Little Big Horn, A Study of a Cavalry Regiment in the Indian Wars

[mikeo80]

Yes and it is reason why Cavalry Colonels and Generals would have the most outlandish uniforms. So when they were in the mist of the fight, their troopers who happen to be watching would notice and fight harder or so the theory goes...

A note of interest in my opinion.

Grant and Sherman wore what amounted to the normal wear of a private with only the insignia on their shoulders denoting their rank.

http://www.sonofthesouth.net/union-generals/ulysses-s-grant/pictures/ulysses-grant-field.htm

http://www.sonofthesouth.net/union-generals/sherman/pictures/william-sherman-portrait.htm

And yet, these were the two generals credited with the victory of the North over the South.

[Adm.Lee]

I'm sure that's what Patton thought, too, re: uniform modifications. Note, that was back in his days as a brigade/division commander.

If he had lost any of his battles, I'm sure he would have been remembered only as the "goggle-eyed maniac" that the 1970 movie almost portrayed him.

[Abbott Shaull]

A note of interest in my opinion.

Grant and Sherman wore what amounted to the normal wear of a private with only the insignia on their shoulders denoting their rank.

http://www.sonofthesouth.net/union-generals/ulysses-s-grant/pictures/ulysses-grant-field.htm

http://www.sonofthesouth.net/union-generals/sherman/pictures/william-sherman-portrait.htm

And yet, these were the two generals credited with the victory of the North over the South.

Yeah already pointed that out and Grant had nasty habit of being drunk too.

[Abbott Shaull]

I'm sure that's what Patton thought, too, re: uniform modifications. Note, that was back in his days as a brigade/division commander.

If he had lost any of his battles, I'm sure he would have been remembered only as the "goggle-eyed maniac" that the 1970 movie almost portrayed him.

He was known to lose a battle or two, the fact was much like Grant and Sherman and other Generals who keep their job for the most part, they have to win most of the times. Where as many of the Generals that the Union went through during the Civil War would at best have one or two victories and the have one or more lost battles that would doom them...

[dragoon500ly]

He was known to lose a battle or two, the fact was much like Grant and Sherman and other Generals who keep their job for the most part, they have to win most of the times. Where as many of the Generals that the Union went through during the Civil War would at best have one or two victories and the have one or more lost battles that would doom them...

And then there was Hooker and Burnside and what a pair of horses' arses they were!

[Abbott Shaull]

And then there was Hooker and Burnside and what a pair of horses' arses they were!

Hooker and Burnside... One sad thing after they both failed as Army Commanders, their superiors were going to allow them back as Corps Commanders. Burnside took up the offer and his former Corps was turned over to him and they were sent to occupational duty away from the Army of the Potomac. Hooker on the other hand didn't want to be put in position where one of his subordinates may one day find themselves his commander was released from the Army.

Many of the failed commanders of the forces of the Union in the East were in general with the exception of McClellan were offered to re-take their place in Corps commands, but many refused. Strangely enough McClellan was allowed to do so command twice. Some were transferred from various Department to others after being relieved.

McDowell is the only commander of an Army that I know where he went to Division after the First Battle of Bull Run, then became Corps Commander and like many he had an independent command that wasn't part of the much larger Army operating in Virginia. Then when three independent Corps had been formed into the Army of Virgina under General Pope due to defeat of the at Second Battle of Bull Run was strip of his command and was no longer allowed to hold command position even though it wasn't his fault for that that lose.

Being a Union General was no treat. You had three career paths of death, force retirement, or success. Then add to the fact that many of them had very little military experience or had been out of the military for years, while others had none. It not surprising that so many Brigadier and Major Generals on both side lost their lives and/or captured during the war. Why for the first couple year the Union went through so many who were forced out.

While on the Confederate side not many Generals were forced to retired for failures. Many would lose their position to be place back into similar position again. General Bragg and General Hood remind me of two generals that probably would of done better as Corps commanders but made it to Army Commander and they for a while with several other cast of Generals rotated through the various variation of Armies that fought first along the Mississippi, then what was called the West, and finally in Georgia and the Carolinas.

