In Defense of the Red Army

[Raellus]

I worked on the vehicle losses for the DC Group, in consultation with my compatriots... We did not use the current Iraq War, or the 1990 Persian Gulf War... the loss model was developed from statistical experience during world war II (although admittedly we had to make some judgement calls), additionally, we figured in recovery rates (from the Arab Israel Wars in 1967 and 1973), new vehicle delivery (based on the industrial mobilization chico mentioned above, and doctrinal industrial mobilization schedules), as well as field & depot battlefield vehicle recovery rates... in the previous mobilization for war document we touch on how crews would be replaced as that document details the number of recruits turned out on an annual basis (again based upon coldwar era mobilization doctrine), and specifies the armor training sites.

It may not be perfect, and grad school has interfered with my completing the other vehicle types and losses listed on the first page, but it's a start...

It's good to hear from you again, FF. I'm reassured that you're not using the Gulf Wars. The '73 Yom Kippur is probably a much better model, due to the various AT weapons fielded and the large tank v. tank engagements on the Golan Heights. It's like you've covered all of the salient factors in your modelling.

Thanks for posting your work for us to look at.

EDIT: Unfortunately, when I open the file, most of what I see is odd, scrambled characters. Darn it!

[kato13]

EDIT: Unfortunately, when I open the file, most of what I see is odd, scrambled characters. Darn it!

Right click the link -> "save link as" (or "save target as" or something similar)
then open.

That usually works. Again the DC group has impressed me with their thoroughness.

[fightingflamingo]

my main problem with using 1973 as a complete model is that the terrain even in the Golan (where at least it was hilly) was relatively open. Western Poland, and Germany have dense foliage which would interfere with wireguided systems, also the weather is generally crappier. I think the general physicality of the region (North Central Europe), has much closer engagement ranges (MBT vs MBT, as well as ATGM vs MBT).

Also of note NATO sent a team to Israel following the 1973 war to assess how the IDF handled battlefield recovery and return to service, as they really did an exceptional job, returning high numbers to knocked out tanks to service very, very quickly. But then that's why we've got ARV's right...

Thanks for the input...

[Raellus]

I've done a lot of reading on the Golan Heights tank battles c. '73. There were indeed some open areas with wide and long vistas, but a lot of the area's broken terrain (hills, ramps, draws, wadis, etc.) created very close engagement distances. The Sinai... now that was some wide open terrain (in general).

Anyway, I know what you're saying and I'm not trying to quibble.

I agree with your assessment that central Europe's terrain would create generally closer engagement ranges than found during the Yom Kippur War but in some ways that would favor the defender, creating more ambush opportunities and flank/rear shots. Also, rough terrain would, in some cases, dictate likely avenues of approach for AFVs, in effect channeling them into heavy defensive fires. These two factors would undoubtedly increase AFV attrition.

[Mohoender]

I'm coming late in that debate and everyone knows that I'm often defending the Russians. In fact, I don't really. However, I have a tendancy to distrust the western habit to underestimate Russia.

I have seen a lot of interesting thing but there are too things I wanted to say:

- Kato stated that the soviet economy was too weak and I think he is right. However, I would argue the same about our western societies and I'm not convinced that we could support a long war with a large ennemy.

- O'borg, talking of the IDF stated that their conscripts are highly motivated and, again, he is right. However, motivation is equally true for the Russians (and can compare to that of the IDF) as it only depends on how you present them the war. In 1812, Napoleon I was defeated by Russian peasants fighting for Mother Russia. In 1917, the Russian army was defeated by the Germans as they were fighting for the Czar. Four years later (after 2 years of fighting) these same soldiers (underequipped and outnumbered at least until late 1920) were defeating the largest world coalition of the time (White Russians, US, Japan, German, Czech, Poles, French, British..., all WW1 veterans) while attacked on four fronts (North, Poland, Ukraine and Siberia). They were fighting for Mother Russia and not for an obscure concept. In WW2, the Russians (losing 23 million soldiers, an amazing number) defeated Germany. Again Stalin was smart enough to call them in the defense of Mother Russia (not a word about communism). No people can accept so many dead without a true motivation. Then, my point is simple. When the Russians are fighting for Mother Russia they are highly motivated and very hard to defeat. Otherwise they are leasy and unreliable. In the case of T2K, they are indeed fighting again for Mother Russia as it is Germany which is the aggressor.

