OT; The Longest Day

[natehale1971]

I remember all the cons that showed how bad that a southern assault through the Balkans would have been, but I swear that I had read smowhere that the soft underbelly of Europe that Churchill was talking about was suppose to be an attack through Vichy France, using Sardina and Corsica as bases for forces to land in Southern France.

That they'd be able to push in and cut Germany off from Northern Italy and get to the Rhine, cutting German Occupation forces along the Atlantic Seaboard off from supplylines with the Fatherland. This would have been followed by the Normandy Landings when the Germans were focused on the Southern Offensive that was pushing towards the Rhine.

[Adm.Lee]

I remember all the cons that showed how bad that a southern assault through the Balkans would have been, but I swear that I had read smowhere that the soft underbelly of Europe that Churchill was talking about was suppose to be an attack through Vichy France, using Sardina and Corsica as bases for forces to land in Southern France.

That they'd be able to push in and cut Germany off from Northern Italy and get to the Rhine, cutting German Occupation forces along the Atlantic Seaboard off from supplylines with the Fatherland. This would have been followed by the Normandy Landings when the Germans were focused on the Southern Offensive that was pushing towards the Rhine.

Churchill was mostly opposed to the southern France landings in August 44, as that took forces away from the Italian campaign. What he wanted was more operations in Italy and the Balkans, for two reasons. One was to block future Soviet penetration of the Balkans, the other was to try to break into Germany from the south. He spoke of the Ljubljana Gap, and sending the Eighth Army's mechanized forces (pretty formidable, actually) through there. This was his "soft underbelly."

Churchill (and several of his military chiefs) was also opposed to the Normandy landings, because they knew it was something of a gamble, and that the British Empire had only one shot at it-- their armies had been bled out, and would be losing strength over time. If it failed, they'd be unable to meaningfully affect the war. Attacking the enemy where he has strength is usually a bad idea if you have waning strength yourself.

IMO, attacking the Balkans is bad idea.This is based on some map study, and a bit of wargaming. You know those supply shortages the W.Allies had in the autumn of 1944, when Patton famously outran his supply lines One key culprit there was the damage inflicted on the French rail net by the Allied air forces. Compare the state of the French rail net, with the air campaign, to the far less developed Balkan railnet, with bombing and Yugoslav partisans. Then add in in all of the effects of dealing with those partisans, other ethnic militias, and so on. Then add in the fact that the Allies would be pushing through mostly rough terrain, against the Germans who had proved themselves to be no slouches at defense. Result The Soviets still get to Berlin, and France is un-liberated.

As for shooting up the Italian peninsula and making a right turn at Trieste, it could work, IMO, only if the Allies had made better northward progress before the winter of '43-44 set in, and continued to make such progress in the spring of '44. If Anzio hadn't been a stalemate for several months, maybe that could have done the trick, but it's hard to make that happen. Either way, you're again trying to shove a big armored corps through the southern foothills of the Alps to try to get to Vienna, leaving a long flank exposed to those same mountains. If you get there before the winter of '44-45, and If you can get through the "Gap," and IF you have the Americans and French to cover that flank, Maybe you get to Vienna by Christmas. And Maybe you invite the Germans to throw the forces that went to the Ardennes in December to descend on Austria instead.

What I haven't seen done, and might work in a game someday, is the part about cutting off the Germans in Italy by cutting across the top of the peninsula from the southern France landings. If those Germans are removed from the OB, then maybe a shove east could work out.

All of the above is again, my opinion as a wargamer.

[simonmark6]

Beevor holds the opinion that Churchill was wrong in his wish to attack through the Balkans and Italy and I have to say that looking at the maps I have to agree with him. He also makes the case, however, that if he hadn't persuaded the Americans to pursue the North Africa/Italy strategy in 1943, then an early D-Day might have failed when the amphibious landings would have seen the Germans in a much stronger position.

I need to look into this further, but it sounds possible to me. On the other hand, Churchill could usually be trusted to screw up tactics and strategy from his Gallipolli Adventure onward so it may well have been the case that even a stopped clock is right twice a day rather than any true strategic acumen.

[Legbreaker]

I can't remember where i read it... but it had said that Churchill had wanted to go with a southern beachhead at the underbelly of Europe, but that it was Eisenhower who wanted to beachhead in northern Europe. And that the gamble of D-Day was such that Eisenhower had stated that if the mission failed, that FDR would have already gotten his resignation letter.

