OT: Putin's War in Ukraine

[Heffe]

I know we've looked at Russian tank losses in this thread previously, but does anyone have information about Ukrainian tank losses beyond Oryx's data

I ask because we know that Russian heavy equipment bases are emptying at an alarming rate, with them emptying entirely being likely in the next 12-18 months (recent attrition rates would indicate closer to 12). And as those bases empty, Russian tank forces are going to be of worse and worse quality.

I'm confident Ukraine is losing tanks as well, albeit likely at nowhere near this pace. Granted, they didn't have anywhere even close to as many to begin with, and the west as noted hasn't really provided many tanks either. But at some point, Russia will run out of tanks, which will "tank" their ability to conduct mechanized assaults, effectively ending their offensive operations further into Ukraine. That is, unless they want to send more waves of infantry and APCs into fortified defenses, which may be the case. At that point, Russia will be someone forced to either operationally pause and reassess their offensive operations, or attempt to broker a treaty by which they'd keep the land they've already taken.

If Ukraine has the tank capacity to outlast the Russian tank supply, that may open up some significant options for them. Or if nothing else, so long as the west continues to provide additional tank forces to them after Russia runs dry, that will impact any possible future negotiations.

*edit: This is also assuming Russia isn't able to begin sourcing tanks from elsewhere - namely Iran and the DPRK.

[kcdusk]

What if Putins health failed before the end of the war, would whomever ended up in power continue the war or respectfully withdrawer

[castlebravo92]

I know we've looked at Russian tank losses in this thread previously, but does anyone have information about Ukrainian tank losses beyond Oryx's data

I ask because we know that Russian heavy equipment bases are emptying at an alarming rate, with them emptying entirely being likely in the next 12-18 months (recent attrition rates would indicate closer to 12). And as those bases empty, Russian tank forces are going to be of worse and worse quality.

I'm confident Ukraine is losing tanks as well, albeit likely at nowhere near this pace. Granted, they didn't have anywhere even close to as many to begin with, and the west as noted hasn't really provided many tanks either. But at some point, Russia will run out of tanks, which will "tank" their ability to conduct mechanized assaults, effectively ending their offensive operations further into Ukraine. That is, unless they want to send more waves of infantry and APCs into fortified defenses, which may be the case. At that point, Russia will be someone forced to either operationally pause and reassess their offensive operations, or attempt to broker a treaty by which they'd keep the land they've already taken.

If Ukraine has the tank capacity to outlast the Russian tank supply, that may open up some significant options for them. Or if nothing else, so long as the west continues to provide additional tank forces to them after Russia runs dry, that will impact any possible future negotiations.

*edit: This is also assuming Russia isn't able to begin sourcing tanks from elsewhere - namely Iran and the DPRK.

From what I've been able to observe, both the Russians and Ukraines have been using tanks more as mobile pill boxes than their traditional role as breakout and maneuver elements. There have been some exceptions, but those ended very poorly for the massed formations. It may be that the current generation of guided and fire and forget anti-tank weapons is just too deadly for Gulf War and earlier tank tactics to be effective against peer / near peer opponents any more, especially without air dominance.

Probably some observation bias at play here, but what we see on a lot of the released videos is squad and platoon sized infantry probes that get wrecked by artillery, and then mopped up by drones, with some occasional close in trench fighting (which is nonetheless probably a lot more common than caught on go-pro).

In one sense, this war reminds me a lot of a WW1 trench style trench warfare with much lower troop densities manning the trenches (partly due to the greater accuracy of artillery and drones, partly due to the fewer numbers of men).

Long term though, an attrition war definitely favors Russia.

[Heffe]

From what I've been able to observe, both the Russians and Ukraines have been using tanks more as mobile pill boxes than their traditional role as breakout and maneuver elements. There have been some exceptions, but those ended very poorly for the massed formations. It may be that the current generation of guided and fire and forget anti-tank weapons is just too deadly for Gulf War and earlier tank tactics to be effective against peer / near peer opponents any more, especially without air dominance.

Probably some observation bias at play here, but what we see on a lot of the released videos is squad and platoon sized infantry probes that get wrecked by artillery, and then mopped up by drones, with some occasional close in trench fighting (which is nonetheless probably a lot more common than caught on go-pro).

In one sense, this war reminds me a lot of a WW1 trench style trench warfare with much lower troop densities manning the trenches (partly due to the greater accuracy of artillery and drones, partly due to the fewer numbers of men).

Long term though, an attrition war definitely favors Russia.

I have the feeling the issue comes down more to minefields and drones, with regard to tank operations. Even still, it's hard to beat direct fire support from tank guns. I do wonder how things will progress in this area - if we see tanks start to disappear from the battlefield entirely due to drone usage, or if counter-drone capabilities get advanced to the point where tanks will re-emerge as a dominating force.

The other piece I wanted to call out was regarding platoon and squad sized probes. Outside of major offensives, you're right that the majority of movement seems to be pretty small in nature. I imagine that this is also the result of drones and better battlefield communications. It seems to have gotten significantly more difficult for sides to build up adequate masses of armor for a large push without the other side knowing about it.

In short, drones and artillery have made it so that neither side can properly amass a force large enough to be able to break through the enormous minefields.

