LAV-75; Stingray; M8 AGS

[dragoon500ly]

While at the sharp end, task organization would be standard, I can't see the Big Army signing off on a "make it up as you go along" approach to the MTOE.

First, even if it's a common chassis, fire control, and everything else, ultimately a different gun system means variation in parts streams on the logistics side, as well as the more obvious ammo issue. Second there will be standards for gunnery, doctrinal employment, etc., that will be better supported by consolidation on the organizational side. Think mech infantry Echo Companies and the M901.

I'd suggest the light infantry Light Tank Battalion (Armored Gun Battalion, Direct Fire Support Battalion, whatever) would be three companies of LAV75s organized into 14 vehicle companies as per standard tank companies, with a fourth company of 20 LAVs with 105. Nominally this gives a mobile anti-armor company per brigade and a two vehicle section of 105mm armed vehicles per battalion for direct fire support (though obviously the usual METT-T realities will drive who gets at any given time). In a more real-world scenario, the 105 would probably be the format of choice -- able enough anti-armor and more anti-infantry bang -- but LAV75 heavy when part of the equation is fighting off the Soviet AFV hordes makes sense.

I'd have to disagree with the idea of a armored battalion trying to maintain ammunition loads of two major caliber weapons just from a logistical standpoint alone. It would be far more likely for the 75mm versions to be assigned to the airborne/light divisions with the 105mm versions beings assigned to the cavalry squadrons...

[James Langham]

I'd have to disagree with the idea of a armored battalion trying to maintain ammunition loads of two major caliber weapons just from a logistical standpoint alone. It would be far more likely for the 75mm versions to be assigned to the airborne/light divisions with the 105mm versions beings assigned to the cavalry squadrons...

What seems logical to us here for some reason never seems to be to senior officers and politicians...

Remember the 105 version is only issued later on, it would be too hard to standardize then. Also it has been fairly common to have different ammo types in the same unit. Actually 75mm and 105mm is less ammo types than an M2 unit with 25mm, TOW and 7.62mm, even before we consider the M231s and dismounts.

Depending on your take of history, feel free to change, after all I'm not canon. an earlier issue would easily allow your change.

[dragoon500ly]

What seems logical to us here for some reason never seems to be to senior officers and politicians...

Remember the 105 version is only issued later on, it would be too hard to standardize then. Also it has been fairly common to have different ammo types in the same unit. Actually 75mm and 105mm is less ammo types than an M2 unit with 25mm, TOW and 7.62mm, even before we consider the M231s and dismounts.

Depending on your take of history, feel free to change, after all I'm not canon. an earlier issue would easily allow your change.

All too true and I did consider that argument; but I also remember an episode that happened in Germany during a Table VIII gunnery, we had just converted to M-1A1s and had ordered 120mm ammo....and the transportation company delivered 105mm...funny in peace time, but in war time...OUCH!

Hmmmm, on the other hand, what a horrible thing to do to a group of players!

[James Langham]

All too true and I did consider that argument; but I also remember an episode that happened in Germany during a Table VIII gunnery, we had just converted to M-1A1s and had ordered 120mm ammo....and the transportation company delivered 105mm...funny in peace time, but in war time...OUCH!

Hmmmm, on the other hand, what a horrible thing to do to a group of players!

On the other hand having both types means SOME will have ammo :-)

"Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics."

[Webstral]

There is a logic to both arguments regarding task organization. US mech units already are accustomed to maintaining large numbers of different vehicles. For example, in 1993 the 4th Combat Engineer Battalion (Mech) used M113, M577, HMMWV, 2.5 ton trucks, 5 ton trucks, at least two models of bulldozer, HMMIT fuelers and wreckers, and other vehicles. Granted, none of these vehicles used unique large caliber ammunition. Large caliber ammo is a supply consideration all its own. Still, the folks empowered to make such decisions will base their conclusions on the perceived need/usefulness of adding LAV fire support vehicles to existing LAV-75 battalions versus the additional logistical burden. Light divisions will need both the anti-armor capability and the fire support capability. This might be one of those moments when the maneuver commanders tell the support people to suck it up and do their [expletive deleted] jobs. Sometimes there will be ammunition mix-ups. If the LAV FSV is deemed sufficiently useful, some mix-ups might be judged a price to be paid.