It was funny that the Confederates did have several Lt Generals and I am not sure if they had two full Generals, I think General Johnston who commanded the Army that would become the Army of Northern Virginia before Robert E. Lee took command. After being wounded in rotated between assignment in Richmond, VA and various postings to the West as they continue to fight a losing battle out there.

The Union Army in contrast until Grant was made Lt General and moving out of the field to Washington. The one thing is everyone remember Lt General Grant and Major General Sherman as the major two commanders. In fact, Major General Meade on paper was still the Commanding General of the Army of the Potomac. I say on paper since most of the time Grant established a field HQ almost near by to make sure the AoP and the various other independent commands working to take Richmond would cooperate and Meade only had true command at the times when Grant had to be in Washington attending to business that the Chief of the Army had to conduct with the War Department, Department of the Army, and with the President. Even though it wasn't unheard of for the President of the United States to visit the field HQs too. One of the few times in history when sitting President would visit field HQs.

[dragoon500ly]

Just How Ready Were to Fight Was the Seventh

One of the many questions about LBH is just how ready were the troopers to fight effectively on 25 June, 1876 This was first brought out in the Reno Court of Inquiry and debated by historians ever since.

One of the stories brought out at the CoI was the presence of a number of untrained raw recruits as well as the fact that the regiment, as a whole, was exhausted by the time it reached the battlefield, thus resulting in the poor showing of the Seventh.

The first portion of this argument holds that raw recruits lack sufficient training to fight alongside seasoned veterans. The ability to fight effectively depends upon the foundations of discipline and skills in weaponary and marksmanship. This, of course, requires careful training over a period of time.

The records shows that about 150 recruits joined the Seventh in 1875, with about 60 of them having had prior service. Another 62 are claimed to have joined prior to the LBH Campaign, but only 54 can be verified by the records. Most likely these men were untrained as cavalrymen; theor daily activities consisting of guard duty, fatigue duty, and the monotonous garrison routine. The lack of training for these new recruits can be placed onto the failure of Major Reno, who commanded the Seventh during Custer's absence in Washington DC during the preparations for the campaign. Reno neglected to schedule target practise or the rudiments of cavalry tactics. To be sure, the Springfield and Colt designs did not require a rocket scientist to figure out how to load, aim and fire. But the Springfield carbine required a technique of loading and extracting that required proper learning and practise in order to acheive its maximum rate of fire. Training in the basic of horsemanship, other than mucking out stalls, was lacking as well.

Upon first examination, the presence of these recruits are a detriment to the ability of the Seventh against the Indians as was stated in the Reno Court of Inquiry. In an article in 1936, 2nd Lieutenant Charles Varnum, a LBH participant stated that the number of recruits who took part in the battle was greatly exaggerated at the CoI in order to aid in Reno's defense. Varnum claimed that most of the recruits had been left at the Powder River base camp and that no company had more than two recruits present on the final march.

A search of the regimental records confirms Varnum's statement. At the time of the battle, a total of 37 recruits (those who signed up in 1876) were on detached duty at Powder River. One was at Ft Abraham Lincoln, another was in confinement at the post stockade and two were in route to the fort. Nine were detailed with the pack train escort and only four remained with the companies assigned to Reno's Battalion. No recruits were assigned to the Custer Battalion.

Another problem that plagued cavalry units throughout the Indian Wars is the number of "green" horses experiencing combat for the first time. It has been estimated that as many as 50% of the Seventh's mounts were newly acquired. And the reactions of these new mounts tothe sounds, smells and chaos of a battlefield would have had an effect on the ability of the Seventh to fight effectively.

The second of Reno's allegations concerned that the troopers were too exhausted to fight effectively. The regiment had traveled 113 miles, with little sleep or nourishment between June 22 and June 25. A long, hard march such as this would certainly create a state of tiredness that would have prevented anyone from operating at peak effectiveness. Field rations of hard bread, bacon and coffee, supplemented with some wild game and mile malnourishment would unquestionably sap the spirit and result in a breakdown of discipline and morale.

The troopers of Seventh were Regulars, however, experienced in Indian fighting and could be expected to perform under the worst of conditions. And a number of these troopers had brazed freezing temperatures and a blizzard to successfully attack Black Kettle's village at the battle of the Washita in November 1868.