[fightingflamingo]

I've done terrain walks in both Sinai, and Golan when I was in Egypt as part of the MFO.
Regarding Sinai, the terrain in the immediate vicinity of the canal and the eastern shore, as well as the north coastal road are relatively open and good country for mounted warfare. However, the central and southern portions of the penninsula are very rugged, and not where I'd want to be riding... not that I prefer walking there as it's hot as hell, but it'd be safer.

Regarding Golan, I think we were on the same page as I wasn't as good as describing my opinion as I intended. In some spaces, the engagement ranges would be very close, and key avenues of approach are relatively easily covered there by the Wadi's, and draws, that allow you to drive into Irsrael proper of off the heights. I intended to infer that the reduced foliage cover, and the terrain (as apposed to the Northern European Plain), would change the character of any combat.

Regarding Poland, and defense, I believe that defense will pretty much always be in a more favorable position than an attacker, and we have discussed at length the fortified defensive belt on the eastern bank of the Oder. However, the terrain in Poland (wife's from Poland so I've travelled extensively there also), which is generally mixed cultivated farms, divided up by thin woodlines, with some deciduous forest, will be a mixed bag. IMHO the foliage there will allow aggressive dismounted infantry anti-armor hunter killer teams a great advantage (both offensively and defensively), which will also affect the outcome of armor engagements. I also think that the battlefield in europe will be come significantly more cluttered with debris generally, since the terrain is more cluttered to begin with (without taking into consideration the fact that the building density is way higher than either if the Arab-Israeli battlefields thus discussed. I think this clutter could significantly hamper the performance of older wireguided antiarmor systems employed at ground level by both sides.
Ultimately I think that the offensive in to Poland, is going to come down to two things. 1) the air situation over the battlefront, and the ability of NATO fixed and rotary wing CAS to support the offensive. 2) the abilty of NATO artillery to suppress WP ATGM systems and dismounted infantry.
We have some idea's regarding how this will be accomplished, but that is another thread, and I for one, would like to wargame the Oder Crossing before I comment on that at length.

[Raellus]

That's awesome that you've been able to walk parts of those battlefields.

Ultimately I think that the offensive in to Poland, is going to come down to two things. 1) the air situation over the battlefront, and the ability of NATO fixed and rotary wing CAS to support the offensive. 2) the abilty of NATO artillery to suppress WP ATGM systems and dismounted infantry.
We have some idea's regarding how this will be accomplished, but that is another thread, and I for one, would like to wargame the Oder Crossing before I comment on that at length.

Fair point.

It is sort of a topic for a new thread but I'd like to share my thoughts anyway.

1.) I think the European battlefield would be even deadlier for aircraft than it would be for AFVs. MANPADs and SPAAA would take a heavy toll of helicopter gunships. The Soviet's extensive and multilayered AAD network would give NATO fits. Sure, NATO was able to take out the Iraqi's AAD networks relatively easilty, and the Serbian's somewhat less so (although, IIRC, the Serbs were able to shoot down an F-117 with a Soviet made SAM), but those networks were poor imitations of what the Soviet' s would have had. A better model would be the Egyptian's network during the Yom Kippur war.

The popular media and the companies that manufacture combat aircraft and their weapon systems tend to portray modern air warfare as neat and tidy. NATO, especially, seems to put a lot of faith in BVR first kill ability. Yes, NATO has a technological edge in AWACs, combat aircraft, and missile systems, but only just a slight one. With hundred of aircraft in the air at once, AWAC would quickly break down. Contrary to popular belief, radars are neither all seeing nor all knowing. As recently as the '91 Gulf War, a flight of F-15s had trouble differentiating between a low flying MiG-25 and another flight of F-15s. They had to radio each other to waggle their wings to finally make a visual determination. At that point, any BVR edge is out the window. In a huge furball, a lot of NATOs technological advantages would dissappear. In fact, Soviet helmet mounted sights and aircraft-mounted IR seekers on the MiG-29 and SU-27 (the Soviets fielded these technologies first) would actually give a slight edge to the Soviet fighter pilots.

