Keeping or Changing Rank in T2K

[Webstral]

Policy probably would change from place to place and as time went on. The Department of Defense probably would have an official policy regarding transferring ranks of every type to the Army. Variables would include USAF/USN rank and MOS, new MOS, etc. By 1999, we should expect to find considerable latitude given the lower echelons of command. By 2000, division or even brigade commanders might be on their own to determine how to handle Air Force personnel entering the unit.

The idea that a commission is somehow sacrosanct is a pre-Exchange concept, I believe. Like everything else in the post-nuke world, rank is only what the others in the group and/or the chain of command are willing to give it. Officers are likely to try to support others in the brotherhood, but an infantry unit with good esprit de corps isnt likely to embrace an Air Force captain from the supply services as a captain until he has paid his dues with a rifle.

I know I keep referring back to my own work, but I feel like specific instances are the best for outlining general philosophies as well as the specifics of circumstance. Fort Huachuca and the 111th MI Brigade is forced to deal with the problem of having too many officers and too few rifle platoon leaders from the Thanksgiving Day Massacre (TDM) forward. In the real world in 1997, 326th MI Battalion is the training unit for all MI company grade and warrant officers. A/326th handled captains, B/326th handled lieutenants, and C/326th handled warrants. At any time, there were three or four classes of thirty-five to forty lieutenants in B/326th. This is a minimum of 105 lieutenants on-post. In Twilight: 2000, this number might be much larger by the time the nukes hit CONUS. There might be 170 lieutenants at the MI Officer Basic Course. There arent 170 platoons needing platoon leaders, although the number of MI students available to be formed into rifle platoons will be much greater in November 1997 than in November 1996.

Compounding the problem is the presence of as many MI captains going through the MI Officer Advanced Course. Unlike the combat arms, MI has more slots for captains than for lieutenants. A large number of infantry, armor, artillery, and air defense lieutenants are switched to MI when they are promoted to captain. In some ways, this is a real blessing for Huachuca. There are captains with the requisite training and experience. Unfortunately, there arent very many company commands in the 111th MI Brigade when the brigade is turned into light infantry. The brigade starts with three battalions, which adds up to a maximum of fifteen company commands. Staff jobs need filling, but there is only so much additional room hereto say nothing of the fact that the staff jobs and the company commands already were filled. Throw in a seventy to one hundred warrant officers, and you have a lot of people looking for work. Then there is the little matter of the NCO Academy, which is full of MI NCOs going through their respective schools.

Huachuca solves this problem by a variety of means. Promising former combat arms candidates from MIOAC are placed into the XO slots of all of the new rifle companies of 305th, 309th, and 326th MI Battalions. The intent is to replace the MI captains in those positions once the new captains have become familiarized with the companies. Lieutenants go into the platoon leader positions that were previously occupied by drill sergeants. NCOs come out of the NCO Academy to fill team leader and squad leader slots. There are still leftover lieutenants, plus plenty of captains and warrant officers.

The staffs of the battalions in 111th MI Brigade are filled with fairly junior people. 111th MI isnt a maneuver brigade, after all. The junior people are rotated out, while warrant officers and captains are rotated in.

Still, there are lots of company grade officers, warrant officers, and senior NCOs who find themselves without proper slots to fill. As the refugee problem builds, Huachuca organizes the refugees into company-sized groups that have a captain to oversee them. The captain gets a warrant officer and a senior NCO as a staff. This solution isnt a favorite among the officers and NCOs assigned to them, but its a useful and necessary function. At this point, Huachuca isnt ready to mess with rank.

At the end of the Summer 1998 campaign, Huachuca is face with rebuilding its forces. There is a hodge-podge of units that have to be re-aligned and reorganized into a single cohesive command. 355th Wing (USAF) at Davis-Monthan AFB is absorbed wholesale into the 111th Brigade and reflagged 355th Battalion. The Wing really is only the Air Force SPs and support personnel at the base who were not deployed overseas with the rest of the Wing. There are a lot of NCOs who are needed as riflemen. Huachuca makes the painful choice of temporary reduction in grade for many airmen who will be used as replacements in other battalions. Their files are earmarked; if the former USAF NCO in question shows promise, he is fast-tracked to team leadership and so on.

The EPW who volunteer for service also are uniformly reduced in rank. Huachuca simply isnt about to turn a squad or a platoon over to a foreign national, regardless of that nationals prior rank. All of the EPW restart life as privates. The ones who know what they are doing and who serve well rise quickly. Obviously, the officers are going to have the biggest problem with this. Huachuca handles this by starting its own OCS program. Many of the lieutenants who are available for service are duds, to be frank. Huachuca wants combat leaders, not ROTC graduates who are paying off their college tuition with grudging service.

