In Defense of the Red Army

[John Farson]

Well, anyone who's been reading my Finnish Sourcebook translation knows that the guys who did the Finnish version solved the issue by putting the POD in late 1993, after the Duma rebellion against Yeltsin (which is when the book was published). After that, things get worse and worse in Russia until the nationalists and militarists seize power in a coup d'etat, resulting in one Vladimir Zhirinovsky becoming president.

Nowadays he's mostly forgotten, but back in the early 1990s he really made a lot of folks worry with his, uh, "interesting" speeches, particularly here in Finland. In the book I see him as a character similar to Greg Stillson (from the Dead Zone) or Robert L. Booth (the last President of the United States, from the Judge Dredd books): a president who starts World War III out of psychosis (Stillson) and/or dumb macho posturing and overconfidence in his own capabilities (Booth).

Although v.1.0 and v.2.2 were the original works, for me the Finnish Sourcebook will always be the "real" Twilight 2000 because that's what got me into Twilight 2000 in the first place. I'm certain this is the case for those who first got to know v.1.0 or v.2.2.

[Adm.Lee]

I believe that an adequate explanation is a [hypothetical] discovery of large oil and natural gas deposits in the eastern USSR, along the frontier with the PRC, in the mid-to-late '80s. This would both allow the Soviet command economy to remain solvent (and perhaps add an influx of hard currency from exports) and create a causus belli for the canonical war with the PRC. An economic revival would also allow the Soviet military to modernize its major platforms and improve the training of its soldiers, sailors, and airmen. This would make the Red Army a more formidable force, more in line with what the v1.0 timeline describes.

I forget, did we address Tom Clancy's scenario start from "The bear and the dragon" That had not just oil & gas, but a gold strike appearing in Siberia, which drew the attention of the Chinese (and their Japanese investors). No comment on the rest of the book, just this element.

[GDWFan]

Third World War

This thread makes me wish I was gaming out the twilight war with the DC group haha.

Third World War was the first board game I ever bought and played myself.
Wish they made a modern Advanced Third Reich.

[sglancy12]

Well, anyone who's been reading my Finnish Sourcebook translation knows that the guys who did the Finnish version solved the issue by putting the POD in late 1993, after the Duma rebellion against Yeltsin (which is when the book was published). After that, things get worse and worse in Russia until the nationalists and militarists seize power in a coup d'etat, resulting in one Vladimir Zhirinovsky becoming president.

While Russia under Zhirinovsky could have threatened the former states of the USSR and even Finland, such as state would have existed during the same period of economic catastrophe that characterized the Yeltsin era. Such as state could instigate a doomed program of conquest, but they'd flounder. Even if the anemic Russian armed forced of the mid-1990s manage to over-run a few former Soviet republics, the international forces arraigned against them would be so great that the desperate Zhirinovsky government would quickly turn to nuclear weapons in an attempt to avoid defeat.

And what would that get us

A nuclear war Yep.

An end of modern civilization Yep.

A post war environment conducive to role playing MMMMmmaybe Depends on the size of the nuclear exchange.

But it wouldn't give us Twilight 2000.

When it comes to preserving things about TW2K, the main thing I want to preserve is the character of the war. The Twilight War is a conventional war of attrition where victory seems so tantalizingly close that no one is willing to risk total annihilation by using nuclear weapons. Instead, as desperation rises, we start small, nuclear war becomes the "Death of 1,000 Cuts" rather than the extinction of humanity you'd get from a full commitment of nuclear forces. Zhirinovsky was the kind of guy who would have unrealistic goals far beyond Russia's ability to achieve, and then would petulantly opt to destroy the world rather than fail. I just don't think a Zhirinovsky taking the reigns in 1993 would create a playable rpg universe. I think he'd create a radioactive graveyard.

A. Scott Glancy, President TCCorp, dba Pagan Publishing

[sglancy12]

In order for the v1.0 alternative history to work, one must reconcile the collapse of the Soviet system/Union IRL with its survival in the v1.0 timeline.

I believe that an adequate explanation is a [hypothetical] discovery of large oil and natural gas deposits in the eastern USSR, along the frontier with the PRC, in the mid-to-late '80s. This would both allow the Soviet command economy to remain solvent (and perhaps add an influx of hard currency from exports) and create a causus belli for the canonical war with the PRC. An economic revival would also allow the Soviet military to modernize its major platforms and improve the training of its soldiers, sailors, and airmen. This would make the Red Army a more formidable force, more in line with what the v1.0 timeline describes.