There is another factor to consider when judging combect effectiveness is the one factor that can overcome fatigue and hunger. As any combat veteran knows, adrenaline-fueled engery can play a major role in quickly readying the mind and body for battle. Senses and concentration is heightened and while fatigue may become a factor during a prolonged battle, men trained to fight usually respond quite well in the short term. Whether the Custer Battalion could have faired better had they enjoyed a good night's sleep and a full belly, is a matter of conjecture.

[dragoon500ly]

The Little Big Horn's Medals of Honor

For the troopers pinned down at the Reno-Benteen Defense Site, by June 26, the lack of water was becoming a serious problem. While the troopers had started out with mostly full canteens when the seige began, much of that water had been delpeted and the men were reduced to drinking the juice from a handful of fruit cans or sucking on potatoes, but many of the wounded were now suffering under the hot Montana sun.

It is believed that heat was one reason that the Indians chose not to launch any serious attackes on the hill. Not only would such an assault caost many Indian lives, but it was evident that soonner or later, the troopers would need to move down a 600 yard long ravine in order to procure water, and that ravine was held by the Indians.

Captain Benteen, acting on his own, made the decision to drive the Indians from the ravine. He led a dismounted charge toward the surprised Indians, killing several of them and chasing away the others, without the loss of a man until the return to the line when one trooper was shot and killed. While this cleared the ravine, anyone attempting to reach the river at the mouth would have to cross about 30 feet of open ground, with Indian sharpshooters firing from the opposite bank.

Benteen declined to order any man to make the attempt, instead he called for volunteers. After the volunteers had collected every possible container that could hold water, four of the best shots available, George Geiger, Henry Meckling, Otto Voit and Charles Windolph were deployed as a skirmish line and ordered to lay down fire across the river. The initial mission was a success, although one man was killed and seven were wounded. Later water carriers acted on their own until about noon, when the Indian firing decreased and additional troopers were sent to fill canteens and other receptacles.

For their bravery, twenty-four Seventh Cavalry troopers were adwarded the Medal of Honor, the largest number ever cited in any single engagement in U.S. history. These men are:

Company A: Sergeant Stanislas Roy, Privates Neil Bancroft and David Harris

Company B: Sergeants Rufus Hutchinson, Benjamin Criswell and Thomas Murray, Privates Thomas Callan, Charles Cunningham and James Pym.

Company C: Sergeant Richard Hanley and Private Peter Thompson

Company D: Privates Abram Brant, Frederick Deetline, William Harris, Henry Holden, George Scott, Thomas Stivers, Frank Tolan, and Charles Welch

Company G: Private Theodore Goldin

Company H: Sergeant George Geiger, Privates Henry Mechlin, Otto Voit and Charles Windolph

[dragoon500ly]

The Mutilation of the Dead Cavalrymen

After the last of the Custer Battalion had fallen, the Sioux and Cheyenne women and a number of children and older men descended on the field of battle to help their warriors loot and mutilate the bodies in every conceivable manner, many beyond all recognition. The actual extent of the mutilation has always been a subject of debate with many eyewitnesses claiming that there was very little and an equal number claiming that it was widespread. The difference of the testmony can be explained due to the assignment of various troops to bury the dead, and certain postions may have received more postdeath mutilation than others.

The acts of mutilation that can be documented include dismemberment of amrs, legs, hands, fingers and penises; decapitation; scalping, lacrations and slashes from knives, tomahawks and axes; skulls crushed with stone mallets, and multiple gunshots and arrows fired from close range. The battlefield was said to have been littered with hands, heads, feet and legs that had been removed.

Those troopers lying facedown were likely killed by a Cheyenne, who were known to believe that it was bad luck to leave an enemy facing the sky. The Sioux traditionally marked a dead enemy with a slashed thigh. The Indians even went so far as to mutilate some of the dead horses. For unknown reasons, the names of the dead had been cut out of the few items of clothing (an undershirt or a pair of socks) not stripped from the bodies. Everything of value, money, watches, rings, and so on was stripped from the bodies.

