between the Bundeswehr and the GoSFiG. The fog-of-war would be so thick, you could cut it with a knife, and "accidents" would be unavoidable- inevitable even. Both sides would know this. I imagine W. Berlin would be placed in a de-facto stage of siege as soon as Bundeswehr forces cross the border into the DDR. Sure, the Soviet Union wouldn't be keen on provoking the rest of NATO into joining the fight, but I just don't see them being willing to allow air traffic from the West unimpeded access to East German territory. The Soviets would be too rattled- paranoia isn't paranoia when the fear is substantiated- by the clear and present danger of losing its western buffer to an aggressive, potentially united Germany (1941, anyone). Sure, they'd warn off the West in the most unambiguous of terms and, unlike 1948, I think they'd back their threats with deadly force (the Soviets didn't have an operational nuclear deterrent in '48; in '96, they would, and it would be massive). The Stavka would remember Stalin's mistake of writing off reports that Barbarossa was underway, and instructing border troops not to fight back in fear of "provoking" Hitler. I think a hard-line, military backed Politburo would draw a line in the sand, and prepare for the worst. With a war well underway in the Far East and a war flaring up in central Europe, the Soviets would not be willing to show weakness.

I wouldn't be proposing open air corridor to West Berlin, just the likely possibility that the US, Britain and France will insist that aid and supplies be allowed to their troops and civilian in West Berlin, and the civilian population of West Berlin on certain dates and times. The Germans are not going to interfere and there is no East German air force left to speak of, so the problem will be the Soviets.

Looking at the Soviet position. They are fighting a costly war in China against five million plus Chinese troops who are now being armed by the West and causing all sorts of problems for the Soviet military and logistics chain. Closer to home in Europe they are no fighting the potentially more dangerous one million plus German army who is better armed and trained than their own army. Shoot down a USAF or RAF transport plane carrying supplies or evacuating civilians from West Berlin, and there is a strong possibility that the Soviets will soon be also fighting another couple of million Western troops in Europe, backed by 20,000 tanks, 5,000 combat aircraft and a few thousand nuclear weapons.

[Raellus]

I see this as more likely:

The Soviets offer to evac Western personnel from W. Berlin- civilian and military. They also announce that anyone who elects to stay behind is taking his/her life into their own hands, as the Soviets cannot/will not acknowledge responsibility for their well-being. They also offer to provide basic humanitarian supplies (food, water, medical) to those who elect to remain, but they make it clear that the "roads" to Berlin are closed.

Y'all make some good points about just how dire the straits the Soviets are in and I agree that the Soviets don't want the rest of NATO to join in on the fun at the frontier. I just don't see the Soviets allowing Western traffic through an active war-zone during a full-blown shooting war. I'm hard pressed to come up with another example of "neutrals" being allowed safe passage through an active war-zone during a modern war. Was the Suez canal open during the 6-Day War or Yom Kippur wars Look what happened to that Malayan airliner over Ukraine a couple of years ago- and that was through a designated "safe" air corridor over a "low intensity" conflict zone!

And who are we kidding With the West actively supporting the Chinese in their war against the USSR, there are no neutrals, really. The Soviets would already be pissed about that and I'm sure there would already have been incidents where Western-flagged merchantmen on their way to China had been sunk by Red Fleet commerce raiders. Tension would already be incredibly high. I just don't see a riled up, backed-into-a-corner Stavka/Politburo being OK with U.S./British/French aircraft flying across the contested frontier and landing in Berlin. What if "relief" flights actually include reinforcements That paranoia would be there.

And would the West be willing to push an aggressively pro-W. Germany agenda in Europe It's brinksmanship all around. If the West insists on supplying W. Berlin, it's provocative. If the Soviets declare a land/air blockade, it's provocative. The Soviets have an incentive to de-escalate but we also know that the rest of NATO is extremely reluctant to go to war on behalf of W. Germany. I mean, some of NATO quits over this. Is the U.S., as the helmsman of NATO, going to push an action that could lead to an escalation I guess it all depends on whether the gov't. is hawkish or not. From canon, it's hard to tell. But canon seems to suggest that the Soviet gov't. is quite hawkish. Does that change between '95 and forced reunification

And, as a fait accompli, we know from canon that the Soviets were willing to use nukes, and use them first, on both fronts. Therefore, I don't think it's outlandish that the Soviets draw that proverbial line in the sand. You shall not pass! (into W. Berlin).

[Adm.Lee]

My best friend from high school was in the Berlin Brigade, '88-92. He told me the Berlin police were curiously heavily armed, having rifles and AT weapons, almost like light infantry.

On top of that, West Germany had 3 airborne brigades. If one is fighting defensively, what good are those Fighting in an urban area behind enemy lines, that's more like their style. No idea if that was true, but that's what this wargamer often did. FWIW, I almost always bypassed West Berlin when I played the Pact, leaving the ugly fighting to the Polish armies coming up on mid-game turns.

So, yeah, I agree that the Stasi had to have been in on the unification; the Soviets in and around Berlin had much bigger fish to fry when the West Germans crossed the border and the East Germans flipped sides. I'd have to check, but wouldn't the SGFG now be outnumbered