OT Navies in WWII

[dragoon500ly]

Above and Beyond the Call of Duty

While in many ways the fighting in the Pacific was different from the other theaters of WWII, in one respect it was very different. Infantry fighting is the most dangerous form of battle, but in the Pacific it was particularly lethal.

For example, the US Army Infantry received, on average, one Medal of Honor for every 800 soldiers killed. The US Army Cavalry received one MoH for every 550 troopers killed. The US Navy received one MoH for every 550 sailors killed.

But the Marines had the most impressive ratio of dead to Medals of Honor, receiving one MoH for every 369 marines killed.

[dragoon500ly]

From a pre-war strength of 18,000 officers and men, the USMC rose to a strength of 485,833 officers and men.

While providing only 5% of the US armed forces in WWII, the Marines suffered almost 10% of the total American casualities, roughly 3% of serving Marines died in combat (1 out of every 34).

The operation suffering the highest casualty rate was the assault on Beito Island in Tarawa Atoll. The 2nd Marine Divisions suffered 3,318 losses---18% of the landing force. The regiment that had the highest casualty rate was the 1st Marines on the island of Pelelie (15-22 Sept 1944) where it suffered 1,672 casualties.

During the 1,364 days, 5 hours and 44 minutes of World War II, the United States Marine Corps suffered:

Killed in Action = 15,161
Died of Wounds = 3,259
Wounded in Action = 67,207 (including those wounded more than once)
Missing in Action, Presumed Dead = 2,822
Killed or Died while Prisoners of War = 348
Prisoners of War = 2,274
Non-battle deaths in combat zones = 4,778

Naval Medical personnel attached to the Marines suffered the following:

Killed in Action = 1,681
Died of Wounds = 252
Wound in Action = 5,153
Missing in Action, Presumed Dead = 529
Prisoners of War = 28

During the war, the USMC earned

18 Presidential Unit Citations (Navy)
3 Presidential Unit Citations (Army)
35 Navy Unit Commendations

During the war, Marines earned
82 Medals of Honor (51 posthumously)
1,026 Navy Crosses
3,952 Silver Stars
606 Legion of Merit
354 Navy and marine Corps Medals
29 Soldiers Medal (Army)

Navy Medical personnel earned 7 Medals of Honor (3 posthumously), 66 Navy Crosses and 485 Silver Stars.

[Graebarde]

Came across this list....

The food supplies for a typical US Battleship for one week....

Beef, Frozen = 10,000lbs
Veal, Frozen = 2,000lbs
Ham, Smoked = 750lbs
Fish, Frozen = 500lbs
Spam = 250lbs
Potatoes, White = 9,000lbs
Potatoes, Sweet = 900lbs
Carrots = 1,500lbs
Lettuce, Iceberg = 1,200lbs
Tomatoes = 900lbs
Asparagus = 900lbs
Cucumbers = 850lbs
Celery = 600lbs
Rhubarb = 500lbs
Oranges = 1,900lbs
Lemons = 1,200lbs
Eggs = 1,500 dozen
Flour = 14,000lbs
Milk (fresh, condensed and powdered) = 2,200lbs
Seasonings and condiments = 700lbs
Ice Cream = 2,000lbs
Coffee = 4,000lbs

Something else!

Navy eats good that's for sure. Meanwhile the doggies ate K-rats.

[dragoon500ly]

Marine Order of Battle at Midway

Midway consists of two islands (Sand and Eastern) and its defenses were organized on these. On 4-5 June, 1942, there were 2,512 Marines (382 in MAG-22). All Marine, Navy and USAAF air units were at NAS, Midway on Eastern Island.

