In Defense of the Red Army

[Targan]

We have noted that the T-72s sold to Iraq were export versions. This means that they did not have all the bells and whistles that came standard on tanks retained for Soviet/Russian use- things like powered turret traverse, night sights, etc.

Correct.

[Abbott Shaull]

You are flat out wrong. No one here has suggested that the Iraqis made their own T-72s.

We have noted that the T-72s sold to Iraq were export versions. This means that they did not have all the bells and whistles that came standard on tanks retained for Soviet/Russian use- things like powered turret traverse, night sights, etc.

If you can provide reliable documentation that refutes this, please feel free to do so. Posting that something is "utter hogwash" does not make the poster an authority on the topic.

I don't recall anyone claiming that these tanks weren't made in Soviet Union/Russia, but the export models always had less features that only the units going to the Soviet Union military units would get. Even today Russia keeps up the same standard when they sell their old equipment.

Much like the U. S. Army did with the equipment that they have sold to Isreal and other Middle East countries since the PG1 War.

[Raellus]

The following is from Osprey's M1 Abrams vs. T-72 Ural- Operation Desert Storm by Steven J. Zaloga.

"As a result of the USSR's export policy, clients such as Iraq did not receive tanks comparable in quality to the best Soviet tanks. In 1990 the best Iraqi version of theT-72 was the T-72M1 – roughly equivalent to the Soviet T-72A, which was already a decade old and not as well armored as the newer T-72B or the preferred T-80B series. Just as importantly, the Soviet Union did not export its best tank ammunition: the Iraqi army relied primarily on second-rate ammunition for its T-72 tanks." (p.24)

In Defense of the Red Army, I would also like to refer to the following excerpt:

"Despite the vehicles' relative technical merits and flaws, the outcome of the tank battles of Desert Storm hinged as much on tactics, terrain, and crew capabilities as onthe machines themselves." (p. 7)

These are just a couple of snippets but they sum up my main points quite nicely. It looks like the entire book can be broused on this site:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/48201782/M1A1-Vs-T-72

Apparently, some of Iraq's T-72s were kit-built in Iraq and they were building a factory for local manufacture of T-72Ms in '91 (but it was destroyed by Coalition airstrikes before it could begin production).

[dragoon500ly]

The following is from Osprey's M1 Abrams vs. T-72 Ural- Operation Desert Storm by Steven J. Zaloga.

"As a result of the USSR"s export policy, clients such as Iraq did not receive tanks comparable in quality to the best Soviet tanks. In 1990 the best Iraqi version of theT-72 was the T-72M1 oe roughly equivalent to the Soviet T-72A, which was already a decade old and not as well armored as the newer T-72B or the preferred T-80B series. Just as importantly, the Soviet Union did not export its best tank ammunition: the Iraqi army relied primarily on second-rate ammunition for its T-72 tanks." (p.24)

In Defense of the Red Army, I would also like to refer to the following excerpt:

"Despite the vehicles" relative technical merits and flaws, the outcome of the tank battles of Desert Storm hinged as much on tactics, terrain, and crew capabilities as onthe machines themselves." (p. 7)

These are just a couple of snippets but they sum up my main points quite nicely. It looks like the entire book can be broused on this site:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/48201782/M1A1-Vs-T-72

Apparently, some of Iraq's T-72s were kit-built in Iraq and they were building a factory for local manufacture of T-72Ms in '91 (but it was destroyed by Coalition airstrikes before it could begin production).

When there is any discussion of the selling of arms in between countries, there is one major misconception. What is sold is NOT the latest hardware with the latest bells and whistles. What is normally sold is earlier versions that carry non-classified equipment. The M-1 that is sold to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Egypt is not the same beast as that used by the AUS/USMC.

The Sovs were perfectly within their rights to refuse to sell their version of Chobham armor, as well as the latest fire control gear. What happened, however, was that tanks on the current production lines were pulled off, outfitted with older fire control equipment and then shipped on to Iraq. These tanks were not manufactured with substandard armor, they simply lacked the Special Armor, although they were fitted and many did carry reactive armor blocks. According to the Congressional Record, an examination of Iraqi T-72s captured in the KTO confirmed that they were fitted with "simple telescopic sights" these sights "being engraved with ballistic data and steroscopic rangefinders". These are the same sights and rangefinders as fitted to the T-55/T-62 series tanks. And Zaloga confirms this same information in his books.

The point that I call utter hogwash was the opinon that the Soviets deliberately produced a run of T-72s with substandard armor. Nowhere, in the Congressional Records, Zaloga's books, the Armor Journel and several other mainstream publiciations is this idea confirmed.

[Webstral]

I don"t think anybody is claiming that Soviets deliberately cheated the Iraqis. The Soviets went with their established policy of exporting less-capable versions of the state-of-the-art equipment. The Iraqis were unable to make good on the shortfall in capabilities with domestic industry, and the Republican Guard paid the price. In a way, it"s too bad. Just as I am academically curious to see what the Wehrmacht could have accomplished on the Eastern Front without Hitler"s interference, I am academically curious to see what the Republican Guard could have accomplished under different circumstances.


Webstral

[raketenjagdpanzer]

Sururov goes over Soviet exporting methods quite a bit in Inside the Red Army; there's definitely a "home standard" and an "export standard".

Sometimes, at least in the west, quality stuff winds up in the hands of allies before it gets used at home: the South Korean military fielded ASEA radar for F15s before it was equipped in US models!

[dragoon500ly]

Sururov goes over Soviet exporting methods quite a bit in Inside the Red Army; there's definitely a "home standard" and an "export standard".

