LAV-75; Stingray; M8 AGS

[Webstral]

Horse, I absolutely agree that there will be voices calling for the United States to limit aid to China. There is, however, a logic to sending top-notch vehicles and missiles to the PRC that has nothing to do with military planning. We know from the v1 chronology that the West sends state-of-the-art missiles to China prior to the start of the Soviet Spring offensive in 1996. Therefore, we know that the West is willing to risk having some of the best technology of the free world fall into Soviet hands.

The Chinese Communists are smart people. We can see today that they know how to use Western capitalism to their advantage. As I have argued in the past, the Chinese capacity to employ the dynamics of capitalism in service of their own purposes would find expression in Twilight: 2000. While many conservative Western voices (none more so than American voices) might tell the Chinese to go hang, the bankers, investors, and arms manufacturers of the West will sing a different tune. France will lead the way, since France has a well-developed arms industry and a penchant for doing her own thing. Once France arranges for loans at handsome rates and closes her first multi-billion dollar (franc) deal, the bankers, investors, and arms manufacturers of the western democracies will be howling for their elected officials to open the doors for British, American, German, etc. involvement. It's hard to imagine how the House of Representatives would be able to resist such an opportunity and such strident calls for profit-making. Once the US acquires a major stake in the future of the PRC, the various barriers will come crashing down.

Webstral

[Webstral]

I was thinking more about the Ridgway as I was reading about assault guns in the WW2 era. Grendals superb information about the 75mm Ares tells us that the LAV-75 as originally conceived would have provided good service as a tank destroyer. Im thinking now that a version equipped with a 105mm gun might still have been desirable for assault gun purposes. Granted, the LAV-75 doesnt have the frontal armor that characterized mature German and Soviet assault guns designs, but a Ridgway with a 105mm gun could do double duty in the anti-tank role and the fire support/assault gun role. This is not to say that the LAV-75 would have been replaced. Rather, it might be possible to see two variants"one optimized for tank killing, the other a more general purpose platform.

Webstral

[HorseSoldier]

Being able to provide effective fire support for infantry units and engage soft targets was the big criteria driving the 105mm gun for the Stryker MGS (well that and a desire to capitalize on existing stocks of 105mm ammo). Makes sense that a 105mm version would have been considered, possibly even fielded alongside the 75mm version in some quantity. A 105mm armed system, for instance, would be a better replacement for the Sheridans in the 82nd for contingency operations, etc.

[Legbreaker]

What sort of weight different could there be between the 75mm and 105mm
With an airdroppable/transportable vehicle, every last kilogram could be important.

[James Langham]

I think I can see my next write up coming.

Rough outline:

1980s - RDF Light Tank proposed and trialed Not a huge success but workable. Not adopted
Late 1980s M8 proposed and prototypes built
1993 ish - M8 getting nowhere, Congress orders off the shelf package
1994 trials of Sherridan with 105 Stingray turret, RDF Light tank (slightly improved), Sherriden with ARES gun, Scorpion 90, maybe a couple of others (THM301)
1995 Sino-Soviet War, rapid numbers needed, Sherridan with Stingray turret, LAV75 adopted as little impact on M2 production. Standard Sherridans also refurbished
1996 LAV75A1 with 105mm gun adopted, some LAV75 with Stingray turrets tried
1997 M8 trial vehicles pulled from storage and issued

Thoughts

[Webstral]

Being able to provide effective fire support for infantry units and engage soft targets was the big criteria driving the 105mm gun for the Stryker MGS (well that and a desire to capitalize on existing stocks of 105mm ammo). Makes sense that a 105mm version would have been considered, possibly even fielded alongside the 75mm version in some quantity. A 105mm armed system, for instance, would be a better replacement for the Sheridans in the 82nd for contingency operations, etc.