[James Langham]

I do sometimes worry how hard we work to make things realistic when reality is far weirder...

The nice thing with this group is the way everyone is friendly and even if we can't reach a consensus we can agree to disagree and run our own campaigns the way we want.

[dragoon500ly]

There is a logic to both arguments regarding task organization. US mech units already are accustomed to maintaining large numbers of different vehicles. For example, in 1993 the 4th Combat Engineer Battalion (Mech) used M113, M577, HMMWV, 2.5 ton trucks, 5 ton trucks, at least two models of bulldozer, HMMIT fuelers and wreckers, and other vehicles. Granted, none of these vehicles used unique large caliber ammunition. Large caliber ammo is a supply consideration all its own. Still, the folks empowered to make such decisions will base their conclusions on the perceived need/usefulness of adding LAV fire support vehicles to existing LAV-75 battalions versus the additional logistical burden. Light divisions will need both the anti-armor capability and the fire support capability. This might be one of those moments when the maneuver commanders tell the support people to suck it up and do their [expletive deleted] jobs. Sometimes there will be ammunition mix-ups. If the LAV FSV is deemed sufficiently useful, some mix-ups might be judged a price to be paid.

Good point!

As far as the mounting of a 105mm on a LAV75; it probably would be more likely that a mounting for a TOW Under Armor system of some kind would be the vehicle of choice. The time frame of T2K would be as the M-901 was leaving service (Echo companies of the mech bns be deactivated). Now the M901 was top heavy for the M113 chassis, but yanking a turret, and replacing it with a TUA stripped from a M901...

I went digging through some old Armor magazines trying to find any of the articles that talked about alternative designs for the LAV, unfortunately the only mention that I could find for were two mentions in passing about a mortar version and a TUA version, neither of which went into any great detail. Still, it is intresting that they were already considering that the 75mm would have problems with the anti-armor role. The article itself was a more of "what-if" the RDF light tank would be deployed sort of thing.

The whole chain of RDFLT-LAV75 is a great "what might have been", but the final judgement for the 75mm was that it packed too little umph, was too complex, and would be too much of a logistical problem.

Still....it would have been fun to take one down range!

[pmulcahy11b]

For what it's worth, my Janes Armor & Artillery 1983-1984 edition says that ARES was working on a 90mm version of the same autocannon on the LAV-75, but abandoned it after producing two working prototypes, to concentrate on the 75mm version. It doesn't say why they did, however.

[dragoon500ly]

For what it's worth, my Janes Armor & Artillery 1983-1984 edition says that ARES was working on a 90mm version of the same autocannon on the LAV-75, but abandoned it after producing two working prototypes, to concentrate on the 75mm version. It doesn't say why they did, however.

Wan't that about the same time that Cockerill displayed their lightweight 90mm

[James Langham]

Good point!

As far as the mounting of a 105mm on a LAV75; it probably would be more likely that a mounting for a TOW Under Armor system of some kind would be the vehicle of choice. The time frame of T2K would be as the M-901 was leaving service (Echo companies of the mech bns be deactivated). Now the M901 was top heavy for the M113 chassis, but yanking a turret, and replacing it with a TUA stripped from a M901...

I went digging through some old Armor magazines trying to find any of the articles that talked about alternative designs for the LAV, unfortunately the only mention that I could find for were two mentions in passing about a mortar version and a TUA version, neither of which went into any great detail. Still, it is intresting that they were already considering that the 75mm would have problems with the anti-armor role. The article itself was a more of "what-if" the RDF light tank would be deployed sort of thing.

The whole chain of RDFLT-LAV75 is a great "what might have been", but the final judgement for the 75mm was that it packed too little umph, was too complex, and would be too much of a logistical problem.

Still....it would have been fun to take one down range!

I did consider it but my feeling is that the M901s will be remaining in service, many being pulled from storage. Maybe a change in employment methods I'm fairly sure the M551TUA was trialled or at least a prototype built. With all of these TUA vehicles on light chassis, the biggest problem is a lack of storage space for reloads (maybe a reload vehicle).

