Little Big Horn, A Study of a Cavalry Regiment in the Indian Wars

[dragoon500ly]

Cavalry Rations

For the enlisted men there was a prescribed daily ration of 12oz of pork or bacon(20oz of salt or fresh beef could be substituted); 22oz of bread (if the post had a bread oven) or 16 ounces of hard bread (often called hard crackers; this was a simple flour and water biscuit measuring 3 1/8" by 2 7/8" by 1/2") substituted when the trooper was on field rations. In addition, the commissary would issue, each day, the following rations for 100 men: 8lbs of ground coffee; 15lbs of beans or peas; 10lbs of rice or hominy; 30lbs of potatoes; 1qt of molasses; 15lbs of sugar; 3lbs 12oz of salt; 4oz of pepper; 1 gallon of vinegar. In addition, each company was required to raise a garden in order to provide fresh vegetables for its men, but in the harsh Plains climate, these gardens often failed.

In garrison, the troopers endured countless rounds of hash, stews and salt meat, with very little variation. In the field, their ration was salt pork or bacon, hard crackers and coffee, sometimes with wild game added to the mix.

Officers, received the same basic ration of salt meat and bread as the troopers, they also received a monthly allowance of foodstuffs: 2 cans of peaches; 1 can of oysters; 1/2 can of jam; 1/2 can of jelly; 4 cans of tomatoes; 2 cans of corn; 1 can of peas; 2 cans of milk; 3lbs of soda crackers; 2 1/2lbs of mackerel; 1 1/2 lbs of dried beef; 2lbs Coffee; 2 1/2lbs of sperm candles; 1/4lb of officer's soap; 1/4 gallon maple syrup; 1 1/2lbs of dried peaches and 2lbs of lard.

Both officers and enlisted could supplement thier rations by purchasing supplies from the post sutler. The sutler enjoyed the sole monopoly for selling goods to the soldiers and often charged exorbitant prices, for example, a sutler could purchase a can of oysters for 29 cents and then retail it for $1.00, fruits in cans were higher priced.

Troopers could purchase items at the sutler on a credit system, to be redeemed on the next pay day. If a trooper was approaching his discharge date and owed the sutler money, the sutler could prevent the discharge from being completed, until the trooper had paid his bill, in full.

[dragoon500ly]

The Allowance of Clothing for a Cavalryman

Since the cavalryman was enlisted for a term of 5 years, he was entitled to be issued a basic issue of clothing and then yearly issues of clothing until the end of his service. Here is what the Quartermaster pawned of on its helpless victims!

The issue is given in the following format: 1st/2nd/3rd/4th/5th/total

Cap, Complete: 2/1/2/1/1/7
Hat with trimmings: 1/1/1/1/1/5
Fatigue forage caps: 1/1/1/1/1/5
Plume: 1/0/1/0/0/2
Eagle and Ring: 1/0/1/0/0/2
Cover: 1/1/1/1/1/5
Coat: 2/1/2/1/2/8
Trousers: 3/2/3/2/3/13
Flannel Shirt: 3/3/3/3/3/15
Flannel Drawers: 3/2/2/2/2/11
Bootees, pair: 2/2/2/2/2/10
Boots: 1/1/1/1/1/5
Stockings, pair: 4/4/4/4/4/20
Greatcoat: 1/0/0/0/0/1
Stable Frock: 1/0/1/0/0/2
Blanket: 1/0/1/0/0/2

Bootees were made of heavy leather, rough-side out, contained no grommets in the lace holes and had heavy rawhide laces. It was a ankle-high, square toe shoe that was issued to all enlisted men, regardless of branch. Both hand-sewn and pegged bootees were in service and they were disliked due to the clumsy shape of the heel. The heel was both flat and awakened and not very high. When a soldier was issued a pair of booteees he would usually go to a shoemaker, spend 75 cents of his pay and have the heels replaced with a smaller, higher heel.