Captain Thomas Custer was singled out for perhaps the worst treatment and he was only identified by tattoos on one arm. First Lieutenant Edward Godfrey described his body: "It was lying face down, all the scalp was removed, leaving only tufts of his fair hair on the nape of his neck. The skull was smashed in and a number of arrows had been shot into the back of the head and in the body. The features where they had touched the ground were pressed out of shape and were somewhat depressed. In turning the body, one arm which had been shot and broken, remained under the body; this was pulled out and on it we saw 'T.W.C.' and the goddess of liberty and the flag. His belly had been cut open and his entrails protruded."

The extent of Tom Custer's abuse has caused some to believe that the Sioux warrior Rain-in-the-Face had made good on his threat to cut out Custer's heart and eat it as revenge for his arrest in 1875. Captain Benteen, however, stated that Custer's heart had not been cut out.

The naked body of George Custer, from all accounts, was not mutilated. He was found in a sitting position leaning against and between two troopers, his face was said to be wearing the expression of a man who "had fallen asleep and enjoyed peaceful dreams". Custer was found with two wounds, a bullet in front of the left temple and another in the left breast.

Chief Gall said in 1886 that GAC had not been scalped "because he was a big chief and we respected him," which is very unlikely because the Indians did not know that they were fighting Custer. Cheyenne Kate Bighead stated that Custer was not mutilated out of respect for their tribal sister Mo-nah-se-tah, who was believed to have gained Custer's affection while working as his translator in 1868. Kate also stated that the women had thrust a sewing awl into Custer's ears to "improve his hearing" because he had not heard the Indians when he smoked the peace pipe with them in 1867. Many historians belive that GAC's body was mutilated, but the truth was deliberately withheld out of respect for the feelings of Libbie Custer.

[dragoon500ly]

The Burial of the Dead

By the time that the Terry-Gibbon Column and the survivors of the Reno-Beteen Battalions marched the four miles north to view Custer's slaughtered command, the more than 200 bodies, along with numerous hourse carcasses, had been decomposing in the summer heat for two days. First Lieutenant Edward Godrey described the scene as the column approached: "We saw a large number of objects that looked liked white boulders scattered over the field and it was announced that these objects were the dead bodies." Captain Thomas Weir exclaimed: "Oh, how white the look! How white!." First Lieutenant Francis Gibson sadly said: "It was the most horrible sight my eyes rested on." Captain Frederick Benteen look down at Custer's body and said, with emotion: "There he is, God damn him, he will never fight anymore!"

The gruesome task of burying the dead began soon after and continued at until the evening of June 28, when the regiment marched away with the wounded on litters to the mouth of the Little Big Horn River.

The soldiers on the burial detail, many of whom were quickly overcome with nausea and vomiting, did not possess proper digging implements. Only a dozen or so spades, shovels and picks, found in the debris of the Indian villages, were available, so they used anything that could scoop away the dirt to hasten the job. The soil was described as dry and porous, resembling sugar, so burial was at best a token gesture. The dead were buried where they fell and they were covered over with sagebrush and dirt or rolled into shallow trenches. The officers were identified by writing thier names on slips of paper, which was then stuffed into cartridge cases and hammered into the crude cedar stakes placed near the gravesites.

The bodies at the various locations were counted, 42 on Custer Hill, 28 in Deep Ravine and 208 or 210 along Battle Ridge and an approximate total of 263 when all the officers, enlisted, civilians and scouts had been tallied.

On June 25, 1877, one year to the day, Captain Henry Nowlan and Company I of the Seventh arrived at the battlefield with the mission of colecting the remains of the officers who had fallen. Nowlan was accompanied by First Lieutenant Hugh Scott, Colonel Michael Sheridan (brother of Phil Sheridan) and all of the Crow scouts that had been with Custer the year before. Fortunately, there would be no need for guesswork to identify the dead officer's, Nowlan had been provided with a map that showed where each officer was buried.

Only one officer was reburied on the field. The father of 2nd Lieutenant John Crittenden, an infantry colonel, had said, "Let my boy lie where he fell." Crittenden's body was placed in a coffin and reburied where he fell. In September, 1931, his remains were moved to the nearby National Military Cemetery.

