1st US Army / XII Corps

[Adm.Lee]

Short answer: Field Army headquarters exist to run more than two corps. The rule of thumb is that a commander can keep track of 3 to 5 subordinates. If he's got more than 5 units under him, it's time to insert another layer of command & control.

FWIW, the "prewar" US Army had eight Armies (a.k.a. "Field Armies"). First through Sixth were regional organizations, meaning they were the administrative headquarters for all (or nearly all) Army assets in their region. I'm pretty sure that included training the Guard and Reserve units.

As I understand it, in the field, an Army is considered more permanent than a Corps (or, at least it was), and is supposed to handle more of the administrative, logistical, and support functions, such as pushing supplies forward to the divisions and attached formations, while the Corps HQs are supposed to focus more on tactical issues. I don't know if this doctrine is carried out anymore. A lot of deep rear-area functions, like post office units or laundries, are assigned to Armies, but not to Corps.

Having said all that, IMO, the JCS in Colorado would try to keep at least something in existence named First Army, to run Army operations in the (North)east. To me, that sounds like whatever's left of the 78th at Fort Dix, plus that post's cadre and whatever else is around. If it's at Richmond, it's well-placed to receive and deploy the returning guys from Omega. (Note I said well-placed, which isn't necessarily the same thing as well-prepared.)

I now have a hankering to look and see where the other Army & Corps HQs are in Howling Wilderness.

[Legbreaker]

Regardless of what happened IRL, or what may have happened if the nukes hadn't flown, large headquarters units, and large numbers of HQ's are a waste of resources in the T2K environment.
The key to a unit's success in 2000 is streamlining - removing unnecessary waste and allocating resources to maximise their usefulness. Manpower is a resource just as important as food, fuel, ammunition, vehicles, aircraft, etc, etc, etc. It may even be more important as the number of specialists decrease through injury, disease, famine, and so on.

Maintaining four seperate military forces (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines) post nuke is extremely wasteful, especially when two out of the four have effectively lost their reason for exisiting (virtually no planes or ships left, and certainly no fuel for those still in one peice).

The Navy has probably suffered much more than the other arms too. When ships sink in the middle of the ocean, just getting into a lifeboat is no guarentee of survival. Chances are the vast majority of the ships company will perish before reaching safety. Therefore, I just can't see large units of naval personnel being formed. Yes there would be personell left on shore in supporting roles, but these would quickly be absorbed within the army, with a fair proportion also deserting if within continental US (as would members of the army, etc).

Keeping a naval command structure when almost no ships remain (a handful in the middle east and a few others scattered around the globe) is pointless. These Admirals, Captains, etc would find themselves (if they survived the nuking of the Pentagon and other areas) commanders of nothing but those few men (and women) who remained of their staff - not exactly a great resource of relevant skills and knowledge. The same could be said of the Air Force commands.

With next to no training for ground based operations, placing these people in command of ground units seems to me at least a really bad idea. therefore, why do it when there's the better alternative of attaching surplus naval and air force personell to army or marine units

[/rambling comments]

[Abbott Shaull]

The Navy has probably suffered much more than the other arms too. When ships sink in the middle of the ocean, just getting into a lifeboat is no guarentee of survival. Chances are the vast majority of the ships company will perish before reaching safety. Therefore, I just can't see large units of naval personnel being formed. Yes there would be personell left on shore in supporting roles, but these would quickly be absorbed within the army, with a fair proportion also deserting if within continental US (as would members of the army, etc).

Keeping a naval command structure when almost no ships remain (a handful in the middle east and a few others scattered around the globe) is pointless. These Admirals, Captains, etc would find themselves (if they survived the nuking of the Pentagon and other areas) commanders of nothing but those few men (and women) who remained of their staff - not exactly a great resource of relevant skills and knowledge. The same could be said of the Air Force commands.