For that to work two other things would have to happen:

First the economic boom would have to happen fairly early.. you suggest as early as the mid 1980s. That way there would be enough time for the newly discovered minerals and fossil fuels to be discovered, exploited and brought to market. But, if the newly discovered resources are the casus belli for the Sino-Soviet war, wouldn't that mean the war would happen earlier than the canon Would ten years really pass before the situation came to a head

Second, for the casus belli to hold off for 7-10 years the resources must be located somewhere in dispute between the USSR and the PRC. The conflict must escalate for years, finally breaking into a full-scale war in 1995.

That leaves two areas as likely locations for the new resources. One is the area of the Soviet Far East south of the Amur River and north of Vladivostok. That area was taken from China in 1858. For a country as old as China, that's a tick of the clock. If the resources are there, and China is in desperate economic straits, China could start claiming that land as theirs. Of course that means that when the Sino-Soviet War starts, it is the Chinese who are forcing the situation, even if the Soviets strike preemptively they are still doing so to preserve the territorial integrity of the USSR in the face of Chinese aggression. Makes things a bit more morally ambiguous if the US is supporting the Chinese efforts to steal a chunk of the Soviet Far East.

The other, more interesting area would be Mongolia. Now, Mongolia is beyond the borders of the USSR, but the government there is the USSR's oldest client state. If the resources were found there, the USSR would be able to put great pressure on the Mongolian communists to allow the Soviets to reap the greatest percentage of the rewards from any joint exploitation of the resources. Mongolia was only lost to China in 1911 (and briefly brought back under Chinese rule before it was lost permanently in 1920). That's only 75 years ago. When China sees all the mineralogical treasures under Mongolia, the may start meddling in Mongol politics, trying to woo the Mongolian government over to China, promising a fairer division of the spoils.

As Mongolia starts to favor China perhaps the Soviet Group of Forces in Mongolia are used to overthrow the government and install a puppet regime. China declares it's commitment to defend Mongolian sovereignty (while secretly planning to annex the place). Tensions mount, forces are built up at the borders, and in 1995 the Soviets launch a preemptive attack to destroy China's ability to take control of Mongolia...

... and you're back on track for ver1 canon.

The only other thing that needs to be considered is whether Mikael Gorbachev is going to be around during this. If he is, it's going to get the ver 1 canon off track again. Gorbachev allowed the WTO members states to go their own ways. That non-interference in the late 80s means no German Reunification crisis. Without that crisis there's no war in Europe without making more changes to the time-line. Now you're off track again.

For the "New Resource" fix of ver1 canon to work, Glasnost, Peristroika and the Gorbachev agenda can never have reached the Kremlin. It's fairly easy to imagine that either Gorbachev never makes it into the Politburo, or never becomes the Secretary General of the CPSU.

... and you're back on track again for ver1 canon.


A. Scott Glancy, President TCCorp, dba Pagan Publishing

[kato13]

First the economic boom would have to happen fairly early.. you suggest as early as the mid 1980s. That way there would be enough time for the newly discovered minerals and fossil fuels to be discovered, exploited and brought to market. But, if the newly discovered resources are the casus belli for the Sino-Soviet war, wouldn't that mean the war would happen earlier than the canon Would ten years really pass before the situation came to a head

I have the oil/gold discovered in - 1982

First profits from Gold in - 1984

First Sale of oil to Japan in - 1988

Economy fully stabilizes and expand rapidly - 1989

Japan expands Chinese investment by threefold 1993 (this happened in real life)

Japanese/Chinese Oil Exploration teams discover equivalent/larger oil fields on the Chinese side of a disputed border -1994

Faced with the reduction of their much needed profits in oil sales to Japan "disputed" borders become "conflicted" - 1995

I honestly never spent the time working out a location but given the 6 years to build a pipeline, that would probably be the limiting factor. The Alaskan Pipeline (800 miles / 1,287 km) was built in 4 years.

[Legbreaker]

Would discovery of a large amount of oil cause problems for the post nuke period

[kato13]

Would discovery of a large amount of oil cause problems for the post nuke period

Might have to add a few nukes to the canon list, however the 150kt ones are missing already. I also expect the reserves to be in very remote and inhospitable areas given they had not found it before 1982.

[Legbreaker]

Do we need the oil or is ore enough
I'm leaning towards the latter.