That letter would have been such a comfort to the family of the tens of thousands of men who died for nothing.....

[Adm.Lee]

Beevor holds the opinion that Churchill was wrong in his wish to attack through the Balkans and Italy and I have to say that looking at the maps I have to agree with him. He also makes the case, however, that if he hadn't persuaded the Americans to pursue the North Africa/Italy strategy in 1943, then an early D-Day might have failed when the amphibious landings would have seen the Germans in a much stronger position.

I need to look into this further, but it sounds possible to me. On the other hand, Churchill could usually be trusted to screw up tactics and strategy from his Gallipolli Adventure onward so it may well have been the case that even a stopped clock is right twice a day rather than any true strategic acumen.

I'm sort of an admirer of Churchill. I like the quote by Portal or Brooke (I can't remember which) to the effect, "Winston has ten ideas before breakfast each day. My job is to sort out the 1 really bad one, and the 2 bad ones from the seven good ones before he implements them all."

IMO, his strategic instincts outstripped the capabilities of the British Empire (and the Allies), and he was reluctant to let go of things in the "nice to have, but we don't have the time or the forces to do that" categories.

To wit, Gallipoli nearly succeeded, and would have been fantastic if it had succeeded, but it didn't. It was, at least, worth trying.

Re: North Africa and the Mediterranean campaign, no less than General Marshall admitted that it was a necessity for the Allies, and that he was wrong to have opposed it. Primary evidence: suppose the US II Corps that was shattered at Kasserine Pass had been in Normandy, instead of the divisions that were there in June 1944

[Legbreaker]

Gallipoli in principle was a brilliant idea. It's the execution that let everyone down.
It was the first time in history an amphibious operation took place on a "modern" battlefield with "repeating" (ie mag fed) rifles and machineguns. If the navigation had been on the money, if the commanders on the ground had been a bit more agressive (particularly in the area of Suvla Bay), and if there'd been a little more initiative taken at critical moments the whole thing would have been an outstanding success. Unfortunately the initial landings were in the wrong location and delays in moving inland allowed the Turks to bring in reinforcements trapping the Anzacs on the beaches and cliffs of the landing areas.

The real crime was not acknowledging it was a lost cause early on and continuing to waste men in a hopeless attempt to force the way inland against prepared positions and heavy fire.

[95th Rifleman]

The real crime was not acknowledging it was a lost cause early on and continuing to waste men in a hopeless attempt to force the way inland against prepared positions and heavy fire.

That sin was a trademark of British operations throughout WW2. There was a view that if we could throw enough men at a problem we would make it go away.

[dragoon500ly]

source material from "D-Day" and "Cross-Channel Attack"...

Churchill pushed for an invasion of Southern France as an alternative to striking the Atlantic Wall directly. The Americans agreed to this in order to secure the key ports of Toulon and Marsielle. Further operations into France and towards Germany would have run into the Volges Mountains (the region along the French-Swiss-German border). It was recognized early on that any major efforts into the Volges would have quickly bogged down, the ground was simply excellent for conduct of a defense (it litterly would have been up one ridge after another).

[Adm.Lee]

As it happened, the Seventh US Army went through the Vosges fairly easily in November, even though the German defenses had solidified in September. Eisenhower had to push very hard to get Churchill to agree to the southern France landings, he wanted them very much to draw pressure off the Normandy front. The landing was originally code-named "Anvil," later changed to "Dragoon." Churchill quipped that it was because he had to be dragooned into it!

The capture of Marseilles was fortuitous, since its port was nearly intact, and it was able to supply both the Seventh US and French First Armies, and even some of Patton's Third.

[dragoon500ly]

According to the Green Book, the Vogles fighting was some of the hardest that the Seventh Army had to endure. The 442nd RCT earned most of its decorations in the Vosges (just to one example). I've walked the ground there once and its damned good defensive terrain, almost impassable to vehicle traffic off road and with lots of nasty little ridges and draws to disrupt any advance.

But if I've learned anything from researching military history, its that you will always find conflicting reports on every battle! One battalion can report foot-by-foot defense by well-led defenders and another battalion on the other side of the ridge, gets greeted by swarms of defenders all to ready to surrender. Go figure!