With next to no training for ground based operations, placing these people in command of ground units seems to me at least a really bad idea. therefore, why do it when there's the better alternative of attaching surplus naval and air force personell to army or marine units

[/rambling comments]

Well why do you think many of the US Division weren't merge. Because every General wanted to protect their status. Wouldn't be no different when Naval and Air Force units were re-task for security/relief and other support missions... Then add in the fact that many of the officers and their officers and NCOs would have to take jobs that were lower ranks. They would move very slowly and time was on their side if they dragged their feet and stayed put to organize their own local defense/support units.

Just some thoughts...

[Abbott Shaull]

Short answer: Field Army headquarters exist to run more than two corps. The rule of thumb is that a commander can keep track of 3 to 5 subordinates. If he's got more than 5 units under him, it's time to insert another layer of command & control.

FWIW, the "prewar" US Army had eight Armies (a.k.a. "Field Armies"). First through Sixth were regional organizations, meaning they were the administrative headquarters for all (or nearly all) Army assets in their region. I'm pretty sure that included training the Guard and Reserve units.

As I understand it, in the field, an Army is considered more permanent than a Corps (or, at least it was), and is supposed to handle more of the administrative, logistical, and support functions, such as pushing supplies forward to the divisions and attached formations, while the Corps HQs are supposed to focus more on tactical issues. I don't know if this doctrine is carried out anymore. A lot of deep rear-area functions, like post office units or laundries, are assigned to Armies, but not to Corps.

The Third Army since the late 1980s was the HQ for the US Army component of the US Central Command.

[Legbreaker]

Protection of status in 2000 equals suicide.

What is status really Would most generals and high ranking officers really think that without a working government status means jack Are they really going to be expecting promotion, or be trying to protect their pensions
Or would they (unless they're complete idiots) see that rationalisation of available forces is the best chance of survival and/or living in relative comfort post nuke

Pre war expectations are just so much radioactive dust. What's happening in 2000 must be seen through the eyes of the survivors.

Sure some of the Air Force and Naval commanders may try to hang on in the early days, but I'd imagine that once they made a few errors in strategy and tactics, their men would either desert, or mutiny, or the commanders themselves may see the writing on the wall (if they're smart) and take the necessary actions to preserve what's left of their command, possibly retaining a firgurehead role while the true command moves to the army.

[kalos72]

Side note: You see alot of Colonels running entire divisions in cannon. I am sure there is SOME room for advancement if units are merged. Personally, it would be entirely stupid not to see merged units at some point soon.

[Webstral]

We covered a great deal of the discussion on the use of USAF and USN personnel after the Exchange in a previous thread. I"m going to maintain the same thing I did then. The use to which surplus airmen and seamen are put will depend a great deal on local circumstances. As long as the United States has a maritime interest, there will be a Navy. The scope and scale of the Navy"s missions and resources in 2000 is a matter for debate. By the same token, as long as there is something that flies there will be a USAF.

If memory serves, folks came up with a variety of arrangements for USAF and USN personnel that did not mean automatic induction into the Army or the Marine Corps (though I believe there was a general consensus that the Air Force and the Navy were going to have to give some warm bodies to the ground pounders). For my own part, I contributed the fate of USAF 355th Wing (which was absorbed by the Fort Huachuca command and reflagged as 355th Battalion), USAF 99th Wing (which absorbed all government forces in Clark County, NV before relocating to Sacramento and ultimate dismemberment), and the ad hoc 2nd Naval Infantry Battalion Blue Two (which was assembled in Alameda, CA for the purpose of providing a QRF for the San Francisco Bay Area).


Webstral

[Legbreaker]

I agree that there will always be an Air Force and Navy to some degree, however they're certainly not going to be very large organisations when all the navy can put together are a few small fishing boats and the odd tall ship.
The Navy may keep itself more independant than the Air Force though simply because they don't necessarily NEED the prewar technology so much - a boat will float no matter what it's using for power - sails, coal, fuel oil, nuclear. The same cannot be said for the Air Force which becomes almost irrelevant without fuel and spare parts.

