In Defense of the Red Army

[Olefin]

also I have read RSR - and it wasnt a cake walk - the F-19's took horrendous losses as did the other attack aircraft - and the Soviets had their moments too when they succeeded against all odds as well - the way I read it by the time it was all done and said the US and NATO were close to 40 percent losses in a short war - and the A-10's paid a big price for their successes

By comparison the Gulf War was the cakewalk for sure

[Raellus]

Misty, Watercolor Memories

Cool. I just finished rereading it a couple of weeks ago, so it's pretty fresh in my mind.

also I have read RSR - and it wasnt a cake walk - the F-19's took horrendous losses as did the other attack aircraft -

Yes, but that's after something like 6 weeks of constant combat ops, and multiple HQs, fuel depots, bridges, tank farms, etc. successfully destroyed. By a single squadron.

and the Soviets had their moments too when they succeeded against all odds as well -

Yes, but only in the naval air war. Over the European FEB, nope. I can't recall a single instance of a successful significant* Soviet air attack over land in the book.

*Like destroying more than a couple of tanks.

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[Olefin]

Cool. I just finished rereading it a couple of weeks ago, so it's pretty fresh in my mind.



Yes, but that's after something like 6 weeks of constant combat ops, and multiple HQs, fuel depots, bridges, tank farms, etc. successfully destroyed. By a single squadron.



Yes, but only in the naval air war. Over the European FEB, nope. I can't recall a single instance of a successful significant* Soviet air attack over land in the book.

*Like destroying more than a couple of tanks.

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They took out an AWACS and gained control of the air over the battlefield during a critical moment during one of the Soviet ground attacks that lead to their getting the river crossing that almost won them the war.

The initial Soviet Naval Aviation attack that nailed the NATO fleet and took out the Foch and almost took out the Nimitz.

The ambush of the B52's over Iceland that cost the US several bombers.

The final air battle over Iceland when they pushed their planes to the limit and managed to take out a bunch of NATO fighters despite being outmatched and out numbered.

The ground attack aircraft that almost managed to win them a battle earlier until their own ground to air missiles started taking out the attack planes.

Was actually just re-reading it in the last few days

I actually think the depiction of the Red Army in the book was very good and showed the book was not a one sided book

[Southernap]

I humbly admit that you're more widely read on this particular topic than I am. I have a clarifying question: When you say NATO aircraft penetrated the edges of Soviet AD networks and survived, do you mean they did so completely undetected, or that the Soviets didn't launch SAMs at them

If it's the former, that's an impressive feat by NATO. If it's the latter, thank God the Soviets showed restraint. By the same token, NATO showed similar restraint. Soviet aircraft routinely violated neutral and NATO airspace during the Cold War (and Russian aircraft continue to do so today). But there's a big difference between not knowing someone is there and deciding not to to shoot at them when you do.

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As I have read its both. FleetEx 83-1, a Task Force of 3 US carriers operated in the Bearing Sea and on over to near the Sea of Okhostk where they flew against NORAD and the JASDF pretending to be Soviet strike groups. Other times they flew strike packages up to the 12NM limit before turning away. In some cases, again according to write ups in various books and historical magazines. The Soviets didn't see the strike packages until they were at the limit or when someone broke radar silence. In some cases the strike aircraft were able to fly across Soviet military installations in the Kurils without being shot at by any of the air defense equipment and the systems only going into a fire control track well after the aircraft disappears over the radar horizon.

Along with that during parts of 1983 and even 1981 to 1982, again based on some readings of technical journals and historical reports at places like the US Naval War College or the US Air War College online reading libraries, the aggressive use of the EP-3 and RC-135s to fly and try to penetrate Soviet or even Soviet Client states like Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Eastern Germany (over the Baltics), etc. Before either a radio command or fighters escorts approached to turn the aircraft away. All in attempts to get both up to date ELINT OrBATs and to get doctrinal assessments of how the air defense systems worked.

Similarly during Northern Wedding 1982, the USS America was able to shake her Soviet tails in a storm just off Scotland. Using some other neat tricks via the NSA and some recording emissions on a couple of destroyers. Get up near Spitsbergen doing flight ops without being seen by Soviet Naval intelligence assets. Then flew coordinated strikes in both conventional mission planning and what SIOP called for against NATO target ranges near Tormso and Bardufoss. As well as have their ASW aircraft start to track Soviet submarines, including their boomers as they entered the ice pack areas in international waters.
Again the Soviets didn't see the aircraft until radio transmissions occurred with either datalinks back to NATO or the carrier, if not verbal radio transmissions. At which the Soviets lost their minds and flushed a bunch of stuff. Then later filed diplomatic protests.

Read up about some of the exercises in Nellis and in Yuma (a USMC airbase in AZ with a huge target range). In both places there was a ton of practice not only doing Red Flags and the Marine Weapons and Tactics Instructor Courses. They practiced as if they had to penetrate the Soviet IADS in Europe or in one of the other spheres (like Norway or the Med). With tactics like NOE flying, coordinated strikes against command nodes for the air defenses systems, and the heavy use of EW assets (both in collecting and ECM/ECCM).

