Wartime production

[Legbreaker]

From the Greek navy thread...

IMHO, one of the unanswered questions of any timeline is when the U.S. started to ramp up production of its armament industry to support its needs.

A very good question which requires it's own thread. I'm sure plenty of others will have something to say on the topic.

Given the war appeared to be going well for NATO up until the first nukes were used by the Pact on the 9th of July 1997, and many units still remained to be deployed (take the 49th AD for example, slated for Europe, but redeployed in late 97 for internal CONUS duty), my thoughts are production would be more focused on maintaining existing supply levels.

I don't see the logic in boosting production much more with the war looking almost won. NATO was on Soviet soil, China was making huge gains in the east. Nowhere really were the Pact on the advance mid summer 1997.

Within a few weeks, perhaps even days, some foresighted people may have seen the wisdom in ramping up production and instituting more widespread conscription (not just into the military, but into essential industries and food production too). Too little, too late though most likely given the exchanges of November 1997...

We also know from pages 11-12 of the 2.2 BYB, and page 25 of the 1st ed Referees Manual (text is identical):

The Italian Army enjoys tremendous success in the first month of its involvement in the war, primarily for logistical reasons. Most of its opponents have already been at war for six months or more. Their peacetime stocks of munitions and replacement vehicles had been depleted, and their industries had not yet geared up to wartime production. The Italians have intact peacetime stockpiles to draw on. As summer turns to fall, however, the Italians too began feeling the logistical pinch, aggravated by the increasing flow of munitions and equipment from the factories of their opponents.

So that tells us there was at least a six month delay (probably longer) in ramping up production of war material.

[Legbreaker]

The other NATO nations (excluding Germany) are likely to have followed a similar production pattern to the USA.
The PACT though, given they run on a command economy, and they'd been at war a bit longer, were probably well on their way towards a high production level, however their forces were nowhere near as fresh as those in the West by the time Germany and Poland butted heads.

And then there's the "lesser" conflicts - Pakistan/India, Australia/Indonesia, and so on. Production patterns for those combatants would look very different again due to a number of factors, perhaps the main ones being the funds available to pay for those wars, history of the conflict (the P/I one going back a long time), and the intensity of operations.

[dragoon500ly]

Targan did a thread from Nov, 2017 called "Long Wars and Industrial Mobilization."

while it doesn't directly answer when the U.S. ramps up its war production (for its own use), it does give some interesting numbers from some of the leading lights on this site. I highly recommend running this thread, as well as the links, interesting reading.

IMHO, no matter what timeline, we are looking at two possible production runs, the first is for the use of China, particularly in munitions, this run-up would lead to the U.S. reopening ammunition plants and stockpiling the necessary chemicals for munitions production. It would also see an increase in the production of weapons, vehicles, helicopters, aircraft and armored vehicles that have been approved for foreign military sales, leading to increased production runs, especially for those systems used by our own military. Secondly, with Soviet aggression in the Far East, it would be very likely that Congress would vote to improve our military readiness and increase logistical stockpiles.

[dragoon500ly]

From the Greek navy thread...


A very good question which requires it's own thread. I'm sure plenty of others will have something to say on the topic.

Given the war appeared to be going well for NATO up until the first nukes were used by the Pact on the 9th of July 1997, and many units still remained to be deployed (take the 49th AD for example, slated for Europe, but redeployed in late 97 for internal CONUS duty), my thoughts are production would be more focused on maintaining existing supply levels.

I don't see the logic in boosting production much more with the war looking almost won. NATO was on Soviet soil, China was making huge gains in the east. Nowhere really were the Pact on the advance mid summer 1997.

Within a few weeks, perhaps even days, some foresighted people may have seen the wisdom in ramping up production and instituting more widespread conscription (not just into the military, but into essential industries and food production too). Too little, too late though most likely given the exchanges of November 1997...

We also know from pages 11-12 of the 2.2 BYB, and page 25 of the 1st ed Referees Manual (text is identical):


So that tells us there was at least a six month delay (probably longer) in ramping up production of war material.

Realistically, tooling up additional factories, acquiring the machinery needed and training up the work force, you are probably looking at roughly 1-2 years to get production ramped up.

It's an interesting question, looking forward to the posts to come!

[swaghauler]

Realistically, tooling up additional factories, acquiring the machinery needed and training up the work force, you are probably looking at roughly 1-2 years to get production ramped up.

It's an interesting question, looking forward to the posts to come!

THIS! This is the reason why my timeline results in a "come as you are" war. I start the serious hostilities in Poland AFTER the 1996 Elections and things escalate in 1997. By the time the NATO and Russian forces begin to realize that they are in a major war, The Exchange occurs*

*This happens in 1999 in my timeline so the Players have only been "living off the land" for a matter of months before they are plowed under near Kaliz.