On Sand Island:
HQ and Service Battery, 6th Defense Battalion (Reinforced)
Batteries A and C (two 5-inch/51 each), Seacoast Artillery Group, 6th DB
7-inch Battery (provisional) (two 7-inch/45), SAG, 6th DB
3-inch Navy Battery (provisional) (two 3-inch/50 cd guns), SAG, 6th DB
One half of Battery G (Searchlight), 6th DB
22nd Provisional Marine Company (provided extra personnel for gun crews)
HQ, Detachment, 2nd Raider Battalion
Company C, 2nd Raider Battalion
Tank Platoon, 6th DB (five M-2A4 light tanks)
HQ, Antiaircraft Group, 6th DB
Battery D (four 3-inch AA guns), 3rd Defense Battalion
Batteries D & F (four 3-inch AA guns each), AAG, 6th DB
HQ, Special Weapons Group, 6th Defense Battalion
one half of Battery H, SWG, 6th DB (six .50 cal water-cooled AA guns)
one half of Battery I, SWG, 6th DB (six M-1917A1 .30 cal HMG)
one half of Battery K, SWG, 3rd DB (four 37mm AA guns)
one half of Battery L, SWG, 3rd DB (four 20mm AA guns)
Detachment, 407th Signal Company, Aviation (USAAF radio station)

On Eastern Island:
HQ, Seacoast Artillery Group, 6th Defense Battalion
Battery B (two 5-inch/51), SAG, 6th DB
7-inch Battery (Provisional) (two 7-inch/45), SAG, 6th DB
3-inch Navy Battery (Provisional) (two 3-inch/50 cd guns), SAG, 6th DB
23rd Provisional Marine Company (provided extra personnel for the gun crews)
Company D, 2nd Raider Battalion
HQ, Antiaircraft Group, 3rd Defense Battalion
Battery E (four 3-inch AA guns), AAG, 6th DB
Batteries E & F (four 3-inch AA guns ea), AAG, 3rd DB
one half of Battery H, SWG, 6th DB (six .50 cal water-cooled AA guns)
one half of Battery I, SWG, 6th DB (six M-1917A1 .30 cal HMG)
one half of Battery K, SWG, 3rd DB (four 37mm AA guns)
one half of Battery L, SWG, 3rd DB (four 20mm AA guns)

Japanese Opposition:
The 2nd Combined Special Landing Force consisted of 5,000 IJN/IJA personnel. The assault element was made up of the 1,250 Yokosuka 5th Special Navy Landing Force (to land on Sand Island) and the 1,200 Ichiki Force [28th Infantry Regiment, 7th Division] (and yes this is the same force that attacked the 1st Marine Division on Alligator Creek on Guadalcanal) who would land on Eastern Island. The IJN 11th and 12th Construction Battalions would provide support along with follow-up survey and weather groups. At least this was the plan for the June 7 landing.

Midway was attacked by 108 carrier aircraft (and claimed 53 shot down by AA guns and defending fighters; NOTE: this estimate may be a tad over the real losses). A submarine was damaged by Marine guns.

Came across a USMC site that states that Midway had two 7-inch gun batteries, each of two guns.

American air power at NAS, Midway consisted of:

Marine Aircraft Group 22
HQ Squadron 22
Service Squadron 22
Marine Fighting Squadron 221: 21 F2A-3 Buffalo (20 operational) and 7 F4F-3 Wildcat (6 operational)
Marine Scout-Bombing Squadron 241: 19 SBD-2 Dauntless (18 operational) and 21 SB2U-3 Vindicator (14 operational,
only 12 air crews)

USN
Patrol Squadron 23: 14 PBY-5 Catalina (13 operational, 11 dedicated to search, 2 to torpedo attack)
detachment, Patrol Squadron 44: 8 PBY-5A Catalina (7 operational, all dedicated to search)
detachment, Patrol Squadron 24: 6 PBY-5A Catalina (2 dedicated to search, 3 to torpedo attack)
detachment, Patrol Squadron 51: 3 PBY-5A Catalina, (2 dedicated to search, 1 to torpedo attack)
detachment, Torpedo Squadron Eight: 6 TBF-1 Avenger

USAAF
detachment, 349th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy): 1 B-17D photo recon
detachment, 42nd Bombardment Squadron (Heavy): 5 B-17E (4 operational)
detachment, 431st Bombardment Squadron (Heavy): 6 B-17E
detachment, 31st Bombardment Squadron (Heavy): 2 B-17E
detachment, 72nd Bombardment Squadron (Heavy): 1 B-17E
detachment, 18th Reconnaissance Squadron (Medium): 2 B-26 in torpedo attack role
detachment, 69th Bombardment Squadron (Medium): 2 B-26B in torpedo attack role

