OT: Putin's War in Ukraine

[castlebravo92]

Like a 90's battle group...

We'd clean the Ruzzian's clock if NATO was unleashed on them with current equipment, professional troops, and unconstrained logistics.

I think a National Guard division like the 36th probably could have defeated the Russian invasion by itself. Much less an active duty division, much less a full corps with air supremacy.

Ironically, I really think the outcome of this conflict is going to be the emergence of Poland as the dominant military land power in Europe. Their buying spree is impressive, and they are going for pretty much top of the line gear. They'll have an armored force about 6-8x the size of Germany's.

[Heffe]

I think a National Guard division like the 36th probably could have defeated the Russian invasion by itself. Much less an active duty division, much less a full corps with air supremacy.

Ironically, I really think the outcome of this conflict is going to be the emergency of Poland as the dominant military land power in Europe. Their buying spree is impressive, and they are going for pretty much top of the line gear. They'll have an armored force about 6-8x the size of Germany's.

And given Poland's history, who could blame them

Since we're all commanding from our armchairs, I'll go out on a limb here. The result of this war has already been decided, and Putin has lost. I just don't see a path forward for Russia where it becomes able to achieve it's operational/strategic goals, not with the losses they've already suffered.

Russia's best bet is to effectively force Ukraine to concede the land already occupied, but short of a major catastrophe, I don't see Ukraine agreeing to concessions anytime soon. As far as cards to play, Russia could and will resort to additional mobilizations, but without the supporting training, equipment, and leadership, those men are just being fed into a meat grinder. All accounts of Bakhmut are showing Russians using human wave attacks. That isn't a recipe for gaining operational momentum.

The west seems ready to keep supporting Ukraine with equipment for the long haul, and Russia's munitions are shrinking drastically. Reports are showing that they've already reached, and potentially surpassed, critical levels of long range missiles. Their armor forces seem to be gutted, with likely somewhere around 1800-2000 tank losses so far. Much the same with artillery systems. The aircraft situation seems nominally better, but Russia appears averse to flying sorties over Ukrainian airspace, probably doubly so now that Patriots are in theater. And Russia's ability to produce anything advanced has been cut off at the knees due to heavy sanctions and lack of microchips.

Anything can happen of course, but short of walking away with some of the already occupied territory (of god forbid, using nukes), I just can't see Putin achieving any kind of real victory in Ukraine.

[Raellus]

Attrition v. Demographics

Broadly, I agree with your assessment, Heffe. I do, however, think it really depends on how long Putin is willing to fight this war. Russia has a significantly larger pool of fighting age men. Even if the Ukrainians produce 3 casualties for every 1 sustained, they'll run out of soldiers first. Can Russian gov't, econ., and society hold out long enough for that to happen Probably not, but the possibility can't be discounted.

This piece does a pretty good job of analyzing demographic trends in relation to the war.

https://ifstudies.org/blog/the-demography-of-war-ukraine-vs-russia

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[Heffe]

Broadly, I agree with your assessment, Heffe. I do, however, think it really depends on how long Putin is willing to fight this war. Russia has a significantly larger pool of fighting age men. Even if the Ukrainians produce 3 casualties for every 1 sustained, they'll run out of soldiers first. Can Russian gov't, econ., and society hold out long enough for that to happen Probably not, but the possibility can't be discounted.

This piece does a pretty good job of analyzing demographic trends in relation to the war.

https://ifstudies.org/blog/the-demography-of-war-ukraine-vs-russia

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That's very fair, but at some point the lack of equipment will result in casualties far in excess of 3:1. You can't just have men with rifles running in against combined forces in well entrenched positions forever.

I kind of suspect the reason why Leopards and Challies are currently on offer is because Ukraine knows that in order for their own forces to go on the offense, they need better armor support, and have communicated that to friendly western nations. If Russia sustains another major defeat or two, Putin risks losing the support of the mil-bloggers, and then that of the people. We'll have to see how that all plays out.

[Raellus]

That's very fair, but at some point the lack of equipment will result in casualties far in excess of 3:1. You can't just have men with rifles running in against combined forces in well entrenched positions forever.

Agreed. Your example cuts both ways, though, when it comes to offensive operations. The Russians have just captured Soledar after weeks of heavy fighting. Can the Ukrainians afford to sustain a 3:1 casualty ratio to retake it

And Ukraine is running out of ammunition too, in particular for its artillery. Although local production has recently ramped up, it can't keep up with demand. Recent reports are that artillery fires have diminished from both sides. NATO is having a difficult time providing enough fresh shells and rockets to keep up with Ukrainian expenditures. They've been outsourcing resupply to "unaligned" countries (like Pakistan), but that supply is going to dry up soon as well.