I think NATO's pilot training was clearly superior to the Soviets', though, so I still think NATO would have an overall advantage in air combat. The Soviet's numbers advantage would somewhat negate that, though. Overall, I think that the skies over central Europe would be particularly deadly for everyone involved, well before the TDM. This is one thing, IMO, that canon got dead on.

2.) IMPO, the Soviet's one clear cut edge, numbers notwithstanding, is artillery. I think NATO would lose a lot of its guns to Soviet counterbattery fire. The Red Army in the '80s still fielded artillery divisions and had gun and rocket systems dedicated exclusively to counterbattery fire.

This is one area where I think NATO's philosophy of technology trumping numbers is the most flawed. MLRS is awesome, but their simply aren't enough of them to negate the Soviet's massive fleets of BM-21s and BM-27s. The respective counter battery radars aren't that different in terms of their capabilities. The Soviet's venerable D30 howitzers are just as capable as the american's M117. The Soviets fielded a lot more large calibre guns (and mortars) than NATO and most of their guns (of all calibres) had a range advantage.

I think NATO counted on taking out Soviet batteries from the air, assuming the establishment of air superiority. I believe this was wishful thinking, on at least two counts. First, I don't think NATO could have achieved anything more than brief, local air superiority. Second, I think Soviet AAD systems would make hitting artillery positions a deady mission for NATO pilots.

I guess all of this reflects my skepticism regarding the ability of technology (as the primary causal factor) to win modern wars.

Mo, I think you're right on concerning the Soviet soldier. They may not be as educated or technologically astute as their western counterparts but, if properly motivated, they are tough, resourceful fighters. By most accounts, the average Soviet citizen is better suited to the privations of life on the battlefied than the average western soldier.

[chico20854]

1.) I think the European battlefield would be even deadlier for aircraft than it would be for AFVs. MANPADs and SPAAA would take a heavy toll of helicopter gunships. The Soviet's extensive and multilayered AAD network would give NATO fits. Sure, NATO was able to take out the Iraqi's AAD networks relatively easilty, and the Serbian's somewhat less so (although, IIRC, the Serbs were able to shoot down an F-117 with a Soviet made SAM), but those networks were poor imitations of what the Soviet' s would have had. A better model would be the Egyptian's network during the Yom Kippur war.

The popular media and the companies that manufacture combat aircraft and their weapon systems tend to portray modern air warfare as neat and tidy. NATO, especially, seems to put a lot of faith in BVR first kill ability. Yes, NATO has a technological edge in AWACs, combat aircraft, and missile systems, but only just a slight one. With hundred of aircraft in the air at once, AWAC would quickly break down. Contrary to popular belief, radars are neither all seeing nor all knowing. As recently as the '91 Gulf War, a flight of F-15s had trouble differentiating between a low flying MiG-25 and another flight of F-15s. They had to radio each other to waggle their wings to finally make a visual determination. At that point, any BVR edge is out the window. In a huge furball, a lot of NATOs technological advantages would dissappear. In fact, Soviet helmet mounted sights and aircraft-mounted IR seekers on the MiG-29 and SU-27 (the Soviets fielded these technologies first) would actually give a slight edge to the Soviet fighter pilots.

I think NATO's pilot training was clearly superior to the Soviets', though, so I still think NATO would have an overall advantage in air combat. The Soviet's numbers advantage would somewhat negate that, though. Overall, I think that the skies over central Europe would be particularly deadly for everyone involved, well before the TDM. This is one thing, IMO, that canon got dead on.