Finally,
Motor Torpedo Squadron One with PT-20, PT-21, PT-22, PT-24, PT-25, PT-26 and PT-27 at Midway

detachment, MTS1: PT-29 and PT-30 at Kure

at French Frigate Shoals: USS Clark, DD-361; USS Ballard, AVD-10 and USS Thorton, AV-12 (support for Catalinas)

At Pearl & Hermes Reef: USS Kaloli, AOG-13; USS Vireo, ATO-144 and USS Crystal, PY-25 (aviation fuel support)

At Lisianski: USS YP-284

At Gardner's Pinnacles: USS YP-345

At Necker Island: USS YP-350

At Laysan: USS YP-290

The YP or Yippies were converted fishing boats that were armed with a radio and perhaps a machinegun. Their job was to monitor the outlaying reefs/islands to insure that the Japanese didn't try to base floatplanes to support their operations against Midway. The presence of these outlaying ships played a little known part in that, by their very presence, prevented the Japanese from conducting long-range aerial reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor by staging seaplanes (refueled by subs) from these "tiny" rocks.

[Targan]

Gee, the Japanese stuffed up their planning for Midway then. Only twice as many invaders as defenders (not counting naval and air assets obviously). Generally a ratio of 3:1 attackers vs defenders is a bare minimum for any hope of success; 5:1 or better is preferable.

[copeab]

One common myth of the battle of Midway was the invasion of the wester Aleutians was a pointless diversion. This was not the case. Although of arguably dubious value to the Japanese, possessing Attu and Kiska interfered with the US shipping route to Russia via the North Pacific. While Japan was not at war with Russia at the time, she remembered the beating Russia delivered to her in the late 1930's near Mongolia.

So unknown were these defeats of Japan that Hitler was enraged when Japan did not attack eastern Russia after Barbarossa and he had no idea why. Neither did the rest of the world. Russia had humiliated the IJA (twice!) and japan really didn't want any more of them.

Of course, the forces used on the Aleutians would have been better deployed at Midway (perhaps as a 'norther carrier force'), but it was not a pointless diversion.

[RN7]

One common myth of the battle of Midway was the invasion of the wester Aleutians was a pointless diversion. This was not the case. Although of arguably dubious value to the Japanese, possessing Attu and Kiska interfered with the US shipping route to Russia via the North Pacific. While Japan was not at war with Russia at the time, she remembered the beating Russia delivered to her in the late 1930's near Mongolia.

So unknown were these defeats of Japan that Hitler was enraged when Japan did not attack eastern Russia after Barbarossa and he had no idea why. Neither did the rest of the world. Russia had humiliated the IJA (twice!) and japan really didn't want any more of them.

Of course, the forces used on the Aleutians would have been better deployed at Midway (perhaps as a 'norther carrier force'), but it was not a pointless diversion.

Probably the reason that nobody knew about the Japanese Army's defeat in Mongolia and Manchuria, was because Germany had invaded Poland at the very same time that the Russians were booting the Japanese out of Mongolia. In fact most of the Japanese military were probably unaware of it as well outside of the top brass and the troops directly involved in the fighting, as it wouldn't have done much for its wider reputation and morale considering the mauling the Red Army gave them. The bulk of Japan's Army was in China and Manchuria at this time along with much of its armoured forces and heavy artillery, and remained so even when they were fighting the Western Allies in the Pacific.

To some degree it is considered the reason why the Japanese Army was made to redirect its focus on the territories in South-East Asia and the Pacific Islands under the control of America, Britain, Vichy France and the Netherlands and Portugal, as the Japanese Navy had wanted. Previously the Japanese Army had wanted to annex Mongolia and the Soviet Far East and Siberia as far as Lake Baikal to consolidate its control of China and use the resources of the area. Unfortunately the Japanese Army wasn't the force it believed itself to be, as was shown when it came up against a well organised and fully mechanised opponent such as the Red Army. The poorly supplied and equipped Chinese and second line and over extended American, British and Dutch forces were a much easier target for them in 1941, and even then the Americans gave them a very tough time in the Philippines, and the British might have done so in Singapore and Malaya if they had been better led.