I kind of suspect the reason why Leopards and Challies are currently on offer is because Ukraine knows that in order for their own forces to go on the offense, they need better armor support, and have communicated that to friendly western nations. If Russia sustains another major defeat or two, Putin risks losing the support of the mil-bloggers, and then that of the people. We'll have to see how that all plays out.

I hope that turns out to be the case. The UAF is probably going to have to repel a large-scale Russian offensive in the spring before it can go over to the offensive again. That's what Ukrainian intel is saying, at least. There's growing concern that said offensive will include another lunge at Kiev out of Belarus. There're also rumblings that the Belarussian military might be taking part in same. If that were to happen, the strategic calculus of Ukraine and NATO is going to have to change.

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[kato13]

The UAF is probably going to have to repel a large-scale Russian offensive in the spring before it can go over to the offensive again.
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Human wave attacks vs US designed cluster bomb artillery shells from Turkey. This is going to be bloody.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/10/turkey-cold-war-cluster-bombs-ukraine/

I remember ICM-DP rounds being worth their weight in gold in T2k, weird how it seems to be that way again.

[Heffe]

Agreed. Your example cuts both ways, though, when it comes to offensive operations. The Russians have just captured Soledar after weeks of heavy fighting. Can the Ukrainians afford to sustain a 3:1 casualty ratio to retake it

And Ukraine is running out of ammunition too, in particular for its artillery. Although local production has recently ramped up, it can't keep up with demand. Recent reports are that artillery fires have diminished from both sides. NATO is having a difficult time providing enough fresh shells and rockets to keep up with Ukrainian expenditures. They've been outsourcing resupply to "unaligned" countries (like Pakistan), but that supply is going to dry up soon as well.
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All good points. Regarding Soledar, my understanding is that Wagner is essentially throwing bodies at the town in the interest of proving that Wagner is superior than the MOD. With vehicle kill counts on the Russian side being somewhat stagnant, that means Russian infantry losses have been absolutely atrocious. To your point though, maybe they really can absorb such tremendous losses. At least for now.

I hope that turns out to be the case. The UAF is probably going to have to repel a large-scale Russian offensive in the spring before it can go over to the offensive again. That's what Ukrainian intel is saying, at least. There's growing concern that said offensive will include another lunge at Kiev out of Belarus. There're also rumblings that the Belarussian military might be taking part in same. If that were to happen, the strategic calculus of Ukraine and NATO is going to have to change.
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Belarus is a really interesting scenario. You have to know Luka is looking at NATO's military build up on his border, and he doesn't have the nukes to scare NATO off, despite his closeness to Russia. NATO's calculus is going to be "Can we take out Belarus without triggering Russia's nukes" It'll be a really dangerous game if Belarus ends up sending troops across the border. The Belarussian people as well, from what I understand, aren't quite as interested in the war as Russia's, and they're arguably more eager to see Luka be ousted.

[Raellus]

All good points. Regarding Soledar, my understanding is that Wagner is essentially throwing bodies at the town in the interest of proving that Wagner is superior than the MOD. With vehicle kill counts on the Russian side being somewhat stagnant, that means Russian infantry losses have been absolutely atrocious. To your point though, maybe they really can absorb such tremendous losses. At least for now.

It's almost certain that Russia sustained heavier losses during the battle, possibly much heavier. Against dug-in positions, especially in MOUT, the defender usually has the advantage and the attacker usually sustains more casualties. I'm worried that Russia can sustain heavier casualty rates longer than Ukraine can. I just hope Russian willpower runs out before their manpower, armor, and ammo do.

Wagner had always been build as an elite PMC. Apparently, now they are employing large numbers of ex-Cons, many recently released specifically for the war.

Belarus is a really interesting scenario. You have to know Luka is looking at NATO's military build up on his border, and he doesn't have the nukes to scare NATO off, despite his closeness to Russia. NATO's calculus is going to be "Can we take out Belarus without triggering Russia's nukes" It'll be a really dangerous game if Belarus ends up sending troops across the border. The Belarussian people as well, from what I understand, aren't quite as interested in the war as Russia's, and they're arguably more eager to see Luka be ousted.

Luka doesn't need nukes. Belarus is under the Russian nuclear umbrella. I may be overstating this a bit, but Luka is essentially a Russian puppet. If Putin orders him to jump, I don't see him saying no. In fact, I'm kind of surprised Belarus hasn't joined the invasion. Surely, Ukraine's "gay nazi demons" are a threat to Belarus as well.

Early in the war, Luka went on record as saying that Belarus would not participate, despite allowing Russian land and air forces basing and transit rights. Then there was the infamous "map slip", so maybe there was a plan to do so at some point.

In early summer, reports emerged indicating that Belarus was surreptitiously giving some of its T-72 tanks to Russia, to make up for heavy Russian losses.