A few thoughts on the situation in the air. First, the Pact had an integrated air defense system. That means, for example, that the Polish PVO was concentrated along the Baltic coast, especially in the west, and then in depth as area defenses around industrial and politically important cities. When East Germany leaves the Pact and turns its radars & SAMs east (or at least off, either by design or because the crews are defending their sites on the ground) the integrated system is left with a massive hole. The Pact is forced to quickly throw up an alternative system, which they can do but will be less effective than the pre-existing fixed system, and the assets that are used to do so will not be available to perform their intended role defending forces in the field or some other portion of the Fatherland.

One thing to keep in mind is the distinction between development of Soviet high-tech weapons and their widespread fielding throughout the Pact. There are only four regiments of Su-27 in the west - most of the Su-27s are assigned to the PVO, defending the USSR's borders. The Pact allies had limited SPAA (even a Soviet division has only 16 Shilkas), with most of the Polish army having ZU-23-2s without radars on trucks and SA-7s in limited numbers as their sole air defense.

As to historical examples, I think the 1990s IRL are fairly indicative. The F-117 that the Serbs downed was a hangar queen whose bomb-bay doors were stuck open after its bombing run and it ran the same egress route for 3 nights in a row, giving the Serbs plenty of time to move several SA-3 batteries under its flight path and firing volleys almost blind. The greatest losses in 1973 were due to the fielding of a new, previously unknown system - the SA-6 - which dropped off quite quickly once effective countermeasures were developed.

As far as AWACS and the possible outcomes of large numbers of aircraft in action, I don't see it as that likely. Having hundreds of aircraft on the orbat and launching hundreds of aircraft at the same time are vastly different. In Central Europe air operations will be 24 hours a day, 7 days a week for months on end. At this point other issues begin to trump things like performance of AAMs and radars. Logistics rears its ugly head once again. What are the stockpiles of modern AAMs like How many missions a day can ground crew maintain for weeks on end How many spare parts are there Are replacement pilots forthcoming How rapidly can replacement ground radars be produced and emplaced I see both sides having serious issues with these problems - the Pact, for example, has most of its aviation maintenance performed by junior officers, and has been in combat for over a year by the time war breaks out in the west (which has depleted stockpiles of parts and munitions but also allowed some industrial mobilization). On the other hand, the Luftwaffe is probably in pretty bad shape after fighting unassisted for 2 months.

The real decider of the war in the air very well might turn out to be the battle of the airfields. The Soviets would likely start to throw Scuds or their more modern replacements, probably with persistent chemical agents, at NATO's airfields at some point prior to the start of the tactical nuclear exchange. At the same time, NATO deep penetrator fighter-bombers - F-15E, F-111 and Tornado - would be gunning for Pact airfields, especially in Poland and Czechoslovakia (the MiG-29 having really short legs). Rough field and highway operations are hard to sustain long term - there's only so much complex maintenance that can be performed in a tent, and the autobahns are desperately needed to move supplies forward to the troops in contact.

I agree, the end result is likely to be that the air over Poland is pretty clear by the early summer of 1997. LOTS of aircraft losses.

2.) IMPO, the Soviet's one clear cut edge, numbers notwithstanding, is artillery. I think NATO would lose a lot of its guns to Soviet counterbattery fire. The Red Army in the '80s still fielded artillery divisions and had gun and rocket systems dedicated exclusively to counterbattery fire.

This is one area where I think NATO's philosophy of technology trumping numbers is the most flawed. MLRS is awesome, but their simply aren't enough of them to negate the Soviet's massive fleets of BM-21s and BM-27s. The respective counter battery radars aren't that different in terms of their capabilities. The Soviet's venerable D30 howitzers are just as capable as the american's M117. The Soviets fielded a lot more large calibre guns (and mortars) than NATO and most of their guns (of all calibres) had a range advantage.

I think NATO counted on taking out Soviet batteries from the air, assuming the establishment of air superiority. I believe this was wishful thinking, on at least two counts. First, I don't think NATO could have achieved anything more than brief, local air superiority. Second, I think Soviet AAD systems would make hitting artillery positions a deady mission for NATO pilots.