As for dear Winston, I've seen books and articles stating that he argued for or against every decision made in the war. So I have no doubt that we are looking at different views from one of the 20th Centuries premier politicans!

[dragoon500ly]

There was an article in the #27 issue of World at War that caught my eye. Its an indepth examination of the Atlantic Wall, one of the tables sheds a little light on something that is all too often ignored.

Logistics

Each Allied division required about 644 tons of supplies daily, this was not only to support the division, but an equal "slice" of the corps/army troops supporting each divisions.

By August 5, 1944 this is what the Allies were shipping into Normandy:

Utah Beach: 4,506 tons per day; enough to support 7 divisions.

Omaha Beach: 7,582 tons per day; enough to support 12 divisions.

Four Small Ports: 3,390 tons per day (total); enough to support 5 divisions.

Mulberry B: 7,000 tons per day; enough to support 11 divisions.

British Beaches (Gold, Juno and Sword): 4,000 tons per day; enough to support 6 divisions.

Cherbourg: 13,500 tons per day; enough to support 21 divisions.

[dragoon500ly]

So just how well defended were the Normandy Beaches

The Atlantic Wall defenses were made up of two types of fortifications; the Stuetzpunkten (StP or strongpoints) were roughly company-sized positions that included a mix of heavy and light fortifications set up for 360-defense. Obstacles (mainly barbed wire and AT ditches) and minefields surrounded their perimenter, as well as formed internal barricades within the position. Heavy fortifications included combat and supporting bunkers while light fortifications were mostly open positions, such as weapon pits and trenches. Many of the StP also included artillery batteries and flak postions.

The most common positions were the Widerstandsnest (Wn or resistance nests). For the most part, these were rouyghly platoon-sized postions that contained a "shell-proof" postions. These mostly consisted of machine gun and mortar positions as well as postions with artillery ranging from 37mm up to 88mm in caliber.

StP and Wn were sited in areas most suited to amphibious landings and were usually placed in one or two defensive lines. The so-called Fortress Areas simply conisted of seveal StP and Wn which were placed to cover not only the beaches, but the landward approaches as well.

The StP and Wn also suffered from two critical weaknesses. First, so short of weapons was the Third Reich that the Atlantic Wall had to rely on a large number of foreign or older weapons, this created major logistical problems in the supply of ammunition and spare parts.

The second critical weakness lay in the troops assigned to defend the wall. A large number of the troops came from the Ost Battalions, units formed up non-German troops, mainly Eastern European "volunteers", whose reliability was questionable. Those German units present in the west often had their ranks filled out with soldiers recuperating from wounds suffered on the eastern front. Many of these units also included large numbers of young and elderly soldiers, often only partially trained. Many of the beach defense units were from Bodenstaendug (Static) Divisions that lacked almost any organic transport.

The number of divisions assigned to the Atlantic Wall was in a constant state of flux, as the best formations were sent to the east to heelp stabilize the deteriorating situatuion. Shattered and depleted divisions from the east took their place.

Hampering the troops was Rommel's decision to focus on the setting up of obstacles and the laying of mines, at the expense of the training of the troops.

Source material is World at War #27 "Atlantic Wall Analysis" and the "German Army Handbook"

[dragoon500ly]

The defenses of lower Normandy (defined as west of the Seine River and including the Cotentin Peninsula) were at their strongest near Cherbourg and included numerous coastal artillery emplacements. The area that would be known as Utah Beach did not include even a small fishing harbor, so it wasn't fortified as heavily. The primary defense was the flooding of the area behind the beach, this left four causeway exits from the beach itself.

The original planned invasion beaches were defended by a Wn and a StP with two 88mm guns placed that flanked the beaches. Fortunately, the loss of several command and control craft and a heavy current pushed the initial waves further south by several hundred yards, an area that was defended by only a single Wn.

Behind the flooded areas, the Germans built two (and third under construction) battery positions, the two active positions were at Azeville (105mm guns) and further north at Crisbeq (210mm guns).

Omaha Beach was defended by a dozen Wn, some of which had 75mm guns, while the one at Vierville had an 88mm gun that flanked the beach. A flooded area also existed beind the beach, but the topography placed this further inland. Many of the Wns were positioned on the bluffs, but some were also placed to flake the beach. Further west was a casemated battery position at Pointe de Hoc, its 155mm guns could fire into Omaha and Utah. Inland was another battery poisition at Maisy (also 155mm and able to fire into Omaha and Utah). Just east of Omaha is the small fishing harbor of Port-en-Bessin, defended by a battery of 155mm guns in a casemated battery at Longues.