[bash]

With respect to massing forces for pushes/breakouts I think the ratio of forces available to width of the front is playing a major role. The front in huge and just occupying it is difficult. It's challenging to mass armor because it requires pulling armor reinforcements from other parts of the line weakening them. With neither side enjoying air superiority they can't shore up a lack of armor with air support or make air assaults.

[Raellus]

Dodging the Draft

Is Ukraine losing its will to fight I am troubled more by this development in the war than any other over the past two years. Russia's main advantage is in military manpower. The Ukrainian parliament's refusal to expand the draft plays right into Putin's hands. He's already shown that he's willing to bleed his own country dry to win the long game.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-kyivs-mobilization-plan-stalled-by-parliament

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[kato13]

Any thought on the double downing over Azov Sea (Edit 3)

https://twitter.com/albafella1/status/1746641376660406730

The Ukrainian Armed Forces shot down two russian aircraft over the Sea of Azov.
This happened an hour and a half ago. The A-50 was shot down and the IL-22 was shot down, but was in the air and trying to get to the nearest airfield. Disappeared from radar in the Kerch area.

This rumor seems to have solidified, but even taking into account longer range assets (Patriot, AMRAAM) getting two hits this deep behind the front lines > (150km) is puzzling.


EDIT 1 & 2
From analyzing satellite images of contrails it looks Like something was tracking much further north than the above image and within patriot range.



Also the IL-22 looks like it made it back to base


Source for both here.

https://twitter.com/HamWa07

Edit 3 Added Patriot Range that covers the circuit tracks.

[Ursus Maior]

Here is a preliminary analysis by author David Axe on how that could have went down on the Ukrainian side. Of course details on such an operation are scarce and likely will remain so for the time being, but he sounds reasonable and in the past has written other well received articles.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/01/16/ukrainian-crews-set-a-complex-missile-trap-for-russias-best-radar-plane/sh=601256603566

[bash]

Here is a preliminary analysis by author David Axe on how that could have went down on the Ukrainian side. Of course details on such an operation are scarce and likely will remain so for the time being, but he sounds reasonable and in the past has written other well received articles.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidax...h=601256603566

If accurate (even partially) that's a great operation by Ukraine. Russia has lots of old AFVs and mobiks but precious few high tech force multipliers like AWACS. Taking those out is a huge benefit to their operations, especially at a time of year where ground forces have limited mobility.

Now breaking a hole in ground based radar means they can conduct long cruise missile and drone attacks on locked down ground assets.

[Heffe]

It doesn't elude me that the AWACS targeting happened almost directly after the first F-16s were allegedly delivered into Ukraine's hands. I have to imagine that delivery was one of the reasons behind the operation.

[bash]

It doesn't elude me that the AWACS targeting happened almost directly after the first F-16s were allegedly delivered into Ukraine's hands. I have to imagine that delivery was one of the reasons behind the operation.

Excellent point.

[Vespers War]

Ukraine has introduced a new UGV, the Ironclad. It's surprisingly small for the name, at 1,800 kilograms dry with a 400 kilogram payload capacity. Standard armament so far seems to be an M2 machine gun in a rotating mount with a thermal optic. The mount (Shablya/Sabre) has also been fitted with PKT and M240 machine guns in other uses. Back in 2018 there was talk of mounting a 40mm grenade launcher instead of the machine gun and a pair of Karl Gustav tubes in addition to the machine gun, but I don't know if those have been developed to the point of entering service.

The optic allegedly has a maximum viewing range of 5 kilometers and will pick up a human at 1800 meters. Control range is supposed to be 5 kilometers as well, with the vehicle having a maximum road speed of 20 km/h, a rough terrain speed of 10-15 km/h, a range of 130 kilometers, and protection from 7.62mm rifle fire.

It looks a lot like an ATV, but with an articulated center joint so that the front and rear can pivot independently (both sections have electric motors powered by a diesel engine), reducing the turn radius. It appears that it can be directly driven in non-combat situations, as the rear section has a seat with controls.

[Raellus]

Speaking of unmanned vehicles, UAF "drone boats" sank a Russian Tarantul III Class corvette (it's sometimes classified as a missile FAB, instead).

https://www.twz.com/news-features/ukraine-sinks-russian-navy-missile-corvette-in-drone-boat-attack

On the ground, Ukrainian forces are really feeling Russia's marked advantage in artillery ammunition.

I really hope the US Congress gets its act together and authorizes another aid package for Ukraine. ATM, it's not looking good.

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[Ursus Maior]

It doesn't elude me that the AWACS targeting happened almost directly after the first F-16s were allegedly delivered into Ukraine's hands. I have to imagine that delivery was one of the reasons behind the operation.

I'm not sure on the status of that, but personally I haven't seen any videos about Ukrainian F-16s in action. So, I remain hesitant to draw conclusions.

[Heffe]

I'm not sure on the status of that, but personally I haven't seen any videos about Ukrainian F-16s in action. So, I remain hesitant to draw conclusions.

That's entirely fair. I tend to be a bit of an optimist regarding the war, but I understand the hesitancy to want to speculate about what's actually happening.

I will say that the situation in Avdiivka unfortunately seems to be deteriorating at a poor rate at the moment, but what can be expected when Russia seems comfortable with the current insane attrition rates.