OT: Putin's War in Ukraine

[Vespers War]

Between regular military units and the Territorial Defense Forces, Ukraine is pretty rapidly approaching a million uniformed personnel. That's at least in the ballpark of what Russia can mobilize without a formal declaration of war, and might well exceed what Russia can actually deploy to Ukraine, even if neither can completely ignore their other neighbors. The TDFs are light motorized infantry, which aren't really suited for offensive operations without significant regular army support, but they can hold territory to free up other units for offensives.

They did have a far smaller military at the start of the war, but they also had a lot of veterans with recent experience because of their policy of rotating units in and out of the Donbas. There were reports that recruiters were being bribed to take people into units that had already met their recruiting quotas, the opposite of Russia where large numbers of conscription-aged men are fleeing the country to avoid service.

Russia does have a vast number of untapped reservists, but given how they've been scraping the bottom of the barrel to re-equip from recent losses and how they've re-formed training units into front-line forces to replace manpower losses, how they would train and equip those reservists would be a mystery even if they had the political will to declare war to make them eligible for call-up. Last week Ukraine captured a T-62 Obr.1967, which is pretty much as old as the name suggests (the Obr.1972 was the next model). No fittings for ERA (1983), no active protection system (1983), too old to have a laser rangefinder (1975) or even a pintle-mounted gun for air defense (1972). By this point I half-expect the next set of replacements to show up with Berdan rifles and tachankas with Maxims because they've already issued everything newer that wasn't looted for parts to sell on the black market.

Russia's still dangerous, to be sure, but their infantry and armor are showing severe shortfalls in capability, with the dangers coming from artillery (both tube and rocket/missile) and air support (both drone and crewed). If those can be suppressed through anti-air and counterbattery provisioning, I think it will largely mitigate Russia's advantages and allow Ukraine to exploit their advantages in having forces with better training and better morale.

[Targan]

One, maybe two stray missiles landing in Poland... not good. If it turns out they were fired by Russia, it'll be largely irrelevant that they were off-target. If they were Ukrainian ADA munitions, much of the world will still make the point that Ukraine wouldn't need to fire anti-missile missiles if they weren't being attacked by Russia.

Hello, Article 4. With Article 5 waiting quietly nearby.

[Heffe]

Even beside the recent news that the missiles were likely Ukrainian in origin (which I'm only half convinced is true in any case), I don't think NATO has any interest in escalation over what was, in all likelihood, an accident.

I saw an interesting analysis last night that the GPS coordinates of the explosion in Poland, when reversed, would target a train junction near Lviv, which could also be a potential explanation for what took place. If it happens again on the other hand, well let's just hope it doesn't happen again.

[Raellus]

Which way does the wind blow

I wonder what this [errant] strike on Polish soil- regardless of who launched the offending missiles- will do to Poland's resolve to continue its support of Ukraine. It could go either way. This incident could either strengthen Poland's resolve (now we're really in this together!) or it could weaken it (why continue to support a combatant next door if it's leading to collateral damage here at home). The Polish government is putting on a brave face, ATM. In a democracy, however, popular sentiment usually prevails in the end.

Does anyone have a sense of popular opinion in Poland re the war

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[Targan]

Does anyone have a sense of popular opinion in Poland re the war

I know nothing about what the people of Poland currently think of the war next door, but I do know that Poles in general remain DEEPLY p*ssed off regarding their treatment by the Soviet Union since 1939. And successive Polish governments in recent times seem to take military readiness pretty seriously.

[ToughOmbres]

Between regular military units and the Territorial Defense Forces, Ukraine is pretty rapidly approaching a million uniformed personnel. That's at least in the ballpark of what Russia can mobilize without a formal declaration of war, and might well exceed what Russia can actually deploy to Ukraine, even if neither can completely ignore their other neighbors. The TDFs are light motorized infantry, which aren't really suited for offensive operations without significant regular army support, but they can hold territory to free up other units for offensives.

They did have a far smaller military at the start of the war, but they also had a lot of veterans with recent experience because of their policy of rotating units in and out of the Donbas. There were reports that recruiters were being bribed to take people into units that had already met their recruiting quotas, the opposite of Russia where large numbers of conscription-aged men are fleeing the country to avoid service.

Russia does have a vast number of untapped reservists, but given how they've been scraping the bottom of the barrel to re-equip from recent losses and how they've re-formed training units into front-line forces to replace manpower losses, how they would train and equip those reservists would be a mystery even if they had the political will to declare war to make them eligible for call-up. Last week Ukraine captured a T-62 Obr.1967, which is pretty much as old as the name suggests (the Obr.1972 was the next model). No fittings for ERA (1983), no active protection system (1983), too old to have a laser rangefinder (1975) or even a pintle-mounted gun for air defense (1972). By this point I half-expect the next set of replacements to show up with Berdan rifles and tachankas with Maxims because they've already issued everything newer that wasn't looted for parts to sell on the black market.

Russia's still dangerous, to be sure, but their infantry and armor are showing severe shortfalls in capability, with the dangers coming from artillery (both tube and rocket/missile) and air support (both drone and crewed). If those can be suppressed through anti-air and counterbattery provisioning, I think it will largely mitigate Russia's advantages and allow Ukraine to exploit their advantages in having forces with better training and better morale.

It looks like the UK is sending more air defense aid to Ukraine in addition to another US military aid package. While neither side can control the air the additional assets make it more risky for Ivan to fly anything other than cruise missiles over Ukraine.

[bash]

It looks like the UK is sending more air defense aid to Ukraine in addition to another US military aid package. While neither side can control the air the additional assets make it more risky for Ivan to fly anything other than cruise missiles over Ukraine.

