Well, truth be told, the Soviets hold the bread-basket of Alaska by holding the Anchorage area. Not only do they have access to port facilities, but they've got rivers that have fairly large salmon runs each year, AND they have the Matanuska Valley for growing their own foods. So food isn't necessarily one of their problems.
Excellent points. And as mentioned in the un-quoted bits, where exactly is Eleventh Army going to go and for what reason By the same token, as they already own some of the best agricultural land in Alaska, it's easy to see the Soviets becoming quite conservative. If they were to push up to Fairbanks and lose big-time, they might lose the whole show. Given that the Soviets have lots to lose and comparatively little to gain by attempting to capture the rest of Alaska, it's not hard to see why they have allowed themselves to be penned into the Anchorage cantonment.
Originally posted by Grimace
So yes, while it might be hard for the Soviets, it would be even tougher on the Americans trying to hold the Soviets in.
No doubt. Perhaps the whole idea that US forces have the Soviets bottled up at Anchorage is a bit of a euphemism. A few shots exchanged now and again with the Americans would serve to justify keeping Eleventh Army right where it is. The illusion of modest pressure by the Americans might help keep the Soviets somewhat cohesive without there being major actions. In turn, the Americans might keep small groups in the Anchorage vicinity so they can feel that something is being done. As is suggested in US Army Vehicle Guide and Howling Wilderness, by 1999 the whole show may have devolved into a pretense in which the real focus is to hold what everyone has and make it through the next long winter.
Webstral
“We’re not innovating. We’re selectively imitating.” June Bernstein, Acting President of the University of Arizona in Tucson, November 15, 1998.
Communications (especially the lack of it) would influence the actions of Soviet commanders in Alaska too. If they were completely out of communication with a higher command I would imagine it would be an easier decision for the 11th Army commanders to just stay put and consolidate as best they can. If higher Soviet command did have communications with them they would be urging (or more likely flat out demanding) that the 11th Army maintain offensive operations.
By 2002 I think the Soviet forces in Alaska would be willing to cut a deal with US and Canadian commanders to withdraw back across the Bering Strait (if that was possible). Two things would make such a scenario more likely -
1: Word from Europe and the Middle East that the war in those regions had effectively ended (if there was any communication coming from those areas to Alaska at all) and;
2: Increasing numbers of Soviet units deserting, refusing orders or "going native".
sigpic "It is better to be feared than loved" - Nicolo Machiavelli
Comment