In short, combat troops keep their rank. Marines from the MarDet at Huachuca and Yuma Marine Corps Air Station join the brigade without a problem. Air Force Detachment personnel initially are sent to Davis-Monthan AFB, then integrated into the Huachuca structure as befits their skills. The Security Police become riflemen of the same rank. The junior NCOs are demoted until they can prove their worth on the battlefield. The same applies to the Navy. The officers are kept in reserve by managing refugee populations. The good ones are rotated into the system as needed; the bad ones are rotated off the line and into refugee management.

The USCG First District handles things slightly differently. Combat arms soldiers (Marines, airmen, etc.) are integrated into the tridents. Support personnel with the appropriate skills are integrated appropriately. People without needed skills are put into an apprenticeship program. Essentially, a captain who cant do anything First District needs is assigned a berth as an acting ensign learning the ropes from someone who knows how to do things. Sorry about that rank, pal. Needs of the service.


Webstral

[Marc]

To be contrarian, in most groups I've known, the rank would be irrelevant. If the captain has good ideas, the PCs would listen to him, otherwise they'd ignore him. Then again, most players I've known would consider any adherence to rank contrary to the spirit of the game (PCs with military skills, military training, but no effective command structure).

This is what I would calificate as the pragmatic point of view of a GM! And a great true, in my opinion. Its a problem that always appears when the characters are tied to any kind of strong jerarchy and occupying different ranks inside it. And this is specially true if the game develops in a military background.. I suppose that in a oePlay by Post game this factor becomes softened, but in a oeface to face game it is very present. And is better for the GM no try to fight agains the natural dynamic of the group. Its a sure ticket for an anticlimatic roleplaying situation.

One possible oesolution I use sometimes(depending of the group and the game) is to have pre-generated characters for the players and allow them to distribute the character sheets among themselves, clarifing that rank would be an important factor (if that is your intention in the game).

[Raellus]

This is an enlightening discussion. A staff position would be better for a non-army officer but how many staff positions would there be to fill There'd be attrition, of course, but it probably wouldn't be high enough to find staff jobs for all of the displaced AF and navy offivers there would be by 2000. There'd be much more attrition among line officers and some of those vacancies would undoubtedly need to be filled by displaced AF or navy officers.

As a side note, I would assume that navy officers would go to Marine/naval infantry units before they would go to regular army units.

I guess there would be time for retraining (winter cantonment) and that unit NCOs would run plenty of interference if/when necessary.

Here's another question. With attrition amongst combat troops and few (if any) properly trained replacements post-TDM, what percentage of an infantry company (leg, mechanized, or airborne) would be made up of proper combat soldiers and what percentage would be made up of "filler" (AF, navy personal, former technicians, service and support troops, etc.)

75-25, 60-40, 50-50

[Webstral]

The percentage of oeproper combat troops probably would vary depending on circumstance and what one considers a proper combat arms soldier (or Marine). For instance, if pre-war infantry, armor, artillery, air defense, and combat engineers are the only proper combat arms people in the Army, then there will be very few of them left in Europe in 2000. If one expands that definition to include combat support people who may have taken part in rear area security or emergency action (including MPs and combat support types attached to brigades), the number rises. If one includes all replacements who have gone through a combat arms school sent since 1997, one could have a significant number. If one includes all replacements given any sort of combat arms training sent after the Thanksgiving Day Massacre, the number grows. If one includes pre-Exchange State Guardsmen drafted in 1998 or later, the number grows. If one includes USAF and USN military police-type troops pressed into duty as riflemen, the number grows.

By late 2000, the 111th Brigade has a small cadre of pre-war combat arms soldiers who saw action in Europe, Korea, or the Middle East before the nukes started flying. However, by this time at least a third of the brigade is made up of former MI soldiers who participated in security and disaster relief missions in early 1998, fought the Mexican Army in mid-1998, and have been involved in sporadic combat with the Mexican Army and marauders throughout southern Arizona since that time. While no one granted any of these people an 11B MOS, surely at some point battlefield experience and post-Exchange training must make them the equivalent of light infantry. Granted, they arent the kinds of riflemen conducting raids into enemy territory in 1999, but the former MI troops are reasonably skilled at patrolling and large unit action against dug-in bandits and light conventional forces like the Mexican Army units facing them.

