Stupid GI Tricks

[Abbott Shaull]

The sheer concept of sending an armored corp up a narrow two-lane road that for most of its length is several feet above the polder insured the failure of Market-Garden far better than anything that the Germans could have done. Considering that most of the forces that were committed to cutting the highway were ad-hoc kampfgruppes should speak volumes about the tactical situation that XXX Corps and 1st Airborne Army faced.

To be sure the intelligence failed in warning of the presence of two understrength, battered SS Panzer Divisions. These divisions proved the key to encircling and slaughtering British 1st Airborne Division and holding the key bridge at Nimegen. But it is also true that the decision to drop the Brits over 12km from their target, and then to drop the division over three days doomed the Arnhem fight to a certain conculsion.

The failure to drop a regiment on the bridge at Nimegan was a operational failure...but the 82nd Airborne always had the primary mission of seizing a low ridge mass that provided plenty of positions for artillery observers on that damned highway.

The loss of a key bridge early in the fight also speaks volumes about the difficulty of running "a one track railroad". Airborne divisions have minimal engineer support and none of what they had was dedicated to building bridges to support armor. The failure of the Guards Armored Division to assign engineer bridging support to the front of their column was a major failure...but one forced on them by the tactical situation that they faced. But then when one throws armor up a highway covered with over a dozen bridges, would it not be fair to assume that the enemy would get lucky, at least once?

Finally, Monty did have access to a wonderful source of intelligence. The Royal Dutch Army. A full brigade was operating with the British and yet their knowledge of local conditions was ignored. And to add insult to injury, the pre-war Dutch Army staged their field exercises in the Nimegen/Arnhem area, they were well aware of the difficults of the terrain and they even knew about the Driel ferry and how it could have been used to transport reinforcements and supplies north of the Rhine.

I have always felt that Market-Garden accomplished several things; first it created a sixty-mile long bulge that led nowhere (and indeed several miles of it had to be abandoned during the fall when the Germans started flooding the Rhine); it destroyed one airborne division and shot up two others; it diverted attention from the vital clearing of Antwerp and the clearing of Antwerp's even more vital passage to the sea, causing further supply problems for the Allied forces. The planning and execution of Market-Garden showed Monty at his worse.

The plan would of worked much better if one would of cut it down and executed in three separate segments. The Allied Airborne Army would of been put to better use with smaller hops instead of trying to capture and enemy held route deep towards the Rhine.

The one thing to remember it was success overall but at a very high cost. Much like Malta was success for the Germany but at a very high cost.

Also it delayed other operation for clearing ports that were needed.

[Abbott Shaull]

Not just Monty, but especially the air and airborne planners. No one thought of packing a bridge onto a glider (OK, lots of gliders)? What about seizing and opening an airfield to airlift supplies (like AT guns or bridges)? IIRC, Eindhoven had an airport.

Me, I've become something of a Montgomery fan over time, recognizing that he had to work with the tools he had-- a British army that had been defeated more often than not, and was on the wrong side of the manpower curve. The British seemed to do well in controlled, "set-piece" battles, and not when improvising. Against the Germans, one needs to bring one's "A" game, and not just slap something together. That's something Alanbrooke tried very hard to impress on US staffers prior to D-Day, too.

I think the near failure of this operation force home to the US and UK the lessons that were learned by the Germans. Russians had learned enough watching the German at Malta and is why they didn't conduct any large Airborne operation during the war, even though they had several Airborne Corps. Malta itself had stopped the Germans from using it airborne troops in such assaults. Operation Market Garden was the last major operation of this type. When the 17th Airborne Division made the next combat jump it was only to the east of German position on the other side of the whatever river it was... I want to the Rhine into Germany itself, in an operation that would be conducted by Airmobile and Air Assault troop as oppose to Airborne units.

[dragoon500ly]

Market-Garden NEARLY worked, it would have only taken one perhaps two of the bits of bad luck for the operation to work.

For reference I would class both Montgomery and Patton above Rommel as commanders as they both were masters of logistics, something which Rommel ignored to great cost. "Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics."

Like the saying goes "Close only counts in horseshoes and with hand grenades."

It is to the everlasting credit of the 1st Allied Airborne Army and XXX Corps that Market-Garden achieved as much as it did. In spite of the bad luck, poor intelligence and piss-poor planning, it came so close to success by the sheer drive and courage of the men who fought and died for that damned highway.

No doubt that both Montgomery and Patton rated better than Rommel as battlefield commanders...on the other hand, how's this for a dream team...

Patton as army commander, Montgomery as his chief of staff and Rommel commanding the 2nd Armored Division!

[Sanjuro]

Without wanting to build up Montgomery's reputation (and acknowledging his appalling lack of diplomacy when dealing with the US) the thing I find easiest to understand is his caution. In common with most British Generals of WW2, he had fought in WW1 as a junior officer, and had seen how easily an entire army could be destroyed by poor command decisions. Indeed, he often showed a level of regard for the soldiers under his command which even modern generals could learn from.