[sglancy12]

So... in the Iraq Thread I tossed out some ideas about my homebrew TW2K timeline, which diverges with a 1988 assassination of Gorbachev and his key reformist allies by hard line Soviet Communists with the connivance of reactionary members of the Chinese Communist Party. Gorbachev's plane is bombed (much like Pakistan President Zia's) on his way to Beijing just prior to the Tienamen Square Massacre. The Soviet and PRC conspirators use the false crisis to crack down on reformers at home and in the WTO, ultimately placing the blame on Muslim fundamentalists getting revenge for Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.

I just beg to differ on several key points.

I would like to point out that the PRC fought the U.S.-led U.N. force in Korea to a stalemate. <SNIP> Anyway, that was, by and large, a conventional war and one that the U.S. could not win outright. I imagine the results may have been different if the U.S. was also simultaneously fighting the Soviets in Europe.

And I am not suggesting that the US is going to win that war... or that they are doing it alone. In my homebrew timeline the Pacific Theatre of the War is going to line up the USSR, the PRC and North Korea against the USA, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the UK (Hong Kong), and Portugal (Macao). The war is confined to the Kurile Island chain, the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. Macao and Hong Kong having been quickly abandoned as the British and Portugese "Dunkirk" out to Taiwan.

I imagine Vietnam is sitting this one out with the exception of Soviet Naval assets using Cam Rahn Bay.

Combine the power of the US Fleet with the choke point of the Korean Peninsula and the "moats" of the Taiwan strait and the Sea of Japan, I believe that the USSR/PRC/PRNK alliance can be held at bay, but not defeated outright... held at bay until the nukes start flying. And in my homebrew timeline the conventional war in the east would only last from mid 1996 (when the German Reunification Crisis lead to a shooting war in Europe) until Thanksgiving 1997 when the war advances to the level of limited nuclear strikes. After that, with both sides ability to wage war will be severely degraded, and the Chinese and Soviet armies will unable to press the Americans, South Koreans, Japanese and Taiwanese very hard. And the Americans and their allies only have to be on the defensive. They "win" by not losing, not by conquering enemy territory.

I think it's a tad unreasonable to place so much stock in the U.S.' historical success in fighting a two-front war.

But it is reasonable to place stock in a belief in the USSR's ability to fight a two-front war, when no historical record exists to support that belief

I like Kato's explanation for the survival and resurgence of the Soviet Union: the U.S.S.R. finds sizeable oil and natural gas deposits near the border with China in the late eighties.

I comment on that in another post on this thread... While the idea has merit, the one thing I forgot to mention is that the problems of the Soviet system were so deep and systemic that I seriously doubt that any mineralogical treasure house would be sufficient to allow the Soviets to get buff enough in seven to ten years to be able to fight a conventional war on three Fronts for nearly two and a half years. Very few economies could handle that strain. The US economy in the mid to late 1990s was, however, one such economy.

A. Scott Glancy, President TCCorp, dba Pagan Publishing

[kato13]

Do we need the oil or is ore enough
I'm leaning towards the latter.

Of course it is your call, but I don't think the revenue would be enough.

Total gold production in 1985 was ~1500 metric tons.

http://goldnews.bullionvault.com/gold_mining_output_2008_china_south_africa_020620082

Lets say the Russians could add 30% of top of that (much more and they depress the price too much). Given 1985 Gold prices that comes out to about 3.8 billion dollars (450tones X 2200 lbs X 12 Troy Oz X 317 dollars per ounce).

Oil on the other hand had 22 billion barrels consumed (in 1985) at an average price of 20 dollars per barrel in 1988 (when they can start selling). If the soviets could get even 10% of the world market they get 44 billion dollars.

I kinda use the gold for the quick dough to build the infrastructure but the real income comes from oil.

Edit.
Just wanted to note that the above numbers reflect gross numbers and moving 450 tons of gold would incur no where near the expense of moving 2.2 billion barrels of oil. Net profits would not show the full disparity listed above.

Edit:
Just discovered that IRL in 1986 the USSR hard currency debt was around 30 billion dollars.

http://countrystudies.us/russia/67.htm

That actually makes me feel even better about my timeline with a full payoff being completed in mid 1989
1984 1.2 billion
1985 1.8 billion
1986 2.0 billion
1987 2.2 billion
1988 10.2 billion
1989 16.5 billion

[chico20854]

Another, related question on the Soviet Army:

How fast do you see the USSR being able to mobilize divisions

I've seen declassified, post-Cold War discussions as to the planning norms for the Pact. Category A divisions could realistically enter the field in 3 days (the 30-minute rush the units out of garrison drills usually resulted in the units making it out of the garrison, but with limited combat capabilities - soldiers left most of their field gear in the barracks, no time to fuel and arm the tanks, etc.). Category B units in a week or two, Category C in a month or so, Mobilization-only units in 2-4 months.

