OT Navies in WWII

[RN7]

From a moral point, I blame the British more than the Germans, since the British were using human shields to protect war materials.

Did the Royal Navy sink any German passenger liners

[ShadoWarrior]

Did the Royal Navy sink any German passenger liners

No, but the Russians did in WW2.

[copeab]

No, but the Russians did in WW2.

I don't remember the name of the ship, but Russia sank one liner late in the war, packed with refugees and soldiers being evacuated, which is the greatest loss of life in a ship disaster.

[copeab]

Did the Royal Navy sink any German passenger liners

Not that I'm aware of, no, but that's largely the result of Germany's surface ships rarely going to sea after the war started and the British navy not taking subs seriously enough at the start of the war (I mean, dear God, they built nearly 20 steam powered subs).

[Sanjuro]

I have never seen any evidence that the Lusitania was carrying war materials; the onboard explosions which made her sinking so rapid can best be accounted for by the initial impact filling her largely empty coal bunkers with coal dust; when the coal dust in turn exploded the mixture was like a primitive Fuel-Air Explosive.
While not perhaps a war crime, the sinking of the Lusitania was an act of terrorism in that it was declared as a specific target, in an effort to deter passengers.
The unrestricted submarine warfare seemed to bring on a new level of unpleasantness; it is understandable to try and sink ships from ambush if they may be armed, but to capture and execute a ship's captain for attempting to sink the submarine which is shooting at him is not.

http://southernlife.org.uk/fryatt.htm

[dragoon500ly]

In a paper for a high school history class, I argued the turning point was the Battle of Coral Sea. Until that point, the Japanese had been running free in the Pacific. While tactically the battle was a draw (or arguably a Japanese marginal victory), it was a strategic loss for them. For the first time in the Pacific war, Japan had failed to mount a successful invasion of significance.

(in that same class, I also wrote a paper where I asserted the sinking of the Lusitania was legally justified)

Coral Sea was at best, a draw for both sides. To be sure, it did stop the immediate Japanese move on Port Morseby. But what halted the planned invasion was Yamamoto's commencement of the Midway/Aleutians operation.

With the launch of the Guadalcanal battle, the Japanese were forced into a attrition battle that they could not sustain. With the encirclement of Rabual, the cream of the Japanese pilots lay dead. This was a blow that they never recovered from.

[dragoon500ly]

Coral Sea was a turning point in the Pacific War for a number of reasons. Firstly it was the first time that the Japanese navy was effectively challenged in the Pacific. Secondly it demonstrated to Japan that Allied resistance or/and offensives would be better organised and more formidable than they previously had been. Thirdly it confirmed to Japan that New Guinea was the absolute outer limit of what it could hope to conquer, and that an invasion of Australia was beyond its capabilities. The fact that Japan actually invaded New Guinea has always puzzled me as it it had few exploitable resources at that time, and only limited logistical capabilities from which to attack Australia. It has always seemed to me to have been a waste of Japanese resources, and I can only think that they went there to disrupt and delay any build up of Allied forces in Australia which would threaten their forces in South East Asia and the Pacific.

I think the sinking of the Lusitania was legally justified, but not morally.

Japan's goals in the New Guinea campaign have always had people scratching their heads in confusion. The only thing that I have ever heard that made any sense was that they wanted to capture Port Moresby for use as an air/naval base for a possible future attack on Australia.

The IJA/IJN were at loggerheads about the need to invade Australia. The IJA's veiwpoint was that it would require too much in terms of troop commitments and logistical support. Okay, makes sense, the IJA was hard pressed to provide more than a dozen divisions for the Pacific and certainly Australia would have required a lot more than dozen divisions to conquer/pacify. Logistical wise, the Japanese simply didn't have the merchant shipping to support operations. The IJN on the other hand, favored an invasion of Australia in order the deny the US any safe area to build up forces for a counter-offensive.

With the Port Moresby invasion force turned back, the IJA/IJN now needed to capture the airfield in order to deny its use to the Allies, as well as acquiring a defensive position on the southern shore of New Guinea.

[Targan]

I don't remember the name of the ship, but Russia sank one liner late in the war, packed with refugees and soldiers being evacuated, which is the greatest loss of life in a ship disaster.

I believe that would be the Wilhelm Gustloff. A major tragedy of WWII.

[Fusilier]

I don't remember the name of the ship, but Russia sank one liner late in the war, packed with refugees and soldiers being evacuated, which is the greatest loss of life in a ship disaster.

Unfortunately, there were a few actually.

[95th Rifleman]

Unfortunately, there were a few actually.

To be fair when you consider what the Germans did to the Russians it's not hard to realise why the Russians ignored the rules of war.

If the Germans and raped and murdered their way through half of the UK, we'd be less inclined to be nice.

[Fusilier]

To be fair when you consider what the Germans did to the Russians it's not hard to realise why the Russians ignored the rules of war.

If the Germans and raped and murdered their way through half of the UK, we'd be less inclined to be nice.

I know why they did it, but don't think that is fair at all. The women and children on the boats didn't rape and murder anyone. I tend to disagree with punishment extending to all those who share ethnicity with the guilty. Fortunately, western society (at least) is in agreement with this and our legal system is based on blood justice.