That said, neither will be particularly strong or numerous post nuke. What's left of the navy (outside the middle east) is likely to be employed mainly in fishing and cargo transport, their military aspects largely put aside since a) they've got no warships left worth anything and b) neither does any enemy.

Give it a few decades and the various governments and economies getting back on their feet and those two forces are likely to be rebuilt from the skeleton left from the war. During the recovery period though, I rather doubt much effort would be put into maintaining the largely irrelevant units.

[Abbott Shaull]

Side note: You see alot of Colonels running entire divisions in cannon. I am sure there is SOME room for advancement if units are merged. Personally, it would be entirely stupid not to see merged units at some point soon.

You see lot of that or lower rank of the remains of the unit. There was like Major or Lt in charge of nothing more than a small company that had been 1st Czech 1st Air Assault Brigade in one of the module.

Yes it would be entirely stupid for the lack of merging units. Tow thing kept it from happening.

For NATO it looked on paper they were able to cover more of front trace line than they had people to actual control and patrol it. Next it the old game all military commander play that I learned in basic training. The Basic Training Company was suppose to have 4 Platoons. For some reason ours had only 3 Platoons so during training we were always short on transport. So short that one time the Captain made a remark to the 1st Sergeant one day in front of the company that the next time they didn't have the bodies to fill out the 4 Platoons they would still have 4 Platoons.

What didn't help either was the other 4 companies of the training Battalion were training Cohort Companies that were to go the 7th ID, 10th Mountain, and couple who were to go overseas to mechanized units. Which meant they were smaller than the regular training company too, and for some reason our company was like 7 weeks behind starting out training, due to catch recycle personnel from the other companies. So every time transportation request was sent to Battalion and then sent to the 1st Training Brigade HQ, they would assume since we had three Platoons, that they were smaller than the normal 56 man platoons that the Platoon Bays could hold.

The thing is by 2000 even if they had started to merge units, a lot of people would lose their jobs due to lack of record keeping and tracking since late 1997/early 1998. It is part of the reason why at times there was some resistance to merging, and no one wanted to lose out of the meager supplies they were still getting into 1998 and 1999.

Now looking at the Soviet/Pact I am surprise that many of the units that had dropped to below 5000 men hadn't been merged with other Division of similar strength. It was how they operated, if a unit got to certain percentage of combat effectiveness, the unit behind them would pass through to them. While the unit that was passed was either brought up to strength by replacement at time, other another unit was graphed to it or they were merged into another unit to bring it up to strength before they continue to follow the front to take their turn again in the front.

On the other hand by 1998 the supply line and ability of the Soviet to get new recruits to the front line had already cut down to the trickle and the pre-war divisions had to relearn how to be self-sufficient like they were before the war. Which was a problem for many of the category C and category Mobilized only Divisions. Each Division would go to great lengths to keep their artist to themselves and not share with anyone else, a throw back to the old system.

Again the Soviet Division would resist merging for fear of losing position. I mean if you were a Colonel in charge of Division and were being merged into a Division with a Major General it didn't take a genius to realize you would no longer be the Division commander, and then there was no telling if where in the 'new' Division you get a staff position or worse yet, you could find yourself as a lonely Regimental Commander.

Much like the 2nd Battalion of the 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment at the end of WWII, was commanded by Major Winters as the acting Commander. Even though in the Regiment there were at Lt Colonels and senior Majors could of threw a fit to get the job, Major Winters was picked by the Regimental Commander and was kept there. After the war was over in Germany in 1945 after troops were being withdrawal in order to ship out to the Pacific and back home. Major Winters was shortly moved back to the XO slot in the Battalion as Lt Colonel was moved into the Commander slot. Lot of it depends on people being in the right place at the right time. There to many variables we don't know why a Colonel or lower were left in command of Divisions.

