US Navy Ships of the Twilight War

[Olefin]

Now that the East Africa sourcebook is official V2.2 canon with the update you can add the following officially to ships listed in Twilight 2000 canon - US, French and Kenyan

TF 212 - Kenya

CG 50 Valley Forge, SH-60 F Seahawk (flagship)
DDG 996 Chandler, SH-2F Seasprite
DDG 46 Preble
FF 1058 Meyerkord, SH-2F Seasprite
FFG 9 Wadsworth
DD 950 Richard S. Edwards
FF 1064 Lockwood (harbor defense)

TF 212.2 Patrol Group - Kenya

USCGC WMEC 725 Jarvis
PC 11 Whirlwind
MCM 7 Patriot
MHC 56 Kingfisher

TF Stryker - Kenya

LST-1190 Boulder (flagship)
LST-1185 Schenectady
LSD-32 Spiegel Grove
Alexander Bonnyman (ex-BDK 14 Mukhtar Avezov)
John Basilone (LCT-1037 Polnochny-B class)
LCU 2031 New Orleans
LCU 1619, 1643 (LCU 1610 class)
LCM 6 ten
LCM 8 six
LCAC 90

TF 233 - Kenya

AD 43 Cape Cod (flagship)
T-A0 146 Kawishiwi
AE 22 Mauna Kea
AOE 7 Rainier
AR 8 Jason
YTB-820 Wanamassa
T-ATF-172 Apache
Solstar (Salvage Tug)

Kenyan Navy - HQ Mombasa

P3126 KNS Nyayo (Missile Boat) six functional Otomat missiles
P3127 KNS Umoja (Missile Boat) missile system non-functional
P3123 KNS Harambee (Missile Boat)- five functional Gabriel missiles
L39 KNS Tana, L38 KNS Galana (Medium landing ships)
Small River Patrol Boats P943-P947

French Indian Ocean Squadron

Djibouti

A631 Somme (Fleet HQ)
A69 type Sloop F789 Lieutenant de vaisseau Le Hnaff
LCM CTM24, CTM25
EDIC Landing Ship Sabre

Reunion

Frigate F730 Floreal, AS 565 Panther
Frigate F732 Nivse, AS565 Panther
Austral Class Patrol Ship F681 Albatros
BATRAL class Landing Ship L9034 La Grandiere
Naval Oiler C1GH22
P400 class P690 La Rieuse
Light Repair Ship A617 Garonne
RV Marion Dufresne II, AS350 B3

Mayotte

Patrol Boats P763, P790, P721
P400 class P683 La Boudeuse
LCM CTM18

[Raellus]

Glass Hulls

More evidence that modern naval vessels are vulnerable to fire.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/34772/uss-bonhomme-richards-bridge-engulfed-in-flames-as-fire-rages-into-the-night

This and other recent instances of accidents at sea resulting in sinking or extended time in dry dock, plus numerous stories about how submarines- especially 70s and 80s-vintage diesel boats- have "sunk" US and NATO aircraft carriers during exercises demonstrates, IMHO, that attrition in a full-scale, modern naval war would be extremely high- perhaps, as high as the canon authors wrote it.

[rcaf_777]

More evidence that modern naval vessels are vulnerable to fire.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/34772/uss-bonhomme-richards-bridge-engulfed-in-flames-as-fire-rages-into-the-night

This and other recent instances of accidents at sea resulting in sinking or extended time in dry dock, plus numerous stories about how submarines- especially 70s and 80s-vintage diesel boats- have "sunk" US and NATO aircraft carriers during exercises demonstrates, IMHO, that attrition in a full-scale, modern naval war would be extremely high- perhaps, as high as the canon authors wrote it.

So your saying that because a amphibious assault ship (not an Aircraft Carrier) that caught fire in port, (not a missile or torpedo strike) could catch fire and sink

Well that interesting, but stinking a carrier at sea during any exercise is a lot different that sinking one at sea. So is a fire in port where all your hatches are open and no one is battle stations and no damage control parties are ready for a fire.

Maybe if I put wings on my grandmother she be a B-52

[Raellus]

Not constructive, not civil, rccaf_777. It's fine to disagree, but sarcasm and condescension are totally unnecessary (and contrary to our forum guidelines).