[Raellus]

Without wanting to build up Montgomery's reputation (and acknowledging his appalling lack of diplomacy when dealing with the US) the thing I find easiest to understand is his caution. In common with most British Generals of WW2, he had fought in WW1 as a junior officer, and had seen how easily an entire army could be destroyed by poor command decisions. Indeed, he often showed a level of regard for the soldiers under his command which even modern generals could learn from.

Monty was a cautious and capable commander. His one foray into daring resulted in the "bridge too far" debacle. His reputation suffered because he often promised much more than he could deliver (D-Day/Normandy) and he was not shy about taking more than his fair share of credit for victories in which he played a supporting role (the relief/counterattack phases of the Battle of the Bulge). He also constantly demanded more from Ike- more authority, more divisions, more fuel, more operational freedom, etc.- despite his overall lack of success in Europe.

I believe that he did genuinely care about his men but he also cared far too deeply for his own reputation and legacy and, somewhat ironically, this is what has damaged it.

At the risk of getting flamed here, I think Monty is somewhat overrated. But then again, I think Patton and Rommel are a bit overrated as well.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

My dad was stationed in Spain at Torejon(sp) AFB in the early 60s and he told me a hell of a funny story...

The USAF base was situated inside a larger Spanish military base, so there were essentially two perimeters: the inner one guarded by the US and the outer one, guarded by the Spaniards.

There had been some concern that the buffer between the outer and inner perimeter wasn't as well guarded as it might be, and that the Spanish had a lackadaisical approach to base security there, so one bright young lieutenant one night had the idea of investigating this and catching the Spanish perimeter guards slacking off so he could file a formal report. He took a hapless corporal with him in a flight-line pickup truck...

Now as an interlude, (and pop personally witnessed this) when you drew weapons for guard duty in the USAF, you were issued an M1 Carbine and a sidearm, you signed for them, for the ammo, and you returned them afterward. The Spanish base security guys...not so much. You walked up, asked for a weapon, took what you got handed. You might get a grease gun, an STG-44, a bolt-action rifle, or, in some cases, a BAR.

So back to our lieutenant...out into the perimeter they went.

At a guardpost, some of the Spanish guards were doing their thing (which usually involved cooking and girlfriends), and our Lieutenant ordered his driver to, as they went into a gully, kill the headlights and then as they got to the top of the rise, kill the engine and coast up to the guard point, and they'd just see about all of this nonsense...

As soon as they topped the rise, everyone on that side of the base heard a fusillade of shots that seemed to go on for a minute or two (so dad says). He was close enough that he'd actually heard it - and before the sirens started, right after the shooting, they hear this voice shout: "ALTO."

Amazingly, the Lt. and his driver were unhurt (as soon as the fire zeroed on them they got small behind the engine block of the flight line truck they were in), but the front end of the truck was utterly destroyed by BAR fire.

Needless to say, no more questions were raised about the efficacy of the Spanish Nationals and their perimeter guarding capabilities...

[James Langham]

Funny thing about the UK and US being Allies in both wars. Both aways try to claim it was the other who actually won the War, and not a group effort... Okay WWI there were other factors... But WWII was won due to the shear weight of three allied forces squeezing a nation like a pimple...

A friend of mine likes the Russian historical view:

"Operation Bagration starts which will eventually result in the Red Army reaching Berlin. Oh yes about the same time the British and Americans launch a diversion in the west."

Maybe we should add Zhukov and Koniev to the list of great generals.

[James Langham]

The plan would of worked much better if one would of cut it down and executed in three separate segments. The Allied Airborne Army would of been put to better use with smaller hops instead of trying to capture and enemy held route deep towards the Rhine.

The one thing to remember it was success overall but at a very high cost. Much like Malta was success for the Germany but at a very high cost.

Also it delayed other operation for clearing ports that were needed.

One thing that is often forgotten is that in the months leading up to September a number of these smaller operations had been conceived and abandoned as the ground troops reached the drop zones before the airborne could be deployed!

The biggest problem with Market Garden (in hindsight) is that it is an all or nothing affair, without reaching Arnhem it gives you no advantage. What is so frustrating is how close it comes and how many little things conspire against success.

[dragoon500ly]

Funny thing about the UK and US being Allies in both wars. Both aways try to claim it was the other who actually won the War, and not a group effort... Okay WWI there were other factors... But WWII was won due to the shear weight of three allied forces squeezing a nation like a pimple...

There is a story that engraved over the main entrance of the German Officer's Academy, in letters 25cm tall and lines with gold leaf is the phase

"NEVER FIGHT A TWO FRONT WAR, DAMN IT!"

Right underneath that in letters equaly high is the phase

"NEVER, EVER, INVADE RUSSIA, DAMN IT"

[helbent4]

Maybe we should add Zhukov and Koniev to the list of great generals.

