Conscript Armies

[Littlearmies]

I'm kind of mixed on this. The US has used the draft for much of its modern history -- most of the Greatest Generation were draftees.

But when I was in the Army, the general consensus among us was that we didn't want to be fighting alongside draftees. We didn't want someone backing us up who hadn't paid proper attention to his training because he had no wish to be there. We felt they were more likely to panic due to that lesser attention to detail. We generally felt that modern draftees, with the difference in work ethic and national spirit felt in our day, might even be dangerous to have around.

Hell, you have a hard enough time with troops who join the Army and then find out that they really aren't cut out for it.

While I can see this POV I can't help thinking that while I wouldn't be wild about being called up if I were one of the draftees in 1996, on the assumption that someone was going to be shooting at me soon I'd be pretty keen to learn everything I could. If you add that to the points made esewhere, that draftees had a higher level of education in the main, and that as you would be getting an older, more experienced (in terms of civilian life) recruit there would be a wider range of practical experience then I can see how a unit of draftees in T2K might be more useful than a pre-war unit.

After all, most units in T2K, whether a "frontline" infantry organisation or a rear area maintenance outfit, are going to need to be able to fight and
do reconstruction work.

Thinking about it a little more, wouldn't the draftees be fed into those units that needed replacements rather than form new units So wouldn't most units be a mixed back of old timers and draftees (who probably don't entirely gel together in the rear until they've been shot at a few times)

[Legbreaker]

Yes, it makes most sense for replacements to be sent into existing units rather than form new ones.
However, Nazi Germany let existing units fall apart and simply raised whole new divisions - part of Hitlers madness I think. Although they only had a few dozen divisions (or whatever it was) actually capable of any type of combat, on paper they had hundreds!

In the initial 2-3 years of the war, I'm fairly certain draftees would be looked down upon by the volunteers. After late 1997 however, this view would be bound to change. As we've established, draftees often posess civilian skills, which would become more and more valuable within a unit. In the long term, a unit that can look after it's own needs even if it's got a lower number of combat types, is a stronger unit than one solely made up of combat experts.

By the last year or two of the war, this fact is undoubtably recognised by even the most hidebound of old soldiers.

[Graebarde]

From my experience, the replacement (FNG) was looked on as an individual who had to 'prove' himself, whether he was a regular or draftee, reguardless of race or creed. On the front lines you all bleed red and when your covered in mud and grime all look the same. The man to your left and right you trust to save your life, and he looks to you to save him. There develops a bonding at the front you don't find in peace time units or REMF elements. When you face death with a man, share your food and water with him and he with you, it gives a whole new perspective. You become closer than kin bonded by blood. This is NOT to say there is not good natured teasing about the fact they had to hunt you down to join the game, but in general I stand by my comments.

I really do not see the general perspective of draftee's being ostrachised once the war is going full bore. And yes, the US policy for replacements would send draftees to existing units to replace losses, at least as long as that is possible. Of course when it is NOT possible, NOBODY is getting replacements and reorganization/amalgmation of units occurs if the commanders are responsible and smart.

New units would be formed from a cadre of veterans, probably many just out of convalesence, and draftee/volunteers just out of basic training. This is generally how it has occured in the past, so I doubt the trend would change until such time as situations force it.

[Mohoender]

Yes, it makes most sense for replacements to be sent into existing units rather than form new ones.
However, Nazi Germany let existing units fall apart and simply raised whole new divisions - part of Hitlers madness I think. Although they only had a few dozen divisions (or whatever it was) actually capable of any type of combat, on paper they had hundreds!

I don't want to start another discussion here, but that is not explained by Hitler's madness. The intension was to confuse the foreign intelligence services which had the worse difficulties to identify and locate German units. It worked very well until 1942 at least and still works today as it remains fairly hard to accurately identify the components of several German units. In addition, that situation evolved with the situation at war: France also had several paper units while it started to face defeat in 1940.

[Graebarde]

I don't want to start another discussion here, but that is not explained by Hitler's madness. The intension was to confuse the foreign intelligence services which had the worse difficulties to identify and locate German units. It worked very well until 1942 at least and still works today as it remains fairly hard to accurately identify the components of several German units. In addition, that situation evolved with the situation at war: France also had several paper units while it started to face defeat in 1940.

Talk about paper divisions... How about the 'ghost army' that Patton 'commanded' prior to Overlord It was a deception tactic that worked marvelously for the time it needed to.

[Legbreaker]

Now that was sheer brilliance.
Beyond a (relative) handful of personell, the entire army consisted of little more than radio traffic.
My understanding is that Patton was less than impressed at this particular assignment and like many at the time, couldn't understand the need for such levels of deception.
Of course one has to remember that barely a generation before, military intelligence had very few tools - reports from the front, spies and occasional balloon observers. Airborne recon, radio intercepts, even radar was still cutting edge and virtually unknown to the average person.