In many cases since it took an act of Congress to confirm all ranks of Colonel on up, it not so surprising, so if someone had been promoted after 1997, after Congress had been re-elected and in session things could get ugly. Lot of the Senior Commanders more or less had been only promoted since late 1997 because there was no Congress to go to get confirmation. It one of the reason why lot of the troops coming home from Europe were release from service. It was easier to do that than to figure out what rank many people would have as they tried to reorganized units out of those who made it back to the East Coast. It was easier to get them settled in for winter and then hopefully get them on the move afterwards....

[Abbott Shaull]

We covered a great deal of the discussion on the use of USAF and USN personnel after the Exchange in a previous thread. I"m going to maintain the same thing I did then. The use to which surplus airmen and seamen are put will depend a great deal on local circumstances. As long as the United States has a maritime interest, there will be a Navy. The scope and scale of the Navy"s missions and resources in 2000 is a matter for debate. By the same token, as long as there is something that flies there will be a USAF.

If memory serves, folks came up with a variety of arrangements for USAF and USN personnel that did not mean automatic induction into the Army or the Marine Corps (though I believe there was a general consensus that the Air Force and the Navy were going to have to give some warm bodies to the ground pounders). For my own part, I contributed the fate of USAF 355th Wing (which was absorbed by the Fort Huachuca command and reflagged as 355th Battalion), USAF 99th Wing (which absorbed all government forces in Clark County, NV before relocating to Sacramento and ultimate dismemberment), and the ad hoc 2nd Naval Infantry Battalion Blue Two (which was assembled in Alameda, CA for the purpose of providing a QRF for the San Francisco Bay Area).


Webstral

I would have to agree with this assessment. They would have to give up some bodies, but they would do begrudgingly and the Army and Marine would end up with the problem children of the units too.

[Legbreaker]

The thing is by 2000 even if they had started to merge units, a lot of people would lose their jobs due to lack of record keeping and tracking since late 1997/early 1998. It is part of the reason why at times there was some resistance to merging, and no one wanted to lose out of the meager supplies they were still getting into 1998 and 1999.

What supplies Where are they coming from Who is providing them
As far as I can tell, units of Divisional even Brigade size became responsible for their own upkeep, especially those on the east coast of the US. Smaller units of battalion and company size (on paper) were (in the books at least) apparently supplied by their brigade or division. These smaller units are not dealt with in any detail in the published material as we know.

But we're not talking about Army or Marine divisions merging with each other, but the "orphaned" naval and air force personell and small units who simply aren't large enough to devote resources to supporting themselves. Stragglers essentially without a ship, support units without planes to service, units which no longer have a purpose and even if supplies were still flowing, would very likely be disbanded and their personell reassigned.

How many large naval units would still exist anyway Many of the land bases were nuked, eliminating a large percentage of those not aboard ships, and as previously stated, it's EXTREMELY unlikely any significant numbers of shipborne personell would remain in units of more than a few dozen to a hundred (at most). Air Force support units would also make good targets for nukes, likewise reducing their numbers. How many AFB's are included in the Nuke target lists How many would have died

Omega may have had the effect of reforming some units, but once they hit the US we can surmise many were "demobilised" and sent on their way. The 78th ID for example, one of the closest units to Omega's landing site only received 800 men out of the tens of thousands aboard the ships. We can probably take that as an indication that a large percentage were basically abandoned by the military.

[stilleto69]

Leg,
Hate to disagree with you, but if you look at the target list given in Howling Wilderness, there are alot of Air Force & Navy land bases that were not nuked. I.e Bangor, WA; Whitman AFB, MO; Ellsworth AFB, SD; NAS Leemore, CA; etc. So there would still be "higher commands" around and personally from my experience in the service I know many Colonels, being very reluctant TDM or not giving up personnel or command to "Lower" ranking officers just because their base/facility is considered "no longer needed". Thus I see if they have to many would go the way of the "Sea Lord of Jacksonville". Furthermore, USAF units (especially support units) would have been dispersed shortly after the first nukes were used, thus the chance of every Air Force unit being nuked out of existence would be slim and the effort to justify them being nuked out of existence you might as well be playing "Gamma World".