[dragoon500ly]

I've always wondered what might have been built if it the war had started a year later, or if the emergence of the aircraft carrier as the most important warship had been delayed a few years. If it had the Yamato would not have been the largest battleships affoat. Consider the opponents.

1) The British Lion Class: The Lions were the most restrained of the planned super battleships, and would have looked very much like the King George V class and were designed for a new pattern 16in triple gun mount that was never produced. 4 ships were planned and 2 were laid down before building was halted in 1940, and was cancelled in 1942.

2) German H Class: The H class were a part of Germany's Z plan to build a balanced fleet and challenge British supremacy at sea. The first two ships were laid down in 1939, but were canceled shortly after. It was planned to build six of these ships.

3) Soviet Sovyetskiy Soyuz Class: Four ships was authorized in 1938, and three were actually laid down. Construction was halted in 1940 after two were 75% complete. All three hulls were broken up in later 1940's.

4) American Montana Class: Five Montana's were authorized in 1940 but construction was suspended in 1942, and canceled in 1943.

All were impressive designs and, speaking from a wargamer viewpoint, its fun to add one or two into the fleet mix just to see what might have happened. But the growth of the aircraft carrier and its air group is what sounded the death of the battleship.

Still....Montana vs Yamato....Lion vs Tripitz.....

[dragoon500ly]

Logistics, the boring stuff....

By 1945, the U.S. had committed 21 infantry divisions and 6 Marine divisions. To give an idea how how much shipping was entailed in moving these 27 divisions around....a infantry division had 14,000 men and 2,000 vehicles, which would require roughly 100,000 tons of shipping space to move.

Shipping requirements could be cut by over 40% if the division's equipment was broken down as much as possible and boxed. This method required a fully equipped port (with piers and cranes) at the other end to get all of the stuff off the ships. This explains the critical importance of Hawaii and Australia/New Zealand to the Pacific War effort.

Amphibious landings required four times as much shipping as the boxed method because the hear had to be stored in the order it would be needed and ready to be operated as soon as it left the ship. This is called combat loading. The preferred method was to ship the units to ports boxed, unload them, acclimate the troops and then reload the ships in the combat loading manner.

The rule of thumb used was that for every soldier, airman or Marine sent overseas, they required 12 tons of shipping each to get them over there with their equipment. Thereafter, they each required 1 ton a month of shipping to maintain them in action.

Explaining this another way; to send an infantry division overseas boxed required six Liberty ships. To move the same division into a combat zone required the use of 20 ships of various sizes. A dozen of these would be assault transports, the rest would be LSTs and other specialized amphibious ships.

The 27 divisions sent into the Pacific also required nearly 2,000,000 support troops (and replacements for losses). This meant that over 20 million tons of shipping was needed to get them there and then as much as 1.5 million tons of shipping each month to keep them supplied. The lack of decent ports in the Pacific meany that many of the ships had to make a 12,000 mile round trip in order to reach the fighting fronts.

Another factor that impacted Allied strategic planning was the various speeds of these ships. Consider this...

The Landing Force could maintain a speed of 12 knots.

The Bombardment Group (the old battleships) could sustain 15 knots.

The Escort Group (the CVEs providind CAS) could sustain 12 knots.

The Support Group (the tankers, cargo and hospital ships) could sustain 12 knots.

The Carrier Task Force (the fast battleships and fleet carriers) could sustain 15-25 knots and maintain 30 knots for extended periods of time.

Now then, making allowances for maneuvering, replenishment etc, the Carrier Task Force could cover between 300-500 miles per day. The Bombardment and Escort Groups might manage 300 miles a day. And the Landing Force and Support Group would be lucky to manage 250-miles a day. In addition, submarines often supported operations such as maintaining a scouting screen and picking up downed fliers, they could cover between 200-250 miles a day.

So the admirals commanding had to juggle their various task groups. While the slower groups could basically maintain straight-line steady courses, teh Carrier Task Force often found it self making hugh circles around the ocean, moving back and forth in irregular patterns, in order to provide cover for the slower ships. And in order to confuse the enemy while this dance was ongoing, the Carrier Task Force would often make air strikes on anything within range.

[dragoon500ly]

Came across this list....

The food supplies for a typical US Battleship for one week....

Beef, Frozen = 10,000lbs
Veal, Frozen = 2,000lbs
Ham, Smoked = 750lbs
Fish, Frozen = 500lbs
Spam = 250lbs
Potatoes, White = 9,000lbs
Potatoes, Sweet = 900lbs
Carrots = 1,500lbs
Lettuce, Iceberg = 1,200lbs
Tomatoes = 900lbs
Asparagus = 900lbs
Cucumbers = 850lbs
Celery = 600lbs
Rhubarb = 500lbs
Oranges = 1,900lbs
Lemons = 1,200lbs
Eggs = 1,500 dozen
Flour = 14,000lbs
Milk (fresh, condensed and powdered) = 2,200lbs
Seasonings and condiments = 700lbs
Ice Cream = 2,000lbs
Coffee = 4,000lbs

Something else!

[dragoon500ly]

Came across this little known factoid...

Most naval battles are fought within a hundred or so miles of land. The record for the distance from the battle site to shor belongs to the Royal Navy.

Its known as the Glorious First of June and was fought on June 1, 1794. The battle sight is a shade over 400 miles from land.