When the Japanese Army came up against well organised and supplied American and British Commonwealth forces in the Pacific Islands, New Guinea and Burma, they increasingly came off second best. The power of the Japanese Navy in the early war years, and the favourable terrain of the Pacific Theatre for Japanese Army tactics preserved their reputation for a while until America's military machine overwhelmed them. Had the Japanese Army taken on fully mechanised American or British forces which were based elsewhere at the time, on an equal footing in an inland campaign the result would probably have been the same as it was when they tried to take on the Red Army in 1939.

[copeab]

Probably the reason that nobody knew about the Japanese Army's defeat in Mongolia and Manchuria, was because Germany had invaded Poland at the very same time that the Russians were booting the Japanese out of Mongolia. In fact most of the Japanese military were probably unaware of it as well outside of the top brass and the troops directly involved in the fighting, as it wouldn't have done much for its wider reputation and morale considering the mauling the Red Army gave them.

And the Soviets, ever paranoid, weren't going to say anything

The bulk of Japan's Army was in China and Manchuria at this time along with much of its armoured forces and heavy artillery, and remained so even when they were fighting the Western Allies in the Pacific.

The major contribution of China to the war was tying down a significant portion of the IJA, which could have been better employed elsewhere.

When the Japanese Army came up against well organised and supplied American and British Commonwealth forces in the Pacific Islands, New Guinea and Burma, they increasingly came off second best.

Also, fighting in China in the 1930's taught the Japanese the absolutely wrong lessons about armored warfare and tank design.

Had the Japanese Army taken on fully mechanised American or British forces which were based elsewhere at the time, on an equal footing in an inland campaign the result would probably have been the same as it was when they tried to take on the Red Army in 1939.

Fortunately for the IJA, most of their Pacific possessions were poor tank country. Parts of the Philippines were an exception and where most of the few significant tank battles of the Pacific were fought, which ended up rather one-sided. Worth noting that Allied tanks that had become obsolete in North Africa and Europe (like the Matilda II and M-3 Stuart) were quite effective against Japanese armor.

[dragoon500ly]

Gee, the Japanese stuffed up their planning for Midway then. Only twice as many invaders as defenders (not counting naval and air assets obviously). Generally a ratio of 3:1 attackers vs defenders is a bare minimum for any hope of success; 5:1 or better is preferable.

The whole landing force operation was not very well considered. Naval gunfire support would be by four heavy cruisers, firing for roughly an hour. But as the USN would learn, naval rifles were not the ideal weapon in dealing with a dug in defender. The most likely result would have been shells hitting at a slight angle and ricocheting.

Any attempt to send landing craft up the ship channel would have run into four 7-inch, four 5-inch and at least eight 3-inch guns firing over open sights into a killing area less than a hundred yards wide. Chopped hamburger comes to mind.

If the Japanese landed on the edge of the reef, then they would have faced advancing across a fairly even surface of at least 500 yards, straight into interlocking machinegun fire. Wouldn't have mattered if they landed at high or low tide, since high tide over the reef still didn't give landing craft enough water to float over.

Finally, 6th Defense Battalion spent its time laying in multiple barbed wire barricades seeded with demolition charges and home-made AP mines. I've never found a definite answer on how many barricades were present, but reports that I've seen indicate at least two thick belts with numerous "channeling" barriers in between. But then there are eyewitness acounts of three to four barriers....in either case, it would have been almost impossible for the landing force to cut their way through under fire.

Most likely, the assault troops would have been cut to pieces, just getting to the wire, the IJN could have committed its construction battalions, but there is no indication that the landing force had anything heavier than the 70mm battalion guns (two supporting each island)...and the Marines had plans to use 37mm and 20mm AA guns to support the beach defenses...not to mention that platoon of tanks.

[dragoon500ly]

One common myth of the battle of Midway was the invasion of the wester Aleutians was a pointless diversion. This was not the case. Although of arguably dubious value to the Japanese, possessing Attu and Kiska interfered with the US shipping route to Russia via the North Pacific. While Japan was not at war with Russia at the time, she remembered the beating Russia delivered to her in the late 1930's near Mongolia.