Again what I love is the way we all agree to disagree.

[pmulcahy11b]

Wan't that about the same time that Cockerill displayed their lightweight 90mm

Maybe ARES got a wind of it, but it's not in that issue of Janes.

[Webstral]

I'm reluctant to throw my support behind eliminating the LAV-75 from the lineup because the established body of material includes the LAV-75 rather prominently. Grendal posted some excellent material effectively debunking the idea that the 75mm ARES gun had problems with killing power vis--vis a 105mm low-recoil gun. If cost was a primary reason for not pursuing the LAV-75, then the fact that the Cold War didnt end in 1989 may give us all the reason we need to imagine the LAV-75 being placed into service.

We can imagine, though, that in the climate of 1996 and certainly 1997 every AFV that can be cobbled together of available parts will be assembled and given to somebody. The US Army Vehicle Guide features a number of interesting items. Im sure we can devise many, many more. I would expect to see units in CONUS supported by a veritable flying circus above and beyond the heavier AFV listed in the Guide in formations like the 40th Infantry Division. Id include some in the TO&E for 111th Brigade but for the inconvenient fact that SAMAD is physically isolated from the rest of the US after mid-1998. However, formations in Fifth and Sixth US Armies might make use of all sorts of non-standardized light AFV.

Im fond of armored TOW launchers, but they dont do the job of an assault gun, light tank, or tank destroyer. The whole purpose of creating a vehicle like the LAV-75, M-8, or other such system was to create a mobile gun system. If the 82nd Airborne and other divisions like it had wanted armored TOW launchers in the 1980s, no one would have bothered trying to create a replacement for the Sheridan. Sometimes a gun is the best tool for the job.

[HorseSoldier]

I'd have to disagree with the idea of a armored battalion trying to maintain ammunition loads of two major caliber weapons just from a logistical standpoint alone. It would be far more likely for the 75mm versions to be assigned to the airborne/light divisions with the 105mm versions beings assigned to the cavalry squadrons...

It's less complicated than what US tank battalions made work in WW2, and not much more complex than supporting a standard tank battalion with an organic mortar platoon.

[dragoon500ly]

It's less complicated than what US tank battalions made work in WW2, and not much more complex than supporting a standard tank battalion with an organic mortar platoon.

I guess my problem with this is that, in my office, I get to see a lot of the more intresting screwups with the supply system, so I view the supply system with a bloodshot eye! Even with the amount of computer support that the military has now, it is amazing the number of problems that occur! I've seen everything from medical units being issued out of date medication (slated for disposal but some SP4 screwed up) to tank battalions being issued TOW missiles (and we are not talking basic loads for the scout platoon, try 1,200 missiles!) to units in Iraq having artic clothing sent to them....in the middle of summer!

Now toss into the problem that of issuing two main caliber ammo types to the same battalion. And to make it even more fun, your assault gun battalion is attached to a light division with three battalions of 105mm howitzer ammunition. What are the odds that howitzer ammo will be issued

And just to give a bit of historical background, Just Cause, the invasion of Panama, had a little logistical incident. A platoon of M-60A1s were assigned to Panama to provide support, and sure enough, they were initially issued 105mm howitzer ammo because of a computer screwup! An emergency supply of 105mm tank ammo had to be airlifted into the area and arrived just before the shooting started.

To be sure, the system works most of the time, but its almost the nature of the system that supply screwups will, not might, happen.

[Webstral]

To be sure, the system works most of the time, but its almost the nature of the system that supply screwups will, not might, happen.

So true! I'm certain that the supply types would be making almost exactly your argument against a 105mm variant of the LAV-75. The maneuver generals will reply in two ways: a) the fighting in the Far East has shown that light forces need stiffening with airmobile armor and b) the supply people are never going to get behind anything that makes their job more difficult, regardless of what that means for the troops actually doing the fighting. The former probably would be true. The latter is cheap shot, although there's a grain of truth in there. The logistics specialists have been a driving force behind commonality of supply since WW2 for good reason. Nonetheless, the "fighting" generals will attempt to discredit the arguments of the supply types if the maneuver commanders become convinced that an FSV variant of the LAV-75 is needed. The real question will be whose voice gets heard.