Sometimes, at least in the west, quality stuff winds up in the hands of allies before it gets used at home: the South Korean military fielded ASEA radar for F15s before it was equipped in US models!

Don't forget about the F-15J, that plane is externally an Eagle, inside its a whle nother bird!

[Raellus]

The point that I call utter hogwash was the opinon that the Soviets deliberately produced a run of T-72s with substandard armor. Nowhere, in the Congressional Records, Zaloga's books, the Armor Journel and several other mainstream publiciations is this idea confirmed.

Perhaps I missed it, but I don't recall anyone here making the claim that you are refuting. I guess we can chalk this little debate up to simple miscommunication.

[dragoon500ly]

Perhaps I missed it, but I don't recall anyone here making the claim that you are refuting. I guess we can chalk this little debate up to simple miscommunication.

It is I who must apoligize, I was in the midst of a rather heated exchange of private messages and that one went out in error.

What can I say, I type faster than my brain can react!

[Raellus]

Just as I am academically curious to see what the Wehrmacht could have accomplished on the Eastern Front without Hitler"s interference, I am academically curious to see what the Republican Guard could have accomplished under different circumstances.

+1

[raketenjagdpanzer]

I don't think anybody is claiming that Soviets deliberately cheated the Iraqis. The Soviets went with their established policy of exporting less-capable versions of the state-of-the-art equipment. The Iraqis were unable to make good on the shortfall in capabilities with domestic industry, and the Republican Guard paid the price. In a way, it's too bad. Just as I am academically curious to see what the Wehrmacht could have accomplished on the Eastern Front without Hitler's interference, I am academically curious to see what the Republican Guard could have accomplished under different circumstances.


Webstral

It's interesting that you bring up operation Barbarossa, Webstral; there's a theory put forth by Shirer in Rise and Fall of the Third Reich that it was Hitler's interference - at one key moment - that was precisely what saved the Army in Russia. His own "not one step back" order that kept units on the front line through the winter of 1941 rather than letting them trade time for distance probably spared the Army a total crushing rout. The Russians had not yet perfected a "cut off and bypass" strategem yet, and the strong-points and lines of defense the Red Army ran into as they counterattacked through the winter kept them from becoming too agile, and kept supply lines and rear areas from being overcome.

Had Hitler allowed the high command to permit a general retreat, the victory for the Soviets might have come much, much sooner.

(With that said I think that was more happenstance than any brilliance on Corporal Shicklegruber's part...)

Oh...edit...I feel kind of weird saying this but I feel weird NOT saying it, but I feel regardless like I should, especially given my user-handle: I'm not a skinhead, neo-Nazi, white supremacist or anything. That post above up there was not some "yeah the Nazis totally kicked ass but got some bad breaks!" type post.

[Raellus]

Had Hitler allowed the high command to permit a general retreat, the victory for the Soviets might have come much, much sooner.

(With that said I think that was more happenstance than any brilliance on Corporal Shicklegruber's part...)

It should be noted that this early success of Hitler's more "intuitive" style of military leadership simply reinforced Hitler's belief in his own infalibility and led to a long litany of operational and strategic blunders that utimately led to the annihilation of his Third Reich. Stalingrad is probably the best and most widely known example of the kind of military disaster that resulted from Hitler's antiquated understanding of warfare and his belief that willpower- not logistics or the correlation of forces- was the definitive key to wresting victory from the jaws of defeat.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

It should be noted that this early success of Hitler's more "intuitive" style of military leadership simply reinforced Hitler's belief in his own infalibility and led to a long litany of operational and strategic blunders that utimately led to the annihilation of his Third Reich. Stalingrad is probably the best and most widely known example of the kind of military disaster that resulted from Hitler's antiquated understanding of warfare and his belief that willpower- not logistics or the correlation of forces- was the definitive key to wresting victory from the jaws of defeat.

Oh I'm completely in agreement with you (and I should have mentioned that was Shirer's thesis, too).

[Sanjuro]

Raellus pointed out:

AFAIK, T-80s were not sold to Iraq. Ever. It was probably a misidentified T-72E that your aquaintance saw.

In fact, I was trying to remember a conversation from the summer of 1991; I couldn't remember whether he said T-72 or T-80 and went online to find what tanks the Iraqis had on the front line: fancy the internet giving the wrong answer!
The mistake is mine; even at second hand, the clang! is the thing that sticks in the mind!

[Webstral]

Shirer's assertion that Hitler saved the Eastern Front by refusing to countenance retreat has some merit. The Army would have lost huge amounts of equipment that couldn't be moved. Who knows how many men would have been left behind for lack of transport. There were no established positions to fall back on, so the retreat could have gone right back to Poland.
We'll never know, of course; however, there is good reason to believe that a retreat would have finished the German Army on the Eastern Front during the winter.

On the other hand, it was Hitler's decision to keep the campaign going despite the onset of a winter for which the Wehrmacht was not prepared. If he saved the Eastern Front, he saved it from a blunder he made himself. I've never bought off on the idea that turning the panzers aside from Moscow to destroy Soviet forces in the Ukraine was a bad idea. However, I do believe that the rasputitsa should have marked the end of the campaign season on the Eastern Front. Small-scale offensives in lieu of Operation Typhoon could have continued to inflict losses on the Soviets west of Moscow while good winter positions were prepared. Of course, for me to say this flies in the face of Prussia military thinking and the lessons Hitler and his generation of Germans learned from WW1--namely, that only offensive warfare brings victory. Nonetheless, if Hitler saved the Eastern Front during that first terrible winter, he saved it from his own mindless adherence to the strategic offensive and his slavish devotion to the idea that the Russians, being inferior peoples, were just about finished from July, 1941 onward.


Webstral