Today's militaries are spoilt by comparison with all the sattelittes, planes, radio, radar, internet, etc, etc, etc. Take just wiki for an example. Even though much of the information there is not classified, or could be inaccurate, how much intel can be gained from just half an hour there How long would it have taken to gather the same info 100 years ago

The intension was to confuse the foreign intelligence services which had the worse difficulties to identify and locate German units.

While this may or may not be true, the creation of new units while allowing existing ones to fade away is madness. Existing units have exisiting support netowrks, command structures, etc. A new unit needs all those things created.
In my opinion, it's probably about ten times harder to create a new division than to simply assign the same personnel to exisiting units as replacements.

If the Germans had the manpower to do both, then the idea has some serious merit. Alternatively, simply renaming exisiting units would have a similar confusing effect without many of the associated problems.

[Mohoender]

While this may or may not be true, the creation of new units while allowing existing ones to fade away is madness. Existing units have exisiting support netowrks, command structures, etc. A new unit needs all those things created.
In my opinion, it's probably about ten times harder to create a new division than to simply assign the same personnel to exisiting units as replacements.

If the Germans had the manpower to do both, then the idea has some serious merit. Alternatively, simply renaming exisiting units would have a similar confusing effect without many of the associated problems.

About Germany in WW2, the organization was much more complicated that what you describe.

1) Several of the core units were never allowed to fade away and remained in action through the entire war (the 7th Panzer, for exemple).

2) Others were allowed to fade away and were recreated later. In fact, that essentially occured when a unit was entirely destroyed. I think that was the case for the 15 Panzer which was lost in Africa and rebuilt in France later.

3) Several were paper division that never existed really, sometimes with no personnel assigned at all. Many of these units were rear area units with little combat capability.

4) Other units were changing name as they were upgraded. going from infantry to motorized, then to panzergrenadier and eventually to panzer. These units had a tendancy to keep the same number assigned to a different denomination.

5) Units truly fading away appeared only during the last stage of the war (late 1944-1945). Then, this occured only at the division level. Surviving elements of the previous division (Regiments, Battalions...) Were simply taken from the previous division and reassigned to the new one. As a result, the 233 Division became the 233 reserve panzer in late 1943 (about that) to finally become the Holstein Panzer in 1945. Regiments that had not been destroyed being reassinged to the Holstein Panzer. In addition (since 1943), when it was needed, some elements were assigned to a kampfgruppe for some times (I think that the first ones appeared in Africa in 1943).

Here is an excellent site on German Panzer Division. Sorry it's in french but for once, a frenchman has been better than anyone in making a site (too bad he never made a translation of it). Nevertheless, hit "Units" on the oppening page, then chose between "Heer, Waffen SS or Herman Goering". At last, chose any unit and you'll find its composition with changes made overtime (you might not understand the comments but you should be able to find your way around).

http://pagesperso-orange.fr/did.panzer/depart.html

Here is another excellent site but it is not focused on the German army. It includes elements on every country participating in the war.

http://www.orbat.com/site/ww2/drleo/

[B.T.]

There are conscripts and conscripts!

When I look back to my time in the Bundeswehr, I have to point out, that the standards and the store of knowlegde varied a lot.
The basic training was the same for everyone: 3 months of infantry training (how to march and shoot, learn the ranks, learn about life in barracks, learn to crawl through the mud and stuff like this). Exception from this rule were the drivers: they had a shortened basic training of 6 weeks and then made their "military driving license" in another 6 weeks.
But after basic training

Several units were trained in a "Kampfkompanie" (= Fighting unit). These were trained for the rest of their time in the military. In an ordinary week we were on the training area for 3 days and spent one day at the firing range. For 12 month.
But the majority of the troops were stationed in some barracks far (from a young Germans point of view!) from home and they had not really something to do. Many young Germans hung in there, waiting for the end of their time in and spent their payment on alcohol and cigarettes!
So: Some conscripts were fine and had a quite good training, others did not know anything. (A lot of the guys from my school never had to shoot with the MG3 or the Uzi. The guys in my unit were familiar with both after 6 weeks.)

On the other hand: The two most inspiring leaders I got to know, joined as conscripts and stayed later on. Both were officers and both taught us a lot about democracy. This, in my mind, is the strongest argument for a conscript army. People join the army as officers, who had never before even wanted to join. And some of them are excellent teachers and leaders.

[dragoon500ly]

In a WWIII setup, I feel that the US would activate Selective Service in the 1995-1997 time frame.

