Little Big Horn, A Study of a Cavalry Regiment in the Indian Wars

[weswood]

Were theCompanies broken down further as we know them today into plattoons & squads

[Abbott Shaull]

Were theCompanies broken down further as we know them today into plattoons & squads

Wouldn't know. During the Civil War a Infantry Company was divided into two platoons. There really wasn't such a thing as squads if I remember the organization. It was more or less ad hoc below. One has to remember tactics still weren't much more advance in lining the companies in lines of two, hence two platoons and then fire at each other....

[Abbott Shaull]

Looking at the numbers that are present per company, the Cavalry had two Platoons. The thing is they had 5 Sergeants after the company First Sergeant. Usually the 1st Lt commanded the 1st Platoon and the 2nd Lt commanded the 2nd Platoon. The senior Sergeant was usually teamed with 2nd Lt platoon and the next senior would be with the First Lt platoon. If IIRC the Corporals would at time act more like E-5 of today Squad Leaders.

[dragoon500ly]

Were theCompanies broken down further as we know them today into plattoons & squads

In 1874, the US Army adopted a new tactics manual, authored by Emory Upton. Prior to this time, each regiment generally used thier own, unique version, based on their colonel's experience. The Upton manual did away with this and brought the army a common system of drill. Another advantage of the Upton manual is that it took into account the increasing use of the breech-loading and repeating carbines.

As part of this change, Upton introduced the "set of fours" as the basic tactical unit. Also referred to as a squad, the set of fours allowed for simplified operations, increased speed, and eliminated cumbersome maneuvers.

Platoons, at least as we know them today, did not exist. If a smaller unit was needed, then the company was split into two even parts and these were called platoons. The company would often be split into platoons for the dismounted skirmish role, since Upton called for each company to maintain a small reserve. One platoon skirmished while the other platoon stood ready to reinforce the skirmish line, restock ammo, or mount charges to restore the line.

Skirmish tactics called for the cavalry to fight dismounted and deployed in a line with every 4th trooper acting as horse-holder for the rest of the set of fours. Skirmishers deployed with 5 yards between each trooper and 15 yards between each set of fours. The commander could order a wider or closer interval, depending on the situation.

When ordered to engage, the odd-numbered men would fire first and start reloading, then the even-numbered men would fire and reload, this would continue until the command to cease fire was given. Dismounted skirmishers would stand or kneel to fire as they thought best, they could even seek cover, but not at the expense of firepower. The skirmish line could deliver direct or oblique fire as needed.

Within the battalion organization, "wings" could be used, at the commander's discreation. The companies would be organized according to their commander's seniority. The Custer battalion, based on Indian testimony, operated in two wings. The Right Wing consisted of Companies C, I and L, with Captain Myles Keogh commanding. The Left Wing consisted of Companies E and F with Captain George Yates commanding.

Just as a note, some authors group the wings differently, and even split up one company to bring the wings "up to equal strength". The Upton manual, allows for wings of different sizes and a company would never be broken up this manner.

[dragoon500ly]

Looking at the numbers that are present per company, the Cavalry had two Platoons. The thing is they had 5 Sergeants after the company First Sergeant. Usually the 1st Lt commanded the 1st Platoon and the 2nd Lt commanded the 2nd Platoon. The senior Sergeant was usually teamed with 2nd Lt platoon and the next senior would be with the First Lt platoon. If IIRC the Corporals would at time act more like E-5 of today Squad Leaders.

The command structure called for the Captain to command the company and the 1st and 2nd Lieutenants to act as file-closers and supervise the skirmish fight. The sergeants and corporals also acted as file closers and directed the fire of individual sets of fours. Don't forget the the platoon of the 1870s was never considered to be a tactical unit by itself, it was a temporary spliting of the company based on the situation.

As a sidebar, of the 43 officer positions authorized the Seventh, 15 officers were either detached for service or on leave of absence.

[dragoon500ly]

The Men of the Seventh

"The soldiers were a superb lot of men physically. The outdoor life had developed them into perfect specimens of vigorous manhood. The soldiers, injured to many years of hardship, were the perfection of physical manhood. Their brawny limbs and lithe, well-poised bodies gave proof of the training their outdoor life had given."