Just a few thoughts

[Legbreaker]

Of course the target list only shows those places which received 0.5 megatons or greater...
The Soviets had numerous sub launched and ICBMs with less than 500 kiloton warheads (how many and which models I'll leave to others to post). Therefore is is quite conceivable all branches of the US military was effectively decapitated in the exchanges (just like the civilian government).

Something to keep in mind is that "Little Boy", the bomb that hit Hiroshima, was only about 13-18 kilotons - barely a drop in the ocean when compared to even half a megaton, the lower yield limit of the listed strikes.

[Abbott Shaull]

Quite correct Leg by 2000 every unit was pretty had to be self-efficient. I am talking about in 1998 and 1999 when the larger Commands were still using stocks to supply lower echelon units. It would be well into 1999 when many units commanders would get the hint that they were more or less be responsible for supplying the needs of their troops. It isn't one thing Higher ups would be to willingly to openly broadcast so as to keep discipline with the units under them. It one of the reasons why many of the Pact Division more or less gave their Army, Front, and higher HQ the bird and sat still. They had only started to get their areas of responsibility into shape to where the unit could exist. Leave that and with lack of steady re-supply from higher HQs is the reason many stayed put. As in the "Band of Brothers" where the unit was at some river and Germans were on the other-side, each side put up with the few mortars and artillery rounds that would be shot each other. As the Sgt told the new Lt. paraphrased a bit,"We both have shelter on our respective side, why ruin a good thing." Especially the members of the 506th it was the best they had been in since Dec., and they were in no hurry to go and destroy what limited shelter from the elements they had there.....

[HorseSoldier]

The 177th Armor Brigade in Southern California which was never mentioned, but had mission to train other brigade as op-for, what happen to it.

More likely looted for replacement personnel and disbanded than converted into a real maneuver unit, in my opinion, but still a question. Same issue with 1-509th at a JRTC still based at Ft Chaffee

I do see the 10th Mountain going to Norway, but not the 6th Infantry Division, they would probably lose one combat Brigade with their Airborne Battalion to the 2nd Infantry Division and use absorb the Alaskan National Guard.

I don't buy stripping Alaska of a garrison, but if I remember right 6th ID's place was taken by 47th ID.

Another problem with 6th ID is that it's round out reserve component units are already spoken for in the GDW OOB -- they had a USAR round out LIB that got placed in the GDW fictional USAR combat division (forget the #, but it also includes the Iceland Defense Force), plus 5-297th or 6-297th Infantry, AK ARNG, who presumably are part of 2nd Arctic Scout Bde. (I can only assume GDW decided Alaska fielded versions of 207th Infantry Group because on paper the state had six battalions of 297th Infantry on the books back then, even though some were organized as Scout battalions, some as standard light infantry, and some as mechanized infantry.)

That leaves 6th ID with five or six battalions, depending on whether the Airborne battalion in AK back then is part of the division or pulled out to serve as a theater level asset, which was their intended role. When it's all said and done, it might have made more sense to leave 6th ID in Alaska and send one brigade of 47th ID to cover the mission they ended up with in the GDW history.

Just some thoughts...

Another problem I have with the GDW stuff is the presumed ability to just magically spin off new Army and Corps headquarters by magic. Most of those headquarters simply cannot have had any of the usual Army or Corps level assets under their command. Looking at Alaska, specifically, as GDW depicts it, I suspect that after the Soviet invasion "US X Corps" basically amounted to the commander of 10th Mountain taking off a hat with two stars on it from time to time and putting on a three star hat to make decisions involving the AK ARNG units, Canadian units in Alaska and whatever other odds and sods 10th Mountain had backing it up. I don't see where any Corps artillery or other assets would have come from.