I guess all of this reflects my skepticism regarding the ability of technology (as the primary causal factor) to win modern wars.

The Soviets have a truly massive artillery park. Each Front has an artillery division, each army has at least one artillery and one MRL brigade. During the pause before Advent Crown this artillery park will get dug in and targets pre-registered, with mountains of ammo dumped next to each piece. Some NATO corps have almost comparable levels of artillery assigned, although there is no NATO counterpart to the front-level divisions.

NATO's biggest hope has to be the technology - more ICM and FASCAM rounds, better counterbattery radar, fewer towed guns in Central Europe (at least in comparison to the Soviets as a proportion of guns). Shoot-n-skoot gets real tiring real fast (I "jumped" 8+ times a day for a week on exercises when I was in a SP artillery battalion - and that was the service battery, the guns moved much more - and it gets old quick!). Most importantly, though, is the digital fire control systems that allow NATO to get the guns on target faster and move before the Soviets can react. (The aerial equivalent is KAL flight 007, when the 747 overflew the Kamchakta peninsula unhindered and was only intercepted over Sakhalin). I don't think the US army ever put a whole lot of faith into tactical aviation as a counterbattery tool - the development of the helicopter gunship was essentially a reaction to the perceived failure of (and lack of interest in) the USAF in providing adequate CAS in Vietnam. The emphasis on CAS seems to have been on massed armor, with counterbattery performed by artillery (and in mobile operations reaction time matters more than range - if you can deploy a battery of M-109s 10 km from a D-30 battery who cares if the D-30 can outrange you if the M-109s fire first!) As far as Pact AAA defending individual batteries, the force structure isn't there, with 5 batteries of SAMs in a division and a regiment/brigade at army and Front level. In the west its unlikely to see the masses of small-medium caliber AAA that the North Koreans or Iraqis were able to mass - those nations received the guns cast off by the Pact armies when they upgraded to SAMs.

Fundamentally, I agree on the limitations of technology to win wars. I believe that the limitations of logistics (supply, transportation, maintenance, infrastructure and industrial capacity) and the nexus of force structure with technology, morale/organization/training and mass are the prime factors that determine the outcome. And in Europe in 1996-7 those factors are greatly tested on both sides.

[Raellus]

I guess I need to find some articles on Soviet AAD doctrine. Maybe I've been too focused on the dizzying array of SAM systems that the Soviets were fielding during the late '80s instead of how they were to be used operationally. The fact that each Soviet division, corps, army, front, etc. had their own subordinate AAD assets lends to the picture that the Soviet AAD network would be both deep and comprehensive. Perhaps this is misleading.

Whereas the U.S. army basically fielded just a few SAM systems- Stinger/Avenger, Vulcan (retired in the early '90s), Hawk (ditto), and Patriot- the Soviets had nearly a dozen operational SAM and AAA systems. To some degree, this was a reaction to the limitations (perceived or real) of some of those systems but, to my understanding, it was also an attempt to cover all of the bases (low, medium, high altitude, various ranges, various types of homing, etc.). I don't think U.S. army divisions had any organic AA other than Stinger/Avenger and Vulcan. Given Patriot's somewhat blotchy combat record (including shooting down a few coalition aircraft in the First Gulf War)*, it just seems that the Red Army placed a much greater emphasis on ground-based air defense systems and operations. Heck, WTO armies still trained their infantry in engaging low flying aircraft with their personal small arms.

As always, please correct me if I'm wrong on any counts. I'm always open to learn!

*This is another case in point regarding the limits of military technology and the deadliness of the modern aerial battlefields.

[fightingflamingo]

FYI - when I went to Basic in the early 1990's here in the US, we were still trained to engage low flying aircraft with massed small arms...

[Webstral]

FYI - when I went to Basic in the early 1990's here in the US, we were still trained to engage low flying aircraft with massed small arms...

Small arms can do the trick. They just have to get some hits. Technically, the roof-mounted MG on most MBT is for air defense. Whether trying to hit a fast-mover with small arms is a good use of ammunition is another question entirely.