My thinking exactly. The fighting in the Far East would have shown the value of a modern assault gun for light forces. During the main Chinese counteroffensive in late 1995, Chinese light infantry would have gone up against at least some prepared fighting positions occupied by Soviet troops. While the Chinese would have employed large numbers of RPG firing HE against Soviet fighting positions, the fighting would have revealed the value of having self-propelled guns to help reduce the enemy's fortifications. A few perceptive folks in the Pentagon might have recognized that while SP guns are available to the heavy divisions, the light divisions would have no weapons acting in the assault gun role. (The Sheridans of the 82nd Airborne are a noteworthy exception, if they remained in service through 1995) Assuming that the LAV-75 had been approved for deployment in the light divisions prior to the start of the war, the same logic that applied to our earlier discussion about refitting all of the LAV-75s would apply to refitting, say, half of them for the assault gun role. The TO&E wouldn't even have to be reorganized. Each battalion of LAV might contain two companies of LAV-75 acting in the tank destroyer role and two companies of LAV-105 acting in the assault gun role. Against most of the enemy's AFV, the assault gun variant would have been reasonably effective with the added bonus of greater flexibility.

The Soviet offensive in 1996 might have served to reinforce the value of the assault gun, depending on how things worked on the battlefield. We know from the v1 chronology that the PLA made good use of the respite between the main Chinese counteroffensive in late 1995 (Operation Red Willow) and the Spring 1996 offensive launched by the Pact. Tying into previous discussions on the matter, the Chinese almost certainly made extensive use of mines and other obstacles, plus hardened fighting positions. Where Soviet assault guns were available, they would have been in high demand to knock out bypassed Chinese strong points (since the tanks, in accordance with Soviet doctrine, would have been pushed through gaps in the enemy's defenses to keep the offensive moving forward). Depending on how this worked out, Western observers in-country probably would have seen the value of a heavily mechanized force using specialty weapons instead of diverting SP guns for the job. There's a lot of room for interpretation here, though.

Nonetheless, the Chinese experience of using light infantry forces against mechanized forces would have caught the attention of the command and staff of the light US divisions, of not the higher-ups.

Webstral

[Grendel]

I could definately see the LAV-75 upgunned with the predecessor of the MGS' 105mm turret in the assault gun role under the designation LAV105. I would organize them as 3 plts of 75mm armed LAV75's with 1 plt of LAV105's per company to facilitate the destruction of bunkers and other fortifications. The LAV105 would travel in the middle of the formation and could swing forward to engage fortifications. They could even have flechete or "beehive" rounds to take care of infantry. This tactic was used in Vietnam when NVA sappers would swarm an M48 in an attemot to remove the hatches and drop grenades into the turret, another M48 would fire a behive round at the M48 which would quickly dispatch the sappers with no damage to the M48's armor integrity.

[James Langham]

I could definately see the LAV-75 upgunned with the predecessor of the MGS' 105mm turret in the assault gun role under the designation LAV105. I would organize them as 3 plts of 75mm armed LAV75's with 1 plt of LAV105's per company to facilitate the destruction of bunkers and other fortifications. The LAV105 would travel in the middle of the formation and could swing forward to engage fortifications. They could even have flechete or "beehive" rounds to take care of infantry. This tactic was used in Vietnam when NVA sappers would swarm an M48 in an attemot to remove the hatches and drop grenades into the turret, another M48 would fire a behive round at the M48 which would quickly dispatch the sappers with no damage to the M48's armor integrity.

I keep trying to avoid the term LAV105. How about LAV75(105)

As for organisation, I suggest it is done as the Sherman 76s were used in WW2, each division can make it's own plan, some will have separate companies to ease logistics, others will have them integrated within troops for flexibility, others will compromise with separate companies. Most will just slot them in wherever they can get a vehicle as a replacement.

[Raellus]

I keep trying to avoid the term LAV105. How about LAV75(105)

I think Paul calls it the LAV-74A4 on his website.

[Grendel]

I keep trying to avoid the term LAV105. How about LAV75(105)

As for organisation, I suggest it is done as the Sherman 76s were used in WW2, each division can make it's own plan, some will have separate companies to ease logistics, others will have them integrated within troops for flexibility, others will compromise with separate companies. Most will just slot them in wherever they can get a vehicle as a replacement.