An infantryman could make a pair of bootees last about two weeks on a march. A soldier who were a pair for more than six weeks was exceptional. A infantryman was issued 4 pairs of bootees a year but usually wore out eight. It was not uncommon for men to wear out their issue, draw another two pairs of bootees and then find themselves charged $6.00 for overdrawing clothing.

A boot ended just under the bend of the knee and behind the leg, arching higher up in front so that the leather protected the knee cap. A boot would typically measure 15 1/2 inches in back and 19 1/2 inches in front. The boot had a 1 1/2-inch cuban-style heel with a heavy arched insole as well as square toes. The tops were made of calf skin while the lowers were made of heavier leather.

[Abbott Shaull]

Gee not much has change...lol...

[dragoon500ly]

Gee not much has change...lol...

LOL, Quartermasters never change.

Of intrest is comparing the qualification rounds fired between then and now (okay 1987!!)

90 rounds a year back then...and 125 rounds in 1987.

[dragoon500ly]

The Army Marches on its Stomach, Right

Compared to the Indians, a column of Regulars was a cumbersome and slow-moving thing. A typical Indian war party would consider a move of 40 miles to be, well, taking their time. The Indians would ride at a fast trot, switching from horse to horse so that their mounts didn't become fatigued.

While the cavalry was considered to the arm most likely to finally close with the Indians, having infantry included in the column was not considered to be a serious handicap; men could survive hardships better than horses and over long periods of time, the foot soldiers could outmarch the mounted solders at a respectable rate of 20 miles a day.

The largest handicap in bring large forces against the Indians was the sheer difficulty of keeping them adequately supplied. Traveling light and fast, was a strictly short-term measure, an officer once compared the usual expedition to a chained dog, "within the length of the chain irresistible, beyond it powerless. The chain was its wagon train and supplies."

Troop and supplies could be moved by railroads, where they existed. Steamers could move supplies up rivers to where the troops were, but only if the rivers and creeks were navigable. Normally, wagon trains or steamers, usually owned by civilians, stockpiled supplies. Wagons then shuttled between these depots and the field forces.

The supplies consumed were impressive. The daily ration for the soldier, weighed about 5lbs per man with its normal packing. Horses required 12lbs of grain daily. Reserve carbine ammunition weighed 105lbs per 1,000 round box. Terry's column alone required some eight tons of supplies each day. And although the Terry column only carried enough supplies to last until resupply by steamer, the supply train consisted of 1,604 horses and mules; even with the wagons rolling four abreast, it stretched out over a half mile.

While an infantry company needed one six-mule wagon to haul its supplies, each cavalry troop required three such wagons due to the forage needs since the cavalry mounts could not exist on grass, even when grass existed. Wagons were more fuel efficient than pack mules; a 6-mule wagon could carry a practical load of roughly a ton, the same 6 mules could carry only 1,200lbs when used as pack mules. Since a pack mule required 10lbs of grain for its own needs, it could eat all of its load in 20 days.

But Indians could go were the wagons could not and only be using pack mules could the Army have any hope of following them. Mule trains did not use the "Hollywood" mode of attaching the mule to the one in front, with a cursing trooper leading the whole string. A pack mule train consisted of 14 men assigned to every 50 mules, this included a pack master, his assistants, a blacksmith, and a cook. The mules were trained to graze within earshot of their bell horse, they simply followed the sound of the bell as they moved at a speed of about 5 miles an hour.

But this was a professional organized and experienced train. Terry later complained that since no such train had ever been organized in his department, the he was "necessarily dependent upon wagons." though he did take some 250 pack saddles along along with 95 pack mules, to be reinforced with mules from his wagons.

Once separated from the Terry Column, Custer's supply train number some 175 mules; including 12 per company; 12 carrying the reserve ammunition, 4 for the regimental headquarters staff, 2 for medical supplies, 2 to carry tools and camp gear and 11 for the use of the Indian Scouts, packers and civilians. So bad was the straggling of the mules, due to the speed of the march, that Custer finally detailed 1 NCO and 6 enlisted from every company to expedite their progress.