Webstral

[avantman42]

Small arms can do the trick. They just have to get some hits. Technically, the roof-mounted MG on most MBT is for air defense. Whether trying to hit a fast-mover with small arms is a good use of ammunition is another question entirely.

A friend of mine was in the Falklands, on an unarmed RFA ship. Apparently when the Argentinian aircraft came over, the helicopter flight deck would be full of marines and sailors firing SLRs, and anything else they could get their hands on, at the aircraft. They were credited with a single kill. Can't remember which ship it was, but I think it may have been the Fort Austin.

[Raellus]

I've been reading a lot lately about the Red Army of WWII and it's gotten me thinking about the Red Army of T2K again.

War Economy and Armaments Production

I'm not an economist so I admit that I don't fully understand the economic factors leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late '80s/early '90s. My understanding is that the proximal cause of the collapse was attempts to at implementing reforms to "Westernize" the Soviet economy. Perhaps if this had not occured, or had been quickly reversed, the Soviet command economy could have held on.

In WWII Soviet Union's command economy enabled them to increase armaments production steadily throughout the war, even when they were forced to rellocate armaments factories out of the path of the advancing German army in 1941 and '42. The overall Soviet economy was by no means very healthy in 1941. By most accounts, Stalin's Five Year Plans almost led to the entire system's collapse. However, centralized party control of the war industries allowed their rapid mobilization and incredible production rates.

The modern West's privately owned, dispersed, decentralized armaments industries, with dozens of subcontractors producing various components, seems more like the WWII German system which simply couldn't keep up.

One could argue that the T2K Soviet Union's war industries would have been well underway in ramping up production by the time the Germans reunified by force in order to support the war in China. Could the Soviet's afford it

Tank Design

By all accounts, the T-34 was a fairly crude tank design when compared to the overly sophisticated Panther or Tiger designs employed by Germany. However, their simplicity and reliability allowed them to be produced and employed in far greater numbers than the more complex, expensive German tanks. I see a direct parallel here between the T-34 and the modern Soviet MBTs based on the T-72 design. It is not as sophisticated or effective as modern western MBTs but it is easier, cheaper, and faster to produce than a Leopard II, Challenger 2, or M1A1. Even before the outset of the war in Europe, the Soviets enjoyed a favorable correlation of forces. One could argue that this correlation of forces would become even more favorable to the Soviets as time wore on.

The historical parallel extends to the Soviet AF as well. In WWII, the Soviet AF was nearly wiped out on the ground in the first few days of Operation Barbarossa. The Germans had complete or local air superiority through the winter of '42 and, sometimes, even after. But, once again, the Soviets proved that they could replace their lost aircraft while the Germans could not.

Operational Experience

The Red Army of '41 was largely incompetent, in almost every aspect of modern (at that time) warfare. Yet, it was able to take advantage of Germany's logistical difficulties, trading space (and lives) for time, while gaining valuable operational experience.

Regardless of whether your T2K timeline includes a Gulf War or not, the Soviet Army of Twilight '97 would have nearly a year's experience in large-scale mechanized manouver warfare in China, in addition to experience gained so painfully in Afghanistan throughout the '80s. They would also have gained experience in all facets of air warfare.

Furthermore, when Germany unifies and, with U.S. support, drives into Eastern Europe, the Soviets could trade its buffer states' soil for time to build up significant operational reserves (new production, newly mobilized units, and veteran mechanized formations transferred from China) in order to mount a strategic counteroffensive against worn-down, encroaching NATO armies nearing the end of their logistically umbilical cords.

In WWII, the Soviets became experts in soaking up German offensive, attriting their best, attacking divisions, and then launching devastating operational and strategic counteroffensives. This could be seen as early as Moscow in the winter of '41-'42, then more spectacularly at Stalingrad a year later and Kursk, the summer after.