-

[pmulcahy11b]

Just an aside -- was Bonhomme Richard active during the Twilight War Anybody know enough about the ship to make up something off-the-cuff

[Raellus]

Just an aside -- was Bonhomme Richard active during the Twilight War Anybody know enough about the ship to make up something off-the-cuff

According to Wikipedia, the latest Bonhomme Richard was laid down 4/18/95, launched 3/14/1997. Given accelerated wartime production, I think it definitely would have been active during the Twilight War.

The national news reported this evening that the ship's fire suppression system was shut down for maintenance. I haven't heard or seen mention of winds in San Diego during the fire. Hypothetically, if she had happened to have been at sea when the fire broke out, it's entirely possible that winds (some generated by being under way) could have worsened the fire.

In a wartime scenario, it's quite possible that a missile or torpedo hit, or mine impact, could have knocked out the ship's FSS, leading to fire damage similar to, or likely even worse, than what we're seeing in the headlines. In WW2, many allied ships were lost to fire when their fire fighting equipment was badly damaged or destroyed.

[Olefin]

I would agree with her being active during the war possibly even part of what was sent to the Persian Gulf or to bring the Marines to Korea. If I remember right during WWII damage to fire fighting equipment was part of the reason for at least one carrier being lost possibly even several - ie they couldnt fight the fires due to the damage

[stilleto69]

Remember Raellus, exercises are just that. The real world is the real world. During my time in the US Army, all the exercises we had, we always lost at least 1-2 platoons of tanks assaulting a position, but when we deployed to the Gulf during Operation Desert Shield/Storm we didn't lose 1 tank.

After talking with my nephew, who severed about a carrier he told me that the attitude aboard the carrier during an exercise was just that "it's an exercise, it's not real." Whereas once they deployed to the Gulf war zone, the attitude aboard suddenly became "Oh, &&^&*, someone might actually try and shoot at us."

[Tegyrius]

This thread does a great job of illuminating the always-interesting divide between fans who want to burn down aspects of canon they dislike and fans who want to find rational, internally-consistent explanations for them.

One item I don't believe I've seen discussed before, which came out of a side conversation elsewhere: how much of the Navy and Air Force sided with the Broward administration rather than Milgov

- C.

[Olefin]

This thread does a great job of illuminating the always-interesting divide between fans who want to burn down aspects of canon they dislike and fans who want to find rational, internally-consistent explanations for them.

One item I don't believe I've seen discussed before, which came out of a side conversation elsewhere: how much of the Navy and Air Force sided with the Broward administration rather than Milgov

- C.

Discussing aspects of the canon that they find unrealistic is hardly burning down the canon - if anything it's ways to possibly improve the canon especially now that the 4th edition is on its way and most likely will not be tied to the Twilight 2300 AD timeline.

And some of the Navy definitely had to go with Civgov - after all they managed to transport three divisions to Yugoslavia and at least some support and supplies as well - which requires at least some kind of escort to do that - especially since the Italian and Greek navies most likely still had a few ships left that would have slaughtered unescorted transports

[Legbreaker]

The Italian and Greek navies weren't exactly formidible in the first place, and after several years of fighting Turkey and later Nato there's a pretty good change all they'd have left is a few sail powered fishing boats with machineguns. Might be a few larger vessels, but fuel, ammo and parts would be in short supply rendering sorties few and far between.
An old rustbucket destroyer in Civgovs hands might well be sufficient to keep them at bay long enough to land the troops plus following reinforcements and supplies, especially if Italian/Greek forces weren't being directly threatened.

[Raellus]

Remember Raellus, exercises are just that. The real world is the real world. During my time in the US Army, all the exercises we had, we always lost at least 1-2 platoons of tanks assaulting a position, but when we deployed to the Gulf during Operation Desert Shield/Storm we didn't lose 1 tank.

History has demonstrated time and again that those who discount their opponents in peacetime usually pay a heavy price in war.

Stilleto69, keep in mind that the Iragi military c1991 was not the Red Army c1986. Yes, they used a lot of similar equipment (although the Soviets usually didn't export their very best) and doctrine (much of which the Iraqi military misapplied), but to conclude that the US Army would have whipped the Red Army because Saddam got spanked is like arguing that North Vietnam would have beaten the United States in a total war because they whipped the US-equipped and trained ARVN in a limited one.

This topic is dealt with extensively in this thread:

https://forum.juhlin.com/showthread.phpt=897&highlight=Defense+Red+Army

After talking with my nephew, who severed about a carrier he told me that the attitude aboard the carrier during an exercise was just that "it's an exercise, it's not real." Whereas once they deployed to the Gulf war zone, the attitude aboard suddenly became "Oh, &&^&*, someone might actually try and shoot at us."