The remains of the other officers from both the Reno and Custer battlefields were gathered up and transferred to pine boxes for transport to cemeteries designated by the next of kin. At this time, many of the enlisted men were either reburied individually where they fell or gathered together in mass graves. The group of 28 bodies that were buried in Deep Ravine have never been located.

GAC had told his wife that when the time came, he wanted to be buried at the US Military Academy at West Point and she was determined to honor his wishes. Libby was advised to wait until the fall to hold the funeral as West Point was relatively vacant during the summer. Custer's remains were stored at a valult in Poughkeepsie, New York.

On October 10, 1877, crowds lined the Hudson River as the bunting-draped Mary Powell, her flags flying at half mast brought Custer's remains to the south dock of the academy. The casket was escorted by a cavalry detachment to the chapel.

Shortly after 2pm, Major General John Schofield, commandant of the Military Academy, escorted Libbie into the chapel. Classes had been suspended and the cadets crowded into the chapel to witness the event. The West Point chaplain, Doctor John Forsyth, conducted an Episcopal service, concluding with the 19th Psalm. Afterward, cadets carried the casket to a caisson, which bore it to the cemetery. A lone horse, displaying a pair of cavalry boots with spurs, with the toes pointed to the rear, followed the caisson. The procession halted at the cemetery, the chaplain spoke again, three volleys were fired and George Armstrong Custer was laid to rest. In 1933, Libbie Custer was buried beside her husband.

In 1881, the remains of the enlisted men were removed from the scattered graves on the battlefield and reinterred in a mass grave under the base of the imposing granite monument that was erected on Custer Hill. The names of the dead, a number of which are spelled incorrecly, were inscribed on the monument. Marble headstones were placed around the battlefield to provide a rough guide as to where the soldiers had been killed.

The final resting places of the officers who were killed on June 25, 1876 are as follows:

1st Lt James Calhoun: Fort Leavenworth National Military Cemetery

1st Lt William W. Cooke: Hamilton Cemetery, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada

2nd Lt John J. Crittendon: Custer National Military Cemetery

LTC George A. Custer: US Military Academy at West Point Cemetery

Capt Thomas W. Custer: Fort Leavenworth National Military Cemetery

Dr. James M. DeWolf: Woodlawn Cemetery, Norwalk, Ohio

2nd Lt Henry M. Harrington: body never found

2nd Lt Benjamin H. Hodgson: Laurel Hill Cemetery, Philadelphia, PA

Capt Myles W. Keogh: Fort Hill Cemetery, Auburn, NY

Dr. George E. Lord: Custer National Military Cemetery

1st Lt Donald McIntosh: Arlington National Cemetery, Washington DC

1st Lt James E. Porter: body never found

2nd Lt William V.W. Reilly: Mount Olivert Cemetery, Washington DC

1st Lt Algernon E. Smith: Fort Leavenworth National Military Cemetery

2nd Lt James G. Sturgis: body never found

Capt George W.M. Yates: Fort Leavenworth National Military Cemetery

[Abbott Shaull]

So their bodies weren't found, or were they unable confirm their bodies from the rest of troops

[dragoon500ly]

So their bodies weren't found, or were they unable confirm their bodies from the rest of troops

More like they were unable to confirm their bodies from the rest of the troops. The body of one of the intererperters, Mitch Boyer, was only discovered in 1987. They were able to ID it due to skull/facial reconstruction

As it stands right now, there are still 28 bodies missing, the men who died in Deep Ravine.

[Stich2.0]

They were able to ID it due to skull/facial reconstruction

I think you are making all of this up. They didn't have CSI in the civil war.

[Abbott Shaull]

That is what I figured. Shame they couldn't use modern stuff to id them all. Yeah, it understandable that they could lose the position for the 28 buried. Probably they believed they were in one place and actually in another place completely.

[copeab]

I think you are making all of this up. They didn't have CSI in the civil war.

The body he referenced identified in this manner was found in 1987 (see the previous sentence in his port). They did have CSI then. I am assuming they had a photograph to compare the reconstruction to.