3rd Brigade of the Arizona State Guard (AZSTAG) has a high proportion of experienced soldiers, some of whom have experience as riflemen in Vietnam. Many of the State Guardsmen in 3rd Brigade retired to southeastern Arizona after wrangling desk positions at Huachuca in the 1980s and 1990s. Many of them volunteered for service in AZSTAG in 1996 and 1997 and now find themselves reserve riflemen. Not all of them are combat arms, but by 2000 all of them have more than two decades of service and at least a few months of combat time. How does one figure these people into the equation

At the end of the day, Id guess that the percentage of infantry in an average US Army infantry battalion in 2000 who actually hold an 11-series MOS awarded by the Infantry School and Center at Fort Benning or one of the US Army Reserve training divisions is less than half. In some cases, the number would be much less than half. In some cases, the pre-Exchange trained infantry might be five percent or less.

Webstral

[Legbreaker]

Back in the early 90's, it was said that for every soldier in a combat role, there were 10 soldiers in supporting roles.
I think there'd be plenty of positions available for non combat officers what with the extra supply needs for a division in 2000 - food collection/production, fuel distilation, ammo reloading, vehicle (and resource) recovery and repair, training of new recruits, retraining of other non combat soldiers (or combat soldiers too wounded to continue in their previous carreer) etc, etc, etc.

With regard to how combat troops treat non combat officers, Rank is still Rank. Sure they might not be all that respectful when they're not around, but if military discipline is still in force, they're going to listen and obey (at least until the officers back is turned) or risk disciplinary action.

Now the officer in Rae's initial example is unlikely to be directly transfered into an Infantry unit BUT would serve quite well in a supporting role at Battalion level or in a supporting unit. This would free up a trained infantry officer to move into a combat role (and be a bit annoyed they'd been pushed out of their comfy rear eschelon desk job and back onto the pointy end).

[copeab]

With regard to how combat troops treat non combat officers, Rank is still Rank. Sure they might not be all that respectful when they're not around, but if military discipline is still in force, they're going to listen and obey (at least until the officers back is turned) or risk disciplinary action.

I see the average soldier in 2000 as grossly inferior to the soldier of 1996. With units in 2000 at around 90% the strength of 1996, I think it's reasonable to assume that most of the combat troops in uniform from 1996 are dead. The bulk of most armies in 2000 are made up of men who were non-combat troops or civilians in 1996. New soldiers in 2000 are, most likely, poorly trained and equipped and most would probably never be allowed in a peacetime army. I can't see how this wouldn't lead to poor morale and discipline.

On a more metagame level, I think one of the key selling points of the setting for civilian players is the weak or non-existent command structure. I somehow get the feeling that ex-military players are more bothered *without* the command structure.

[Raellus]

Back in the early 90's, it was said that for every soldier in a combat role, there were 10 soldiers in supporting roles.
I think there'd be plenty of positions available for non combat officers what with the extra supply needs for a division in 2000 - food collection/production, fuel distilation, ammo reloading, vehicle (and resource) recovery and repair, training of new recruits, retraining of other non combat soldiers (or combat soldiers too wounded to continue in their previous carreer) etc, etc, etc.

I think that, by 2000, the ratios would be reversed to closer to 10 combat soldiers for every one soldier in a purely supporting role. IMO, a lot of the non-combat roles that you mentioned would be handled, wherever and whenever possible, by local civilians or maybe even EPWs. The exceptions would be vehicle recovery and repair and troop training. Outside of "Campaign Season", combat soldiers would be helping with or responsible for most of those things themselves.

I wonder if divisions on the move during campaign would have civilian camp followers ([local] wives, children, laundresses, cooks- sometimes all of the above), much as armies right up until the 20th century had...

[Raellus]

I see the average soldier in 2000 as grossly inferior to the soldier of 1996. With units in 2000 at around 90% the strength of 1996, I think it's reasonable to assume that most of the combat troops in uniform from 1996 are dead. The bulk of most armies in 2000 are made up of men who were non-combat troops or civilians in 1996. New soldiers in 2000 are, most likely, poorly trained and equipped and most would probably never be allowed in a peacetime army. I can't see how this wouldn't lead to poor morale and discipline.

You're probably right about the average soldier in 2000. On the flip side, some of your veteran soldiers would have combat experience going way back to early '97. Kind of like how American divisions in 1945, although made up of mostly draftees, still had a sprinkling of soldiers, noncoms, and junior officers who'd fought in North Africa, Italy, France, the Low Countries, and across the Rhine (and maybe the Philippines, Guadalcanal, the Aleutians, or New Guinea).

As you noted, even folks who were clerk-typists, truck drivers, cooks, etc. would have real, crunchy combat experience by 2000. In that sense, at least, divisions in 2000 would be leaner and meaner than they were when the war first kicked off.