From what I have read the assumption in what was released unclassified in the early 80s exercises. That NATO Tactical Air Forces over Europe in a general war would be able to hack it for about 14 days before losses, supply issues, and battle fatigue would have driven them from the field. That is why the whole AirLand battle doctrine was created. Get in with the first 96 hours the good licks in the Soviets air defense systems (again command HQs, static radars and SAM sites, air bases). Then switch to supporting the ground forces while reserves from the US arrived. It was even gamed out that the US Navy once it had good control of the Western Mediterranean and Baltic approaches would have carrier aircraft fly strikes into Europe with whole air wings supporting ground offensives by the US Army or even the use of a Marine Amphibious Brigade landing on the Danish Coast or into Italy driving into PACT territory.

So I am not saying it would be easy, or a cake walk at all. I am just saying that post Vietnam, the US air forces learned a bunch and worked hard on what it would take to crack that hard nut of Soviet air defenses over central Europe. Yet, there was growing evidence by the 1980s and even more so by the late 1980s that the Soviets were not the insurmountable threat that some played them to be, nor would they have been push overs. Rather it was going to be ugly and it was going to be who broke first attrition wise.
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Oh definitely and I do not disagree with you. If anything, I think the Soviet layered AA network would have made life very difficult for NATO air forces. The whole rationale behind the A-10 design was that the air environment would be tough to survive so at the very least, that's a tacit acknowledgement from the USAF that the Soviets would not be so easily overcome.

Talking to friends who were in the USN aviation community and some of the Marines that were neighbors of mine in the time period. There was tactical doctrine for the tankers and anti-tank teams to not only kill the tanks, but their priority list was roughly this:

1. Command tanks or vehicles
2. Mobile air defense systems
3. Everything else on the battlefield

since killing the mobile air defense systems would not only allow for the A-10s to survive, but also the AH-1 and AH-64s to survive as well. The attack helos had the same target lists when working in conjunction with the A-10s.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

Talking to friends who were in the USN aviation community and some of the Marines that were neighbors of mine in the time period. There was tactical doctrine for the tankers and anti-tank teams to not only kill the tanks, but their priority list was roughly this:

1. Command tanks or vehicles
2. Mobile air defense systems
3. Everything else on the battlefield

since killing the mobile air defense systems would not only allow for the A-10s to survive, but also the AH-1 and AH-64s to survive as well. The attack helos had the same target lists when working in conjunction with the A-10s.

Can't get air support until you control the air so yeah, I completely understand their priority list and again, it shows that the US (and presumably NATO in general) had a good idea of Soviet capabilities and did not treat them as though they would be a pushover (nor impossible to beat for that matter).

[Raellus]

No "I" in Команда

Another challenge NATO would face during the Twilight War, especially in Europe, is the dynamic of coalition warfare. I think it would be a lot easier for the Soviets to operate a unified command, directing its WTO "allies" by dictate. I don't think the U.S. would find its NATO allies quite as compliant.

We saw this in WWII. There was a lot of politicking among the Western Allies- the tension between SHAEF Eisenhower and Montgomery caused all kinds of issues for the Western Allies between D-Day and VE Day. The Soviets, on the other hand, treated their allies as would a slave-driver; as a result, there was far less drama and much better unity of command.

With NATO already fractured by the outset of WWIII (in the v1 timeline, at least), the tension among allies would already be high.

This, I think, would be an advantage for the Soviets.

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[Legbreaker]

That can however also be a strength for the west - they've got the flexibility to come up with different ideas that wouldn't be allowed in the more authoritarian Pact.
The trick is balancing the two factors.

[Raellus]

Depends

That can however also be a strength for the west - they've got the flexibility to come up with different ideas that wouldn't be allowed in the more authoritarian Pact.
The trick is balancing the two factors.

That's a good point. A lot would depend on leadership. A team of good leaders could make coalition warfare into a significant strength. Of course, the opposite is also true.

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[Legbreaker]

Given leaders in the west generally get promoted due to ability rather than political reasons (yes, there are definitely exceptions), I'm thinking the west is probably a little better off than they otherwise could be.

[Raellus]

Double-edged Sword

Given leaders in the west generally get promoted due to ability rather than political reasons (yes, there are definitely exceptions), I'm thinking the west is probably a little better off than they otherwise could be.

Good point, but the Soviets have also been known to produce their fair share of top-shelf field leaders. In WW2, the Soviets had a lot of good field generals (Zhukov, Konev, Rokossovski, Vasilevski)- as good, if not better, than many of the Western Allies' storied leaders.

The West has traditionally been more patient with generals. They tend to get more chances before being sacked. This can be a good thing, because it allows them time to learn form their mistakes and grow. On the other hand, it allows ineffective generals to remain in place for longer, and that's almost always a bad thing.