The British/Canadian beaches included some small fishing harbors. Shoals covered large portions of Juno and Sword beaches. Sword was defended by a StP (with two 155mm guns), two Wn flanking the beaches and several more Wn inland, guarding the exits from Sword.

Juno Beach was defended by three Wn (one at Courseulles-sur-Mer, with two flanking it) As well as two additional Wn (Bernieres-sur-Mer and St. Aubin)

The British forces landing on Gold Beach would have to deal with four Wn on the beach, with two additional ones inland near Mont Fleury. These positions had a mix of 88mm, 75mm and 50mm guns. East of the Orne River was Battery Merville which had four 100mm guns covering the beach. Further east was Battery Mont Caisny (155mm guns), designed to provide flanking fire for Le Havre.

Too recap, the invasion beaches were protected by elements of three divisions, support by some 7 StP and over 60 Wn, the largest coastal batteries were 210mm and most were 155mm.


Source material is World at War #27 "Atlantic Wall Analysis" and the "German Army Handbook"

[dragoon500ly]

The German Army believed that any fortified position should consist of small works, organized in great depth. The idea was not to present an unyielding front to the attacker, but rather to act as a shocj absorber and gradually slow doen the advance. Then, when the attacker has lost his momentum, a series of counterattacks would destroy the penetration before the attacker had reorganized and consolidated his gains. The Germans would typically man their defense postions with inferior soldiers in concrete positions and group their best soldiers and equipment in reserve, ready for the counterattack. The soldiers defending these positions were carefully trained to continue fighting, even when their positions were being overrun.

The Germans would typically organize their defenses into three zones, these were:
1) The Forward Zone (Vorfeldzone) consisting mostly of field fortifications, trenches, barbed wire entanglements, machine gun emplacements and observation posts.
2) The Main Defense Zone (Groskampfzone) comprised of fortified structures such as pillboxes, casemates and shelters and antitank obstacles covered by antitank guns. In addition, this zone would have intermediate areas to its front and rear, in which isolated works were placed at critical points along the avenues of approach, with the mission od disrupting and delaying the advnace as well as channeling the attackers into pre-planned killing zones.
3) The Rear Defense Zone (Ruckwartige Zone), organized mush as the Groskampfzone, but not as strong, as the attacker continued his attack, this would often be built up and converted into a Groskampfzone and a new Ruckwartige Zone would be built to the rear.

The Germans would emplace their pillboxes, casemated and field fortifications in order to provide interlocking fields of fire, but not so close together that enemy artillery would be able to mass its fire on a particular sector. The Germans build their fortifications along the principle of "Effect before cover", in this, a wide field of fire is considered to be more important in the siting of a position than any cover or concealment. Whenever possible fortifications are sited to permit both frontal and flanking fire. Defensive fire plans are carefully coordinated so that artillery concentrations can be laid on the areas where fire coverage from the positions is relatively weak.

In accordance with this doctrine, the Germans carefully reinforce their pillboxes and casemates with extensive field fortifications that lend flexibility and mobility to the defending troops as well as allowing the defenders to engage the enemy before he gets close enough to engage the main works. A typical pillbox position would included barbed-ware and minefields, fire trenches for infantry and open emplacements for mortars and field artillery, typically placed to cover the dead zones around the fortification.

The German practice is to provide all troops with adequate shelter against weather and hostile fire. pillboxes and casemates often have accommodations for their crews, field works would have underground shelters adjacent to the combat positions. The reserves would also enjoy underground shelters, these would protect them from enemy bombardment until they are committed to the counterattack.

German fortified positions are commonly linked together by communications trenches, to allow the relief of personnel, ammunition resupply and the evacuation of the wounded. In many cases, a group of defenses would be connected by a system of tunnels. SIgnal communication is provided by buried telephone wire, with telephones often being used to communicate between the inside/outside of a positions. In some pillboes, speaking tubes are installed in case of the failure of the telephone system.


Source material is World at War #27 "Atlantic Wall Analysis" and the "German Army Handbook"