[dragoon500ly]

I posted earlier a copy of General Terry's famous written order to Colonel Custer on the day that the Seventh broke off from the column and started its march to the Little Big Horn. I was hoping for some debate on the order and if Custer had really disobeyed orders when he launched his attack.

In the years since 1876, the Terry order has been argued, since the Officer's Call on June 21, Custer was already well awareof how the campaign was to progress, this order was simply written to confirm this. right

Colonel William Pond (ret) conducted an analysis which is intresting on many points: "No matter what Custer does, Terry is protected. If Custer does everything that Terry thinks, and wins, Terry told him to, and the credit is his. If Custer does and is defeated, Terry told him to use his discretion and the blame is Custer's. On the other hand if Custer disregards what Terry thinks and wins, Terry gave him the discretion to do it, and credit is due Terry. If he loses, he disobeyed orders and again the blame is his alone."

Other historians regard the Terry order as so vague that Custer could not have disobeyed them, unless he disobeyed his own opinion as to his best course of action. Others argue that Custer's determination to strike the Indians on his own simply made him indifferent to his orders, especially since he had supposedly told a friend of his determination to "cut loose" from Terry and operate independently.

Another factor is the question of whether Terry verbally modify these orders prior on the morning of the 22nd. In 1896, General Nelson Miles cited an affidavit which had Terry, tell Custer: "Use your own judgement, and do what you think best if you strike the trail; and whatever you do, hold on to your wounded." Miles thought this "a most reasonable conversation." Others questioned the likelihood of such a conversation, citing Terry's caution against Custer abandoning the wounded as most unlikely. Miles later identified his eyewitness only as "Custer's servant." Libby Custer possessed a copy of the affidavit but never defended its authenticity. The affidavit was not published until 1953 were it was revealed that the affiant was Mary Adams, Custer's negro servant. Statements made by three surviving Seventh Cavalry officers, taken in 1924 stated that no servant had accompanied the Dakota Column and another witness had "Maria", Libby Custer's housemaid at Ft Lincoln. At this point, the affidavit was regardless as useless.

However, in 1983, historian John Manion produced evidence which establised the presence of Mary Adams with the column, but also explain "Maria" as Mary's sister, both women being employed as house servants by the Custers. But even this evidence does not confirm the affidavit's contents as to the real nature of Terry's verbal orders to Custer.

[dragoon500ly]

The Reno Court of Inquiry

Marcus A. Reno.

A lot of debate surrounds Custer's second-in-command and his (mis)conduct at the Battle of the Little Big Horn. His conduct after the battle also leads to questions about Reno's capability as an officer.

Reno graduated West Point in 1857, after taking six years to complete the five year program. He served as a brevet 2nd Lieutenant with the 1st Dragoons on the Washington and Oregon frontiers. He was promoted to 2nd Lieutenant in 1858, to 1st Lieutenant in April of 1861 and to Captain in November of 1862. He commanded a troop in the renamed 1st Cavalry in the 1862 Maryland campaign. He was injured in 1863 and served for a time on recruiting and staff duty and on the Army's Cavalry Bureau. He rejoined the Army of the Potomac in May 1864 and served as chief of staff of Sheridan's Cavalry Division, and later as colonel of the 12th Pennsylvania Cavalry and then as commander of a cavalry brigade. By the end of the Civil War, his brevets included colonel of Regulars and brigadier general of volunteers.

He was promoted to major in the Seventh in December of 1868. Following the Battle of the Little Big Horn, His behavior as the acting commander of the Seventh became so bizarrely officious and obnoxious that on July 24, 1876, he was placed under arrest after a dispute with Colonel Gibbon. General Terry apparently considered relieving Reno as well, noting in his journey that "Reno's self important rudeness makes him unbearable." Considering Reno's performance and the outcome of the battle, it seems like this would be an odd time for self-important airs.

Reno was courts-martialed in 1877 for "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentlemen," including taking "improper and insulting liberties with a fellow officer's wife." Reno was found guilty and President Hayes commuted his sentence of dismissal from the service to two years suspension without pay.