So unknown were these defeats of Japan that Hitler was enraged when Japan did not attack eastern Russia after Barbarossa and he had no idea why. Neither did the rest of the world. Russia had humiliated the IJA (twice!) and japan really didn't want any more of them.

Of course, the forces used on the Aleutians would have been better deployed at Midway (perhaps as a 'norther carrier force'), but it was not a pointless diversion.

Ever since I read "Incredible Victory" as a young man, I was always puzzled by why the IJN went for the Attu/Kiska at the same time as Midway. Didn't the principle of mass mean that you hit the target with everything that you had

By all accounts, the northern operation had the goals of establishing a presence far enough out to threaten any US/Canadian operation against northern Japan and to get weather stations for better forecasting; another purpose was to convince the US Pacific Fleet to send major units north. At the time, Japan did not want to threaten any shipping heading into the USSR and thus giving Russia a chance to join the the Pacific War. Good, logical thinking. But it was the timing of the operation that hurt the Japanese more than anything else.

Just think how Midway would have been changed with the addition of two Japanese carriers

[dragoon500ly]

Fortunately for the IJA, most of their Pacific possessions were poor tank country. Parts of the Philippines were an exception and where most of the few significant tank battles of the Pacific were fought, which ended up rather one-sided. Worth noting that Allied tanks that had become obsolete in North Africa and Europe (like the Matilda II and M-3 Stuart) were quite effective against Japanese armor.

Not to mention that the 37mm antitank gun was still a deadly threat to Japanese tanks.

The only reason why the Matilda and Stuarts were replaced with Grant/Lee and Shermans was that their main armament was ineffective against bunkers.

[Legbreaker]

Worth noting that Allied tanks that had become obsolete in North Africa and Europe (like the Matilda II and M-3 Stuart) were quite effective against Japanese armor.

The Stuart was not highly regarded by Australians in the jungles, mainly because they were too highly geared and had to be kept in 1st most of the time. The Matildas on the other hand, although a much older design and completely outdated was generally loved (especially by the infantry nearby). With a top speed not much more than a man could comfortably jog, they were ideal for the slow movement of jungle fighting. Heavily armoured (compared to other AFVs of it's period) it was able to withstand almost all the AT weapons the Japanese had at their disposal. It's only real drawback was it's armament of the 2 pounder peashooter of a cannon which was never issued explosive rounds.

[dragoon500ly]

The Stuart was not highly regarded by Australians in the jungles, mainly because they were too highly geared and had to be kept in 1st most of the time. The Matildas on the other hand, although a much older design and completely outdated was generally loved. With a top speed not much more than a man could comfortably jog, they were ideal for the slow movement of jungle fighting. Heavily armoured (compared to other AFVs of it's period) it was able to withstand almost all the AT weapons the Japanese had at their disposal. It's only real drawback was it's armament of the 2 pounder peashooter of a cannon which was never issued explosive rounds.

Don't forget the other major drawback of the Stuart...it used aviation gasoline for fuel (due to the shortage of a decent tank engine, Wright Cyclone radial engines were mounted in many US designs).

Stuarts were also very vulernable to having metal rods thrust into their road wheels, the design had open spokes with external bracing, ideal for immobilizing the vehicle with something as simple as a piece of rebar.

[copeab]

Just think how Midway would have been changed with the addition of two Japanese carriers

Actually, things could have turned out quite differently had a single Japanese plane not suffered mechanical problems.

The floatplane that eventually first spotted the US forces was delayed a few hours because it needed repairs. Had it been launched on time, the Japanese could have gotten in a first strike well before the US.

Such are the things the fates of armies (and fleets) depend on.

[dragoon500ly]

Actually, things could have turned out quite differently had a single Japanese plane not suffered mechanical problems.

The floatplane that eventually first spotted the US forces was delayed a few hours because it needed repairs. Had it been launched on time, the Japanese could have gotten in a first strike well before the US.

Such are the things the fates of armies (and fleets) depend on.

Actually it wasn't the plane that needed repairs. While there is no official documents, there is a story that the Tone's catapult officer was fairly new to the job and that after launching one floatplane, had managed to damage the catapult.

Still...