On a more metagame level, i think one of the key selling points of the setting ifor civilian players is the weak or non-existent command structure. I somehow get the feeling that ex-military players are more bothered *without* the command structure.

I agree. In my experience, this is very true. I prefer a looser rank structure (more democratic, you could say) but I've found players with RL military experience get very uncomfortable with this.

[Matt Wiser]

You might want to take a look at how the U.S. Army on Bataan handled the Army Air Corps for some insight into this matter. Back then, it was assumed that the air corps enlisted men had gone through basic and knew the basics of infantry work, but the pilots and other officers Nope-very few had been to West Point or ROTC, and had their officer training while learning to fly. They did find some infantry officers and NCOs who were "currently unattached" to be assigned to the Provisional Air Corps Regiment, so that some of the more experienced pilots could go over to the two airfields on Bataan and fly the remaining handful of P-40s and P-35s. But most of the pilots (2nd Lts) were used as grunts. One of them, who got fatally wounded and died on the OR table, said it best as they were taking him into surgery "A ten-thousand dollar pilot shot to hell in the infantry." They were mainly used for rear-area protection (there were several Japanese amphibious landings behind the main defense line on Bataan, and the air corps men were used to root them out)

[Targan]

To be contrarian, in most groups I've known, the rank would be irrelevant. If the captain has good ideas, the PCs would listen to him, otherwise they'd ignore him. Then again, most players I've known would consider any adherence to rank contrary to the spirit of the game (PCs with military skills, military training, but no effective command structure).

I can't agree with that. I think it is a matter of taste. Nowhere in the original T2K rules does it say that rank should be ignored or that it should be obeyed. I think it comes down to individual campaigns and what the players are comfortable with. I have no problem with a campaign being based around a rank-free band of soldiers trying to stay alive, but suggesting that my campaign goes against the spirit of Twilight:2000 because the PCs in my campaign hold to a proper rank structure makes me raise my hackles.

I think the feeling would be among both the characters and the players in my campaign that if they ignored rank they would be no better than the maurauders they regularly destroy.

[Legbreaker]

Nowhere in the original T2K rules does it say that rank should be ignored or that it should be obeyed.

Not quite true.
I'm sure most of us can remember the narrative during the breakout from Kalisz in which the "crazy artillery captain" wanted their LAV-25 to run shotgun for his ammo train, but "the major had the rank"...

I think the feeling would be among both the characters and the players in my campaign that if they ignored rank they would be no better than the maurauders they regularly destroy.

And I wholeheartedly agree with that statement. The vast majority of PCs are combat veterans who've been in the military for a VERY long time. Only a tiny proportion are draftees in my experience - almost all are volunteers and so are much more likely to accept military chain of command even after things begin to fall apart.

For non-draftee or militia PCs to ignore the chain of command is more a reflection on the player than the character in my opinion.

[Targan]

Not quite true.
I'm sure most of us can remember the narrative during the breakout from Kalisz in which the "crazy artillery captain" wanted their LAV-25 to run shotgun for his ammo train, but "the major had the rank"...

Is that from the v2 rules I don't remember that story but I haven't ever got around to reading all of the v2 rulebook.

[kato13]

Is that from the v2 rules I don't remember that story but I haven't ever got around to reading all of the v2 rulebook.

V1 page 6 of the players manual

[copeab]

I can't agree with that. I think it is a matter of taste. Nowhere in the original T2K rules does it say that rank should be ignored or that it should be obeyed.

I admittedly tend read the "You're on your own" line fairly broadly.

I think it comes down to individual campaigns and what the players are comfortable with. I have no problem with a campaign being based around a rank-free band of soldiers trying to stay alive, but suggesting that my campaign goes against the spirit of Twilight:2000 because the PCs in my campaign hold to a proper rank structure makes me raise my hackles.

Sorry, didn't mean any insult.

I think the feeling would be among both the characters and the players in my campaign that if they ignored rank they would be no better than the maurauders they regularly destroy.

Lack of command structure does not indicate a lack of morals. Nor does adherence to rank prevent atrocities.

[Targan]

Sorry, didn't mean any insult.

I apologise, upon re-reading my post I did come across as a little harsh.

Lack of command structure does not indicate a lack of morals. Nor does adherence to rank prevent atrocities.

Absolutely true. From the POV of the PCs in my campaign they use rank structure as much as possible for their own ends, using it sometimes as a blunt instrument to get their way and at other times deliberately staying out of contact with their higher command to allow them to do as they will. The morality of Major Po in particular is (at best) highly suspect.

I guess another way to look at it is that in my campaign without adhering to rank structure the PC party would tear itself to pieces within days if not hours. There would almost certainly be shooting and explosions involved.