Since at least autumn, Russia has been shifting forces to Belarus, despite simultaneously losing ground in Ukraine. Russia claimed it was just to conduct joint maneuvers with the Belarussians. AFAIK, those RF forces are still there, and reports indicating they're continuing to be reinforced. Some analysts believe this is to pressure Ukraine to maintain significant forces in the Kiev area, to defend the capital from potential second lunge at Kiev. I'm not so sure.

Do you think NATO will strike at Belarus if it joins the invasion of Ukraine I don't.

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[Targan]

Do you think NATO will strike at Belarus if it joins the invasion of Ukraine I don't.

I don't think it will either, but it's possible. NATO won't attack Russian forces on Ukraine's behalf, but technically Belarus isn't Russia . So if NATO did give Belarus a slap, it would send a powerful message without instantly starting WWIII.

[kato13]

RETRACTED***RETRACTED***RETRACTED***RETRACTED***RE TRACTED***

UK to send Apaches to Ukraine

https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-news/britain-apache-helicopters-ukraine-war-28957065

RETRACTED***RETRACTED***RETRACTED***RETRACTED***RE TRACTED***

EDIT *** https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/st...76434382528513

I have always thought NATO looked at the situation as the frog (Russia) in the stove pot (Ukraine), where they raised the temp slowly enough the frog never realized it was being boiled alive. Now they seem to be cranking the heat a bit (albeit with small numbers of tech).

EDIT *** I thought this was a RADICAL increase in quality of equipment. So back to the slow raising of the temperature in the pot.


This is going to be an incredible experiment in cross NATO platform C3I.

[LoneCollector1987]

I just found an article in the german newspaper WELT (unfortunately behind a paywall) where Wolfgang Ischinger says that Ukraine fires aso much ammunition in one day as Germany produces in 6 months.

Ischinger served as chairman of the Munich Security Conference from 2008 to 2022.

I think that following McKinsey (switching everything to just-in-time production), outsourcing nearly everything to the Far East and reducing stockpiles to nearly nothing was the wrong way to go.

Every country should have the production capability to produce at least 50% of its military needs (vehicles, ammunition, etc) on its own. And the stockpiles must be big.
I remember reading that in WWI the armies used up nearly all the ammo in a short time because nobody could imagine that artillery barrages would consume soo much ammo.

[Ewan]

I remember reading that in WWI the armies used up nearly all the ammo in a short time because nobody could imagine that artillery barrages would consume soo much ammo.

Years ago reading a book about WW1 logistics the British had to decide a year in advance what kind of war they were going for the following year (offensive or defensive) to get enough shells manufactured and stockpiled in time for the campaigns.

[kcdusk]

The latest warzone articles discuss Ukraine being supplied with Stryker, Marder, Challenger and potentially Leopod tanks. And questions how the associated countries will be able to keep up this level of spending.

If Nato/USA is struggling to keep up supply and spending, how will Russia ever be able to And, they are potentially loosing more equipment than Nato.

[Raellus]

The latest warzone articles discuss Ukraine being supplied with Stryker, Marder, Challenger and potentially Leopod tanks. And questions how the associated countries will be able to keep up this level of spending.

If Nato/USA is struggling to keep up supply and spending, how will Russia ever be able to And, they are potentially loosing more equipment than Nato.

A lot of the systems you mentioned are at or nearing the end of their service lives and were scheduled to be phased out of service over the next couple of years anyways. In effect donating them to Ukraine just gets them off the books a few years sooner. It's kind of like a kid starting to outgrow some old clothes and, before that happens, handing them down to a younger sibling (or giving them to a needy neighbor). That says, the donating countries are getting nothing for them (whereas they could sell these systems on the secondary market to recoup a portion of the loss).

NATO defense spending has gone up since the Russian invasion of Ukraine (it was already trending that way before said). Giving Ukraine mountains of military aid in the form of weapons systems and ammo gives NATO militaries a nice excuse to ask for bigger budgets and shiny new toys.

Transactionally, I'm less concerned for NATO than I am for Ukraine. Maintaining such a motley assortment of older, but new-to-them, vehicles and weapons systems is going to be extremely challenging, especially under wartime conditions. And, despite major similarities between analogous systems (say, for example, a Chally and a Leo), each system requires an adequate training cycle in order to be employed effectively.

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[Ursus Maior]

Ironically, I really think the outcome of this conflict is going to be the emergence of Poland as the dominant military land power in Europe. Their buying spree is impressive, and they are going for pretty much top of the line gear. They'll have an armored force about 6-8x the size of Germany's.

Their problem is that they don't have the people for such a force. And while they said they'd be increasing defense spending to 3 % of their GDP, that money needs to be found within their total budget. That's not an easy feat. Plus, their army would need a hell of a lot more maintenance, supply and infantry units just to support all those new tanks and have battle line in front of all those HIMARS artillery units.

This is going to be an interesting time for Poland, indeed. If they don't find the money, their reform and resizing implodes. If they find the money, a lot of other stuff won't get funded and even more deficit will be built up.