I"ve also seen accounts of the actual experience in the late 20th century, most notably Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979-80. In both cases it took a few months to call up Category B and C units and, looking at things in perspective, they performed (barely) adequately although not looking pretty doing so.

As to the key military indicators: personnel and equipment. First, the personnel. In peacetime, the Soviet Army rotated nearly half of its enlisted force (since their NCO corps was overwhelmingly conscript). By recalling all those that had been discharged in the previous two years (20-22 year olds) the enlisted force would double in size. If you expand the callups to those under 30, you get another 200% of the enlisted strength, 250% in total. That should be sufficient enlisted men to both replace combat losses in China and bring the understrength divisions up to full strength. In addition, every year the draft brings in 18 year olds equal to 50% of the peacetime enlisted force. Officers are going to be more problematic; although the Category B and C units were usually set up so that all the units had most command and NCO positions full. (Example oe if the tank regiment in a Category C division was at one third strength, it would have all the subunits established and understrength, so that a tank platoon would have a platoon leader and three tank commanders with no drivers and gunners (although the commanders would be able to act as drivers or gunners). The idea was that reservists would be recalled to fill the lower skill positions, and that someone who had trained as a commander 2 years before would fill the gunners position and someone who had been out for 4 years would drive). There were reserve officers too oe it seems that regular male university students would undergo some training similar to US ROTC and be eligible for callup in time of war.

Ok, now to equipment. The mobilization-only divisions IRL were stocked with equipment sets from units that upgraded. For example, when the T-72 was fielded in Mongolia, the troops that had been operating the T-62 brought the T-62s to depots in Siberia for use by mobilization-only units. In the late 80s and 90s some truly ancient equipment, long thought retired, was pulled out of depots for scrapping. (The 1990 Victory Day parade in Red Square featured several battalions of T-34s, and T-10s from a tank division in Ukraine were scrapped in 1988). On the small arms side, US gun shows over the past years have been overrun at times with quantities of Nagant revolvers, SVT, SKS, Mosin Nagant and captured German Mauser rifles, not touching the mountains of early model AKs that couldn"t be imported. Some of the older equipment might have been exported to allies, such as the T-34s that were sent to Somalia and Ethiopia in the late 70s, but IMHO there seems to be ample combat equipment to equip the entirety of the Soviet Army on day one. Trucks obviously would be an issue, I"ll get to that. (I"m also not touching the issue of production oe losses vs production, presumably at some point production could exceed losses, allowing divisions arriving at the front to field some equipment that wasn"t 40 years old! Taking a pessimistic view, I"ll discount that possibility, even given that the USSR maintained a considerable mobilization industrial infrastructure such that every heavy industrial plant had some sort of mobilization military production capability and the USSR had been at war for almost 18 months by the time the US enters the war)

That raises the issue of timing. To meet the demands of the war in China, by late 1996 mobilization-only units are drilling. The war expands rapidly in intensity and scale from there. What I"m having a hard time grasping is why, given the strategic situation, does the USSR not mobilize the rest of its units simultaneously In fact, it continues to call up divisions long after the nuclear exchange oe the 117th MRD, according to the Soviet Vehicle Guide, is called up from the Kiev Military District in the Spring of 1999. Why wasn"t this division called up and sent to the front in the desperate days of July 1997, when NATO tank brigades so threatened Brest-Litovsk that the Soviet commander was forced to use tactical nuclear weapons to halt them

A few ideas as to why. First, maybe the division"s allocated personnel and equipment were taken away to replace losses in other units. Second, maybe the output of the Ukraine"s war economy oe providing masses of grain, ore, coal, steel, tanks (from Kharkov) and aircraft (from Kiev) would have been seriously hurt by calling up 10,000 men in their 20s.

But that raises the issue of why in 1999, and a secondary question of how. In 1999 the situation in Ukraine is much worse (from all perspectives), so the 10,000 men (likely far fewer would show up, and likely a bit younger or older and in worse health) would be an even greater burden. It also raises the question of how, over 18 months after a (limited) nuclear exchange, the Soviet central government is able to (no matter how poorly) organize, train and equip a division in one of its rebellious provinces.

I"d like to hear your thoughts as to the hows and why"s. For my T2k universe, I"m inclined to go with a more rapid mobilization in most theaters than that outlined in the Soviet Vehicle Guide, but I"d like your thoughts on it too.