The only reason I suggested it is that it is obvious the guys at GDW renamed the HSTVL the LAV75 was the weapon it carried. But hey LAV75(105) works to. Of course I would have expected had it actually entered service it would have recieved a "M" designation.

[James Langham]

Well here we go...

[Grendel]

Well here we go...

Nice!!

[HorseSoldier]

As for organisation, I suggest it is done as the Sherman 76s were used in WW2, each division can make it's own plan, some will have separate companies to ease logistics, others will have them integrated within troops for flexibility, others will compromise with separate companies. Most will just slot them in wherever they can get a vehicle as a replacement.

While at the sharp end, task organization would be standard, I can't see the Big Army signing off on a "make it up as you go along" approach to the MTOE.

First, even if it's a common chassis, fire control, and everything else, ultimately a different gun system means variation in parts streams on the logistics side, as well as the more obvious ammo issue. Second there will be standards for gunnery, doctrinal employment, etc., that will be better supported by consolidation on the organizational side. Think mech infantry Echo Companies and the M901.

I'd suggest the light infantry Light Tank Battalion (Armored Gun Battalion, Direct Fire Support Battalion, whatever) would be three companies of LAV75s organized into 14 vehicle companies as per standard tank companies, with a fourth company of 20 LAVs with 105. Nominally this gives a mobile anti-armor company per brigade and a two vehicle section of 105mm armed vehicles per battalion for direct fire support (though obviously the usual METT-T realities will drive who gets at any given time). In a more real-world scenario, the 105 would probably be the format of choice -- able enough anti-armor and more anti-infantry bang -- but LAV75 heavy when part of the equation is fighting off the Soviet AFV hordes makes sense.

[James Langham]

While at the sharp end, task organization would be standard, I can't see the Big Army signing off on a "make it up as you go along" approach to the MTOE.

First, even if it's a common chassis, fire control, and everything else, ultimately a different gun system means variation in parts streams on the logistics side, as well as the more obvious ammo issue. Second there will be standards for gunnery, doctrinal employment, etc., that will be better supported by consolidation on the organizational side. Think mech infantry Echo Companies and the M901.

I'd suggest the light infantry Light Tank Battalion (Armored Gun Battalion, Direct Fire Support Battalion, whatever) would be three companies of LAV75s organized into 14 vehicle companies as per standard tank companies, with a fourth company of 20 LAVs with 105. Nominally this gives a mobile anti-armor company per brigade and a two vehicle section of 105mm armed vehicles per battalion for direct fire support (though obviously the usual METT-T realities will drive who gets at any given time). In a more real-world scenario, the 105 would probably be the format of choice -- able enough anti-armor and more anti-infantry bang -- but LAV75 heavy when part of the equation is fighting off the Soviet AFV hordes makes sense.

The manual may well say one thing...

See the Osprey on the 76mm Sherman for a comparison of 2 similar tanks with different armaments. Cross attaching would also be common. I may even put a comment in that some tankers preferred the 75mm for the rate of fire and reliability of the autoloader as fighting tanks rare late war.

[Webstral]

James, excellent work finding photos to support the writing! I feel the images really strengthen the presentation. Inclusion of the M551 chassis as a basis for some of the light tank variants found in the US tank park during the Twilight War indeed is creative. I have concerns about the timeline. Its one thing to have a 105mm variant of the LAV-75 on the drawing board and examples of the original vehicle in service in 1995. Its quite another to try to introduce a new AFV for US light divisions after the fighting starts in the Far East but before the US gets involved in the world war. Still, it would be hypocritical of me to point fingers at someone going off-reservation in terms of timelines, allocation of resources, troops, materiel, etc.

Horse, Im intrigued by your idea for task organization. I like the idea of a reinforced company to provide fire support. If such a thing were fairly standardized within the Army in 1997, it would be easier to explain how a company-sized body of Ridgways with 105mm guns was assigned to Huachuca.