During this period of suspension, Reno came under increasing attack by Libby Custer and several newspapers for his conduct at LBH. This led to him requesting a Court of Inquiry to clear his name just two days before the statutes of limitations on any possible charges expired. Five months later, a relucant War Department finally ordered the court convened.

The CoI was held at Chicago's Palmer House Hotel and was unable to subpoena the man who might have provided the most damaging testimony. Captain Thomas Weir had died less than six months after the battle "terribly used up with liquor". But the court did hear most of the surviving officers as well as a few enlisted men and civilians.

The three man panel, chaired by Colonel Wesley Merritt, concluded after four weeks of testimony that "While subordinates in some circumstances did more for the safety of the command by brilliant displays of courage than did Major Reno, there was nothing in his conduct which requires animadversion from this Court." While it was not quite a verdict of "Not Proven", it was a decidely halfhearted "clearing" of Reno's name. Merritt was quoted as privately remarking; "Well, the officers wouldn't tell us anything, and we could do no more than damn Reno with faint praise."

Even Colonel Graham, relictant to believe that officers would deliberately perjure themselves, believed some had been "evasive" and all had been "more or less reluctant," answering only when specifally asked and volunteering no information. Yet the impression that the court was merely a white-wash was based not merely on the suspicions that the officers had closed ranks, but also on the reluctance of the Court to probe for the truth with questions. Furthermore, even the evidence actually heard could have justified a harsher verdict, given Reno's rout-like "charge" to the bluffs and his loss of command control during the Weir Point episode.

Certainly the Army, which never sought to try Reno on any charges related to the battle, had nothing to gain by reopening the wounds of LBH, especially since Reno, even if a court confirmed the worst suspicions of incompentence and cowardice, was due to rise to a colonelcy through seniority. There was also the honr of the Seventh to consider, as well as the reputations of its surviving officers. Captain Benteen, in spite of his lack of respect for Reno, later confessed that the court; "knew there was something kept back by me, but they didn't know how to dig it out by questioning, as I gave them no chance to do so."

One civilian witness, Fred Gerard, later claimed that the officers knew that anyone making himself obnoxious to the defense would incur the wraith of superiors.

Later in 1879, Reno was again courts-martialed for "conduct unbecoming," on charges including peeping through the window of his commanding officer's daughter and attempting to brain a lieutenant with a billiard cue. THis time President Hayes failed to interced and Reno was dismissed from the service. Still striving for reinstatement, he died of complications due to tongue cancer in 1889.

Reno won a posthumous victory of sorts in 1967 when the Army Board for Correction of Military Records met in response to an appeal from Reno's great-grand nephew. For no apparent reason, the board simply jettisioned the considered opinions of Reno's colleagues and President Hayes, termed his dismissial "unjust" and ordered his records "corrected" to indicate an honorable discharge. One historian would later term it "a very silly procedure." But it did entitle Reno to be reburied in a military cemetery and he was duly interred with the pomp and honors due a military officer....at Little Big Horn National Military Cemetery.

[Abbott Shaull]

LOL, Quartermasters never change.

Of intrest is comparing the qualification rounds fired between then and now (okay 1987!!)

90 rounds a year back then...and 125 rounds in 1987.

1988 and 1989 weren't much better...lol I believe fired more rounds during the 3 months of Basic/AIT than I did in who year usually.

[Abbott Shaull]

I posted earlier a copy of General Terry's famous written order to Colonel Custer on the day that the Seventh broke off from the column and started its march to the Little Big Horn. I was hoping for some debate on the order and if Custer had really disobeyed orders when he launched his attack.

In the years since 1876, the Terry order has been argued, since the Officer's Call on June 21, Custer was already well awareof how the campaign was to progress, this order was simply written to confirm this. right

Colonel William Pond (ret) conducted an analysis which is intresting on many points: "No matter what Custer does, Terry is protected. If Custer does everything that Terry thinks, and wins, Terry told him to, and the credit is his. If Custer does and is defeated, Terry told him to use his discretion and the blame is Custer's. On the other hand if Custer disregards what Terry thinks and wins, Terry gave him the discretion to do it, and credit is due Terry. If he loses, he disobeyed orders and again the blame is his alone."