And hopefully neuter Russia's cruise missiles at the same time. Ukraine will be much better off if Russia can't keep terrorizing civilians with cruise missiles.

[Vespers War]

I'm curious what the 100+ anti-aircraft guns will end up being, since I think the last new piece of AAA adopted by the British Army was the QF 5.25-inch Mark II in 1942. There were a few prototypes of systems after that, but they introduced missiles for land-based air defense in the late 1950s and never looked back.

[ToughOmbres]

AAA

I can't imagine what AAA would be either unless the UK is purchasing guns from a third party to ship to Ukraine-a run of Swiss or Swedish Oerlikons Surely nothing captured from Argentina would still be held.

Wonder if quantities of Blowpipe missiles are still in inventory that could be reconditioned and fitted with new batteries The Blowpipe had a questionable reputation in Afghanistan but seemed perfectly good elsewhere.

[kato13]

I'm curious what the 100+ anti-aircraft guns will end up being

Ma Deuce (L111A1 in UK)

If that particular term "anti-aircraft" was used by anyone in politics or media rather than the military, I could see it.

[Rainbow Six]

I wonder what this [errant] strike on Polish soil- regardless of who launched the offending missiles- will do to Poland's resolve to continue its support of Ukraine. It could go either way. This incident could either strengthen Poland's resolve (now we're really in this together!) or it could weaken it (why continue to support a combatant next door if it's leading to collateral damage here at home). The Polish government is putting on a brave face, ATM. In a democracy, however, popular sentiment usually prevails in the end.

Does anyone have a sense of popular opinion in Poland re the war

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This may be of interest to you

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/19/eastern-poland-putin-war-russian-aggression-poles-ukrainians-history

[Raellus]

Trickle of Tanks

Thanks for that piece, Rainbow. That's reassuring. I was worried that Poland's far right would be sympathetic to Putin's brand of populist authoritarianism.

As I watched yet another video clip of UAF ATGM teams engaging in a game of Russian tank turret toss, it struck me that I've only seen one or two videos- and those from early in the war- of more than a couple of Russian tanks operating together- it's almost always singletons or pairs. Also, in said clips (I've watched at least 100 by now, I'm sure), Russian armor is never supported by dismounted infantry.

Both are big tactical errors, and are assuredly big contributors to Russian AFV losses. I keep wondering why the Russians continue to deploy their armor piecemeal. Perhaps all those [Cold War] years of imagining masses of Soviet tanks and IFVs swarming across the fields of the Fulda Gap have conditioned me resulting in cognitive dissonance.

By the same token, in the terminal phases of the Twilight War, armor would nearly always be tactically deployed in very small numbers, so that's helpful.

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[bash]

Thanks for that piece, Rainbow. That's reassuring. I was worried that Poland's far right would be sympathetic to Putin's brand of populist authoritarianism.

As I watched yet another video clip of UAF ATGM teams engaging in a game of Russian tank turret toss, it struck me that I've only seen one or two videos- and those from early in the war- of more than a couple of Russian tanks operating together- it's almost always singletons or pairs. Also, in said clips (I've watched at least 100 by now, I'm sure), Russian armor is never supported by dismounted infantry.

Both are big tactical errors, and are assuredly big contributors to Russian AFV losses. I keep wondering why the Russians continue to deploy their armor piecemeal. Perhaps all those [Cold War] years of imagining masses of Soviet tanks and IFVs swarming across the fields of the Fulda Gap have conditioned me resulting in cognitive dissonance.

By the same token, in the terminal phases of the Twilight War, armor would nearly always be tactically deployed in very small numbers, so that's helpful.

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As I understand it Russian BTGs are very light on actual infantry, some 200 per BTG. If we assume they've got an offensive frontage a few km wide the density of infantry is super low even at full strength.

It seems to me (I'm no expert) that even modest combat losses to a BTG's infantry means they don't have enough men to cover their frontage and spare some to maneuver with the tanks. So tanks might have dismounted infantry in a well coordinated push but most of the time the tanks end up by themselves.

My understanding could of course be way off.

[Vespers War]

Jack Watling of RUTI isn't sure it's even worthwhile to discuss BTGs any more, that Russia's level of effective unit coordination has devolved down to the company level. If that's accurate, then in addition to the general infantry shortages, there's going to be relatively little sharing of assets of different types, since AFAIK Russia still generally has the old Soviet 3:1 ratio where armor units have 3 of an armored unit size to 1 infantry unit of the same size, and infantry is vice versa.

Assuming they can still do their usual split of the smaller unit, that means a company of tanks might be assigned a platoon of infantry or a company of infantry might get a platoon of tanks, but those platoons still report up to their company leader, not the company leader they're being loaned to. Russia's very hierarchical command structure and lack of promoting initiative among junior officers makes coordination slower and more difficult.

And there are likely still infantry shortages in general, since the small(ish) professional core of the Russian military tends to emphasize more technical roles, and there are probably still motorized rifle platoons where you've got 3 BMPs and only enough men to have 4-5 dismounts when accounting for the fact that the infantry platoon provides the IFV crews. So you might end up with a tank company of 10 tanks having their loaned platoon of infantry being 3 BMPs with their crews and a half dozen guys who actually fight on foot.

[Raellus]

Going Solo

sThanks. That helps explain the lack of infantry support.

I'm still baffled why Russian armor so often operates in such small groups. This video, assuming it's real, is a perfect example of what I'm talking about.

https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1594383471874637826cxt=HHwWhIC8zb_UsaAsAAAA

That Russian tank is completely on its own. What was it's crew, and unit commander, thinking

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