By that logic, wouldn't the OPFOR be half-assing it during those exercises too In that case, the conclusion that CAG's are vulnerable to submarine attack still stands up (if both sides aren't trying, and the OPFOR still manages to sink a carrier, it stands to reason they could also do it if both sides were trying). Or are you contending that only USN sailors don't take exercises seriously And, not to discount your nephew, but one person is a tiny small sample size. My little brother is career naval officer going on 20 years of service and he doesn't slack, or allow his sailors to slack, during exercises. You could poll the entire active duty USN about how hard they try during exercises and get a wide range of responses.

Discussing aspects of the canon that they find unrealistic is hardly burning down the canon - if anything it's ways to possibly improve the canon especially now that the 4th edition is on its way and most likely will not be tied to the Twilight 2300 AD timeline.

Discussions of canon are inherently subjective. One man's "improvement" is another's "ruining it". Every GM is free to revise their own T2kU as they see fit, but trying to "fix" it for everyone is a slippery slope. v1 canon is what it is. Some of us want to reconcile with canon as much as possible (I fall into that camp); some want to revise or even rewrite it. Neither approach is wrong, necessarily. It becomes an issue when folks start using value words like "should" or "shouldn't", or pushing their POV hard on others.

re CivGov naval resources, there must be a few, as canon has CivGov sending reinforcements to Yugoslavia relatively late in the war. I can't imagine that they'd send troop ships, un-escorted, across the Atlantic and into the hostile Mediterranean.

[cawest]

More evidence that modern naval vessels are vulnerable to fire.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/34772/uss-bonhomme-richards-bridge-engulfed-in-flames-as-fire-rages-into-the-night

This and other recent instances of accidents at sea resulting in sinking or extended time in dry dock, plus numerous stories about how submarines- especially 70s and 80s-vintage diesel boats- have "sunk" US and NATO aircraft carriers during exercises demonstrates, IMHO, that attrition in a full-scale, modern naval war would be extremely high- perhaps, as high as the canon authors wrote it.

remember she only had a small crew on board, not a full crew and at battle stations. Now if the ship was in port and took a missile or trop that might be different. the problem if fighting ship fires is that once the take hold, they are hard to put out. its like the golden hour for combat wounded, but for ships.

[stilleto69]

Raellus, I think you might have misunderstood my point. What I was trying to say sometimes exercises can give a team/unit a false sense of reality. I.e. your point about the Iraqi Army, yes in hindsight we know all what happened, but when I was in the copula, commanding my tank, I could only envision them as the Soviet Army, because that's what I had been trained to fight (their equipment/doctrine/etc.)

But my main point about taking an assumption how things from exercises relate to the real world was like watching the Cleveland Browns beat the New England Patriots in a preseason game, and expecting the same result in the regular season. That was my point. Sorry if it missed you.

[Raellus]

Raellus, I think you might have misunderstood my point. What I was trying to say sometimes exercises can give a team/unit a false sense of reality. I.e. your point about the Iraqi Army, yes in hindsight we know all what happened, but when I was in the copula, commanding my tank, I could only envision them as the Soviet Army, because that's what I had been trained to fight (their equipment/doctrine/etc.)

But my main point about taking an assumption how things from exercises relate to the real world was like watching the Cleveland Browns beat the New England Patriots in a preseason game, and expecting the same result in the regular season. That was my point. Sorry if it missed you.

No need to apologize. Thanks for the clarification. You make a good point. Training and "real life" aren't the same thing. One can definitely draw the wrong conclusions about the latter based on the former. As you point out, sometimes, the underdog can derive false confidence from success in "practice" scenarios. I contend that it's the favorite that more often makes mistaken assumptions based on exercises/training maneuvers. If the favorite "wins", it bolsters overconfidence. If they "lose", they write it off to a fluke, beginners luck, or "we weren't really trying". In either case, when the SHTF, a rude awakening often awaits.

I feel like Desert Storm was the exception that proves this rule. The Coalition had been expecting a tough fight but a cakewalk (by comparison) ensued. They trained hard and were briefed to expect stiff resistance. In most cases, they faced little, if any. It was a best case scenario for the Coalition forces.

The argument that I've been making for years is that the US military drew the wrong conclusion from Desert Storm: that Soviet equipment and doctrine were far inferior to their American counterparts, and that a hot war in Central Europe would have gone much better for NATO than the Cold War think tanks predicted.