Other historians regard the Terry order as so vague that Custer could not have disobeyed them, unless he disobeyed his own opinion as to his best course of action. Others argue that Custer's determination to strike the Indians on his own simply made him indifferent to his orders, especially since he had supposedly told a friend of his determination to "cut loose" from Terry and operate independently.

Another factor is the question of whether Terry verbally modify these orders prior on the morning of the 22nd. In 1896, General Nelson Miles cited an affidavit which had Terry, tell Custer: "Use your own judgement, and do what you think best if you strike the trail; and whatever you do, hold on to your wounded." Miles thought this "a most reasonable conversation." Others questioned the likelihood of such a conversation, citing Terry's caution against Custer abandoning the wounded as most unlikely. Miles later identified his eyewitness only as "Custer's servant." Libby Custer possessed a copy of the affidavit but never defended its authenticity. The affidavit was not published until 1953 were it was revealed that the affiant was Mary Adams, Custer's negro servant. Statements made by three surviving Seventh Cavalry officers, taken in 1924 stated that no servant had accompanied the Dakota Column and another witness had "Maria", Libby Custer's housemaid at Ft Lincoln. At this point, the affidavit was regardless as useless.

However, in 1983, historian John Manion produced evidence which establised the presence of Mary Adams with the column, but also explain "Maria" as Mary's sister, both women being employed as house servants by the Custers. But even this evidence does not confirm the affidavit's contents as to the real nature of Terry's verbal orders to Custer.

The orders as written show clearly that General Terry was covering all bases, another thing that hasn't change much since their time. The orders appear to direct Custer to follow one course of action while in the next breath he gets told to use his best judgement. In either direction if Custer luck held out, it would be Terry taking the credit. If it failed Custer was the only to blame.

As you have state, you have drawn same conclusion from the orders and I think many of us drew from the same conclusion.

I am concern that General Terry would go through the express effort to write out the last part for Custer to use his best Judgement. That part is usually the unspoken part of one written orders. We have to remember back in time period they didn't have the ability to call back to HQs and ask for permission. It where it was better to do something first and then ask for forgiveness, than do nothing and fail attitude came from.

The only time I know of orders being written in such way, were back in the Civil War. Where many of the top players during this time had fought. The purpose was to give the subordinate freedom to act as they felt they should since they were Johny on the spot. With the clear intention of any failures would rest with the subordinate and keep the commander clear of the matter coming through the fan of fallout.

Of course hearing the conversation where General Terry may have verbally modify the orders does on one hand surprise me. First off during the Civil War, the only time verbals orders were issued at this level were in time of distress. In many cases, when said orders were later disputed due to the fact they were rarely recorded, and infrequently were passed along by some aid. While at others the Chief of Staff were known to issue verbal orders in the name of their Commander too. Again when disputed there was general no record. In almost every case where things went badly, especially for the Union side the commanding officer would find themselves relief of duty.

Especially in the East during the Civil War there were times when due to verbal orders a senior Commander had been removed from command to be replace by the same people who units had failed, but due to lack of documentation that they failed in executing their supposed orders were allow to raise to Corps and Army Commanders. In fact even Major General Meade, Major General Sherman, and Lt. General Grant all been accused of various forms of misconduct before and during their various command stints.

Now back to George A. Custer, one of the things that many Regular Army Officers would keep noting during his military career was that Custer was only Regular Army Captain and was Brevet to Major General during the Civil War. Most of the jumps of rank from Captain to that Major General was due to fact that he served as aid to Major General McCleallan and then after he removed from command of the army he came to the attention of Major General Pheasonton who happen to command a Division of Cavalry. It was Pheasonton who promoted Custer from Captain of Regular Army to Brigadier General of Volunteers and assigned him to command a Brigade before the Battle of Gettysburg. From this point on Custer star would raise.