Canon describes NATO as able to meet and defeat early Soviet counter offensives in Europe, prompting the Soviets to use tactical nuclear weapons for the first time in the West. This implies that the Soviets were simply not good enough to meet NATO on a conventional footing. I believe there is an alternative to this explanation.

Soviet Strategy

Having already used tactical nuclear weapons to great effect in the East, and having suffered little in the way of retaliation in kind, the Soviets would be greatly tempted to use tac-nukes again in the west. Repeating their previous success would be argument enough for those more hawkish members of the Soviet political and military high command.

I'd like to add a second, political motivation as well. I believe it stands to reason that the Soviets wanted to send a message to its E. European client states. In the wake of E. Germany's treachery, the Soviets may be worred about the loyalty of the rest of the WTO. Using nukes on E. German and Polish soil would send a powerful message that disloyalty could be punished by total destruction. On the other hand, NATO retaliation in kind could be used as a powerful propaganda tool in a sort of carrot and stick approach. To the average Pole or Czech whose city was destroyed by NATO nukes, it would matter very little who "started it". If the Soviet's intelligence apparati detected/suspected other allies were preparing to follow in E. Germany's footsteps, a nuclear option could quickly squash such treason.

So perhaps the Soviet's first use nukes in Europe has less to do with NATO's conventional military superiority and more to do with broader strategic and political considerations.

[Mohoender]

Raellus you have put up here (IMO) some great ideas and some very accurate ones. My comments are, therefore, nothing like critics but they are only inteded to reinforce a point I think well made. Anyone, there is no politics behind it.

War Economy and Armaments Production
I'm not an economist so I admit that I don't fully understand the economic factors leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late '80s/early '90s. My understanding is that the proximal cause of the collapse was attempts to at implementing reforms to "Westernize" the Soviet economy. Perhaps if this had not occured, or had been quickly reversed, the Soviet command economy could have held on.

It might be very true and it is more than possible that Reagan/Bush policies (1982-1991) tricked them into it.

The overall Soviet economy was by no means very healthy in 1941. By most accounts, Stalin's Five Year Plans almost led to the entire system's collapse. However, centralized party control of the war industries allowed their rapid mobilization and incredible production rates.

This is even an understatement. Stalin's political/military purges (more than the Plan itself which was not implemented) weakened the soviet union as never before. Technical teams had been disbanded, leading strategist (Toukhatchevski) was killed, 2 Field Marshall remained out of at least 50, Stalin delayed the mechanization/motorization programs that were well underway to refocus on the artillery (Stalin was an artillery officer). His purge had virtually destroyed the animal care system that existed and the red army was lacking in horses (millions of horses had been killed or let to die because of unproper care in the late 1930's and because of the purge: collateral casualties).

Tank Design
By all accounts, the T-34 was a fairly crude tank design when compared to the overly sophisticated Panther or Tiger designs employed by Germany. However, their simplicity and reliability allowed them to be produced and employed in far greater numbers than the more complex, expensive German tanks. I see a direct parallel here between the T-34 and the modern Soviet MBTs based on the T-72 design. It is not as sophisticated or effective as modern western MBTs but it is easier, cheaper, and faster to produce than a Leopard II, Challenger 2, or M1A1. Even before the outset of the war in Europe, the Soviets enjoyed a favorable correlation of forces. One could argue that this correlation of forces would become even more favorable to the Soviets as time wore on.

True but the T-34 was not so much a crude tank (It was also well in advanced to any world production in 1941 and was matched by no one). It will take two years for Germany to compete. In addition the simple design allowed for easy cheap upgrade going from T-34m41 to T-34m43 to T-34m44 (85mm Gun). A main difference in T2K would be that the west would already have competing designs.

The historical parallel extends to the Soviet AF as well. In WWII, the Soviet AF was nearly wiped out on the ground in the first few days of Operation Barbarossa. The Germans had complete or local air superiority through the winter of '42 and, sometimes, even after. But, once again, the Soviets proved that they could replace their lost aircraft while the Germans could not.

