OT - Book (Non Fiction) Review/Recommendations Thread

[bobcat]

house to house by david bellavia is a very good book. great depictions of modern urban fighting. taken from real events in fallujah.

(of course you will notice the crazy guy what trained me is mentioned by name on page 78)

[Targan]

house to house by david bellavia is a very good book. great depictions of modern urban fighting. taken from real events in fallujah.

(of course you will notice the crazy guy what trained me is mentioned by name on page 78)

Indeed a good read (as I said in post #38 of this thread ). Depicts urban warfare as being a really intense, visceral activity. Obviously very nerve-wracking for the author.

[Graebarde]

I hope that's fiction!

Ooops.. yeah it's fiction... dang glasses LOL.. though I was posting in the fiction books.. sorry.

[ArmySGT.]

http://www.scribd.com/collections/2340844/WWII-American-TMs-and-FMs

[Rainbow Six]

Just finished "Outlaws Inc" by Matt Potter (isbn 9780283071379).

It details the activities of ex Soviet Air Force crews who turned to private enterprise after the end of the Cold War, flying cargos of varying legality around the World in ageing Ilyushins and Antonovs.

Highly recommended for anyone running a Merc: 2000 game.

[Adm.Lee]

Just finished "Outlaws Inc" by Matt Potter ...

Highly recommended for anyone running a Merc: 2000 game.

That sounds cool!

I'm about halfway thru "Lions of Kandahar: the story of a fight against all odds" by Maj. Rusty Bradley. It's an SF A-Team (with an Afghan company) south of Kandahar in the fall of 2006. So far, it's good, but not great. Standard "SF are awesome, Big Army just doesn't understand us" vibe is running through it.

[kota1342000]

Anyone running Mediterranean Cruise or Boomer might be interested in "Dangerous Ground" ISBN-10: 076530788X, and "Cold Choices" ISBN-10: 0765358468, both by Larry Bond. Both fiction both excellent backgound and detail for attack boats.

[Webstral]

Standard "SF are awesome, Big Army just doesn't understand us" vibe is running through it.

The Big Army doesn't get SF. It's not that the regulars can't get SF; however, the Army leadership is conditioned to deal with Joe. Joe is a good guy, but at the same time he generally sucks a**. He requires close supervision for virtually every task. Despite having volunteered, he generally behaves as though he was dragooned into service. His responsibilities mean little to him beyond the fact that he will suffer if he is caught not executing them. The spirit of the law is only to be observed when it comes to his privileges; otherwise, a stricter observance of the letter of the law than a tort lawyer could argue is the watchword. "I was told I couldn't go to the PX. No one said anything about the commissary or the bowling alley."

Of course, the other side of the coin is that the leadership has become so jaded from dealing with Joe that everything comes to revolve around the lowest common demoninator. Since in any body of soldiers larger than four someone is sure to become a drunken idiot if given a touch of liberty, no one can be given liberty. Since every application of UCMJ in my command (says a unit commander) jeopardizes my OER, the only reasonable solution is to prevent any and all misbehavior. Better to treat 100 men putting their lives on the line for the nation like untrustworthy children than let a single chowderhead take the heat for his own decisions. Grown men can only be treated like untrustworthy children for so long before they start to live up to the expectations of the leadership. The circle completes itself.

So I would argue that the Big Army doesn't get Special Forces because we're acculturated against tolerating or recognizing the behaviors that mark SF: initiative, judgment, commitment, recognizance.

[atiff]

I can't find the quote, but I believe it was a Civil War general who said something like "To understand that men are simply boys grown large, one must have commanded soldiers." Seems this idea of how large groups of men in uniform behave has been around for some time...

[Legbreaker]

So I would argue that the Big Army doesn't get Special Forces because we're acculturated against tolerating or recognizing the behaviors that mark SF: initiative, judgment, commitment, recognizance.

It really depends on the organisation. Over here in Australia, personal initiative, good judgement, commitment, and self control are highly desired traits in the junior ranks.
This isn't to say obedience and discipline aren't demanded, however the individual soldier is given the freedom to make their own decisions on most matters (and enough rope to hang themselves with if they're stupid with that freedom).