But enough about me.

Elizabeth "Libby" Custer wrote this description of the men of the Seventh in her autobiography in 1913. But the question remains, just what sort of men made up the Seventh They have been demonized as drunken rapists and murderers, as elite soldiers in the finest regiment, as raw recruits thrown into battle with little or no training and slaughtered on the alter of "manifest destiny".

Historical records give names, birth places, locations of enlistment, age, height and a rough description of hair color, eye color and complexion. We therefore have an idea how old they said they were and how tall. From army regulations, medical reports and personal recollections it is possible to build up a physical profile.

Taken as a group, the Seventh Cavalry was composed of career military men. As Snow and Fitzpatrick say in their work "They are, after all, a fairly typical sample of US Cavalry troopers of the Indian-fighting Army, who, along with the Indian, the Mountain Man, the Cowboy, the Outlaw, the Lawman and other subspecies of the Westerner, form the cast of the longest-running morality play in American history, The Winning of the West."

[dragoon500ly]

Recruitment and the Recruit Medical Exam-1870s style

In order to join the Army in the 1870s, the recruit presented himself to a recruiting depot; located in many of the larger cities. He would provide two recommendations, in written form, attesting to his fine character. The recruiting officer would then take the recruit and have him examined by a military surgeon to determine his fitness for service.

The physical exam was always conducted by a surgeon who followed written regulations concerning the inspection and acceptability of the recruit. However, the surgeon was caught on the horns of a dilemma. The surgeon was charged with insuring the selection of thebest quality men, while, on the other hand, having to please the recruiting officer, who was more concerned with numbers and quotas than of quality. Deja vu anyone

The regulations for recruit exams had not changed very much since the 1850s. The recruit was to be examined individually during daylight hours in a well-lighted room. The sober recruit was to enter the room stripped (if dirty, he was to be bathed before entering the exam room), where he would walk briskly around several times. He would then hop around the room, first on one foot and then on the other. After this, the surgeon placed his hand on the recruit's chest and checked for an abnormal heartbeat (the stethoscope was a new instrument in the 1870s and not widely used).

The recruit was then made to stand at attention while the surgeon examined his head, eyes, ears, mouth and nose. The surgeon looked for abnormalities such as fractures, depressions, diseases, deafness, unintelligible speech and poor eyesight. The recruit then stretched out his arms at right angles to his body and then touched his shoulders with his hands; placed his hands together over his head and then turned his head and coughed while the surgeon checked for hernia.

The surgeon checked the fingers and thumbs for their dexterity. He would also check the chest capacity and looked over the recruit's legs to determine if they were sturdy and could carry the man's weight. Finally, the recruit would bend over and grab his buttocks while the surgeon checked for piles or hemorroids. Hemorroids were cause for rejection but not outright rejection. If there was more than one old pile and it waslarger than a marble, or if one old pile was ulcerated, or if one pile, was associated with a varicose vein, then the recruit was rejected.

The surgeon also checked vision for myopia, although recruits with sight defects were acceptable. Hearing was examined for deafness, which was cause for rejection. Among the other causes for rejection were atrophied testicles and extreme bowed legs (ironic since the recruits would be spending long days in the saddle).

After passing the exam, the recruit was found fit for service, sworn in, placed in uniform and then sent for three months training before joining his regiment. For soldiers heading west this was Jefferson Barracks, St. Louis, Missouri. Recruits received, at best, a brief introduction to army life at the recruit barracks. Most training was limited to close-order drill. When the recruit arrived at his post, the regiment and company provided his real training, mostly by on-the-job training.

[dragoon500ly]

Age of the Men

During the 1870s, the Army had several different minumum ages for enlistment. In 1874 this was 16. Recruits aged between 16 and 18 were limited to musician positions and recruits aged between 18 and 21 needed parental or guardian consent. The normal minimum age was 21.

The reason for establishing a minimum age was twofold. First was the concern that the ability of youths to provide adequate service while also enduring the physical hardships that military life entailed. Second, and a more humanitarian one, was for the youth's growth and developmental well-being. During the mid 1800s there was a belief that overwork, including military life, drained the energy required for normal development, stunting growth and leading to smaller, deformed adults.