I'll contradict you partly on that one. What you say is true but the problem was not that of the aircraft. Many were indeed out of dates and outmatched but they also met with the most success. However, for a time the newer models proved no matched because of their week points and crew inexperience. Converting from one aircraft to another need time and work investments. The other problem came from the taking over of eastern Poland. Before that events, the RKKA had several airfield well located and well supplied close to the front. When the Red army moved to Poland in early 1940 the frontal aviation couldn't compete anymore. The building of new fields was underway but it was only in its infancy when Germany attacked. That is a problem Russia wouldn't have in T2K (as actually stated in Canon).

Operational Experience
The Red Army of '41 was largely incompetent, in almost every aspect of modern (at that time) warfare. Yet, it was able to take advantage of Germany's logistical difficulties, trading space (and lives) for time, while gaining valuable operational experience.

I'll be more hard on that one because it is a western world legend that has no solid ground to it. Actually, the Red Army of 1941 was full of largely competent officers. The problem was that Stalin Purges had killed tens of thousand of high ranking officers (including almost all field marshall but the two least competent, most army commanders and corps commanders). The younger officers were very good (almost as good as the German ones but they lacked the knowledge to conduct large field operation: this is that field of experience that they had to learn). However, they were highly innovative and the Red army had developped strategies that were soon brought back to life (Parachutist by 1936, Mechanized corps, Cavalry/Army collaboration...). Likewise, while German soldiers were not equipped for the winter of 1941, the soviet trooper was not dying from the cold (Probably thanks to the Finnish war a year earlier). Another problem for the Red army was that of the too influencial political officers who could disrupt proper field command (by early 1942, as he did between 1919-1921, Stalin had understood it and they were loosing ground).

Soviet Strategy
I'd like to add a second, political motivation as well. I believe it stands to reason that the Soviets wanted to send a message to its E. European client states. In the wake of E. Germany's treachery, the Soviets may be worred about the loyalty of the rest of the WTO.

I don't want to criticize your reasoning here (nothing to critic in fact) but E.German treachery is a v1.0 canon assesment which (IMO) is their worse misunderstanding of the Warsaw Pact at the time (also it makes perfect sense in a game and they certainly didn't have the information available to us 20 years later). In fact (IRL) and up to 1989, The E.German army was and remained the most faithful component of the Warsaw Pact. The treachery was not on the side of E.Germany but on the side of Russia (Gorbatchev). When events started in Germany prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the E.German army asked for Russian backing in crushing the protesters. Basically, Moscow refused and told them they were on their own. It's only when they had lost faith in their Russian ally that the E.German turned to the West.

On the other hand, a real treachery came from the Czech Republics and Hungary who had allowed earlier east german citizens to cross to the west through their borders (fairly logical when you remember the 1956 and 1968 events). Earlier, several treacheries had been done by Poland (Polish communists sending classified information to the West from time to time) but that was not the case in 1989. An important point to Poland would and remained for long its fear of Germany (They feared the Russians a little less).

Bulgaria was the other faithfull ally and could have remain so even to these days if history had taken another path.

Romania is entirely different matter which would deserve more thinking nad more knowledge than I have.

Internaly, outside of the Baltic Republics everything could have stayed in place if Gorbatchev (or anyone else) had been able to come up with some true politics (IMO of course).

[Raellus]

This debate's kind of flared up again in the Iraq thread and so I'd like to un-hijack that thread and revive the debate over here (if anyone's interested).

In order for the v1.0 alternative history to work, one must reconcile the collapse of the Soviet system/Union IRL with its survival in the v1.0 timeline.

I believe that an adequate explanation is a [hypothetical] discovery of large oil and natural gas deposits in the eastern USSR, along the frontier with the PRC, in the mid-to-late '80s. This would both allow the Soviet command economy to remain solvent (and perhaps add an influx of hard currency from exports) and create a causus belli for the canonical war with the PRC. An economic revival would also allow the Soviet military to modernize its major platforms and improve the training of its soldiers, sailors, and airmen. This would make the Red Army a more formidable force, more in line with what the v1.0 timeline describes.