[Legbreaker]

THIS! This is the reason why my timeline results in a "come as you are" war. I start the serious hostilities in Poland AFTER the 1996 Elections and things escalate in 1997.

That's pretty much the timing for wider NATO involvement too in all editions - Germans don't ask for help until later in November 96, so after the US election.
The German/Poland war had kicked off properly on the 27th of July though, or the 7th of October in the 1st ed timeline. Either way, the US (and majority of NATO) were not actively involved early enough for the war to be a major political issue leading up to the election.

2nd ed actually allows the west a longer period of preparation than 1st ed, provided of course anyone was awake enough to see the signs of imminent conflict. Given there was an election campaign under way, I'm pretty damn sure neither side would have been very happy to be publicly supporting or advocating increasing military spending. Vietnam was only a generation earlier, and we all know how public opinion effected that little conflict and the political scalps it claimed....

That said, increasing production my private companies to supply the Chinese may have been promoted by one side or the other as "job creation", although I'm not convinced the country as a whole would have been very happy to be supplying a communist country with weapons and ammo, even if they were fighting another communist country. Too much publicity during the election campaign could have spelt political death.

My thoughts are laws may have been altered to allow easier export to China, but that's probably about as far as the Government would have been willing to go.

[ChalkLine]

I've often thought that there's be an initial spike in R&D and technology increase at the beginning of the war on both sides. It would only last for a while until the final effects of the strategic strikes took effect.

[Legbreaker]

Would there be though
The first six months or so of the war went pretty well for NATO with Pact forces pushed back pretty much everywhere right up until they used nukes in July 97.
Can't see anyone thinking there'd be much of a need for new tech, not like in WWII where the Allies started well behind in just about all areas, and Germany pushed pretty hard for a "wonder weapon" to end the war in recognition of their limited manpower and resources (compared to the Allies).

When the tide turned in favour of the Soviets, it was less because of deficiencies in equipment, and more because there really isn't much you can do to defend against tactical nukes besides taking out the artillery and aircraft delivering them. Okay, improved counter-battery radar and air defences might help, but that tech was pretty well developed already in 1997 and any further advances weren't likely to help in the next couple of years, let alone the new few weeks when it might have actually done some good.

It's not just equipment though that might get some attention. Tactics would absolutely be in constant and rapid development - the first time really that NATO have actually gone up against Pact forces outside small scale encounters and exercises. These developments would take on a whole new flavour after the first few nukes, and again when supply lines broke down and the high tech gear couldn't be repaired or replaced any more.

[ChalkLine]

A general conflict of of NATO vs WTO would still be 'total war' though and defence industries would start work on a long war whether the war was going well or not.

Not knowing the future the assumption would be that the USSR alone would summon up its vast manpower reserves and that NATO wouldn't be able to get past the border.

The traditional Russian tactic is to keep fighting no matter how many conditions of victory have been achieved. This means a long war and eventually a war of attrition

[dragoon500ly]

That said, increasing production my private companies to supply the Chinese may have been promoted by one side or the other as "job creation", although I'm not convinced the country as a whole would have been very happy to be supplying a communist country with weapons and ammo, even if they were fighting another communist country. Too much publicity during the election campaign could have spelt political death.

My thoughts are laws may have been altered to allow easier export to China, but that's probably about as far as the Government would have been willing to go.

Considering the trade deficit between China and the U.S. at the time, I can see Congress altering these laws by quite a margin. I also hold with the thought that at the same time, there is an increase in U.S. military spending, dramatically increasing logistical stockpiles, bringing new weapons systems that have neared the end of their test and development phase into service, even a limited call of the reserves to "take part" in military exercises "testing" our military preparations.

[dragoon500ly]

I've often thought that there's be an initial spike in R&D and technology increase at the beginning of the war on both sides. It would only last for a while until the final effects of the strategic strikes took effect.

IMHO this would be a given! Given a chance to get intelligence on the actual performance of first line Soviet equipment, one would expect that the CIA and the DIA would be having knife fights over who got to go to China first. Not to mention all of the surveillance aircraft crowding international airspace!

[Legbreaker]

I'm not at all convinced.
The Soviets and their allies were seen to be on the back foot. NATO and China were pushing forward everywhere, even without France, Belgium, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal, and the withdrawal of the Netherlands (who's main task was to provide sea mine clearing and laying for the combined navies - with lesser roles in other areas). That's approximately 25% of NATO's manpower missing, and in the case of Italy and to a lesser extent France and Belgium, becoming an enemy. The withdrawal of some of those countries also opened up a serious capability gap (see the Netherlands naval responsibilities for example).
And all this after the previous 50 years assuming NATO would start the war on the defensive and not be able to make any offensive progress until the Pact had battered themselves to pieces.
Given everything we know from the game timelines and other sources, there's just no way I can see the early war being perceived as anything other than going very well for NATO, and therefore there being little justification for ramping up production in the same way as happened in WWI and WWII.