The Soviets took a different route. Their generals knew that a lack of results could lead to a one-way ticket to the gulag, or a bullet in the back of the head. This tends to motivate, but it also creates leaders who are reckless or extremely averse to risk-taking. Either product can lead to disaster on the battlefield. I reckon that more than a few potentially brilliant Soviet generals never got past their first mistake.

I guess leadership is one of the biggest "intangibles" when it comes to predicting the outcome of a war.

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[RN7]

In regards to Soviet/Russian air defences I think their SAM's were good but there fighters were a mixed bag.

Soviet/Russian medium and long ranged SAM systems from the S-300 (SA-10) to the latest S-500 are excellent, and would give NATO aircraft a lot of trouble. I would say they were ahead of NATO until the late 90's early 2000's when the treat ballistic missile from rogue states such as Iran and North Korea forces the west to pump money into developing more capable SAM systems.

Soviet/Russian fighter aircraft were never really a match for the best Western aircraft. The Mig-29/Mig-31/Su-27 generation were as good or better than any European NATO aircraft and export variants of American fighters, but not a good as the F-16/F-15/F-18s that US forces used. Training standards and AWACs was also inferior to NATO. There were some elite squadrons with better trained pilots and the latest Soviet arms and sensors, but on the whole they would have been in trouble outside of the USSR/Russia and Warsaw Pact territory beyond their SAM network. The current crop of modern Russian 4th and 4.5th Generation Su-27 Fulcrum derivatives or Mig-35 and the Chinese fighters are also not as good as US 4.5 and 5th Generation fighters or the latest variant of the 4.5 Generation Eurofighter despite what Russia and China say. Their 5th Generation is still at the prototype stage despite nearly two decades of development, whereas the US already has a 6th generation prototype flying.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

Raellus, this may interest you. It's an answer by David Rendahl to the question: - Was the Soviet Union ever superior to the United States in any way during the Cold War (1945-1991)
David's credentials include British army & British police intelligence and also as a researcher & analyst at Jane's Information Group.

Direct link to David's answer

https://qr.ae/pNJNJN

This is the link for the original page. Many of the other posts on the page are not necessarily relevant or are too biased or too ignorant to be particularly useful.

https://www.quora.com/Was-the-Soviet-Union-ever-superior-to-the-United-States-in-any-way-during-the-Cold-War-1945-1991

[Raellus]

"Conventional War With Limited Aims"

Thanks for sharing that piece, SSC. The author's comparative analysis of weapon ground-based systems is interesting (and I'm not just saying that because much of it supports the thesis of the thread OP), but his strategic analysis is quite illuminating, and particularly germane to the v4 World At War controversy/debate. A particularly eye-opening quote follows:

"Launching a conventional war with limited aims in Northern Europe (Seven Days to the Rhine) with an openly declared promise not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, would produce such a shock to our system it would have been economically catastrophic.

Recovery from that would have put Russia and the USA on more equal financial terms as much of the Dollar economy is based on confidence and communication, while the Russian economy was captive. It may not be a plan to take over the world, but quite possibly enough coercion to get the world to pay them off - give them Germany, Denmark, Holland and back off from China to stop them slapping us about.

It was unlikely, but many historical pivots only needed a gentle push off the cliff. In August 1991 I sat in a tank shed in Hohne listing to the BBC news tell us about the Soviet coup in Moscow . Gorbachev was rumoured to have been killed, the Tamanskya Guards Division were rolling around the Kremlin, shady generals were in charge and unhappy with the imminent end of Soviet power. There were still millions of WarPac soldiers and tons of equipment within a day's drive from our position.

It was genuinely the scariest couple of days of my career."

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[RN7]

Raellus, this may interest you. It's an answer by David Rendahl to the question: - Was the Soviet Union ever superior to the United States in any way during the Cold War (1945-1991)
David's credentials include British army & British police intelligence and also as a researcher & analyst at Jane's Information Group.

Direct link to David's answer

https://qr.ae/pNJNJN

This is the link for the original page. Many of the other posts on the page are not necessarily relevant or are too biased or too ignorant to be particularly useful.
https://www.quora.com/Was-the-Soviet...-War-1945-1991

That's a good read and very informative about the capabilities and doctrine of NATO and Soviet forces throughout the Cold War.

I've always thought that NATO would have been better equipped to deal with the Soviets in Europe if the Germans or British had led the land forces instead of the Americans. They were more focused on the Soviet threat in Europe and seemed to be able to develop land systems more quickly that were needed to counter the Soviets. This of course would have been impossible as America was the leader of the West and by far the biggest defence spender in NATO.

[rcaf_777]

I've always thought that NATO would have been better equipped to deal with the Soviets in Europe if the Germans or British had led the land forces instead of the Americans. They were more focused on the Soviet threat in Europe and seemed to be able to develop land systems more quickly that were needed to counter the Soviets. This of course would have been impossible as America was the leader of the West and by far the biggest defense spender in NATO.

what a thought interesting Idea, yes the us have money but the germans own the land lol