The down side of the US Army replacement system is that the soldier is treated as just another "spare part" to plug into the logistics system. During WWII this resulted in fresh replacements being assignd to a combat unit, in all too many cases, right before the unit returned to combat, and in some cases (Normandy and Hurtgen Forest), the replacements would be assigned to the front line, during pauses in the fighting. Any reading of any of the regimental histories tell of new replacements reporting for duty in the morning, and being wounded or dead that same afternoon.

[Webstral]

The handling of replacements is an important issue. It seems that the US Arrmy has learned that unit integrity is important, if Iraq and Afghanstan are indicators. However, we received some augmentees about 2/3 of the way through the tour. They just showed up and were distributed. (A California National Guard unit that had not been mobilized for OIF 3 was mobilized for 120 days and parceled out among the components of 29th Infantry Brigade).

During the Battle of Poland, there would be enormously strong pressure to send the fresh meat right to the front. Canon indicates that NATO losses were heavy during the drive across Poland. It's hard to imagine that losses were not extraordinary during the withdrawal. I wonder what guidance SACEUR would have given on the subject.

Much the same is probably true of the fighting in Korea during the same timeframe. The drive to the Yalu would have resulted in massive casualties. Senior commanders, anxious to keep up the momentum, would have wanted their fresh privates commmitted ASAP. They would be aware of the "model" formula that says a unit should be in hard action for a week, followed by rest, refit, and retraining for two weeks. No one ever seems to follow that rule, though.


Webstral

[dragoon500ly]

It really is a commander's worst nightmare, you get a influx of green-as-grass replacements, your brigade is committed to heavy fighting an the line units have taken a mauling...do you use the replacements to bring the reserve up to strength and then rotate a mauled battalion out of the line, or do you parcel out the FNGs, knowing that most of them won't make it their first week.

When I was still in service, my time was split in between tanks and scouts, I know that tank crews were trained to operate with a minimum of three men, but the effectiveness of the crew in that case was down almost 30%. Toss in a brand new loader and the average crew as down to 50%. The scouts could operate short 2-3 men in the sections and were a lot more effective.

To think of a infantry company, understrength by 30%....ouch!

[Adm.Lee]

I'd like to mount a small historical defense of the oft-maligned Army replacement system. In WW2, the individual replacements often were casualties within 24 hours of arriving, often after spending many boring days or weeks in a replacement depot with little or no training. The defense of the system is that the US Army was able to keep its divisions in the line constantly at an effective (not full) strength, hardly ever having to withdraw them for replenishment. [Which was good, since Ike almost never had any reserve divisions to replace shot-out ones on the line.]

What most divisions and regiments learned was to hold their replacements for some refresher training, and to cycle them in when a company came off the line for a week or so. When things got too hot, then this got tossed out the window.

In short, it worked well enough, but only from the higher command's point of view.

Anyway, back to the '90s. SACEUR's going to have even fewer divisions to rotate then Ike did, but with at least as high a casualty rate. Towards the latter half of the Battle for Poland in '97, both sides are going to need a lot of replacements, really quickly.

[dragoon500ly]

While I agree that the WWII Army was able to keep its divisions at effective strength, the cost, physically and mentally was excessive. While the Army Air Forces were able to rotate bomber crews home after 25 missions, the infantryman was never allowed that, his lot was to endure from the beginning to the end of the war, unless he suffered a crippling injury, or had earned a high enough decoration to be be shipped home to help drum up the war effort. The replacement system that was used was a complete and utter waste of manpower, instead of the replacements being used as labor to load/unload supplies, or left twiddling their thumbs in some repple-depot, they should have been run through a training program to teach them how to survive and fight on a battlefield. Then sent to their division and introduced into the infantry regiments, allowing time for them to enter their platoons and become part of the units. That the US Army used the replacement system in the manner that they did, was a utter disgrace. And nothing was learned. The same system was used again in Korea and again in Vietnam.

Just for a historical trivia, a single rifle company of the 3rd Infantry Division, during the period from 1942-1945 suffered a 200% turnover in personnel, of the 1942 grunts, only two were left on VE-day, the supply sergeant and Audie Murphy, the most decorated soldier of WWII.

[HorseSoldier]

To think of a infantry company, understrength by 30%....ouch!

My understanding is that is 70% wasn't unusual for US infantry units in Vietnam, going out on operations. Armor and ground cavalry units did not necessarily do a whole lot better -- I can recall reading something David Drake (the sci-fi author) wrote about his Vietnam service where three man crews were typical on their M48s and two man crews weren't unheard of at all.

[copeab]

Just for a historical trivia, a single rifle company of the 3rd Infantry Division, during the period from 1942-1945 suffered a 200% turnover in personnel, of the 1942 grunts, only two were left on VE-day, the supply sergeant and Audie Murphy, the most decorated soldier of WWII.

I see you have some James Dunnigan books too