The maximum age for a first enlistment was more rigid than the minimum age. It was 30 years old for the cavalry. Once a man enlisted, reenlistments could occur well past the age of thirty. The US Army at this time did not have a mandatory retirement age.

Research into the records of the members of the Seventh shows some intresting numbers. The average age of a trooper was 25.6 years and the median age, which is less affected by extreme ages was 24. The typical trooper would have been full-grown and in the bloom of his early adulthood, well capable of bearing the strain of military life.

The following table shows a the enlistment ages of the Seventh

17 = 1
18 = 8
19 = 7
20 = 8
21 = 193
22 = 96
23 = 59
24 = 53
25 = 38
26 = 65
27 = 72
28 = 47
29 = 36
30 = 31
31 = 18
32 = 15
33 = 23
34 = 15
35 = 14
36 = 8
37 = 8
38 = 1
39 = 5
40 = 6
41 = 1
42 = 1
43 = 1
44 = 2
45 = 5
46 = 1
48 = 1
49 = 1

[Legbreaker]

I think it's worth noting that in Vietnam where the Australians were issued with L1A1 SLR rifles, "first line" ammunition load was just 60 rounds of 7.62N, 200 rounds of 5.56N (for those handful who found themselves with an M16) and 600 rounds belted for the M60s.

The US Cavalry with their 100 and 24 were much better supplied when you think about it.

[Abbott Shaull]

I think it's worth noting that in Vietnam where the Australians were issued with L1A1 SLR rifles, "first line" ammunition load was just 60 rounds of 7.62N, 200 rounds of 5.56N (for those handful who found themselves with an M16) and 600 rounds belted for the M60s.

The US Cavalry with their 100 and 24 were much better supplied when you think about it.

Yeah, but coming from a time in which you would have at min over twice as much 5.56N rounds.

Then again we didn't have supply trains following us everywhere in the field...

[Grimace]

While a very small portion of the information is likely incorrect (as time changes so much in history, it seems) this is a very good display of the information for the Battle of Little Big Horn.

Two years ago I made the trip to the Battle of Little Big Horn. If you guys ever get a chance, it's a rather sombering place to visit that really drives home what these guys in the 7th Cavalry experienced. Seeing the grave markers placed where (supposedly) each man fell, the white stone with the individual name on it standing out against the golden wild grass of the hills, it really gives you an idea of not only where they were, but what they were up against. I can also say, based on the chase-kills and surrounded death-pockets where the men died, there was well more than a thousand indians. Five to 1 odds would be something that the cavalry would have handled better. 10 or 20 to 1 would certianly cause the panic, the desperation, and the last ditch attempts to survive on terrain that offered no real place to hide or escape.

It's a whole different experience when you put yourself into the battle and see what they saw. Very enlightening, yet very sombering.

[Punkpogoer]

Have any of you been to the LBH battle site I've been there, very interesting stuff. Of course they take you on the tour and give you the "official" story, but you can gather quite a bit from just wondering around the place. I've not done an indepth study like dragoon500ly has here, but from my experience of touring the site I would have to make the assumption that Custer was an incompetent.

[dragoon500ly]

The sad thing about LBH is not that Custer was an idiot. Custer had been fighting Indians off and on since 1867. He was regarded as being an advocate of the Indians, and had earned their respect as a warrior.

There is no doubt that Custer failed to believe his scouts about the true size of the villages in the valley. In accordance to his instructions from Terry and his on instincts as a fighter, he decided to attack. In all fairness, throughout the entire history of the Indian Wars (1866-1891) whenever any army column attacked an Indian village, the Indians broke and ran, except for this one time at LBH. Custer went into battle expecting to win, Indian testimony shows that he maneuvered his battalion to support Reno. But when Reno broke and routed out of the valley, then the Indians were able to focus on Custer and his battalion. The very layout of the slaughtered cavalrymen shows that Custer expected Benteen to bring up his squadron and the pack train with its ammo reserve.