[dragoon500ly]

There is always going to be some disagreement on this, but based on my last experiences and observations of the U.S. Military and our beloved Congress...the military would take the opportunity presented by the Sino-Soviet War and the increased production of military supplies, to convince Congress that an increase in logistical support and military readiness, the observations of Soviet technology would also give R&D a push to develop countermeasures, the question, of course, is just how much Congress will be willing to spend.

At the very least, I would rate an increase in the R&D to be very high (just too good an opportunity to miss), the logistical stockpiling "to replace older lots of ordnance," with the older lots being expended during increased training periods ( this actually happens quite often).

Would there be an effort to bring new weapons systems online This would depend on how near they are to the end of their testing phase. Certainly i would expect some moves to bring missiles and PGMs into service. Upgrades to vehicles, may be pushed forward as well.

Would new warships be laid down Possible, but I would rate this lower, perhaps with the fleet adding new frigates and destroyers, mothballing some classes to free up trained personnel, but now many Perhaps a dozen or so in the BYB time line.

Would the Air Force get more aircaft I can see upgrades, maybe even several dozen new planes added, but not much more than that.

[pmulcahy11b]

Would the Air Force get more aircaft I can see upgrades, maybe even several dozen new planes added, but not much more than that.

One Twilight 2000 move that may be possible is the conversion of QF-4 Phantom II target drones back to combat aircraft. They are designed to remain man-flyable aircraft, they've just had most of their combat avionics removed -- and with parts from the Boneyard (or before the TDM, new parts), they might be able to carry men and women back into combat.

Today there are hardly any QF-4s left, but in the early 1990s, there were lots of them, and a lot of F-4s and RF-4s stored at the Boneyard. There was even limited production of parts for the foreign air forces still flying F-4s.

[Olefin]

There definitely would have been an increase in war production across the board - but there would have been a limit based on what the tooling and parts suppliers could handle based on what their pre-war capabilities would have been.

For instance look at the Lima Tank Plant - that plant in the 1980's was building 120 tanks per month - currently that plant is building 11 per month. However its suppliers tooled up to make 120 a month - meaning that very soon after the war started they could hit that number without having to build new tooling. Also in a war situation where you work two shifts instead of one you basically double your production - so that plant could have made as many as 240 a month very quickly - most likely within 3-4 months of the war start - i.e. long before the TDM

An example of this would have been the real world ramp-up that occurred when I was at BAE on the M88A2 and the Bradley. We had been producing four per month of the M88A2 and forty per month of the Bradley (keep mind we are talking rebuilds here not new production) when the Army had us ramp up production to eight per month and 120 per month - how did we do that

Answer - we added a second shift and Saturday work and had suppliers ramp up as well - and hit that level within four months of go - with corresponding increases as we initially brought the lines up to full capacity and then implemented the second shift at both our plants and our suppliers

And it is mentioned in a couple of modules how workers were getting paid very well with overtime at war plants

And I dont see the US thinking they had it won and not ramping up production - for one they would have been using up bombs and tanks and shells at a prodigious rate - you see what it did to the Italians - that would have been the case everywhere else - look at how quickly the bomb stockpile, much of which was from WWII, was depleted from the rather short Gulf War

Now think what it would have been like after six months of conventional warfare

That is why the Soviets launched the nuclear attack - because the US was getting their war stocks replaced and increasing - and that they knew if they didnt stop that in the end they would be losing

And its not like the US wasnt taking enough losses to justify increasing production - between what raiders put at the bottom of the sea, the losses the Navy took, the need to replace what we sent China when it turned out we needed it ourselves and the pace of the war there were more than enough reasons to get more tanks and shells and APC's

a clue would be that the US grabbed the Stingray tanks that were supposed to go to Pakistan before the TDM - i.e. the units that got them in Europe were from one of the last convoys bringing over heavy equipment - that tells me that losses in tanks were bad enough that they grabbed anything they could find to fill the gaps

also keep in mind that they were deploying National Guard units as well - units that desperately needed better tanks if they were going to be able to survive against first line Soviet units (i.e. not the guys with T-55's)

given that the Lima plant had to have been shoved to full all out production long before the TDM - most likely by mid year at the latest

that is probably why the NATO forces were still capable of fighting by 2000 - i.e. that surge from mid-April to the TDM got enough stuff made that they made it thru 1998-2000 still able to field units that were capable of combat

because after the TDM with the power and fuel issues I dont see US production being much more than a shadow of itself - especially by late 1998 when fuel and coal stockpiles were probably getting very low to generate power