James,

Maybe? Of course!

Tony

[dragoon500ly]

One thing that is often forgotten is that in the months leading up to September a number of these smaller operations had been conceived and abandoned as the ground troops reached the drop zones before the airborne could be deployed!

The biggest problem with Market Garden (in hindsight) is that it is an all or nothing affair, without reaching Arnhem it gives you no advantage. What is so frustrating is how close it comes and how many little things conspire against success.

If my memory is correct, I want to say there was something on the order of 14-15 operations that were planned and dropped due to the speed of the ground advance.

To be sure 1st Allied Airborne Army wanted to get back into the fight and one of the things that came out of Market-Garden was the speed with which they were able to plan and launch over 35,000 paratroopers. Just that was a major feat.

But Market-Garden also showed the weakness of airborne forces, unless they can be quickly reinforced by the ground forces, the paratroopers get cut up quickly.

Before the paratroop mafia jumps over this ole tanker, the stands of the 101st and 82nd in the Battle of the Bulge showed off their capability...but let us not forget that the 101st was encircled in Bastogne with the remaining elements of CCR, 9th Armored Division, CCB, 10th Armored Division, a battalion of SP tank destroyers, three battalions of 155mm howitzers and 4.5in guns, as well as survivors of the 28th Infantry Division (Team SNAFU), hardly the "all-airborne" fight that is remembered.

The 82nd fought elements of the 1st SS Panzer Division trying to break through to relieve KG Pieper. Until the 82nd was reinforced by major elements of the 3rd Armored Division, they were not able to maintain a line...bazookas, 57mm antitank guns and satchel charges had a rather hard time in slowing down Panthers and King Tigers.

[Abbott Shaull]

If my memory is correct, I want to say there was something on the order of 14-15 operations that were planned and dropped due to the speed of the ground advance.

To be sure 1st Allied Airborne Army wanted to get back into the fight and one of the things that came out of Market-Garden was the speed with which they were able to plan and launch over 35,000 paratroopers. Just that was a major feat.

But Market-Garden also showed the weakness of airborne forces, unless they can be quickly reinforced by the ground forces, the paratroopers get cut up quickly.

Before the paratroop mafia jumps over this ole tanker, the stands of the 101st and 82nd in the Battle of the Bulge showed off their capability...but let us not forget that the 101st was encircled in Bastogne with the remaining elements of CCR, 9th Armored Division, CCB, 10th Armored Division, a battalion of SP tank destroyers, three battalions of 155mm howitzers and 4.5in guns, as well as survivors of the 28th Infantry Division (Team SNAFU), hardly the "all-airborne" fight that is remembered.

The 82nd fought elements of the 1st SS Panzer Division trying to break through to relieve KG Pieper. Until the 82nd was reinforced by major elements of the 3rd Armored Division, they were not able to maintain a line...bazookas, 57mm antitank guns and satchel charges had a rather hard time in slowing down Panthers and King Tigers.

Hey I do understand. I always thought it was silly that they expected Airborne/Air Assault/Light Infantry Anti-Tank teams to seriously be much more of speed bump against heavily armed force.

[Abbott Shaull]

If my memory is correct, I want to say there was something on the order of 14-15 operations that were planned and dropped due to the speed of the ground advance.

To be sure 1st Allied Airborne Army wanted to get back into the fight and one of the things that came out of Market-Garden was the speed with which they were able to plan and launch over 35,000 paratroopers. Just that was a major feat.

But Market-Garden also showed the weakness of airborne forces, unless they can be quickly reinforced by the ground forces, the paratroopers get cut up quickly.

That is another thing that many people fail to take into account too. For the most part after the Airborne Divisions had been withdrawn back to England were time and again alerted to only have someone to overrun their drop zone.

[Adm.Lee]

That is another thing that many people fail to take into account too. For the most part after the Airborne Divisions had been withdrawn back to England were time and again alerted to only have someone to overrun their drop zone.

This is one big reason that some generals advocated smaller airborne forces, assigned further down the chain of command. IIRC, Patton suggested a regiment per field army, for short-range operations like bridge-grabbing. The planning was assumed to be less time-consuming.

To drag this back towards T2k, Soviet Fronts and Tank Armies each have a desant (air-assault) brigade assigned, for just this kind of thing.

[Abbott Shaull]

This is one big reason that some generals advocated smaller airborne forces, assigned further down the chain of command. IIRC, Patton suggested a regiment per field army, for short-range operations like bridge-grabbing. The planning was assumed to be less time-consuming.

To drag this back towards T2k, Soviet Fronts and Tank Armies each have a desant (air-assault) brigade assigned, for just this kind of thing.

Yeah I was about to say that the Soviet at certain command levels were suppose to have an assigned Air Assault Brigade. While in each Motorized Rifle Division in theory one of the Rifle Regiments was suppose to be a Airmobile trained...