[Adm.Lee]

It really depends on the organisation. Over here in Australia, personal initiative, good judgement, commitment, and self control are highly desired traits in the junior ranks.
This isn't to say obedience and discipline aren't demanded, however the individual soldier is given the freedom to make their own decisions on most matters (and enough rope to hang themselves with if they're stupid with that freedom).

I think it comes down to command climate. No commander went wrong (it is believed) if he stuck to the regs. It is a lot easier than making judgement calls, and allowing subordinates the freedom to do what they need/want.

Anyway, I am reminded of a great quote about large organizations. "The Navy is a system designed by geniuses, to be operated by idiots." -- I forget the character's name, from The Caine Mutiny, by Herman Wouk.

[Matt W]

"Merchant of Death"

http://www.amazon.com/Merchant-Death-Money-Planes-Possible/dp/0470048662

Ideal for a Merc: 2000 campaign

[Adm.Lee]

That sounds cool!

I'm about halfway thru "Lions of Kandahar: the story of a fight against all odds" by Maj. Rusty Bradley. It's an SF A-Team (with an Afghan company) south of Kandahar in the fall of 2006.

I should have posted once I finished it. It was good, but not great. The author's team, with other teams and their Afghan allies, drove across a desert to form a backstop for 2+ Canadian mechanized battalions that were driving south from Kandahar. What happened was that the mechs got mired in built-up towns, while the teams blundered into the Taliban's training, HQ and marshaling area, stirring up a hornet's nest.

What I didn't like was that while the "foolish Big Army" vibe continued, I didn't detect much that the Canadians didn't do for the SF guys. The other bit that rubbed me wrong was that it was the author that always had the right answer to his commander's problems-- it seemed a bit self-promoting.

[Adm.Lee]

What it's like to go to war by Karl Marlantes.

Wow. The author has also written the novel Matterhorn, about a Marine lieutenant in Vietnam. This is his book on dealing with his own life, before during and after having been a Marine LT in Vietnam. He delves into myth, religion, psychology, spirituality, philosophy and more.

The main thrust is how screwed up he was after he got back (he actually did get spit on while in uniform), how he's come to terms with that, and what America and western society ought to do to accommodate warriors among them. It's stuff to head off or alleviate PTSD before and after battle, and to come to grips with it in the long term. It's also something that he wants policymakers to understand before making life & death decisions.

It's heady stuff, and I plan on reading it again someday.

[HorseSoldier]

Grown men can only be treated like untrustworthy children for so long before they start to live up to the expectations of the leadership. The circle completes itself.

I think that problem has been perennial in any military organization, at least judging by Kipling's "We aren't no thin red 'eroes, nor we aren't no blackguards too, But single men in barricks, most remarkable like you; . . . You talk o' better food for us, an' schools, an' fires, an' all: We'll wait for extry rations if you treat us rational."

So I would argue that the Big Army doesn't get Special Forces because we're acculturated against tolerating or recognizing the behaviors that mark SF: initiative, judgment, commitment, recognizance.

That would be my assessment, also, having done the gear shifting back from the land of the happy secret squirrels to the Big Army (or National Guard, anyway). I see a lot of NCOs who don't seem to grasp that trying to model yourself and your conduct on how your drill sergeant treated people in basic training doesn't make you a good NCO, it just marks you as a dolt who can't really analyze and assess how to get the best out your troops in grown-up land. This would probably be less galling if the same guys didn't tend to be the best and brightest -- on paper -- but who are really just the end result of an organization that has a seriously pathological love-hate relationship with initiative and autonomy.

(On the other hand, on the SF side of the house, if someone wanted to be a stereotypical Joe -- even on the support side -- he could usually be shown the door and found some new home if he didn't make midcourse corrections. In the Big Army, when Joe wants to be as dumb as he can be . . . well, then someone has to retard their response down to his level. Or revise the system so it's easier to separate the non-adaptors and duds, but I'm not holding my breath on that.)