[Raellus]

I admit that this is a somewhat simplistic and incomplete answer, but I think that Soviet military mobilization would speed up as the war progressed. I base this on the Red Army's performance in this aspect during WWII. The Red Army was incredibly adept at churning out massive numbers of poorly trained but relatively well equipped infantry and tankers.

I agree that moblilization would start off at a slower and more deliberate pace, likely producing, on the whole, fairly competent units. As the war began in Europe, a lot of the gears would already be turning and mobilization could likely be ramped up with only modestly negative effects on quality. As time passed- and especially after the nuclear exchanges began- the quality of newly mobilized and replacement units would probably drop off rather significantly.

As for trucks, I've posted before that I think that the Soviets would push the automotive industries in the WTO nations to support the war effort in China first with increased production of military trucks for the Soviet Military. IIRC, there already were STAR in Poland, TATRA in Czechoslovakia, and another company whose name escapes me in Hungary that were producing fairly good quality military trucks during the Cold War. It also stands to reason that military truck production in the USSR could also be sped up relatively easily (compared to say, AFV or combat aircraft production).

[GDWFan]

Soviets at War

Well this argument has really picked up steam lately, I have studied this subject a bit myself and heres my 2 cents.

The soviets are underestimated in every area I believe by most fiction this is basically true as they are the evil empire enemy in most works.

As far as a fully funded and equipped army is concerned I believe even with inferior equipment the sheer numbers could force NATO into submission.
However none of that means anything if the canon or personal story of your game history cant deliver a major shift in the way the soviet economy worked during the mid 70's thru the late 80's. I do not believe there is anyway the soviets of this real era could have operated a sustained war of any kind with success.

The posters here keep refering back to the massive soviet war machine of WW2, without a charasmatic leader or extremly brutal leader there would be no repeat of WW2 more likely the early surrender of WW1. The Enron like book-keeping of the Soviets and the general lack of transparency of the USSR led many Def Anylysts to some assumptions that seemed plausible that thanks to unclassified documents were fantastical at best.

Selling huge stocks of those hoarded weapons systems could provide some stimulus, Gold and Oil could also have an effect if introduced early enough.
But the income isn't the major issue its the planned economy and culture of the management in the state run industry that are the true heart of the matter here. I think a slightly capitalist yet hardline nationalist is needed to emerge from the eastern europe crisis, Hawkish enough to slap the politboro and ministers in line yet savvy enough to allow Russia to step onto the global market with force. If started early enough this leader could provide emphesis to

Build gas lines into europe proper
This would take economic pressure off of the Pact nations with discount fuel as well as tempt other nations of europe to suck this teat

Use the ore and Oil strikes to become vital to the WORLD Economy
If other nations besides the Pact rely on commodities from Russia there is incentive to work with and tolerate that nations transgressions. Look at the ChiComs.

Exert its influence on the world again
This has always been a big one for me, Give the Soviets a real voice at the start of the war. Let the new leader be boisterous and aggresive. Take it back to an era when the soviets really were a threat to communize parts of the world. The Soviets always seem week because they are without a doubt starting from a weak position.

Raise the standard of living in the bloc a level
Let this relieve a small part of the pressure on the state, lull the pop into false security before reinstituting a new collectivization, full conscription or a crackdown on rights throughout the pact.

I think these reforms or others like them would ass incentive for Italy and greeces defection. Maybe as they slightly liberalize France begins trade of high tech info and schematics for oil or gas. My main point however is that without massive economic reforms and additional income and some new tech the soviets are really a joke til they pull the nuclear trigger. The Soviets watched there empire dissapear as the policy makers watched there power vanish and they could do nothing of use. The house of cards would not or could not stand up to the stress of a true world war

[chico20854]

I guess I need to find some articles on Soviet AAD doctrine. Maybe I've been too focused on the dizzying array of SAM systems that the Soviets were fielding during the late '80s instead of how they were to be used operationally. The fact that each Soviet division, corps, army, front, etc. had their own subordinate AAD assets lends to the picture that the Soviet AAD network would be both deep and comprehensive. Perhaps this is misleading.

I found a quartet of really nice analytical pieces on the Pact strategic (defensive) SAM network on the Central Front:

Poland: http://geimint.blogspot.com/2009/10/...-cold-war.html
DDR: http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/08/...ase-study.html
Czechoslovakia: http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/09/...r-defense.html
Hungary: http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/10/...ense-cold.html

He notes that in at least the cases of Czechoslovakia and Hungary that there were large gaps in coverage and a reliance on obsolete systems that NATO had developed counters for. When the DDR network goes down the situation for NATO in the air gets better, although as you properly noted the army fields local and area air defense assets.