Then fast forward to the end of the war. Custer was still listed as Captain in the Regular Army, but again jumped to Lt. Colonel due to his successes he had during the Civil War and 2nd in command of the 7th Cavalry Regiment. A unit for most part until his death he held, most of the time as 'acting' Commander, but due the actual commander of the Regiment being sent of to fill some other duty.

The facts are that many Officers in the US Army didn't care for one Lt. Colonel George A. Custer. Many felt he hadn't proven himself, and felt he was under qualified for his position in his command. General Terry was one of those officers who felt this way, hence is why he issued the orders in this way. It was common practice for senior Officers who felt they had limit control over subordinates or wanted to find a reason to relieve someone.

Then again if IIRC, some of the orders from even the War Department and directly from President Lincoln were similarly worded. Again this is due to the direct fact of life at the time. The Officer who was conducting the operation was to Johny on the spot and was to act as they felt was required, and yes they would be second guess later if they failed. This was general unwritten rule for any written orders, the only times it seems to be include when the Commander who issued the order felt it important enough to express, said unwritten part to remind the subordinate that they could use their better judgement because they were trusted when the subordinate had shown they wouldn't always use the initiative. Or as the case seem here invite the subordinate to use their initiative in hopes they second guess themselves long enough to give the commander to catch up and claim any victory to their credit, while leaving failures to be the subordinate fault solely.

[dragoon500ly]

And that is the problem with the orders. Have to agree that Custer was possibly one of the most hated regimental commanders in the army....and then you have how Benteen felt about Custer!

As long as Custer came up with the vistories, he was the darling, but when he was defeated.......

[Abbott Shaull]

Yes that is how it always is. If Commander can win he is well liked, when they lose they are out in the dog house. Officers in the Civil War were made by having lucky days, and the days they were so lucky, well they were soon out of job. It was mentality that stayed with the regular Army for a long time...

It was Custer was liked by Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and others who were still in high places that help keep Custer in command of the 7th Cavalry and reason why the Colonel who was the actual Commander in postings in Washington to keep him out of Custer hair. I am guessing that he wasn't a Custer fan either. *shrug*

[Abbott Shaull]

Like I said he was court martial for being AWOL and suspended but somehow retained the rank of Lt Col and 'acting' Commander/field commander depending on what accounts you read. General Sheridan seems to be the driving force behind this and the fact that the actual Colonel of the Regiment was detailed elsewhere.

General Grant was known to wear a uniform that were the same issued to Private. While Custer fell in the group that highly modify their uniform to their taste. All other Colonels and General of all ranks fell somewhere between the two.

[Legbreaker]

...the group that highly modify their uniform to their taste.

So much for uniforms actually being, well, uniform....

[dragoon500ly]

Like I said he was court martial for being AWOL and suspended but somehow retained the rank of Lt Col and 'acting' Commander/field commander depending on what accounts you read. General Sheridan seems to be the driving force behind this and the fact that the actual Colonel of the Regiment was detailed elsewhere.

General Grant was known to wear a uniform that were the same issued to Private. While Custer fell in the group that highly modify their uniform to their taste. All other Colonels and General of all ranks fell somewhere between the two.

Too be brutally honest, even Custer admited that his Civil War tastes in uniform were "above and beyond"....but as Custer proved on day 3 of Gettysburg, he was highly visible to his troops, and since he led at least three charges against Stuart's cavalry and was seen by one of his Michigan troopers "running his saber into the belly of a Rebel cavalryman, as you can imagine, the men fight well for such a general!"

Call it what him what you want, Custer may have been a vain, glory-hungry, undiscplined jackass...but when the time came to fight, he did better than most of his peers.

[Abbott Shaull]

Yes and it is reason why Cavalry Colonels and Generals would have the most outlandish uniforms. So when they were in the mist of the fight, their troopers who happen to be watching would notice and fight harder or so the theory goes...