From Custer Hill, down Battle Ridge and Calhoun Hill, the positions of the fallen speak of an attempt to hold a line to allow reinforcements and resupply to join Custer. When the Indians managed to overwhelm the cavalry on Calhoun Hill and then start rolling up the line towards Custer Hill, then the cavalry men, on foot, running out of ammo, and demoralized by the sudden turn of events, started running for safety. At some point, a company of cavalry made an attack down Deep Ravine trying to make for the river only to be stopped and cut-down.

The more I research LBH, the more I shift through the Court of Inquiry documents, the reports filed after the battle, the more I get the sense of an effort to white-wash the whole affair, to blame the dead for the failure and to release the living from any sense of responsability.

No, Custer was not an idiot, seeking glory on a battlefield, if any officer every deserved that title, then it would be Captain Fetterman. Was Custer perfect, by no means is this so. Did he make mistakes, certainly, but no more than any other cavalry officer serving in the West.

[dragoon500ly]

The Terry Column of 1876

This is the makeup of the Terry Column on May 18, 1876:

The fighting element
7th Cavalry: 28 officers, 747 enlisted
2 companies, 17th Infantry & 1 company, 6th Infantry:
8 officers, 135 enlisted
1 section of Gatling Guns (drawn from 20th Infantry):
2 officers, 32 enlisted, 3 .50-caliber Gatlings
45 Indian Scouts

The supply train
114 six-mule teams, 37 two-horse teams, 70 other wagons and 85 pack mules with 179 civilian packers.

[dragoon500ly]

June 22, 1876

The Terry Column had joined with the Gibbon Column at the mouth of the Rosebud River. An officer's call was held to plan the next course of action.

The current situation was this: General Terry knew of the presence of General Crook's column, but did not know just where Crook was presently operating. The operations of Gibbon's Montana Column and Terry's Dakota Column could only be coordinated in the most general way. At the conference, Terry was very doubtful of the ability of the two columns to assist each other in case of contact with the hostile Indians. Terry ended a dispatch to General Sheridan with the words; "I only hope that one of the two columns will find the Indians. I go personally with Gibbon..."

It was believed that the Indians were encamped at the head of the Rosebud River or on the Little Big Horn River, a divide of only 15-20 miles of ridges separating the two. Terry decided that Custer would strike the blow. This was a disappointment to Gibbon and his column, elements of which had been in the field since February 22nd, monitoring the movements of the Indians until the three columns could get into position to attack.

Terry's reasons for selecting the Seventh for the honor of the attack were good ones. The Seventh was all cavalry and could pursue the Indians if the attempted to escape while Gibbon's column was half infantry and in the rapid approach march to the Indian camp, could become separated. The Seventh was the numerically stronger than Gibbon's column and Terry made the decision that the strongest unit should strike.

The most recent report from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in regard to the number of hostiles absent from the agencies, estimated a figure of not more than 1,500 warriors. Custer stated at the conference that this figure was not correct and that there probably three times that number. The conference broke-up around sundown and Custer followed Terry to his tent where the two spent some time in converstation.

Officer's call brought his subordinates to Custer's tent. Orders were given to prepare the pack mules (there were 12 assigned to each troop) in the morning with 15 days rations of bard bread, coffee and sugar and 12 days rations of bacon. Twelve of the strongest mules were to carry the 24,000 rounds of the regiment's reserve ammo. Each trooper was to be issued 100 rounds of carbine ammo and 24 rounds of pistol ammo. For every horse, 12 pounds of oats were to be carried, with care to ration it after lengthy marches. Custer also suggested that extra forage might come in handy, but the troop commanders foresaw difficulties in packing the extra forage. "Well gentlemen," Custer replied, "you may carry what supplies you please; you will be held responsible for your companies. The extra forage was only a suggestion, but this fact bear in mind, we will follow the trail for 15 days unless we catch them before that time expires, no matter how far it takes us from our base of supplies. We may not see the supply steamer again. You had better carry along an extra supply of salt, we may have to live on horse meat before we get through."

While the troopers made their preparations, Custer was accosted by Major James Brisbin, Gibbon's second in command. Brisbin offered Custer four troops of the 2nd Cavalry, but Custer declined. Stating, "The 7th can handle anything it meets." An plea was made by Lieutenant Low to take all or part of his Gatling detachement was also refused, on the grounds that the cumbersome guns, pulled by condemned horses might impede the 7th's march.